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KM333
Gift of The People of t!:o UniLod States
Through the Vir.tr.: S-.ck Campaign •
(A.L.A. — A. h.C — U.S.O.) :
To the Armed -o:r^ p.r'd tfc: chant Marine
i
*
Gift of The People of t!.o UnKad States
Through the Vict'.: • S-.ck Campaign •
(A. L A. — A. h. o.-~U. S. 0.) ;
To the Arm:d -o:t->s ar'd tfc: chant Marine
Story of The Great War
History of the European
War from Official Sources
COMPLETE HISTORICAL RECORDS OF EVENTS TO DATE.
ILLUSTRATED WITH DRAWINGS, MAPS, and PHOTOGRAPHS
'Prefaced by
WHAT THE WAR MEANS TO AMERICA
MAJOR GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, U. S. A.
NAVAL LESSONS OF THE WAR
REAR ADMIRAL AUSTIN M. KNIGHT, U. S. N.
THE WORLDS WAR
FREDERICK PALMER
THEATRES OF THE WAR'S CAMPAIGNS
FRANK H. SIMONDS
THE WAR CORRESPONDENT
ARTHUR RUHL
Cdited by
FRANCIS J. REYNOLDS ALLEN L. CHURCHILL
Former Reference Librarian of Congress Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia
FRANCIS TREVELYAN MILLER
Editor in Chief, Photographic History of the Civil War
O L L I E R
NEW YORK
&
SON
O Si
s ^ S
The
STORY OF THE
GREAT WAR
CHAMPAGNE • ARTOIS • GRODNO
FALL OF NISH • CAUCASUS
MESOPOTAMIA • DEVELOPMENT
OF AIR STRATEGY • UNITED
STATES AND THE WAR
>ft A
1
VOLUME IV
P • F • COLLIER W SON • NEW YORK
KT3333
AurvardN
university
Vlibrar /
Copyright 1916
By P. F. Collie* ft Son
CONTENTS
PART I.— WAR IN SYRIA AND EGYPT
<'.I'TEB PAGK
1. Renewed Turkish Attempts 9
PART II.— WAR IN THE AIR
II. Raids of the Airmen 16
III. Zeppelins Attack London— Battles in the Air ... 29
IV. Venice Attacked— Other Raids 34
PART III.— THE WESTERN FRONT
V. Summary of First Year's Operations 89
VI. Fighting in Artois and the Vosges . 46
VII. Political Crisis in France— Aeroplane Warfare — Fierce
Combats in the Vosges — Preparations for Allied
Offense 52
VIII. The Great Champagne Offensive 61
IX. The British Front in Artois 81
X. The Battle of Loos 90
XI. The Cavell Case— Accident to King George 98
XII. Operations in Champagne and Artois— Preparations for
Winter Campaign 104
XIII. Events in the 'Winter Campaign 117
XIV. The Battle of Verdun — The German Attack .... 131
PART IV.— THE WAR AT SEA
XV. Naval Situation at the Beginning of the Second Year-
Submarine Exploits 143
XVI. The Sinking of the Arabic — British Submarine Successes 150
XVII. Cruise of the Moewe— Loss of British Battleships . . 159
XVIII. Continuation of War on Merchant Shipping — Italian
and Russian Naval Movements — Sinking of La
Provence 165
1
CONTENTS
PART V.— THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT
CKAPTBB PA0B
XIX. Summary of First Year's Operations 174
XX. The Fall of the Niemen and Nareff Fortresses . . 178
XXI. The Conquest of Grodno and Vilna 185
XXII. The Capture of Brest-Litovsk 198
XXIII. The Struggle in East Galicia and Volhynia and the
Capture of Pinsk 200
XXIV. In the Pripet Marshes 209
XXV. Fighting on the Dvina and in the Dvina- Vilna Sector 212
XXVI. Winter Battles on the Styr and Strypa Rivers . . 223
XXVII. On the Tracks of the Russian Retreat 229
XXVIII. Sidelights on the Russian Retreat and German
Advance 240
XXIX. Winter on the Eastern Front 250
PART VI.— THE BALKANS
XXX. Battle Clouds Gather Again 255
XXXI. The Invasion Begins 268
XXXII. Bulgaria Enters the War 269
XXXIII. The Teutonic Invasion Rolls o:j 273
XXXIV. The Fall of Nish — Defense of Babuna Pass . . . 282
XXXV. Bulgarian Advance — Serbian Resistance .... 290
XXXVI. End of German Operations — Flight of Serb People —
Greece 800
XXXVII. Allies Withdraw into Greece — Attitude of Greek
Government 808
XXXVIII. Bulgarian Attacks — Allies Concentrate at Saloniki 816
XXXIX. Italian Movements in Albania— Conquest of Monte-
negro 327
XL. Conditions in Serbia, Greece, and Rumania .... 339
PART VII.— THE DARDANELLES AND RUSSO-
TURKISH CAMPAIGN
XLI. Conditions in Galupoli— Attack at Suvla Bay . . 344
PART VIIL— AGGRESSIVE TURKISH CAMPAIGN
AT DARDANELLES
XLII. Sari Bair— Partial Withdrawal of Allies .... 353
XLIII. Aggressive Turkish Movements — Opinion in England —
Change in Command 357
CONTENTS
3
PART VIIL— AGGRESSIVE TURKISH CAMPAIGN
AT DARDANELLES— Continued
CHAPTEB FACW
XLIV. Abandonment op Dardanelles — Armenian Atrocities . 369
XLV. Campaign in Caucasus — Fall op Erzerum 880
PART IX.— ITALY IN THE WAR
XLVI. Review op Preceding Operations— Italian Movements . 393
XLVII. Italy's Relations to the Other Warring Nations . . 899
LXVIII. Problems op Strategy 404
XLIX. Move Against Germany 410
L. Renewed Attacks — Italy's Situation at the Beginning
op March, 1916 413
PART X.— CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
LI. Operations Against Bagdad and Around the Tigris . 419
LII. Advance Toward Bagdad — Battle op Kut-el-Amara . . 426
LIII. Battle of Ctesiphon 437
LIV. Stand at Kut-el-Amara— Attempts at Relief ... 444
PART XL— THE WAR IN THE AIR
LV. Development of the Strategy and Tactics of Air
Fighting 454
LVI. Zeppelin Raids— Attacks on German Arms Factories-
German Over-Sea Raids 459
LVII. Attacks on London — Bombardment op Italian Ports —
Aeroplane as Commerce Destroyer 466
LVIII. Air Fighting on All Fronts— Losses 473
PART XII.— THE UNITED STATES AND THE
BELLIGERENTS
LIX. Sinking of the Arabic — Another Crisis — Germany's
Defense and Concessions 480
LX. Issue with Austria-Hungary Over the Ancona — Sur-
render to American Demands 490
LXI. The Lusitania Deadlock — Agreement Blocked by Armed
Merchantmen Issue— Crisis in Congress .... 496
LXII. Developments of Pro-German Propaganda — Munitions
Crusade Defended — New Aspects of American Policy 505
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Kaiser Wilhelm Inspbcting His Troops ...... Frontispiece
OPPOSTTB PAG*
Zigzag Trenches in the Champagne 62
German Infantry Storming a Hill 94
General Joffre and General Pctajn 142
Austrian Infantry in Russia 238
Constructing a Bridge Over the Danube 270
British Hydroplane on Guard at Saloniki . 818
Aeroplane Guns on Turntable 462
Firing a Torpedo from the Deck of a Destroyer 494
LIST OP MAPS
TAO*
Middle Europe— The German Vision of an Empire fbom the Baltic
to the Persian Gulf (Colored Map) Front Insert
Champagne District, The 68
Battle in Champagne, September, 1915, Detail Map of . . . 69
Artois Region, September, 1915, The French Gains in ... . 86
Battle at Loos, The 95
Verdun, The Forts at 184
Verdun, Fighting at, up to March 1, 1916 141
Verdun (Colored Map) Opposite 142
IKjel Canal 167
Russia, The Battle Front in, January 1, 1916 228
Balkan (Serbian) Operations, General Map of 262
German-Austro-Bulgar Campaign Against Serbia, The Beginning
of the 268
Retreat of Serbians 804
Saloniki, The Allies at 824
Montenegro, The Austrian Campaign in 835
Dardanelles, Operations at the . . - 868
Turkish Empire, The 381
Turkey in Armenia, The Russian Advance on 390
Bagdad Railroad, The 420
Russian Advance Through Persia, The 488
Mesopotamia, The British Campaign in 461
i§
3
rS
*o
y
"JA..*J*x,:iGF; ' •irs-i^.-* ?s --JM3K™'
PART I— WAR IN SYRIA AND EGYPT
CHAPTER I
RENEWED TURKISH ATTEMPTS
THE leaders of the Turkish troops had been hard at work
arousing the fanaticism of the Turkish soldiery against the
British foe before the next day's battle began. It is due these
noisy "Holy Warriors" that sentries of the Fifth Egyptian Field
Battery were warned of the near presence of the enemy.
The Indian troops now took the offensive, supported by the
warships and mountain and field artillery. The Serapeum
garrison, consisting of Ninety-second Punjabis and Rajputs,
now cleared its front of the enemy who had been stopped three-
quarters of a mile away. A counterattack made by the Sixty-
second Punjabis of the Tussum garrison drove the Turks back.
Two battalions of the Turkish Twenty-eighth Regiment now
joined the fight, but the British artillery threw them into dis-
order, and by 3 p. m. of February 3, 1915, the Moslems were in
retreat, leaving behind them a rear guard of a few hundred
men hidden in the gaps among the brush along the eastern
bank.
The warships on Lake Timsah had been in action since morn-
ing, and the sand hills near Ismailia were at first crowded by
civilians and soldiers eager to witness the fight, until the Turkish
guns to the east and southeast of the Ferry post drove them in
cover.
About 11 a. m. an old unprotected Indian Marine transport,
H. M. S. Harding e, was struck by two 6-inch shells. One carried
away the funnel and the other burst inboard doing much dam-
9
10 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR •
age. Two of the crew were killed and nine wounded. George
Carew, the pilot, lost a leg, but continued on duty and helped to
bring the injured vessel into Ismailia. The French coast guard
battleship Requin came now under the Turkish fire, but her
10.8-inch guns soon silenced the enemy's batteries.
The morning of February 8, 1915, the Turks advanced on the
Ismailia Ferry, then held by Sikhs, Punjabi Rifles, a battery of
Indian mountain artillery and Australian engineers, digging
shelter pits as they moved forward, covered by two field bat-
teries. Their advance was stopped by the British guns when
they had come within 1,000 yards of the outpost line. During
the afternoon the Turks kept up some desultory firing that' was
ineffective; they also engaged in some reconnoitering of British
positions during the dark night that followed, but when morning
broke they had all disappeared.
Meanwhile, at El Kantara the struggle had reached much the
same conclusion. The Indian troops had repelled an advance
from the south, in which two Turkish regiments, the Eightieth
and Eighty-first of the Twenty-seventh Division, were engaged.
H.M.S. Stviftsure, which had taken the place of the disabled
Hardinge, aided by Indian and Territorial artillery, did effective
work in covering the British positions. The nature of the
ground here was so marshy that in places the Turks sank to
their waists in muddy ooze, and foredoomed their attack to
failure. Again it was demonstrated that they are poor strate-
gists and fail to make careful observations of the terrain before
advancing to attack. At El Ferdan, where some Turks made a
demonstration with a battery about this time, there were no
losses, though the gunboat Clio was hit several times. At El
Kantara, where a part of General Cox's brigade of Gurkhas,
Sikhs, and Punjabis were engaged, there were thirty casualties.
Between Tussum and Serapeum there was some sniping dur-
ing the late afternoon of February 3 from the east bank of the
canal, during which a British sailor was killed on H.M.S. SwifU
sure. The desultory firing continued during the night and
through the early morning of February 4. A deplorable incident
occurred this day in which a brave British officer and several of
SYRIA AND EGYPT 1J
his men were the victims of Turkish treachery. Several hun-
dred Turks had been discovered by half a battalion of Ninety*
second Punjabis sent out from Serapeum. In the encounter that
followed, some of the Turks held up their hands as a sign of
surrender, while others continued to fire. Captain Cochran of
the Ninety-second company, who was advancing with his men to
take the surrender, was killed. A few of his soldiers also fell,
and some others were wounded. The British took a prompt and
~ complete revenge for the loss of these men. After being reen-
f orced by Indian troops they overpowered the enemy in a hand-
to-hand struggle, in which a Turkish officer was killed by a
British officer in a sword combat. The Turks had lost in this
brisk engagement about 120 killed and wounded, and 6 officers
and 25 men were captured with 3 Maxim guns.
The Turkish attempts at Suez on February 2, 1915, were insig-
nificant, and did not cost the British the loss of a single man.
By nightfall, just as their compatriots had done along other
parts of the canal, the Turks fled in the direction of Nakhl,
Djebel, Habeite, and Katia. On the afternoon of the 4th, when
the fighting between Serapeum and Tussum was concluded,
Indian cavalry and various patrols captured some men and war
materials. At Ismailia preparations were under way to pursue
the retreating Turks across the canal. This plan, for some
reason, was subsequently abandoned.
During these various fights along the canal, the British had
lost 115 killed and wounded, a small number considering the
character of the ground and the very numerous attacks and
skirmishes. Nine hundred Turks were buried or found drowned
in the canal, 650 were taken prisoners, while it is estimated that
between 1,500 and 2,000 must have been wounded. The brunt
of the struggle fell on the Indian troops, who, in general, fought
with great bravery. There were some Australian and Egyptian
troops engaged who proved themselves valuable auxiliaries.
In these engagements along the canal the Syrian Moslems dis-
played even greater bravery than the Turks, who were not
lacking in intrepidity, though they showed poor judgment. They
had much to learn in the way of taking cover, and would often
12 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
blindly advance over difficult ground that placed them at a dish
advantage.
Djemal Pasha had evidently counted on an Egyptian rising,
and perhaps a mutiny of the Indian Moslem troops, but he
showed that he entirely misjudged their sentiments, as they dis-
played great bitterness toward the Turks during the fighting,
and attacked them in a thoroughly vindictive spirit. If Djemal
had not counted on help from these quarters he would probably
not have attempted to break through the British positions cover*
ing a ninety-mile front with such a small force. It was esti-
mated that he had about 25,000 men, but not more than half of
these were brought into action at any given point where they
might have achieved some success. The Turks had burned up
some war material and left a few deserters behind them, but
they had retreated in good order, and the British commanders
had reason to believe that they should soon be heard from again,
and that a main attack was contemplated.
On February 6, 1915, British aeroplane observers discovered
that the Turks in front of the Tussum-Deversoir section had gath-
ered at Djebel, Habeite, and were strongly reenforced. It ap-
peared that Djemal was now preparing to attack in force. The
British were quite ready for them, having been reenforced on
February 3 and 4 by the Seventh and Eighth Australian bat-
talions, a squadron of the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry,
and the Herts, and Second County of London Yeomanry. But
the British hopes of a decisive engagement were blighted by the
general retirement of the Turkish army with their reenforce-
ments.
They crossed the desert successfully, thanks to the organizing
skill of Kress von Kressensteiil and Roshan Bey, and set off for
the Turkish base at Beersheba, spreading the news along the
road that they had won a victory and would soon return to
Egypt and achieve another, this by way of keeping the Syrians
reassured that success was on the Moslem side.
In January, 1915, the commander of Turkish troops at Fort
Nakhl, hearing that the Government quarantine station at Tor
was undefended, sent a body of men under two German officers to
SYRIA AND EGYPT 13
occupy the place. The raiders found on their arrival at Tor that
about 200 Egyptian soldiers were in occupation and waited there
until they received reenforcements, which brought their force
up to 400 men. For the time they occupied a small village about
five miles north of Tor, occasionally firing a shot at long range
and sending arrogant messages to the Egyptians. On February
11 a detachment of Ghurkas embarked secretly from Suez, and
advancing over the hills in the rear of the Turks, surprised their
position on the following morning. In the encounter that fol-
lowed the Turks were annihilated. Sixty lay dead on the field,
and over a hundred, including a Turkish officer, were made
prisoners. On the British side one Ghurka was killed and an-
other wounded. It was a disappointment that the German offi-
cers and a few men had left the camp some days before for Abu
Zenaima on the coast, where there was a British-owned man-
ganese mine, which the raiders damaged as best they could, and
then stealing some camels, departed for the fort at Nakhl.
The failure of the Turks to win any success at that canal, and
their' subsequent retreat, had a discouraging influence on the
Bedouin levies, who had joined Djemal Pasha and Hilmi Bey,
and they now chose the first opportunity to vanish with the new
rifles that had been given to them.
For a month the Turks did nothing but keep the British troops
occupied by petty raids and feint attacks, which were worri-
some, but better than utter stagnation.
On March 22, 1915, a Turkish column with guns and cavalry
appeared near the canal near El Kubri, and their advance guard
of about 400 encountered a patrol of nine men under Havildar
Subha Singh of the Fifty-sixth Punjab Rifles. The Havildar
retired fighting courageously, holding the enemy back until he
had got his men to safety, with a loss of two killed and three
wounded. The Havildar, who was badly wounded himself, re-
ceived the Indian Order of Merit and was promoted to Jemadar.
He had inflicted on the enemy a loss of twelve men and fifteen
wounded.
On March 23, 1915, General Sir G. J. Younghusband set out to
attack the Turks who had been under the command of Colonel van
14 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Trommer, but owing to delays they had had time to retreat to-
ward Nakhl. In the pursuit that followed, their rear guard lost
about forty men and some were taken prisoners. There were
about a dozen British casualties.
On April 29, 1915, a raiding party with Maxims attacked a de-
tachment of Bikanir Camel Corps and Egyptian sappers near Bir
Mahadet, which resulted in the wounding of a British officer, and
five killed and three wounded among the Egyptians and
Bikaniris. A punitive expedition sent out to attack the raiders
marched through the night to Bir Mahadet only to find that the
Turks had fled. The British aeroplane soon after "spotted" the
enemy near a well six miles north. The Patiala cavalry, who
were leading, came up with the Turkish rear guard in the after-
noon and charged. The Turks stampeded, except for a small
group of Turkish soldiers led by a plucky Albanian officer, who
held their ground and attacked from the flank the advancing
British officers and Patiala cavalry. Two British officers and a
native officer were killed or badly wounded in the subsequent
charge. The Albanian, who had displayed such courage, proved
to be a son of Djemal Pasha. He fell with seven lance thrusts,
none of which however proved fatal, while all his men were
killed or captured. The British had four or five times as many
men as the escaping enemy, but they did not pursue.
In June, 1915, Colonel von Laufer and a mixed force attempted
a feeble raid on the canal near El Kantara, but were driven off
with some loss by the Yeomanry, who had done effective work in
keeping the enemy away from the British lines. A mine having
been found near the canal about this time, the Porte informed
the neutral powers that the canal must be closed to navigation
owing to the arbitrary conduct of the British in Egypt. But the
rurks were not in a position to carry out their threats, owing to
the vigorous attack on the Dardanelles. Troops were hurried
from Syria to Constantinople, and by June 6 less than 25,000
Turkish troops remained in central and southern Syria and the
Simai Peninsula. At Nakhl and El Arish there were left about
7,000 veteran desert fighters, but the British air scouts kept a
watchful eye on the desert roads, and used bombs with such
A— War St 4
SYRIA AND EGYPT 15
effect that the Turks were kept in a constant state of appre-
hension by their attacks.
At Sharkieh, the eastern province of the Delta, there had
been some uneasiness when the Turks made their unsuccessful
strikes at the canal, but the population gave no trouble. At
Alexandria and Cairo some few fanatics and ignorant people of
the lower classes displayed some opposition to the Government.
The sultan was fired on April 8, 1915, by a degenerate, Mohammed
Khalil, a haberdasher of Masoura, the bullet missing the victim
by only a few inches. Khalil was tried by court-martial and
executed April 24. The attempt on Sultan Hussein's life had the
effect of making him friends from among the disaffected in
the higher classes who found it wise policy to express their
horror of the attempted crime, and to proclaim their allegiance
to the Government. On April 9 the sultan received a popular
ovation while on his way to the mosque.
As a base for the allied Mediterranean expeditionary force,
and as a training ground for Australian, Indian, and British
troops, Egypt in 1915 was of the utmost military importance to
the British Empire. From the great camps around Cairo and
the canal, forces could be dispatched for service in Europe,
Mesopotamia, and at the Dardanelles, while fresh'contingents of
soldiers were constantly arriving to take their places.
On July 5, 1915, a body of Turks and Arabs from Yemen in
southwest Arabia made a threatening demonstration against
Aden, the "Gibraltar of the East/' on the Strait of Perim at the
entrance to the Red Sea. They were equipped with some field
guns and light artillery, and crossing the Aden hinterland near
Lahej, forced the British to retire on Aden.
On July 29, 1915, Sheikh Othman, which had been abandoned
by the British on their retreat on the 5th, was again occupied by
them, and the Turks and Arabs were expelled. The British
troops drove the enemy for five miles across the country, causing
some casualties, when the Turks and their allies scattered and
disappeared.
B— War St 4
PART II— WAR IN THE AIR
CHAPTER II
RAIDS OF THE AIRMEN
THE war in the air developed into a reign of terror during the
second half of the first year of the world catastrophe. While
the armies on the land were locked in terrific conflict, and the
navies were sweeping the seas, the huge ships of the air were
hovering over cities with a desperate resolve to win on all sides.
By degrees the pilots of the various nations learned to work in
squadrons. The tactics of the air began to be developed and op-
posing aerial fleets maneuvered much as did the warships. Long
raids by fifty or more machines were reported, tons of bombs
being released upon cities hundreds of miles from the battle line.
The German ambition to shell London was realized, and the
east coast of England grew accustomed to raids. The spirit of
the British never faltered. Perhaps it was best typified in the
admonition of a Yarmouth minister following a disastrous Zep-
pelin visit, who said: "It is our privilege, we who live on the
east coast, to be on the firing line, and we should steel ourselves
to face the position with brave hearts/'
Casualties grew in all quarters. French cities were the great-
est sufferers, although French airmen performed prodigies of
valor in defending the capital and in attacks upon German de-
fensive positions. But the stealthy Zeppelin took heavy toll on
many occasions. It was shown that there was no really adequate
defense against sudden attack from the air. Constant watchful-
ness and patrolling machines might be eluded at night and death
rained upon the sleeping city beneath.
16
RAIDS OP THE AIRMEN 17
The spring of 1915 found the air service of every army primed
for a dash. The cold months were spent in repairing, reorganiz-
ing and extending aerial squadrons. Everything awaited the
advent of good weather conditions.
During February, 1915, the hand of tragedy fell upon the Ger-
man air service. Two Zeppelins and another large aircraft were
wrecked within a couple of days.
In a storm over the North Sea on February 16, 1915, a Zep-
pelin fought heroically. Contrary air currents compelled the
Zeppelin commander to maneuver over a wide zone in an effort
to reach land. Caught in the gale the big dirigible was at the
mercy of the elements. Snow, sleet, and fog enveloped it and
added to its peril. The craft caught in the February storm,
fought a losing battle for twenty-four hours and finally made a
landing on Fanoe Island, in Danish territory. The officers and
men were interned, several of whom were suffering from ex-
posure in an acute form and nearly all of them with frostbitten
hands and feet.
Another Zeppelin was lost in this same February storm. It is
presumed that the two started on a raiding trip against England
and were caught in the storm before reaching their destination.
Details of the second Zeppelin's fate never have been told. It
fell into the sea, where parts of the wreckage were found by
Dutch fishermen. All on board lost their lives. The third air-
ship wrecked that month was of another type than the Zeppelin.
It foundered off the west coast of Jutland and four of its crew
were killed. The others escaped, but the airship was a total loss.
This trio of accidents shocked the German official world to its
depths and had a chilling effect upon the aerial branch of its
military organization for some weeks. The Zeppelins remained
at home until the return of better weather. England, for a time,
was practically freed from the new menace.
It was not accident alone, nor an adverse fortune, which
caused the loss of the three airships. The position of the British
Isles, on the edge of the Atlantic, enabled British weather fore-
casters to tell with almost unfailing exactness when a storm was
to be expected. The French also had an excellent service in this
18 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
direction. Realizing that bad weather was the worst foe of the
Zeppelin, aside from its own inherent clumsiness, the two gov-
ernments agreed to suppress publication of weather reports,
thereby keeping from the Germans information of a vital char-
acter. The German Government maintained a skilled weather
department, but the geographical location of the country is such
that its forecasters could not foretell with the same accuracy the
conditions on the Atlantic. The shrewd step of the French and
British therefore resulted in the destruction of three dirigibles
in a single month, a much higher average than all the efforts of
land guns and aviators had been able to achieve.
February, 1915, was a bleak, drear month. Aviators of all
the armies made daily scouting trips, but wasted little time in at-
tacking each other. Few raids of importance took place on any
of the fronts. But British airmen descended upon German posi-
tions in Belgium on several occasions. Zeebrugge, Ostend, and
Blankenberghe received their attention in a half dozen visits be-
tween February 5 and 20.
On February 16, 1915, a large fleet of aeroplanes, mostly Brit-
ish, swept along the Flanders coast, attacking defensive posi-
tions wherever sighted. At the same time, French airmen shelled
the aeroplane center at Ghistelles, preventing the Germans from
sending a squadron against the other flotilla.
Paris, Dunkirk, and Calais glimpsed an occasional enemy aero-
plane, but they were bent on watching troop movements and only
a few stray bombs were dropped. The inactivity of the armies,
burrowed in their winter quarters, was reflected in the air.
It was announced by the French Foreign Office that from the
beginning of hostilities up to February 1, 1915, French aircraft
had made 10,000 reconnaissances, covering a total of more than
1,250,000 miles. This represented 18,000 hours spent in the air.
Antwerp, which had surrendered to the Germans, was visited
by British flyers on March 7, 1915. They bombarded the sub-
marine plant at Hoboken, a suburb. The plant at this point had
been quickly developed by the conquerors and the harbor served
as a refuge for many undersea boats. Numerous attacks on ships
off the Dutch mainland persuaded the British authorities that a
RAIDS OF THE AIRMEN 19
blow at Hoboken would be a telling stroke against German sub-
marines, and so the event proved. Several ?raft were sunk or
badly damaged. Bombs set fire to the submarine works and much
havoc was wrought among the material stored there. A number
of employees were injured. The Antwerp populace cheered the
airmen on their trip across the city and back to the British lines,
for which a fine was imposed upon the city.
During March, 1915, there was some activity in the East,
where Zeppelins shelled Warsaw in Poland, killing fifty persons
and causing many fires. One of the raiders was brought down on
March 18, and her crew captured. The Russian service suffered
losses, Berlin announcing the capture of six aeroplanes in a
single week. One of these was of the Sikorsky type, a giant bat-
tle plane carrying a half dozen men.
Shortly after one o'clock on the morning of March 21, 1915,
two Zeppelins appeared above Paris. Four of the raiders started
from the German lines originally, but two were forced to turn
back. They were first seen above Compifcgne, north of which the
German lines came nearest to Paris. The news was flashed ahead.
The French airmen rose to meet them. Two of the Zeppelins
eluded the patrol. Their coming was expected and when they ap-
proached the city searchlights picked them up and kept the
raiders in view as they maneuvered above the French capital.
The French defenders and the Zeppelin commanders met in a
bold battle in the air. The Zeppelins kept up a running fight with
pursuing aeroplanes while dropping bombs. They sailed across
Mt Vaterien, one of the most powerful Paris forts, dropping
missiles which did little harm. A searchlight from the Eiffel
Tower kept them in full view. They were forced to move rapidly.
Finally they swung in a big arc toward Versailles, and then
turned suddenly and sailed for the heart of the city. Twenty-five
bombs were dropped. Eight persons were struck and a number
of fires started.
The Parisians flocked to the streets and watched the strange
combat with rapt interest. Although the raiders had come be-
fore, the spectacle had not lost its fascination. Even though the
authorities issued strict order? and troops tried to drive the
20 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
throngs indoors, Parisians persisted in risking life and limb to
see the Zeppelins battle in the night skies. Upon this occasion
the battle aloft lasted until after four o'clock in the morning, or
more than three hours.
On the same night, March 21, 1915, three bombs were thrown
upon Villers-Cotterets, fifteen miles southwest of Soissons. There
was small damage and no casualties. But the two raids em-
phasized that a few weeks more would see intensive resumption
of war in the air.
French aviators shelled Bazincourt, Briey, Brimont, and Vailly
on March 22, 1915. At Briey, the station was damaged and the
railway line cut, two of the birdmen descending to within a few
hundred yards of the track. Enemy batteries at Brimont suffered
damage. The next day a German machine was shot down near
Colmar, in Alsace, and its two occupants captured.
With the return of spring, 1915, came renewed activity among
airmen on all fronts. The first day of April was marked by the
loss of two German machines, one near Soissons and the other
near Rheims. The first fell a victim to gunfire, both occupants
being killed. The second, an Albatross model, was discovered
prowling above Rheims. French pilots immediately gave chase
and after a circuitous flight back and forth across the city, com-
pelled the enemy machine to land. The pilot and observer were
overpowered before they had time to set it afire, the usual pro-
cedure when captured.
A typical day of this season with the birdmen of France was
April 2, 1915. A War Office report of that day tells of forty-three
reconnoitering flights and twenty others for the purpose of at-
tacking enemy positions or ascertaining the direction of gunfire.
Bombs were dropped upon the hangars and aviation camp at
Habsheim. The munition factories at Dietweiler, and the railway
station in Walheim. The station at Bensdorf and the barracks at
the same place were shelled from the air. Much damage was done.
Seven French aeroplanes flew over the Woevre region on this
day, penetrating as far as Vigneulles, where the aerial observers
discovered barracks covered with heavy corrugated iron. The
machines descended in long spirals and dropped a number of
RAIDS OP THE AIRMEN 21
bombs, setting the barracks afire. Troops were seen rushing in
all directions from the burning structures.
The aviation camp at Coucu-le-Chateau, north of Soissons, and
the station at Comines, Belgium, were under fire from the air. In
Champagne a quantity of shells were unloosed upon the station
at Somme-Py and Dontrein, near Eacille and St Etienne-sur-
Suippe enemy bivouacs were bombarded. Other bivouacs at
Basancourt and Pont Fa verger were struck by arrows dropped
from the skies.
These numerous raids and reconnaissances were repeated
every day at many points. German airmen were not less active
than those of the Allies. Neither side allowed a fine day to pass
without watching the enemy from the air and striking him at
such places and times as they could.
Early on the morning of April 13, 1915, a Zeppelin was dis-
covered surveying allied gun positions near Ypres, in Belgium*
The batteries immediately opened fire and several shells found
their target, judging from the heavy list which the airship de-
veloped. It was seen to be in serious trouble as it made its
escape. Amsterdam reported the following day that the craft
fell near Thielt, a complete wreck. What became of the crew
never was learned. \
The raids on England were now resumed. On April 13, 1915,
a Zeppelin visited Newcastle-on-Tyne and several near-by towns*
Newcastle, a great naval station and manufacturing city, had
been the objective of previous air attacks that brought forth
little result. The Zeppelin commander, who directed the bom-
bardment of the thirteenth, was well informed and proceeded
straight to the arsenal and naval workshops. More than a dozen
bombs fell. Strangely enough none of these caused material loss,
and there were no casualties. Dwellings were set afire in other
quarters of the city. The stir that followed brought England to
the realization that better weather was dawning and with it an
imminent peril. Efforts were redoubled to ward off aerial raiders.
A flotilla of Zeppelins shelled Blyth, Wallsend, and South
Shields, on the northeastern coast of England on the night of
April 14, 1915. This attack was directed primarily at the indus-
22 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
(rial and shipping centers of Tyneside. Berlin claimed a distinct
success, buttheBritish denied that extensive harm had been done.
French airmen drove home an attack on April 15, 1915, that
had important results. The station at Saint-Quentin was shelled
from the air and upward of 150 freight cars and extensive freight
sheds destroyed. Some of the cars contained benzol, the explo-
sion of which spread burning liquid in every direction. Adjacent
buildings were consumed by the spreading fire and it seemed that
Saint-Quentin itself might go. Twenty-four German soldiers
were killed and the fire burned from four o'clock in the after-
noon until six the next morning, the explosion of shells being
frequently heard. These facts were communicated to the French
by spies and prisoners and thus written into the war's record.
Lowestoft and Maldon, only thirty miles from London, were
the mark of bombs on the morning of April 16, 1915. The raiders
arrived at Lowestoft about midnight and released three bombs,
one of which killed two horses. A half hour later they appeared
over Maldon, where six bombs were dropped. Several fires broke
out. There was a panic when searchlights revealed one of the
raiders still hovering above the city. But he apparently was
merely bent on learning the extent of his success, as he passed
on to Hebridge, two miles away, where a building was fired by a
bursting shell.
Another German squadron of six craft was sighted at Ipswich,
approaching from the direction of the channel. A few fires in
Ipswich and two persons hurt at Southwold were the only evi-
dences of the visit. This raid was made significant by the fact
that the squadron paid small attention to towns in its route, pro-
ceeding to Henham Hall, residence of the Countess Stradbroke,
near Southwold. It then was used as a hospital for wounded
soldiers. A half dozen bombs fell in close proximity to the main
building, but fortunately none of them struck their mark.
The evening of that day, April 26, 1915, the third raid on
England in less than twenty-four hours took place. Canterbury,
Sittingbourne, and Faversham were shelled, all three towns
being within thirty miles of London. British machines drove the
invaders off. About half past one of the next morning a Zeppelin
RAIDS OF THE AIRMEN 23
dropped seven bombs in the neighborhood of Colchester. It was
evident from these frequent visitations that the German authori-
ties were bent on reaching London itself. Nearly every raid
brought the enemy craft nearer. The gain of almost a mile was
made on each raid. The Germans were wary and evidently
suspected that London's air defenses were adequate. The small
towns which they shelled were of no importance whatever from
a military standpoint, and such casualties as resulted were in-
significant as compared to the death roll that London might be
expected to yield.
A French squadron engaged in a raid of some consequence on
April 16, 1915. Leopoldshoehe, east of Rurigue, fell a victim.
Workshops, where shells were made, came in for a heavy aerial
bombardment. Fire started which swept away several buildings.
Equipment and supplies were smashed. Other bombs dropped on
a powder magazine at Rothwell caused a second fire. The elec-
tric plant at Maixienes-les-Metz, ten miles north of Metz, which
supplied the city with light and power, was rendered useless.
Munition plants and the station in Metz itself suffered, and three
German aeroplanes guarding the city were compelled to land
under the guns of the fortress when the French squadron
turned about. This dash was a profitable one for the French and
showed a new organization that promised well for the future.
Just how many machines took part was not learned, hut there
probably were forty or fifty. North of Ypres French gunners
brought down a German aeroplane which fell behind the enemy's
trenches, ablaze from end to end.
The Germans took similar toll. Several of their flyers shelled
Amiens on April 17, 1915, dropping bombs which killed or
wounded ten persons in the vicinity of the cathedral. The in-
vaders sailed up in the night and descended to a point just above
the city before dropping the first bomb. They were off in a couple
of minutes, before pursuing machines could engage them.
All of these raids were more or less effective. At the time they
attracted wide attention, but as the war wore on the world be-
came accustomed to aerial attacks. The total of lives lost and the
destruction caused never will be accurately known.
24 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On April 21, 1915, came news of another trip to Warsaw by
Zeppelins, a dozen persons being killed. Bombs fell in the center
of the city and the post-office building was struck. A resumption
of activity in that quarter was productive of raids, clashes in the
air and Zeppelin alarms, such as were common in the western
theatre, but on a lesser scale, as the Russians and Austrians
possessed only a limited air equipment and the Germans
were compelled to concentrate the bulk of their machines
elsewhere.
In the southern war zone the aerial operations recommenced
with April, 1915. The Austrians made several more or less futile
attacks on Venice. Italian cities, especially Venice, Verona, and
others near the border removed many of their art works to safe
places, including stained-glass windows from cathedrals, can-
vases, and statuary. The base of the Campanile, Venice, and
other historic edifices were protected with thousands of sand-
bags. The famous horses brought from Constantinople were
taken down. This denuding process robbed the ancient seat of
Venetian power of its many splendors, but assured their pres-
ervation and future restoration.
The Austrian bombs started numerous fires, tore up a few
streets, and caused some casualties. In turn, the Italians dashed
across the Austrian lines and attacked supply bases, railway sta-
tions, and other vantage points in the same way that the Allies
were harrowing the Germans on the western front. In this work
the Italians made use to some extent of their dirigibles, a type
smaller than the Zeppelin but highly efficient.
Thirty persons were killed or wounded in Calais on April 26,
1915, when a Zeppelin succeeded in reaching a point above one
of the thickly populated sections of the city. The raid took place
before midnight The visitor was quickly driven away by a
French machine, but not until the damage had been done. An
orphanage was among the buildings struck, many of the victims
being children. A fleet of aeroplanes visited Amiens at about the
same hour, their efforts being directed to the bombardment of
ammunition depots near that city. The invaders were driven off
with small results to show for their work.
RAIDS OP THE AIRMEN 25
In a raid on April 28, 1915, upon Friedrichshafen, bo often
the mark of airmen, several airship sheds and a Zeppelin were
damaged. A nearly simultaneous bombardment of Leopolds-
hoehe, Lorrach, and the station at Haltinge resulted in the
destruction of train sheds and two locomotives. Forty-two mem-
bers of the Landsturm were killed or wounded at Lorrach and
two aeroplanes put out of commission, service being cut on the
railway line. This was the official French version. Geneva gave
a different and more vivid account. According to the Swiss, the
French airmen visited Friedrichshafen twice within thirty-six
hours, destroying five airships, setting fire to several buildings,
and causing at least $1,000,000 damage. The report said that
they returned by way of Metz, dropping arrows and bombs, and
wrecking the station at Lftrrach.
The east coast of England was the victim of an air raid on
April 30, 1915. Hostile aircraft were sighted over Ipswich,
about sixty-five miles from London, shortly after midnight. The
alarm was spread westward, whence the craft were bound. Five
bombs fell upon Ipswich, but no one was killed. A few dwell-
ings and commercial buildings were struck, fires starting which
the local department soon controlled. Only a few minutes after
the machines shelled Ipswich, they were seen to approach Bury
St Edmunds, fourteen miles to the northwest of Ipswich. Three
bombs failed to produce casualties, but fires were started. Little
damage resulted.
On the first day of May, 1915, announcement was made in
Paris that experiments conducted at Issy les Molineaux over
several months had brought about successful tests in firing a
three-inch gun from an aeroplane. This had never been ac-
complished before, and had seemed a well-nigh impossible task.
An entirely new piece was developed, firing a shell of about the
same size as the regular 75-millimeter field gun. It was made
lighter by half, with an effective range of 2,500 meters, consider-
ably less than the standard gun.
French skill in designing weapons, always a trait of the race,
was evidenced here. The heavy steel breechblock of the seventy-
five was replaced by a wooden block When fired the explosion
26 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of the powder charge automatically blew the wooden breech-
block backward, thus neutralizing the shock. But owing to the
open breech much of the powder's driving force was lost. Noth-
ing to equal the new arm had there been up to that time. The
wooden breechblock completely did away with the heavy hydraulic
recoil cylinders which were one of the distinguishing features of
the seventy-five. These cylinders were esteemed by many author-
ities to be the finest in the world, absorbing maximum shock
with a minimum of effort.
The coming of this new gun marked a big step forward in
aerial war and gave the French machines so equipped a decided
advantage. Its effect was to make the German flyers more wary,
avoiding combat except when impossible to avoid the issue. But
its use was confined to the larger machines as a rule, particularly
the Voisin biplane, the machine gun being favored by many air-
men because of its lightness and the ease with which it could
be handled.
The beginning of May, 1915, found aerial warfare in full
progress again. The British defense squadrons showed some-
what better generalship and it was not until the tenth of the
month that Zeppelins obtained any appreciable advantage in
that quarter. But two of the raiders evaded the patrols on the
night of May 10, 1915, and dropped bombs upon Westcliff-on-
Sea, near Southend, at the mouth of the Thames, a bare twenty-
five miles from London. There were no fatalities, but a man
and his wife were badly burned when their home caught fire
from a bursting bomb. At Leigh, near Southend, several shops
were burned. It was reported that four Zeppelins had been
seen at Leigh, whereas Westcliff-on-Sea saw but two. If the
larger number were correct it would indicate that the Germans
were becoming more determined to reach London. One feature
of the raid at Westcliff-on-Sea was that of sixty bombs dropped
only a few struck in the town. Most of them fell on the beach
and the sand neutralized any effects that the missiles might have
had.
The Bull and George Hotel at Ramsgate was completely wrecked
by bombs which struck it on the night of May 17, 1915. An in-
RAIDS OF THE AIRMEN 27
stance of the vagaries of explosives was furnished by this raid.
One of the bombs which struck the hotel penetrated the roof and
fell upon a bed on which a woman was sleeping. It wrecked
the room and tore a great hole in the floor through which the
bed and occupant fell to the cellar. The sleeper was badly hurt
and the bed practically uninjured. Fires started by other bombs
in Ramsgate soon were extinguished.
Advices from Rotterdam stated that during this raid a Zep-
pelin fell into the Gierlesche Woods, Belgium, two men being
hurt The cause of the airship's plight was unknown, but the
damage made it necessary that the frame be taken apart and
sent to Germany for repairs.
One of the oddest combats of the war was staged on this day-
May 17, 1915. A Zeppelin, flying from the direction of the
English coast, was sighted in the channel by a French torpedo
boat. The craft was at a comparatively low altitude and
furnished an excellent mark. Only a few shots had been fired
when it was seen to be in distress. The Zeppelin made several
frantic efforts to rise, then fell into the sea within four miles of
Gravesline. It sank before aid could be given the crew.
May 17, 1915, was a bad day for Zeppelins. One of the
dirigibles supposed to have attacked Ramsgate early that morn-
iing was discovered off Nieuport, Belgium, by a squadron of
eight British naval machines which had made a sortie from
Dunkirk. They surrounded the enemy craft and three of the
pilots succeeded in approaching close to the Zeppelin. Foul
bombs were dropped upon the airship from a height of 200 feet
A column of smoke arose. The Zeppelin looked as though it
would fall for a moment, but righted itself and mounted to an
altitude of some 11,000 feet, finally eluding its pursuers.
Two Zeppelins and two Taubes were caught by daylight after
a frustrated raid upon Calais on May 18, 1915. They were fired
upon from many points. A battery at Gros Nez succeeded in
hitting one of the dirigibles. The other craft of the flotilla stood
by their injured fellow as long as they dared, but made off after
a few minutes, as French machines were closing in from all sides.
The injured Zeppelin dropped on the beach near Fort Mardick,
28 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
about two miles from Dunkirk. Forty men aboard were taken
prisoners, including several officers.
Two women in Southend, England, met death on May 27,
1915, when Zeppelins visited that city. A child was badly in-
jured. The lighting plant and several industrial establishments
suffered damage. Repeated attacks on Southend had resulted
in the installation of searchlights and the detailing of more
aviators to guard its citizens. Neither availed to prevent the
loss of life, but they did succeed in driving away the raiders
after their first appearance.
Of all the raids carried out during the spring and summer of
1915, one of the most important was that upon Ludwigshafen,
in Bavaria. Here the laboratories of the Badische Anilin und
Soda Fabrik were located. This plant was said to produce two-
thirds of the nitrates used in the production of ammunition for
the German armies. Since the start of the war it had been the
object of several attacks, none of which had noteworthy results.
But on the morning of May 26, 1915, eighteen French aero-
planes started at daybreak from a border stronghold and headed
straight for Ludwigshafen. They had a supply of gasoline to
last seven hours and rose to a height of 6,500 feet in order to
escape detection. In this they did not succeed, but ran into
several lively cannonades before reaching their destination. Once
there, they circled above the big chemical works, dropping bomb
after bomb. More than a ton of explosives were hurled upon the
buildings in a quarter of an hour. Columns of smoke rose from
the burning structures. Loud explosions issued from the smoke-
stacks, sounding like the report of heavy guns. Workmen fled
in all directions and the whole plant soon was wrapped in flames.
The airmen lingered about for a short time, watching the results
of their work. It became evident that the plant would be a total
loss, and the flames spread to near-by buildings, for a time
threatening a good part of the city.
Swiss reports of a few days later said that upward of a
hundred workmen lost their lives, that scores were hurt and the
property loss ran well into the millions. The blow was severe,
the heaviest up to that time which German industries, far from
ZEPPELINS ATTACK LONDON 29
the battle front, had sustained. It revealed a new chapter of war
in the air to communities which would be snugly secure under
any other condition. On the return trip, ill fortune overtook
the French flotilla. The machine of its commander found if
necessary to make a landing. Chief of Squadron, De Goys, and
Adjutant Bunau-Varilla were captured. They burned their aero-
plane before being taken prisoners.
CHAPTER III
ZEPPELINS ATTACK L 0 N D 0 N — BATTLES
IN THE AIR
ENGLAND'S insularity disappeared on the night of May 31,
1915. The isolation by sea which had kept her immune from
attack since the days of the Normans failed to save London from
the Zeppelin. After ten months of war the British capital looked
upon its dead for the first time. Four children, one woman, and
one man were killed. An old apple woman died of fright. There
were numerous fires, only three of which assumed serious pro-
portions and these were extinguished by the fire department
after a few hours.
London's initial glimpse of a Zeppelin was obtained about
11.80 p. m., when the theatre section was filled with homeward
bound throngs. The lights attracted the raiders to this district,
where a half dozen bombs were dropped. No sooner bad the
first of the missiles fallen than antiaircraft guns began to open
a bombardment from many directions. Searchlights mounted at
advantageous points threw their narrow pencils of light into the
skies. The people in different sections of the city caught a
fleeting glance of a huge airship that floated sullenly along, like
some bird of prey from out of the past — a new pterodactyl that
instead of seizing its victims dropped death upon them.
One shell fell in Trafalgar Square. The Zeppelins passed over
the Houses of Parliament, Westminster, and other famous build-
80 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
ings, but apparently did not have their location well in mind as
these noted monuments escaped harm.
But the Zeppelins had come. And they left scars which greeted
Londoners the following morning to prove that the raid was
not a bad dream which would disappear with the morning mists.
In addition to the four persons killed, seventy others were in-
jured, some of whom suffered the loss of limbs and other injuries
that incapacitated them. Immediately there was a cry for
revenge. Some of the newspapers advocated reprisals upon
German cities. This the government refused to do and stead-
fastly adhered to a policy of war upon fortified places and armed
men alone. Rioting took place in many districts where Germans
were numerous. Shops and homes were looted. Every Ger-
man who appeared in the streets, or any person who looked like
one, was liable to attack. A number of aliens were badly
handled. The public declared a spontaneous boycott upon every
person having a name that seemed to be of German origin.
There was a united movement to obtain some reparation for the
Zeppelin raids. But the results were only trifling and the in-
dignation died down with the passing days, British calmness
soon succeeding the excitement of a moment.
Italian frontier towns became the goal of Austrian airmen
on June 1, 1915. A half dozen persons were killed or injured
and there was some property damaged. With warm weather
and good flying conditions raids were in order every day.
On June 3, 1915, British aviators made a successful attack
upon German airship sheds at Evere, Belgium. The same day
French machines bombarded the headquarters of the crown
prince in the Argonne, with what results never was definitely
established, although there were reports that several high officers
had been killed.
It was made known in London on June 3, 1915, that Great
Britain and Germany had agreed to a plan for the protection of
public buildings from air raids. According to this agreement
hospitals, churches, museums, and similar buildings were to
have large white crosses marked upon their roofs. Both
governments pledged themselves to respect these crosses. Much
ZEPPELINS ATTACK LONDON 31
importance was attached to the idea at the time, but its effects
were disappointing. The marks either were not readily perceiv-
able from an aeroplane or the pilots did not trouble themselves
too much about the crosses. Public buildings continued to suffer.
On the night of June 4, 1915, German dirigibles attacked
towns at the mouth of the Humber, the port and shipping of
Hardwich, in England. There were some casualties and con-
siderable properly loss, but the British Government would not
make public the extent of the damage as the places attacked
were of naval importance. Calais, on the French coast was
raided the next day by two German airmen. There was one
casualty. England's east coast was visited by Zeppelins on the
night of June 6, 1915, twenty-four persons being killed and forty
hurt. There was much damage, all details of which were
suppressed.
Just after the break of day on June 7, 1915, a British mono-
plane was returning from a scouting trip over Belgium. At the
same hour a Zeppelin flew homeward from the English coast.
The two met between Ghent and Brussels. Four persons had
been killed and forty injured during the night at Yarmouth and
other near-by towns on the East channel coast. Raids had been
frequent of late and the British pilot sensed the fact that this
Zeppelin was one of the dreaded visitors. He was several miles
away when the big aircraft hove into view. Uncertain for a
few minutes how to proceed, he rose until he was two thousand
feet above the Zeppelin. His maneuver was not appreciated at
first, or the Zeppelin crew did not see him. There was no attempt
either to flee or give battle.
But as the monoplane drew nearer it was sighted and a com-
bat followed such as never was seen before. Sub-Lieutenant
R. A. J. Warneford, a young Canadian who had not reached
twenty-one years of age, matched his pygmy machine against
the great aerial dreadnought. The fight started at a height of
6,000 feet. Lieutenant Warneford released his first bomb when
about 1,000 feet above the Zeppelin. He saw it strike the airbag
and disappear, followed by a puff of smoke. Because of the
sectional arrangement this did not disable thp airship. The
C— War St. 4
32 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Lieutenant circled off and again approached the Zeppelin. Every
gun was trained upon him that could be brought to bear. The
wings of his machine were shattered many times, but he kept
on fighting. When once more above the enemy craft, he released
another bomb. It also struck the Zeppelin, but appeared to
glance off.
The antagonists resorted to every conceivable ruse, one to
escape, the other to bring down its quarry. All efforts of the
Zeppelin commander to reach the height of his antagonist were
defeated. His lone enemy kept above him. The battle varied
from an altitude of 6,000 to 10,000 feet Three other bombs
struck the airship, and each time there was the telltale wisp of
smoke.
The Zeppelin was mortally injured. Her commander turned
to earth for refuge. Seeing this, Lieutenant Warnef ord came
nearer. He had but one bomb left Descending to within a few
hundred feet of the airship, while its machine guns played upon
him, he released this remaining bomb. It struck the Zeppelin
amidship. There was a flash, a roar, and a great burst of smoke
as the vanquished craft exploded and plunged nose downward.
The rush of air caused by the explosion upset the equilibrium
of the victorious machine, which dropped toward the ground and
turned completely over before its pilot could regain control. The
presence of mind which he showed at this juncture, was one of
the most remarkable features of this remarkable conflict.
The young Canadian pilot righted his machine in time to see
the Zeppelin end its career. Like a flaming comet it fell upon the
convent of Le Grand Beguinage de Sainte Elizabeth, located in
Mont Saint Amand, a suburb of Ghent. This convent was used
as an orphanage. The burning airship set fire to several build-
ings, causing the death of two sisters and two children. The
twenty-eight men aboard were killed. Accounts from Amster-
dam a day or two later gave a vivid description of the charred
remnants of the machine, the burned convent buildings, and the
victims all piled together.
Lieutenant Warnef ord saw the Zeppelin fall and knew that its
raiding days were over. Then he discovered that his own ma-
ZEPPELINS ATTACK LONDON 33
chine was in trouble. In another moment he realized the im-
possibility of returning to the British lines, and was compelled to
volplane toward earth, cutting off his driving power. Descend-
ing in a soft field, he found that his motor was out of order.
Thirty precious minutes were spent repairing the damage. It
took him as long again to get his machine started, a task not
often accomplished by one man. But he sailed serenely home and
brought the news of his strange victory.
Within twenty-four hours Lieutenant Warnef ord was the hero
of the world. His name and achievement had been flashed to
the four corners of the earth. Every newspaper rang with
acclaim for the boyish aviator who had shown that one man of
skill and daring was a match for the huge Zeppelin. It was the
old story of David and Goliath, of the Roman youth who bested
the Gaul, of Drake's improvised fleet against the Armada. The
lieutenant was called to London and presented with the Victoria
Cross by King George, who thanked him in the name of the
British Empire for adding another laurel to the long list of its
honors. A day or two later President Poincarg received him in
Paris and pinned the Legion of Honor cross upon his breast.
But this same week saw the climax of this war romance — a
tragic ending to a war epic. Lieutenant Warnef ord was practic-
ing with a new French machine at Versailles. He either lost
control or the motor failed him. It dropped to earth, killing the
pilot and an American newspaper correspondent who was in the
observer's seat. This sudden end to a career so brilliant, the
cutting off of a future so promising, cast a pall over the minds
of both the French and British airmen. The body of Lieutenant
Warnef ord lay in state at the French capital and afterward in
London, where every honor was shown his memory.
34 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER IV
VENICE ATTACKED — OTHER RAIDS
BRITISH airmen visited Ghent on June 8, 1915, where several
ammunition depots were fired. The railway station was hit
and a number of German troops in a train standing there killed
or hurt.
On June 9, 1915, Venice was shelled by Austrian aviators,
bombs falling near St. Mark's and setting a number of fires.
There were no casualties as far as known.
An Italian airship squadron raided Pola, the principal Aus-
trian naval base, on June 14, 1915. Pola has one of the best
harbors on the Adriatic and is an exceptionally strong position.
It was from there that Austrian warships and aircraft made
their attacks upon Italian and other allied shipping. The city
had a big arsenal and miscellaneous war plants. The arsenal
was struck by some of the bombs dropped during this raid, ship-
ping in the harbor was bombarded, and one warship badly dam-
aged. This was perhaps the most valuable accomplishment of
the Italian air service in offensive actions up to that time. Con-
trary to what might be expected from the Latin temperament,
Italy had confined herself to the use of aircraft for scouting pur-
poses almost exclusively. The campaign in Tripoli had taught
her their value, and she had not shown a disposition to bombard
Austrian cities in reply to attacks upon her own people.
The visit of the Zeppelins to London had aroused not only the
ire of Britain, but that of her French allies. It was decided to
take reprisals. Forty-five French machines left the eastern
border during the night of June 15, 1915, and set their journey
toward Karlsruhe. Some of the craft were large battle planes;
all of them had speed and carrying capacity. Approaching
Karlsruhe they at first were taken for German machines, by
reason of the location of Karlsruhe far from the front.
The squadron divided and approached the city from a half
dozen different directions, dripping bombs as they came. One of
VENICE ATTACKED 35
the largest chemical plants in Germany was set afire and burned
to the ground. Both wings of the Margrave's Palace were struck
and one of them practically ruined. In the opposite wing, which
escaped with only slight damage, the Queen of Sweden, who is a
German by birth, was sleeping. She was said to have missed
death only by a few inches. Other titled persons in the palace
had narrow escapes. A collection of art works was ruined. De-
spite the fire of antiaircraft guns the French machines hovered
above the city and dropped bombs at will, again proving that
there was no sufficient protection against air attacks except by
flotillas of equal force.
Within a half hour flames started in many sections of the city.
The chemical and other plants were burned. Karlsruhe's citizens
were made to realize the losses which German airmen had in-
flicted upon the noncombatants of other countries. According
to the best advices 112 persons were killed and upward of 300
wounded. The maximum number admitted by the Germans to
have been injured was 19 killed and 14 wounded. But persons
arriving in Geneva, for weeks after the raid, told of the whole-
sale destruction and large casualties. The victims were buried
with honors, and the German Government issued a statement
deploring the "senseless" attack. This was one of the few raids
made by aviators of the allied powers in which the lives of non-
combatants were lost. That it was a warning and not an adopted
policy is indicated by the fact that it was not followed up with
other raids.
Zeppelins were seen off the east coast of England about mid-
night on June 16, 1915. They left in their wake one of the long-
est casualty lists resulting from aerial raids upon England up to
that time. South Shields was the principal sufferer. Sixteen
persons were killed and forty injured. The Zeppelins devoted
their attention to the big Armstrong works principally. Guns
and munitions of almost every description were being made
there, and the raid was planned to wreck the establishment.
This attempt was partially successful, but the buildings destroyed
soon were replaced and operations at the plant never ceased.
The extent of the damage was kept secret, but the number
36 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
of victims again caused indignation throughout the British
Empire.
One result of this raid was a demand in the House of Com-
mons on June 24, 1915, that the public be informed as to defense
measures against air raids. The Government had evaded the
question at every opportunity, and up to that time kept discus-
sion of the subject down to the minimum. But on this occasion
the Commons were not to be easily disposed of, and insisted upon
an answer. This was promised for a future day, but Home
Secretary Brace announced that 24 men, 21 women, and 11 chil-
dren had died as a result of attacks from the air since the war
began. He said that 86 men, 35 women, and 17 children had
been wounded. Of these a percentage died later. The secretary
intimated that the Government was keeping a, record of every
pound's worth of damage and every person injured, with the
expectation of making Germany reimburse.
The South Shields attack led to further expansion of the air
service and redoubled measures to check the raiders. It seems
likely that not a few aircraft have been captured about which
the British Government made no report. What the motives for
this secrecy are it would be hard to decide. But a guess may be
hazarded that, as in the case of certain submarine crews, it is
intended to charge some aviators and Zeppelin crews with mur-
der after the war is over, and try them by due process of law.
For a time the Government kept a number of men taken from
submarines, known to have caused the loss of noncombatant
lives, in close confinement. Germany retaliated upon army
officers, and the British were compelled to retire from their
position. It has been hinted that in the case of the Zeppelin
raiders she had quietly locked up a number of them without
announcing her purpose to the world.
The closing days of June, 1915, brought two raids on Paris.
Taubes in one instance, and Zeppelins in another were held up
by the air patrol and driven back, a few bombs being dropped on
Saint Cloud. The work of the Paris defense forces was notably
good during the summer of 1915, countless incursions being
halted before the capital was reached.
VENICE ATTACKED 37
What may have been intended as a raid equal to the Cuxhaven
attack was attempted on July 4, 1915, but was foiled by the
watchfulness of the Germans. Cruisers and destroyers ap-
proached German positions on an unnamed bay of the North
Sea, and a squadron of British seaplanes rose from the vessels.
German airmen promptly went aloft and drove off the invaders.
The set-to took place near the island of Terschelling off the
Netherlands. When convinced that the Germans were fully
ready to meet them the British turned back and put out to the
open sea. It was intimated from Berlin that a considerable naval
force had been engaged on the British side. There was a good
deal of mystery about the incident.
Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the British
flying men during July, 1915, as concerns actual fighting, was
the destruction of three Taubes at the mouth of the Thames.
The invaders were sighted while still at sea and the word wire-
lessed ahead. Four British machines mounted to give battle, and
after a stirring contest above the city brought down two of the
Taubes. They were hit in midair, and one of them caught fire.
The burning machine dropping headlong to earth furnished a
spectacle that the watchers are not likely to forget. The third
Taube was winged after a long flight seaward and sank beneath
the waves, carrying down both occupants. This contest took
place July 20, 1915, and followed several visits to England by
Zeppelins, none of which had important results.
On July 21, 1915, French aviators made three conspicuous
raids. A squadron of six machines descended upon Colmar in
Alsace, dropping ninety-one shells upon the passenger and
freight stations. Both broke into flames, and the former was
almost wholly destroyed, tying up traffic on the line, the object
of all attacks upon railroad stations, except at such times as
troops were concentrated there or trains were standing on the
tracks ready to load or unload soldiers.
The second raid of this day was especially interesting, because
a dirigible and not an aeroplane was employed, the French sel-
dom using the big craft so much favored by the Germans.
Vigneulles and the Hatton Chattel in the St Mihiel salient were
38 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
the objectives of the dirigible. A munition depot and the
Vigneulles station were shelled successfully. The third air
attack was made upon Challerange, near Vouziers, by four
French aeroplanes. Forty-eight bombs were dropped on the
station there, a junction point and one of the German lesser
supply bases. The damage was reported to have halted reen-
ilorcements for a position nearby where the French took a trench
section on this same day. Accepting the report as true, it
exemplifies the unison of army units striving for the same pur*
pose by remarkably different methods and weapons.
The French kept busy during this month of July, 1915, with
raids upon Metz and intermediate positions. Metz is the first
objective of what the French hope will be a march to the Rhine,
and since the start of the war the Germans there have Jiad no
rest.
On July 28, 1915, Nancy was visited by a flock of Zep-
pelins and a number of bombs dropped which did considerable
damage in that war-scarred city. Eleven or twelve persons
were killed.
During the night of July 29-30, 1915, a French aviator shelled
a plant in Dornach, Alsace, where asphyxiating gas was being
made. Several of his bombs went home and a tremendous ex-
plosion took place that almost wrecked the machine. But the
driver returned safely. An air squadron also visited Freiburg, so
often the target of airmen, and released bombs upon the railway
station.
French airmen were extremely active on July 29, 1915. One
flotilla bombarded the railroad between Ypres and Roulers, near
Passchendaele, tearing up the track for several hundred yards.
German bivouacs in the region of Longueval, west of Combles,
also were shelled from the air, and German organizations on the
Brimont Hill, near Rheims, served as targets for French bird-
men. A military station on the railway at Chattel was shelled,
and the station at Burthecourt in Lorraine damaged. Forty-five
French machines dropped 103 bombs on munition factories and
adjoining buildings at Pechelbronn, near Wissemburg.
PART III— THE WESTERN FRONT
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS
THE first anniversary of the war on the western front fell on
August 2, 1915. It was on Tuesday, July 28, of the previous
year that Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign
Minister, had pressed the button in "the powder magazine of
Europe" — the Balkans — by declaring war on Serbia.
For two days the world looked on in breathless, wondering
suspense. Then, like a series of titanic thunderbolts hurled in
quick succession, mighty events shaped themselves with a violence
and a rapidity that staggered the imagination.
On July 31, 1914, "a state of war" was proclaimed in Ger-
many; the next day (August 1) that country declared war on
Russia; on August 2, 1914, Germany delivered her ultimatum
to Belgium and invaded both France and Luxemburg, following
up these acts with a declaration of war against France on the
3d of the same month.
Before the sun had risen and set again there came the climax
to that most sensational week: Great Britain had thrown her
weight into the scales against the Teutonic Powers. This oc-
curred on August 4, 1914, the same day that the German frontier
force under General von Emmich came into contact with the
Belgian pickets before Liege.
After thirty-six hours of fighting the southern forts were cap-
tured and the city fell into German hands on August 7, 1914. . It
was not until the 15th, however, that General Leman, the Belgian
commander, was conquered in his last stronghold, the northern
fort of Loncin. When that fell, the railway system of the
3*
40 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Belgian plains lay open to the invaders. Leman's determined
stand had delayed the German advance for at least a week, and
afforded an extremely valuable respite for the unprepared
French and British armies.
The first drafts of the British Expeditionary Force landed
in France on August 16, 1914. On August 7, 1914, a French
brigade from Belfort had crossed the frontier into Alsace
and taken the towns of AltWrch and Mulhausen, which,
however, they were unable to hold for more than three days.
Between August 7 and August 15, 1914, large bodies of Ger-
man cavalry with infantry supports crossed the Meuse be-
tween Liege and the Dutch frontier, acting as a screen for the
main advance. The Belgian army, concentrated on the Dyle,
scored some successes against the Germans at Haelen, Tirlemont,
and Engherzee on the 12th and 13th, but after the fall of Fort
Loncin the German advance guards fell back and the main Ger-
man right under Von Kluck advanced toward Brussels. On the
19th the Belgians began to withdraw to the fortress of Antwerp.
Brussels fell to the Germans on the 20th. Von Kluck turned
toward the Sambre and Von Billow advanced along the Meuse to
Namur. On the opposite bank (the right) of the Meuse the
Saxon army of Von Hausen moved against Namur and Dinant,
while farther south the German Crown Prince and the Duke of
Wiirttemberg pushed their forces toward the French frontier.
Meanwhile, General de Castelnau, commanding the French right,
had seized most of the passes of the Vosges, overrun upper
Alsace almost to the Rhine, and had reached Saarburg on the
Metz-Strassburg railway. On August 20, 1914, the Germans at-
tacked Namur, captured it on the 23d, and demolished the last
forts on the 24th. This unexpected event placed the Allies in an
extremely critical situation, which led to serious reverses. The
British force on the left was in danger of being enveloped in Von
Kluck's wheeling movement; the fall of Namur had turned the
flank of the Fourth and Fifth French armies; the latter was
defeated by Von Btilow at Charleroi on the 22d; the pressure
exerted by the armies of the Duke of Wiirttemberg and the
crown prince also contributed to render inevitable an immediate
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS 41
retirement of the allied right and center. The French army that
had invaded Lorraine — a grave strategical blunder — had also
come to grief. The Bavarians from Metz had broken its left
wing on the 20th and driven it back over the frontier. De
Castelnau was fighting desperately for Nancy on a long front
from Pont-&-Mousson down to St. Di6. On the 24th the British
line fell back to the vicinity of Maubeuge, where Von Kluck
attempted to close it in. Sir John French frustrated the plan by
further retiring to a line running through Le Cateau and Land*
recies, August 25, 1914. After a violent holding battle during
two days the whole British front had fallen back to St. Quentin
and the upper valley of the Oise.
It was General Joffre's plan to retreat to a position south
of the Marne, where his reserves would be available, a move-
ment which was successfully carried out by all parts of the
allied line during the following week. By September 5, 1914,
this line extended from the southeast of Paris, along the
southern tributaries of the Marne, across the Champagne
to a point south of Verdun. Beyond that, De Castelnau
was still holding the heights in front of Nancy. The powerful
German advance had forced the Allies back some hundred and
thirty miles, almost to the shelter of the Paris fortifications. It
seemed only a matter of hours to the fall of Paris when General
Joffre began his counteroffensive on September 6, 1914. At-
tempting to pierce and envelop the allied left center, Von Kluck
marched across the front of the British to strike at the Fifth
French Army commanded by General d'Esperey, who had re-
placed Lanrezac after the Charleroi defeat. But the turn of the
tide was at hand. The Sixth French Army from Paris, under
General Manoury, fiercely attacked Von Kluck's rear guards on
the Ourcq; Sir John French drove against the right of the main
German advance; the Fifth and Ninth French armies held the
front of Von Kluck and Von Bulow; the Fourth French Army
south of Vitry resisted the piercing movement of the Duke of
Wflrttemberg, and the Third French Army (General Sarrail)
checked the crown prince at Verdun, while De Castelnau at
Nancy entered upon the final stage of the battle of Lorraine. The
42 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
first great German offensive had failed in its purpose. By
September 12, 1914, the whole German front was retreating
northward. The Aisne plateau, where the Germans came to a halt,
is considered one of the strongest defensive positions in Europe,
and General Joffre soon realized that it could not be taken by
direct assault. He therefore attempted to envelop the German
right and extended his left wing— with a new army — up the
valley of the Oise. Some desperate German counterattacks were
met at Rheiins and south of Verdun, but they achieved small
success beyond creating a sharp salient in their line at St.
MihiSl, where the invaders managed to cross the Meuse. Gen-
eral Sarrail defended Verdun with a field army in a wide circle
of intrenchments, with the result that the crown prince was
unable to bring the great howitzers within range of the fortress,
and his army suffered a severe defeat in the Argonne.
The allied stand on the Marne and the resultant battle not
only checked the German avalanche and saved Paris, but dis-
located the fundamental principle of the whole German plan of
campaign — to crush France speedily with one mighty blow and
then deal with Russia.
On September 3, 1914, the Russians had already captured
Lemberg— two days before the allied retreat from Mons came to
a sudden halt on the Marne. On that same day, too, the French
Government had been removed from Paris to Bordeaux in antici-
pation of the worst. Having secured the capital against immedi-
ate danger, General Joffre now began to extend his line for a
great enveloping movement against the German right. He
placed the new Tenth Army under Maud'huy north of De Cas-
telnau's force, reaching almost to the Belgian frontier. The
small British army under Sir John French moved north of that,
and the new Eighth French Army, under General d'Urbal, was
intended to fill the gap to the Channel. With remarkable flexi-
bility the Germans initiated the movement with their right as
fast as the French extended their left, and the whole strategy
of both sides developed into a feverish race for the northern
shore. Before General d'Urbal could reach his appointed sector,
however, that "gap" had been filled by the remnants of the Bel-
SUMMARY OP FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS 43
gian army, liberated after the fall of Antwerp on October 9, 1914.
By a narrow margin the Allies had won the race, but were unable
to carry out the intended offensive. Desperate conflicts raged
for a month, but they succeeded in holding the gate to the
Channel ports. The first battle of Ypres-Armentieres opened on
October 11, 1914, when the Germans attacked simultaneously at
Ypres, Armentidres, Arras, and La Bass6e. As a victory at either
of the two last-named places would have amply sufficed for the
German purpose, this fourfold attack appears to be a rather
curious division of energy. The passages at Arras and La
Bass6e were held by General Maudliuy and General Smith-
Dorrien respectively. The former defended his position for the
first three weeks in October when the German attacks weakened ;
the latter, with the British Second Corps, had reached the far-
thest point in the La Bass6e position by October 19, 1914. Violent
fighting occurred round this sector during the latter part of
October, and, though compelled to yield ground occasionally, the
British fores* prevented any serious German advance. In the
early stage of the struggle the Belgian army and a brigade of
French marines held the Yser line. A British squadron, operat-
ing from the Channel, broke the attack of the German right, and
during the last week of October the Belgians held the middle
crossings, with the assistance of part of the French Eighth
Army. All immediate danger was removed from this section by
October 31, 1914, after the Belgians had flooded the country and
driven the Wurttembergers back at Ramscapelle.
Returning to Ypres, we have stated that the Germans attacked
four different points in this region, on October 11, 1914. By the
20th, however, it became apparent that their main objective was
the Ypres salient — neither the best nor the easiest route to the
sea. What, then, was the motive underlying this particular phase
of the German strategic plan? It would be pure presumption —
taking that word at its worst meaning— to criticize the deep
and crafty calculations of the German war staff. A reason —
and a good reason — there must have been. What the historian
cannot explain he may, perhaps, be permitted to speculate upon
in order to arrive at some working hypothesis. Hence, would it
44 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
be considered an extravagant flight of fancy to assume that the
German decision was influenced by the very simple fact that the
British Expeditionary Force was concentrated in and around
Ypres? Skillful stage management is useful even in the grim
drama of war, and the defeat or elimination of the British forces
in the first great battle of the war would indeed have produced
a most sensational effect with almost incalculable results. Be
that as it may, the first battle of Ypres has already been accorded
its position in the British calendar as "the greatest fight in the
history of our army." There is yet another distinction that
battle can claim : it was the first mighty collision between Anglo-
Saxon and Teuton in the history of mankind. They had fought
shoulder to shoulder in the past — never face to face. French
troops also took part in the battle; they consisted of territorials,
some cavalry, and Dubois's Ninth Corps; but the heaviest blows
were delivered with whole-hearted force and energy upon the
British line. This remarkable fight lasted nearly a month. Dur-
ing its progress the Allies withstood some half a million German
troops with a force that never exceeded 150,000 in number.
Before the last thunderous echoes of Ypres had melted away in
space, dreary winter spread its mantle over the combatants with
impartial severity. During the next three months the opposing
forces settled down and heavily intrenched themselves and then
began that warfare at present familiar to the world, resembling
huge siege operations. The Allies were fighting for time — the Ger-
mans against it. The allied commanders aimed at wearing down
the man-power of the enemy by a series of indecisive actions in
which his losses should be disproportionally greater than their own.
The most important events of the winter campaign were the
fight near La Bass6e in December, 1914, where the British Indian
Corps distinguished itself; the fighting at Givenchy in January
and February, 1915; the battle at Soissons in January, 1915,
where the French lost some ground ; the long struggle in northern
Champagne during February and March, 1915, where the French
first made use of artillery on a grand scale; and some consider-
able actions in the neighborhood of Pont-&-Mousson and the
southeast valleys of the Vosges.
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS 45
In March, 1915, the Allies began what has been described as a
tentative offensive. Between March 10 and Mar?h 12, 1915, the
British advanced about a mile on a front of three miles at Neuve
Chapelle, but the aim of the operations, which were directed
against Lille, could not be achieved. Early in April the French
carried the heights of Les Eparges, which commanded the main
communications of the Woevre, an action that led to a general
belief that the Allies' summer offensive would be aimed at Metz.
But the plan — if it ever was entertained — was abandoned toward
the end of April, 1915, when the critical situation of the Russians
in Galicia made it imperative to create a diversion in another
area, where the effects would be more quickly felt. Before the
French attack could mature, however, the second battle of Ypres
was developing.
The Germans began shelling Ypres on April 20, 1915, to prevent
reenf orcements from entering the salient, and in the evening of
April 22, 1915, they made their first attack with poisonous gas. A
French division lying between the canal and the Pilken road had
the first experience of this new horror added to the methods of
warfare. Much has been written in condemnation of employing
poisonous gas, and the practice has been widely discussed from
the "moral" and "humane" point of view. The Germans claim
that the French used it first — a contention not supported by
evidence. "On the general moral question," says Mr. John
fiuchan, the well-known English writer on military subjects, "it
is foolish to dogmatize." He points out that all war is barbarous
in essence, and that a man who died in torture from the effects of
poison gas might have suffered equal agony from a shrapnel
wound. Hence he draws the conclusion that the German innova-
tion, if not particularly more barbarous than other weapons,
was at least impolitic, since its employment raised a storm of
indignation and exasperated the feelings of Germany's enemies.
Be that as it may, the poison clouds proved very effective at
Ypres during April and May, 1915. The French line was driven
in and the left brigade of the Canadians on their right was
forced back in a sharp angle. For the first five days the northern
side of the salient was steadily pressed in by gas and artillery
46 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
attacks. This, the second battle of Ypres, ended about May 24,
1915; it had lasted practically as long as the first battle, though
the fighting had been less continuous. The Germans were mean-
while striving desperately to force a decision in Galicia and
Poland, simultaneously fighting a long-range holding battle in
the west with fewer men and more guns.
On May 10, 1915, began the great attack by the French in the
Artois, aimed at securing Lens and the communications of the
Scheldt valley. After violent artillery-fire preparations, the
French center south of Carency was pushed forward a distance
of three miles. In a few days they took the towns of Albain,
Carency, Neuville St. Vaast, and most of Souchez, besides the
whole plateau of Lorette. But the Germans had prepared a
number of fortins, which had to be captured before any general
advance could be made. This mode of warfare enables a nu-
merically inferior force well supplied with ammunition to resist
for a considerable time the most resolute attacks. The French
army was still engaged in this operation when the first anni-
versary of the war dawned. The situation at the moment is
summarized in a French official communique as follows : "There
has been no great change on the western front for many months.
Great battles have been fought, the casualties have been heavy on
both sides, but territorial gains have been insignificant/'
CHAPTER VI
FIGHTING IN ARTOIS AND THE
VOSGES
ON the first of August, 1915, the situation on the western
front was as follows : The position of the Belgian troops has
been described ; the British held the line from the north of Ypres
to the south of La Bassle. The Germans had closed in to some
extent round Ypres during the two big battles, and the trenches
now ran in a semicircle about the city at a distance of from
FIGHTING IN ARTOIS AND THE VOSGES 47
two and one-half to three miles. The line turned south at St
Eloi, skirted the west of the Messines ridge, turned east again
at Ploegstreet Wood, and south to the east of Armenti&res.
Hence the trenches extended south westward to Neuve Chapelle
and Festhubert to La Bass6e. The remainder of the front —
down to the Swiss frontier — was defended by the French, along
by Lille, Rheims, and the fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Epinal,
and Belfort.
After the battles of May and June, 1915, in Artois, activity
on the western front became concentrated in the Vosges, where
the French by a series of comparatively successful engagements
had managed to secure possession of more favorable positions
and to retain them in spite of incessant and violent counter-
attacks. The supreme object of the allied commanders at this
stage was to wear down their opponents through vain and costly
counteroffensives, and to absorb the German local resources in
that sector. It had been decided by the Allies to begin a fresh
offensive on the western front in August, 1915, but owing to
incomplete preparations, the attempt was of necessity postponed
till the third week in September. It was extremely urgent that
some determined move should be made as speedily as possible;
the Russians were suffering defeat and disaster in the east, and
were already retreating from Warsaw in the first days of August,
1915. The British and the French meanwhile could do little more
than engage in local actions until their arrangements for offen-
sive operations on a vast scale should be completed. On the other
side, the Germans were also busily making preparations to pro-
vide against every possibility in case of retreat New lines of
defenses were constructed across Belgium; formidable complex
trenches guarded by barbed-wire entanglements; concrete bases
for heavy guns connected by railways; and a large fortified
station was erected. These preparations rendered possible a
very rapid transportation of troops and munitions to Brabant
and Antwerp.
The fighting on the western front during August, 1915, may
be described as a fierce, continuous battle, a lively seesaw of cap-
turing and recapturing positions, followed at regular intervals
D— War St. 4
48 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
by the publication of the most contradictory "official" reports
from the German, French, and British headquarters. Many of
them gave diametrically opposite accounts of the same events.
In the first week of the month the Germans made furious
attacks against the French positions at Lingekopf and Barren-
kopf. All through the Argonne forest the combatants pelted
each other with bombs, hand grenades, and other newly invented
missiles. Several determined attempts were made by the Ger-
mans to recapture the positions lost at Schratzmannele and
Reichsackerkopf, but the French artillery fire proved too
strong. Soissons was again bombarded; desperate night attacks
were delivered around Souchez, on the plateau of Quennevi&rest
and in the valley of the Aisne ; local engagements were fought in
Belgium and along parts of the British front; trenches were
mined and shattered, while aeroplanes scattered bombs and
fought thrilling duels in the air. The Belgians were forced
partly to evacuate their advanced positions over the river
Yser, near Heraisse, south of Dixmude. In the Argonne the
Germans, by a strong infantry charge, penetrated the first
line of the French trenches, but were unable to hold their
ground.
On August 9, 1915, a squadron of thirty-two large French
aeroplanes carrying explosives, and accompanied by a number
of lighter machines to act as scouts, set out to bombard the
important mining and manufacturing town of Saarbriicken, on
the river Saar, in Rhenish Prussia. This was where the first en-
gagement in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was fought.
Owing to mist and heavy clouds, only twenty-eight of the aero-
planes succeeded in locating the town, where they dropped one
hundred and sixty bombs of large caliber. A number of Ger-
man aviators ascended as soon as the flotilla's arrival had been
signaled, and a lively skirmish ensued between them and the
French scouts. The results and casualties of the raid have not
leaked out
The German General Staff was evidently not unacquainted
with the fact that the Allies had a big "drive" in contemplation.
Most of the fighting had been forced by the Germans with ever-
FIGHTING IN ARTOIS AND THE VOSGES 49
increasing violence and energy. Toward the middle of August,
1915, tEeir attacks became fiercer still. After a deadly bombard-
ment that literally flattened the countryside, and in which shells
of all calibers as well as asphyxiating gas bombs were hurled
against the French positions between the Binarville-Vienne-le*
Chateau road and the Houyette ravine in the Argonne, the Ger-
man infantry dashed from their trenches in great numbers and
close formation and charged across the intervening ground. So
furious was the onslaught that the French were driven well
back out of their shattered defenses. Within a few hours strong
reenf orcements hurried to the spot enabled the French to deliver
a counterattack and recover some of the lost ground. Simul-
taneously, the Germans attempted to storm the French position
in the neighborhood of La Fontaine-aux-Charmes, but with less
success. During the last week of July and the first half of
August, 1915, large bodies of German troops were detached from
the armies operating on the eastern front and poured into
France and Flanders. Different estimates fix the numbers at
from 140,000 to 200,000.
On August 18, 1915, violent fighting broke out in the region
north of Arras, in the course of which the French took an
important field position. In a desperate bayonet charge the
following night the Germans vainly endeavored to recover the
ground. The French also captured a trench in a long battle
spread over a wide section of the Alsatian front. In the Artois
they seized the junction of the highroads between Bethune and
Arras and between Ablain and Angres. North of Carleul they
held the Germans in check against a heavy artillery* infantry,
and bomb attack, but were driven out of some trenches they had
previously won on Lingekopf . By the 20th the Germans had
regained some of the trenches on the Ablain-Angres road, but
lost them again in a French bayonet charge two days later.
French aviators bombarded the railway stations at Lens, H6nin-
LiStard and Loos, in the Department of Pas de Calais. Arras,
the scene of some of the severest conflicts in the war, was sub-
jected to another prolonged bombardment by the heavy German
artillery. Thus the pendulum swung to and fro; the main
50 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
strength of Germany and Austria-Hungary was strenuously
being exerted in the Polish salient, while on the western front
the Germans also conducted a harassing and exhausting
defensive. Meanwhile the Allies were gradually completing
their preparations for the great coup from which so much was
expected.
On August 31, 1915, the science of aviation lost one of its
most daring and brilliant exponents by the death of Alphonse
P6goud. No man before him ever took such liberties with the
law of gravitation or performed such dare-devil pranks at dizzy
altitudes up in the sky. He was the first to demonstrate the
possibility of "looping the loop" thousands of feet from the
earth; many have done the trick since, but for the pioneer it
was a pure gamble with almost certain death. Even into the
serious business of war P6goud carried his freak aeronautics,
though it must be added that his remarkable skill in that direc-
tion had enabled him to escape from many a perilous situation.
A few days before he fell P6goud carried out a flight of 186 miles
over German territory. He returned unscathed, while the planes
of his machine were riddled with bullet holes. On the occasion
of decorating P6goud with the Military Medal in March, 1915,
the French Minister for War said : "Time and again he has pur-
sued the enemy's aeroplanes successfully. On one day he brought
down a monoplane and a biplane and compelled another biplane
to land while he was all the time within range of fire." The
following two of his innumerable thrilling exploits deserve to be
recorded : "At one time P6goud caught sight of a German ammu-
nition depot and dropped nine bombs on it. The air concussion
was so great from the explosion of the ammunition that his
machine was all but wrecked, and he regained his equilibrium
only after performing more than exhibition acrobatics. On
another occasion, having located a captive German balloon, he
ascended to a great height behind the clouds and then literally
fell out of the sky toward his target. At a distance of only fifty
yards he dropped a bomb which struck the balloon squarely. The
vibration waves caused his aeroplane to bounce about like a
toy boat on a rough pond. But P6goud still carried his good
FIGHTING IN ARTOIS AND THE VOSGES 51
luck and, managing to steady the craft, sailed away amid a hail
of German bullets."*
Of all the fighting on the western front during the month of
August, 1915, the main interest attaches to that carried on in
the struggle for the important mountain peaks in the Vosges
which dominated German positions in the Alsatian valleys and
plain. According to the French official reports, these operations
resulted in the capture of the peaks named Lingekopf , Schratz-
mannele and Barrenkopf. The German official statement of
September 2, 1915, however, claimed that the first and last of
these had been recaptured. The French preparations for the
attack on Lingekopf included the building of a mountain
road eight miles long with communication trenches extending
even farther, and also the construction of innumerable camps,
sheds, ammunition and repair depots, as well as ambulance
stations. The mountain road proved to be a triumph of engi-
neering, as more than a hundred tons of war material passed
over it daily without a single breakdown. The slopes which had
to be stormed were thickly wooded, which greatly facilitated
their defense, while the main French approach trenches were
exposed to a double enfilade fire, rendering their use impossible
in daytime. Between Schratzmannele and Barrenkopf there was
a German blockhouse with cement walls ten feet thick. This was
surrounded with barbed-wire entanglements and chevaux-de-
frise. The French delivered their first attack on July 20, 1915.
After a violent bombardment of ten hours, chasseur battalions
stormed the German positions, capturing the Linge summit to the
left and the Barren to the right. The Germans, however, firmly
retained their hold on Schratzmannele. They caught the exposed
French flanks with a stream of machine-gun fire and forced the
chasseurs to retire to sheltered positions lower down the slopes.
Two days later the French made another attack, and for quite
a month, judging from the contradictory "official" reports, these
peaks changed hands about twice a week. The French claim
that they obtained "complete possession" on August 22, 1915,
and that "the enemy, who had employed seven brigades against
* New York "Sun."
52 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
us, had to accept defeat/' The German version, on the other
hand, ran : "The battle line of Lingekopf-Barrenkopf thus passed
again into our possession. All counterattacks have been
repulsed."
CHAPTER VII
POLITICAL CRISIS IN FRANCE — AEROPLANE
WARFARE — FIERCE COMBATS IN THE
VOSGES — PREPARATIONS FOR
ALLIED OFFENSE
IT was also during the month of August, 1915, that the political
horizon in France was temporarily overcast by one of those
peculiar "crises" which seem to happen chiefly in countries en-
joying the most liberal institutions and the greatest freedom of
speech and press. On the 6th it was announced from Paris that
the Government had decided to replace General H. J. E. Gouraud,
Commander of the French Expeditionary Force at the Darda-
nelles, by General Sarrail, who had been designated Commander
in Chief of the Army in the Orient. That Gouraud would have
to be relieved of his command was painfully obvious, for that
gallant officer had been struck by a shell while visiting a base
hospital on July 8, hopelessly shattering his right arm, which
had to be amputated. As, however, the French military con-
tingent in the ill-starred Gallipoli adventure was but a small
affair, the appointment of General Sarrail to the command
thereof could only be regarded as the reverse of a promotion.
In the first great German offensive toward Paris it was General
Sarrail who had successfully defended the fortress of Verdun
against the attacks of the German Crown Prince. Gradually the
story came out that the general was the victim of a political
intrigue — a plot to displace him as well as M. Millerand, the Min-
ister for War. An acrimonious discussion developed in the French
Chamber on August 14, 1915, in which some of the members
nearly came to blows. The political truce, arranged between the
PREPARATIONS FOR ALLIED OFFENSE 53
conflicting parties at the beginning of the war, hung in the
balance. Faithful to the old tradition that the duty of the Oppo-
sition is to oppose anything and everything, the Radical-
Socialists and the Socialist party were loud in their denunciation
of the conduct of the war, and desired to allocate responsibility
for the military failures of the previous year. A number of
high officers had already been "retired" in connection with those
failures, which were serious enough. But the charge alleged
against Sarrail was that he had omitted to supply his men
adequately with antipoison gas masks. In one of the German
attacks in which gas was used, Sarrail's front was pierced and
a thousand men were forced to surrender. Some accounts gave
the number as 5,000. For this the general was at first suspended,
and then offered the other command, which he refused on the
ground that if he was guilty he deserved punishment; if not,
he was entitled to reinstatement. The real motive underlying
the prosecution, however, was generally believed to have been
one of a purely political nature. Sarrail, a "Republican/9 as
opposed to a "Reactionary/' which latter signifies a conservative
in politics and, frequently also, a professed churchman — in
short, General Sarrail had attracted the animosity of both the
clerical and radical parties. When, finally, the Government
promised to increase the Dardanelles force to 80,000 men, he
accepted the appointment.
The first week in September, 1915, saw considerable artillery
activity along the whole front. Except in the Vosges, where
French and German bayonets clashed on mountain peaks and in
underground tunnels, infantry action had been suspended for
nearly two weeks. Heavy bombardments had been maintained
by both sides — those of the Allies being especially deliberate and
persistent. As a fireman would sway the nozzle of his streaming
hose from side to side, so the Allies poured a continuous, sweep-
ing torrent of shot and shell over the German positions in certain
well-defined zones along the line. It began from the extreme
left on the Belgian front, thence swung into the region of
Souchez, then around Arras, farther on along the Aisne, par-
ticularly at the two extremities of the Aisne plateau, turned to
54 . THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the right in Champagne, spread to the Argonne, next in the
Woevre and finally in Lorraine. Beneath the cyclone and out
of sight trench mortar actions were fought, mining operations
carried on, bombs and hand grenades thrown.
On September 1, 1915, four German aeroplanes had dropped
bombs on the open town of LunSville, killing many civilians. As
a measure of reprisal forty French aeroplanes returned the
compliment by making another air raid on Saarbriicken, where
,they bombarded the station, factories, and military establish-
ments. A squadron of thirty or forty vessels of the British
Fleet bombarded ihe whole of the Belgian coast in German pos-
session as far as Ostend. French artillery stationed in the
vicinity of Nieuport cooperated to shell the German coast bat-
teries at Westende. In retaliation for the bombardment of the
open towns of St. Di<§ and Gerardmer by German aeroplanes, a
French aeroplane squadron assailed the railroad and military
establishments of Freiburg in Breisgau. Aerial operations had
by this time become a powerful auxiliary to the combatants on
each side. The aeroplane attained a definite position as a weapon
even in trench and field warfare. Machines hovered over the
lines every day, reconnoitering and dropping bombs on positions,
stores, transports, moving troops, trenches, and munition depots.
Bombardment by aeroplane was, in fact, quite as serious and
formidable a business as any artillery attack. The bombs carried
by these machines were exactly of the same caliber as those used
by heavy guns. Constant practice afforded by daily opportunities
had enormously increased the skill of the aviators, many of whom
could hit a small house from high altitudes without much
trouble. Duels and pitched battles in the air were of daily
occurrence on the western front. As soon as an "enemy flyer"
hove in sight on either side of the lines, locally attached aviators
rose and attacked the intruder. This, the most "modern" method
of fighting, has produced a crop of thrilling incidents and stir-
ring examples of bravery exhibited by the German, French, and
British flying men. A code of what might be called "aerial
chivalry" has spontaneously grown up among the flying frater-
nity. Two pretty incidents will suffice to demonstrate: A
PREPARATIONS FOR ALLIED OFFENSE 55
German aviator had been attacked and brought to earth by a
French airman. The German was killed in the contest. In the
dead man's pocket was found a diary of his adventures in the
war, and other happenings, from day to day. It was written in
conversational style addressed throughout to his wife, together
with a letter to her of the same day's date. The next morning
a French aeroplane flew over the German line. Descending to
within a few hundred yards of the ground, despite the hail of
bullets that whistled around him, the aviator dropped a neatly
wrapped parcel, rose suddenly to a great height and was gone.
That parcel contained all the dead German aviator's private
property, his papers, medals, etc., with a note of sympathy from
the victor. A few days after the death of P6goud, who was
killed in mid-air before he fell, a German aviator flew at great
height over an Alsatian commune on the old frontier and dropped
a wreath bearing the inscription : "In memory of P6goud, who
died a hero's death, from his adversary."
The French method of aerial maneuvering is interesting as
well as effective. Their air squadrons operate in the following
manner: ten machines rise 6,000 feet along the enemy's line; ten
others rise 9,000 feet. If an enemy machine attempts to pass
the Frenchmen attack simultaneously from above and below,
while, if necessary, two other machines come to their aid. Thus
the intruder is always at a disadvantage. On several occasions
the Germans attempted to fly across the French lines in force,
but always with disastrous consequences. When the French set
out in squadrons to make a raid or bombard a position they
pursue the same tactics and achieve very important results.
Early in September, 1915, General Joffre paid a visit to Rome,
was received in audience by King Victor Emmanuel, and decor-
ated with the highest Italian military distinction — the Grand
Cross of the Military Order of Savoy— as proof of his majesty's
esteem for the French army. General Joffre afterward made a
tour of the Italian battle front and conferred with General
Cadorna.
About September 8, 1915, the Germans recommenced to attack
in the Argonne, where the German Crown Prince had failed to
56 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
break the French line in June and July. After a violent artillery
preparation, including the use of a large number of asphyxiating
shells, two infantry divisions were flung against the French.
The Germans rushed the first-line trenches at several points.
Strong attacks were launched against them and prevented any
further advance.
French and British airmen raided the aviation sheds at
Ostend ; another air squadron dropped sixty shells on the aviation
ground at Saint Medard and on the railway station at Dieuze,
in Lorraine, twenty-five miles northeast of Nancy. A bombard-
ment of Zeebrugge by the British fleet caused much damage, the
Germans losing forty dead and some hundred wounded. Here
the submarine port, with two submersibles and two guns on the
harbor wall were destroyed, while the central airship shed, con-
taining at the time two dirigibles, was also severely damaged.
The semaphore tower was shot to pieces and some sluices
crippled. Perhaps the most exciting incident at this period was
the great allied air raid on the Forest of Houlthulst, about half-
way between Ypres and Dixmude. The forest was quite shel-
tered from the ravages of the allied guns, and had been converted
into a regular garrison district, with comfortable barracks full
of soldiers, provision stores, and large munition depots. The
whole camp was brilliantly illuminated with electric light.
At ten o'clock on the night of September 9, 1915, sixty French,
British and Belgian aeroplanes started out in clear moonlight.
Immediately the aerial flotilla had announced its approach by
the well-known buzzing of sixty industrious propellers, the whole
neighborhood was plunged in sudden darkness. The moon, how-
ever, supplied the necessary light to guide the sky raiders to
their goal. Besides, French flyers had already photographed the
region in broad daylight, so that the situation of the main build-
ings was thoroughly known to all the pilots. It is stated that
four tons of high explosives and incendiary bombs were scattered
with deadly effect; some of the aircraft whose stock became
exhausted flew back to their base, landed, refilled, and returned
to the scene of action — two and three times. The greatest con-
sternation naturally prevailed among the soldiers below, running
PREPARATIONS FOR ALLIED OFFENSE 57
in panic-stricken groups to escape from the blasting shower let
loose over their heads. Indescribable confusion prevailed; fre-
quent explosions were heard as some aerial missile found a piled-
up accumulation of its own kind. By 11.30, an hour and a half
after the squadron had set sail, the entire forest and the build-
ings it contained were in flames. The next morning a German
aeroplane, "adorned with sixteen Iron Crosses/' was forced to
descend near Calais owing to engine trouble and was captured
by the French.
By way of reprisals for the continued attacks on Lund-
ville and Compi&gne by German aviators, a squadron of French
aeroplanes flew over the German town of Trier (Treves) on
September 13, 1915, and deposited one hundred bombs. After
returning to the base and taking on board further supplies, they
set out again in the afternoon and dropped fifty-eight shells on
the station of Dommary Baroncourt. Other aeros bombarded the
railway stations at Donaueschingen on the Danube and at Mar-
bach, where movements of troops had been reported. Activity
grew in intensity all along the front. Artillery fighting on the
Yser, the north and south of Arras, in the sectors of Neuville,
Roclincourt and Mailly. To the north of the Oise the French
artillery carried out a destructive fire on the German defenses .
and the works of Beuvraignes. Infantry attacks occurred in
front of Andrechy. On the canal from the Aisne to the Maine
the French bombarded the trenches, batteries and cantonments
of the Germans in the environs of Sapigneul and of Neuville,
near Berry-au-Bac. Grenade engagements took place neai the
Bethune- Arras road and north of Souchez. South of the Somme,
before Fay, there were constant and stubborn mine duels, while
fierce bombardments in the sectors of Armancourt (southwest
of Compi&gne), Beuvraignes (south of Roye), as well as on the
plateau of Quenneviferes (northeast of Compi&gne) and Nouvron
(northwest of Soissons) , continued uninterruptedly. In Cham-
pagne and in the Argonne also, long range artillery fighting rent
the air.
On the Lorraine front, in the environs of Embermenil,
Leintrey, and Ancerviller, near LunSville, the German trenches
58 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
and works were subjected to heavy fire. Poison shells and
liquid fire played an important part in the furious fighting
that was gradually developing in the Vosges, and assisted the
Germans to gain some initial successes. On the Lingekopf-
Barrenkopf front the French were driven out of a first-line
trench on the Schratzmannele, but they recovered most of the
ground by a counterattack. Similarly on the summit of the
Hartmannsweilerkopf, where the Germans had also obtained a
footing in the French trenches, they were subsequently ejected
again. These trenches had been captured with the aid of blaz-
ing liquids. Our first knowledge of this ''blazing liquid" (out-
side of Germany) was derived from a document which fell into
French hands early in the war. It was Note 32 of the Second
Army, dated October 16, 1914, at St. Quentin. In it were
published the following instructions under the heading of
"Arms at the disposal of Pioneers (Sappers) for fighting at
close quarters" :
"The flame projectors (Flammenwerfer), which are very sim-
ilar to portable fire extinguishers, are worked by specially trained
pioneers and throw a liquid which at once catches fire spon-
taneously. The jet of fire has an effective range of 30 meters.
The effect is immediate and deadly, and the great heat developed
forces the enemy back a long way. As they burn from one and
a half to two minutes, and can be stopped whenever neces-
sary, short and isolated jets of flame are advisable, so that
one charge is sufficient to spray several objectives. Flame pro-
jectors will be mainly employed in street and house-to-house
fighting, and will be kept in readiness at the place from which
an attack starts/1
There is no doubt that some engines of this nature were em-
ployed by the Germans during August and September, 1914, to
destroy portions of the towns and villages destroyed by them.
One captured apparatus, actually examined, comprised a portable
reservoir for holding the inflammable liquid and the means of
spraying it. The former, which is carried strapped on to a man's
back, is* a steel cylinder containing oil and compressed air in
separate chambers. The latter consist* of a suitable length of
PREPARATIONS FOR ALLIED OFFENSE 59
metal pipe fitted with universal joints and a nozzle capable of
rotation in any direction. When a valve is turned on, the air
pressure forces the oil out of the nozzle in a fine spray for a
distance of over twenty yards. The oil is ignited automatically
at the nozzle and continues to issue in a sheet of flame until the
air pressure falls too low or the oil is exhausted. The heat given
out is terrific in its intensity. A similar method employed by
the German troops consists of a liquid substance which is squirted
into the trenches. Bombs are then thrown which on explosion
ignite the fluid. Yet another sort of projectile took the form
of an incendiary bomb or shell which was discharged noise-
lessly, possibly from a catapult. It bursts on impact, tear-
ing a hole and burning a circle of ground about eight feet in
diameter.
By the middle of the month, September, 1915, the liveliest
activity obtained everywhere in the west — each side apparently
doing its utmost to harass the other. Nothing of a definite
nature was achieved by either. The Germans were merely sit-
ting tight along most of the line while taking the offensive only
in those sectors where they had reason to believe the Allies would
attempt to strike the great blow. The Allies, on the other hand,
endeavored to weaken their opponents as much as possible in
order to create an easier passage for the great "drive" they con-
templated. The innumerable engagements about this time
throughout the western theatre of the war form a bewildering
conflict of unconnected and minor battles and skirmishes. When,
years hence, the "official" histories are written and published,
the student may be able to read the riddle and trace some thread
of continuity and intention through the labyrinth of these opera-
tions. For the present they must be regarded as mere incidents
in the overture leading to a great battle. The actions were de-
scribed from day to day with some detail by the Allies, and as
"unimportant attempts" by the German official communiques.
The latter generally consisted of few words that gave little or no
indication of what had happened, and frequently wound up with
the phrase: "There was no change on the front." The following
translation may be given as a typical example: "The French
60 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
attempted an attack but were repulsed by our fire. An enemy
aeroplane was shot down. We successfully attacked in the
Argonne. The situation is unchanged."
On September 18, 1915, the British fleet again bombarded the
German defenses on the Belgian coast, in conjunction with the
British artillery in the Nieuport district. Unabated fighting
raged along the whole front, and it was all summed up in the
German official communique of September 20, 1915, with com-
mendable brevity:
"The hostile vessels which unsuccessfully bombarded Westende
and Middelkerke, southwest of Ostend, withdrew before our fire.
Several hits were observed. Along the land front there were no
important events/'
Nevertheless, important events were shaping themselves about
this time. German artillery attacks increased in violence against
the British front. Aeroplanes were particularly busy observing
all moves on the board. In Champagne the Germans kept the
French occupied with heavy shells and "lachrymatory projec-
tiles." These projectiles have been described as "tearful and
wonderful engines of war/' They are ordinary hand grenades
with a charge that rips open the grenade and liberates a liquid
chemical. When that happens, the effect of the fumes brings
water to the eyes of the men in such quantities that they are quite
unable to defend themselves in the event of an attack. Shooting
is entirely out of the question. The stinging sensation produced
in the eyes is not pleasant, but it is not painful, and the effect
wears off in a few minutes. The troops humorously refer to
these grenades as "onions."
On September 21, 1915, a party of French airmen carried out
the most daring of the many raids on German towns and posi-
tions they had hitherto accomplished. An aero squadron flew to
Stuttgart, which is about 140 miles due east from Nancy, and
dropped thirty shells on the palace of the King of Wurttemberg
and the railway station of the town. They were fired at from
many points, but safely completed their double journey of nearly
300 miles. Before this exploit, which was undertaken as a
reprisal, the longest distances traveled by raiding squadrons of
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE 61
French aeroplanes were those to the Friedrichshafen Zeppelin
factories on June 28, 1915, involving a double journey of 240
miles from Belfort; and to the explosives factory at Ludwigs-
hafen, on the Rhine, which represented a distance of 230 miles
from Nancy and back. The Berlin official report thus describes
the event:
"At 8.15 this morning enemy airmen with German marks on
their aeros attacked Stuttgart and dropped several bombs on the
town, killing four persons and wounding a number of soldiers
and civilians. The material damage was quite unimportant/'
CHAPTER VIII
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE
THE day fixed for the opening of the Allies' long-projected
offensive dawned on September 22, 1915. Gigantic prepara-
tions had been in the making. Large drafts of fresh British
troops had been poured into France, which enabled Sir John
French to take over the defense of a portion of the lines hitherto
held by General Joffre's men. Defensive organizations had been
improved all round; immense supplies of munitions had been
accumulated; units had been carefully regrouped and new ones
created ; all that skill, foresight and arduous toil could accomplish
had been attained. The spirit of the human fighting material
was all that could be desired. In order not to interrupt the course
of the narrative later, we insert here the interesting general
order that the French commander in chief issued to his troops
on September 23, 1915, when it was read to the regiments by
their officers :
"Soldiers of the Republic:
"After months of waiting, which have enabled us to increase
our forces and our resources, while the adversary has been using
up his own, the hour has come to attack and conquer and to add
62 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
fresh glorious pages to those of the Marne and Flanders, the
Vosges and Arras.
"Behind the whirlwind of iron and fire let loose, thanks to the
factories of France, where your brothers have, night and day,
worked for us, you will proceed to the attack, all together, on the
whole front, in close union with the armies of our allies.
*Your 6lan will be irresistible. It will carry you at a bound
up to the batteries of the adversary, beyond the fortified lines
which he has placed before you.
"You will give him neither pause nor rest until victory has
been achieved.
"Set to with all your might for the deliverance of the soil of
la Patrie, for the triumph of justice and liberty.
"J. JOFFRE."
The general outlines of the plan of campaign may be briefly
described: The British were to deliver a main attack on the
German trenches between Liens and La Bass6e, in close coopera-
tion with the French on their immediate right in Artois, and to
hold the enemy by secondary attacks and demonstrations on the
rest of the (British) front, about eighty miles. The French, for
their part, took in hand the two principal operations — to batter
through in Artois and to exert their mightiest efforts in
Champagne.
To a proper understanding of a campaign or a battle, some
knowledge of the topographical conditions is essential. The
chief scene in the act— where the grand attack falls — is the
beautiful vineyard region of Champagne. Here the German
front is the same as they established and fortified it after the
Battle of the Marne. It rests on the west side on the Massif de
Moronvillers; to the east it stretches as far as the Argonne.
It was intended to cover the railroad from Challerange to Bazan-
court, a line indispensable for the concentration movements of
the German troops. The offensive front, which extends from
Auberive to the east of Ville-sur-Tourbe, presents a varied aspect.
From east to west may be seen, firstly, a glacis or sloping bank
about five miles wide and covered with little woods. The road
SOgsag treacfees in Chasipafne. The strip on which the armies are clinched varies hi width
aad winds ever denes, marshes, weeds sad meentalas
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE
63
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64 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
from Saint-Hilaire to Saint-Souplet, with the Baraque de l'Epine
de Vedegrange, marks approximately its axis.
(2) The hollow, in which lies the pretty village of Souain and
where the first German line follows its edge. The road from
Souain to Pomme-Py describes the radius of this semicircle*
The farm of Navarin stands on the top of the hills two miles
north of Souain.
(8) To the north of Perthes, a comparatively tranquil region
of uniform aspect, forming between the wooded hills of the
Trou Bricot and those of the Butte du Mesnil a passage two
miles wide, barred by several lines of trenches and ending at a
series of heights — the Butte de Souain, Hills 195 and 201 and
the Butte de Tahure, surmounted by the second German line.
(4) To the north of Mesnil, a very strong position, bastioned
on the west by two twin heights (Mamelle Nord and Trap&ze),
on the east by the Butte du Mesnil. The German trenches form
a powerful curtain between these two bastions, behind which a
thickly wooded undulating region extends as far as Tahure.
(5) To the north of Beaus6jour, a bare terrain easily travers-
able, with a gentle rise in the direction of Ripon to the farms of
Maisons de Champagne.
(6) To the north of Massiges, hills numbered 191 and 199,
describing on the map the figure of a hand, very strongly forti-
fied and forming the eastern flank of the whole German line.
This table-land slopes down gently in the direction of Ville-sur-
Tourbe.
As to the German defenses, the French were intimately
acquainted with every detail. They had maps showing every
defensive work, trench, alley of communication, and clump of
trees in the landscape. Each of these features had been given a
special name or number preceded by a certain letter, according
to the sector of attack wherein it was situated. These details
had been laboriously collected by aviators and spies, and applied
with minute precision.
On the morning of September 22, 1915, the French accelerated
their long-sustained bombardment of the German positions with
intense fury, continuing day and night without a break until
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE 66
the 25th. The direct object of this preparatory cannonade was
to destroy the wire entanglements, bury the defenders in their
dugouts, raze the trenches, smash the embrasures, and stop up
the alleys of communication. The range included not only the
first trench line, but also the supporting trench and the second
position, though the last was so far distant as to make accurate
observation difficult. The heavy long-range guns shelled the
headquarters, the cantonments and the railroad stations. They
speedily demolished the permanent way, thereby stopping all
traffic in reenf orcements, munitions and commissariat. From
letters and notes afterwards found upon German prisoners who
came out alive from that inferno, one may gather an approxi-
mate idea of what the bombardment was like :
"September 23.
"The French artillery fired without intermission from the
morning of the 21st to the evening of the 23rd, and we all took
refuge in our dugouts. On the evening of the 22d we were to
have gone to get some food, but the French continued to fire on
our trenches. In the evening we had heavy losses, and we had
nothing to eat" ua A _ ^M
"September 24.
"For the last two days the French have been firing like mad.
To-day, for instance, a dugout has been destroyed. There were
sixteen men in it. Not one of them managed to save his skin.
They are all dead. Besides that, a number of individual men
have been killed and there are a great mass of wounded. The
artillery fires almost as rapidly as the infantry. A mist of
smoke hangs over the whole battle front, so that it is impossible
to see anything. Men are dropping like flies. The trenches are
no longer anything but a mound of ruins."
"September 24.
"A rain of shells is pouring down upon us. The kitchen and
everything that is sent to us is bombarded at night. The field
kitchens no longer come to us. Oh, if only the end were near!
That is the cry everyone is repeating."
"September 25.
"I have received no news, and probably shall not receive any
for some days. The whole postal service has been stopped; all
66 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
places have been bombarded to such an extent that no human
being could stand against it. The railway line is so seriously
damaged that the train service for some time has been com-
pletely stopped. We have been for three days in the first line;
during those three days the French have fired so heavily that
our trenches are no longer visible/'
"September 25.
"We have passed through some terrible hours. It was as
though the whole world were in a state of collapse. We have
had heavy losses. One company of 250 men had sixty killed
last night. A neighboring battery had sixteen killed yesterday.
The following instance will show you the frightful destruc-
tiveness of the French shells : A dugout five meters deep, sur-
rounded by two meters fifty centimeters of earth and two
thicknesses of heavy timber, was broken like a match."
Report made on September 24, 1915, in the morning, by the
captain commanding the Third Company of the 135th Regiment
of Reserves :
"The French are firing on us with great bombs and machine
guns. We must have reenforcements at once. Many ;nen are
no longer fit for anything. It is not that they are wounded, but
they are Landsturmers. Moreover the wastage is greater than
the losses announced. Send rations immediately; no food has
reached us to-day. Urgently want illuminating cartridges and
hand grenades. Is the hospital corps never coming to fetch the
wounded? I urgently beg for reenforcements; the men are dying
from fatigue and want of sleep. I have no news of the battalion."
The time fixed for all the attacks on the Champagne front
was 9.15 a. m., September 25, 1915. Just before the assault
General Joffre issued the following brief order:
"The offensive will be carried on without truce and without
respite.
"Remember the Marne — Victory or death."
Punctual to the moment the troops climbed out of their
trenches with the aid of steps or scaling ladders and drew up
in line before making a rush at the German trenches. The opera-
tion was rapidly effected. The German position was at an average
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE 67
distance of 220 yards; at the word of command the troops broke
into a steady trot and covered that ground without any serious
loss. The honor of the first assault was granted to the dare-
devil Colonial Corps, men hardened in the building up of
France's African Empire, and to the Moroccan troops, famous
for fierce and obstinate fighting. The men tore across the ground
to the assault, led by their commander, General Marchand, of
Fashoda fame, who left the army at the age of forty-four but
volunteered immediately on the outbreak of the war, and was
given command of the Colonial Brigade. General Marchand fell
in the charge with a dangerous shell wound in the abdomen.
The men dashed on to the German trench line, stirring the rain-
drenched, chalky soil to foam beneath their feet. Under the
leadership of General Baratier, Marchand's right-hand man in
his colonial conquests, the French Colonial Cavalry played
an important part in the charge. This was the first time for
many months that cavalry really came into action on the
western front. They lost heavily, but their activities prob-
ably explain the great number of prisoners captured in so
short a time.
At nearly every point the Germans were taken completely by
surprise, for their defensive fire was not opened until after the
flowing tide of the invaders had passed by. This was due neither
to lack of courage nor of vigilance, but to the demoralizing effect
on the nerves of the defenders by the terrific cannonade, which
in all such cases induces a sort of helpless apathy.
The French actually penetrated into the first German trench
over the whole attacking front at one rush ; after that their prog-
ress met with fiercer resistance and varying checks. While
certain units continued their advance with remarkable rapidity,
others encountered machine guns still in action and either
stopped or advanced with extreme difficulty. Some centers of
the German resistance maintained their position for several
hours; some even for days. A line showing the different stages
of the French advance in Champagne would assume a curiously
winding shape, and would reveal on one hand the defensive
power of an adversary resolved to hold his ground at all costs,
68 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
and on the other the mathematically successful continuity of the
French efforts in this hand-to-hand struggle.
The Battle of Champagne must be considered in the light of
a series of assaults, executed at the same moment, in parallel or
convergent directions and having for their object either the
capture or the hemming in of the first German position, the
units being instructed to re-form in a continuous line before the
second position. In order to follow the development clearly, the
terrain must be divided into several sectors, in each of which
the operations, although closely coordinated, assumed, as a con-
sequence either of the nature of the ground or of the peculiarities
of the German defenses, a different character. The unity of the
action was nevertheless insured by the simultaneity of the rush,
which carried all the troops beyond the first position, past the
batteries, to the defenses established by the Germans on the
heights to the south of Py. At the two extremities of the
French attacking front, where the advance was subjected to
converging fires and to counterattacks on the flanks, the offensive
practically failed — or at least made no progress. The fighting
that took place in Auberive and round about Servon was marked
by several heroic features, but it led to no further result than
to hold and immobilize the German forces on the wings while
the attack was progressing in the center.
In accordance with the pToposed arrangement of divisions into
sectors, we will take as Number —
(1) The sector of the Epine de Vedegrange: Here the first
German line was established at the base of a wide glacis covered
with clumps of trees, and formed a series of salients running
into each other. At certain points it ran along the edge of the
woods where the supplementary defenses were completed by
abatis. The position as a whole between Auberive and Souain
described a vast triangle. To the west of the road from Saint-
Hilaire to Saint-Souplet, the troops traversed the first German
line and rushed forward for a distance of about 1,200 yards as
far as a supporting trench, in front of which they were stopped
by wire entanglements. A counterattack debouching from the
west and supported by the artillery of Moronvillers caused a
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE
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70 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
slight retirement of the French left. The troops on the right,
on the contrary, held their gains and succeeded on the following
days in increasing and extending them, remaining in touch with
the units which were attacking on the east of the road. The
latter had succeeded in a brilliant manner in overcoming the
difficulties that faced them. The German position which they
captured, with its triple and quadruple lines of trenches, its
small forts armed with machine guns, its woods adapted for the
defensive purpose in view, constituted one of the most complete
schemes of defense on the Champagne front and afforded cover
to a numerous artillery concealed in the woods of the glacis. On
this front, about three miles wide, the attack on September 25,
1915, achieved a mixed success. The troops on the left, after
having penetrated into the first trench, had their progress
arrested by machine guns. On the right, however, in spite of
obstacles presented by four successive trenches, each of which
was covered by a network of wire entanglements and was con-
cealed in the woods, where the French artillery had difficulty in
reaching them, the attacking troops gained about one and one-
half miles, took 700 prisoners and captured seven guns.
The advance here recommenced on September 27, 1915. The
left took possession of the woods lining the road from Saint-
Hilaire to Saint-Souplet as far as the Epine de Vedegrange.
Along the whole extent of the wooded heights as far as the
western side of the hollow at Souain the success was identical.
Notwithstanding the losses they sustained and the fatigue in-
volved in the incessant fighting, the troops pushed forward,
leaving behind them only a sufficient force to clear the woods of
isolated groups of Germans still remaining there. Between four
and six in the afternoon they arrived immediately in front of
the second German position. On the same day they penetrated
this position at two points, and captured a trench over a thou-
sand yards wide, called the "Parallel of the Epine de Vedegrange,"
which was duplicated almost throughout by another trench
(the parallel of the wood of Chevron) . A little farther east the
French also penetrated the German trench to a depth of about
450 yards. But it was impossible to take advantage of this
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE 71
breach owing to a concentration of the heavy German artillery,
a rapidly continued defense of the surrounding woods, and the
fire of machine guns which could not be approached. These
guns were planted in the trenches on the right and left of the
entry and exit of the breach. The results attained by the
French in this sector alone amounted to fifteen square miles of
territory organized for defenses throughout nearly the whole of
its extent. On September 28, 1915, they also took over 3,000
prisoners and forty-four cannon.
(2) Sector of Souain: The German lines round about Souain
described a wide curve. Close to the French trenches, to the
west at the Mill and to the east at the wood of Sabot, they
swerved to the extent of about a mile to the north of the village
and of the source of the Ain.
When the offensive was decided upon it was necessary, in
order to extend the French lines forward to striking distance,
to undertake sapping operations in parallel lines, and at times to
make dashes by night over the intervening ground. The men
working underground got into communication with the trenches
by digging alleys of communication. Under the eyes and the
fire of the Germans this difficult undertaking was carried out
with very slight loss. These parallel lines approached to within
a distance of 150 yards of the German trenches. The assault
was made in three different directions : on the west in the direc-
tion of Hills 167 and 174; in the center along a line running
parallel with the road from Souain to Pomme-Py, in the direction
of the farm of Navarin; on the east in the direction of the
woods intersected by the road from Souain to Tahure, and in
the direction of the Butte de Souain. The advance was extremely
rapid — on the left over 2,000 yards in less than an hour, in the
center over 3,000 yards in forty-five minutes. At 10 a. m. the
French had reached the farm of Navarin. Toward the east
the forward march was more difficult. Some German machine
guns stood their ground in the wood of Sabot and enormously
strengthened the German resistance. This defense was even-
tually overcome by surrounding them. Arriving at the wooded
region in that part where it is intersected by thf> road mentioned
72 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
above, the assailants joined tip on the 27th with those of their
comrades who were attacking to the north of Perthes. They
left behind them here, also, only sufficient men to clear the
woods of stragglers.
Parlementaires were sent to the Germans, who received them
with a volley of rifle shots and endeavored to escape during the
night. The majority were killed and the survivors surrendered.
Several batteries and a large quantity of war material remained
to the French. On the 28th, along the entire length of the
sector, they were immediately in front of the second German
line.
(3) Sector of Perthes: Between Souain and Perthes stretches
a wooded region in which heavy fighting had already taken place
in February and March. At that time the French had contrived
to take possession of the German defenses of the wood of Sabot
on the eastern extremity of this region. They had also made
some progress to the northwest of Perthes, on the summit of
Hill 200. But between these two positions the Germans had
retained a strong system of trenches forming a salient almost
triangular in shape, which the French nicknamed "la Poche"
(the Pocket). During the whole year a war of mining had
been going on, and the region, which was broken up by concave
constructions and intersected in all directions by trenches and
alleys of communication, constituted an attacking ground all the
more difficult because to the north of la Poche the rather thickly-
wooded Trou Bricot, the edges of which had been put in a state
of defense, obstructed a rapid advance. This wooded region
extends over a width of more than a mile. The arrangements
made for the attack contemplated, after the capture of la Poche,
the surrounding of the woods of the Trou Bricot The junction
was to be made at the road from Souain to Tahure, with the
troops assigned for the attack on the eastern border of the
hollow at Souain.
The ground to the east of the Trou Bricot was less difficult.
Open and comparatively flat it was defended on the north of
Perthes by a triple line of trenches distant 100 yards from each
other. At a distance of 1,000 to 1.200 yards a supporting
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE 73
trench, called the "York trench/9 was almost unique in its entire
construction. The open country beyond stretched for a distance
of two and one-half miles up to the second German position (Hill
195, Butte de Tahure) . The principal effort was directed against
this passage, the left flank of attack being secured by a sub-
sidiary action confined to the capture of la Poche.
At 9 a. m. the French artillery directed their fire successively
against the first-line trenches and the supporting trenches. The
attack took place in perfect order. The infantry were already
swarming into the German trenches when the German artillery
opened its defensive fire. The French counterhatteries ham-
pered the German pieces and the reserves in the rear suffered
little from their fire. At 9.45 a. m. the two columns which were
attacking the extremities of the salient of la Poche joined hands.
The position was surrounded. Those Germans who remained
alive inside it surrendered. At the same time a battalion was
setting foot in the defenses of the southern edges of the wood of
Trou Bricot. The battalion that followed, marching to the out-
side of the eastern edges, executed with perfect regularity a
"left turn" and came and formed up alongside the communica-
tion alleys as far as the supporting trench. At the same moment,
in the open country to the north of Perthes, the French troops
surmounted the three first-line trenches and, preceded by artil-
lery, made a quick march to the York trench and occupied it
almost without striking a blow.
Farther to the east, along the road from Perthes to Tahure,
the French advance encountered greater difficulties. Some
centers of the German resistance could not be overcome. A
sheltered machine gun continued its fire. An infantry officer,
with a petty officer of artillery, succeeded in getting a gun into
action at a distance of over 300 yards from the machine gun
and firing at it at close quarters. Of the troops that were
advancing to the north of Perthes, some made for the eastern
border of the wood of Bricot, where they penetrated into the
camps, ousting the defenders and surprising several officers in
bed. Late in the afternoon a French regiment had reached the
road from Souain to Tahure. Other units were marching
74 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
straight toward the north, clearing out the little woods on the
way. They there captured batteries of which the artillerymen
were "riveted to their guns by meana of bayonets/' The same
work of clearance was meanwhile being performed in the woods
extending east of the road from Perthes to Souain and Tahure,
where batteries were charged and captured while in action. At
this spot a regiment covered three miles in two hours and cap-
tured ten guns. From midday onward the rate of progress
slackened, the bad weather making it impossible for the French
artillery to see what was going on, and rendering the joining up
movements extremely difficult. From the Buttes de Souain and
Tahure the Germans directed converging fires on the French,
who were advancing there along very open ground. Neverthe-
less, they continued their advance as far as the slopes of Hill
198 and the Butte de Tahure and there dug themselves in.
The night passed without any German counterattack. In the
darkness the French artillery brought forward their heavy pieces
and several field batteries which had arrived immediately after
the attack beyond the York trench. At dawn the reconstituted
regiments made another forward rush which enabled them to
establish themselves in immediate contact with the second Ger-
man position from the Butte de Souain to the Butte de Tahure,
and even to seize several advanced posts in the neighborhood.
But on the lower slopes some of the wire entanglements remained
intact; a successful assault on them would have been possible
only after a fresh artillery preparation. Up to October 6, 1915,
the troops remained where they were, digging trenches and
organizing a defensive system which had to be constructed all
over again on ground devastated by German fire.
(4) Sector of Le Mesnil: It was to the north of Le Mesnil
that the French encountered the greatest German resistance. In
the course of the engagements of the preceding winter the French
had succeeded in securing a foothold on top of the hill numbered
196. The Germans remained a little to the east, in the "Ravin
des Cuisines" (Ravine of the Kitchens) . This the French now
took by assault, but could get no farther. The German .trenches,
constructed on the northern slopes of Hill 196, were so con-
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE 75
cealed from field observation that it was difficult for the artillery
to reach them. They were furthermore flanked on one side by
the twin heights of the Mamelles, and on the other by the Butte
du Mesnil. Some French units managed to penetrate into the
trenches to the eastward on the 25th, but a counterattack and
flank fires dislodged them again. To the west they did not cap-
ture the northern Mamelle till the night of October 1-2, 1915,
thereby surrounding the trapeze works that surmounted the
southern Mamelle.
(5) Sector of Beaus6jour: The French attacks launched north
of Beaus6jour met with more conspicuous success. Throwing
themselves on the first German lines the swarming invaders
rapidly captured the defense works in the woods of Fer de Lance
and Demi-Lune, and afterwards all the works known as the
Bastion. Certain units won the top of Maisons de Champagne
in one rush and darted past several batteries, killing the gunners
as they served their pieces. The same movement took them
across the intricate region of the mine "funnels9' of Beaus6jour
up to the wood intersected by the road to Maisons de Champagne.
There ihey encountered German artillerymen in the act of
unlimbering their guns. They killed the drivers and the horses ;
the survivors surrendered.
Farther westward the left wing of the attacking force
advanced with greater difficulty, being hampered by the small
forts and covered works with which the trenches were every-
where protected. At this moment the cavalry unexpectedly came
to the support of the infantry. Two squadrons of hussars gal-
loped against the German batteries north of Maisons de Cham-
pagne in the teeth of a fierce artillery fire. Thqr nevertheless
reached that part of the lines where the Germans still held their
ground. Machine guns rattled against the cavalry, dropping
many of their horses. The hussars dismounted and, with drawn
sabers, made a rush for the trenches. Favored by this diversion
the infantry simultaneously resumed their forward movement.
The German resistance broke down, and more than 600 were
taken prisoners. Later in the day of the 25th some German
counterattacks were made from the direction of Ripon, but
76 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
failed to drive the French from the Maisons de Champagne
summit. During the next few days a desperate struggle ensued
north of the summit in the vicinity of a defensive work called
the "Ouvrage de la Defaite," which the French took by storm,
lost it again, then recovered it, and finally were driven out by a
severe bombardment.
(6) Sector of Massiges: The safety of the French troops
which had advanced to the wood and the Maisons de Champagne
was assured by the capture of the heights of Massiges. This
sharply undulating upland (199 on the north and 191 on the
south) formed a German stronghold that was believed to be
impregnable. From the top they commanded the French posi-
tions in several directions. The two first attacking parties
marched out in columns at 9.15 a. m., preceded by field-artillery
fire. In fifteen minutes they had reached the summit. Then
their difficulties began. In the face of a withering rifle and
machine-gun fire they could proceed but slowly along the sum-
mits by the communication alleys, blasting their way through
with hand grenades, and supported by the artillery, which was
constantly kept informed of their movements by means of flag
signals. The Germans surrendered in large numbers as the
grenadiers advanced. The French formed an uninterrupted,
ever-lengthening chain of grenade-bearers in the communication
alleys, just as buckets of water were passed from hand to hand
at fires in former times. This chain started from Massiges and
each fresh arrival of grenades at the other end was accompanied
by a. further advance.
The fight continued in this manner from September 25, 1915,
to October 3, 1915, with fierce perseverance against stubborn
opposition. The Germans poured a continuous stream of reen-
forcements into the section and offered a resistance that has
rarely been equaled for obstinacy and courage. According to
French reports, they stood up to be shot down — the machine-
gun men at their guns, the grenadiers on their grenade chests.
Every attempt at counterattacking failed them. Having the
heights of Massiges in their possession enabled the French to
extend their gains toward Ville-sur-Tourbe, while taking in
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE 77
flank those trenches they had failed to capture by a frontal
attack. The loss of these heights seemed to have particularly
disturbed the German General Staff. It was at first denied in
the official reports, and then explained that the ground had been
abandoned owing to artillery fire, whereas the French Head-
quarters Staff claimed that they had captured the ground mainly
by hand-grenade fighting at close quarters.
The Battle of Champagne presents a number of curious
aspects. How came the Germans to be so overwhelmingly sur-
prised? Beyond all doubt, they expected a great French
offensive. In the orders of the day issued by General von
Ditfurth on August 15, 1915 — five weeks before the French
attack began — we read, "The possibility of a great French
offensive must be considered." General von Fleck was rather
late: on September 26, 1915, when the French had already
taken nearly the whole first-line trenches, he expressed the
opinion that "The French Higher Command appears to be dis-
posed to make another desperate effort." What is tolerably
certain is that the German General Staff did not foresee the
strength of the blow nor suspect the vigor with which it would
be delivered. Even the command on the battle field itself appar-
ently failed to recognize what was happening before their eyes.
Inside the shelters of the second line two German officers were
placidly enjoying the delights of morning in bed, when they
were disturbed by noises which it was beyond their wits to
account for. The door of their little house was rudely thrust
open and excited voices said rude things in French. Then bayo-
nets made their appearance, and soldiers, hot and breathing hard
after their steeplechase across the German trenches, pulled the
officers from their beds with scant respect, informing them
briefly that they were prisoners. This was the first intimation
which the stupefied officers received that the enemy had broken
through their lines.
Thqy seemed to have had an excessive confidence in the
strength of their first line, and the interruption of telephonic
communications had prevented their being informed of the rapid
French advance. Then as to the disposition and employment of
78 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
reserves : Here it looks as though that perfect organization and
semi-infallible precision which characterize the German army
had, for the nonce, gone awry in the Champagne conflict. In
order to make up for the insufficiency of the local reserves the
German military authorities had to put in line not only the
important units which they held at their disposal behind the
front (Tenth Corps brought back from Russia), but the local
reserves from other sectors (Soissons, Argonne, the Woevre,
Alsace), which were dispatched to Champagne one battalion
after another, and even in groups of double companies. Ill
provided with food and munitions, the reenforcements were
pushed to battle on an unknown terrain without indication as to
the direction they had to take and without their junction with
neighboring units having been arranged. Through the haste
with which the reserves were thrown under the fire of the
French artillery and infantry — already in possession of the
positions — the German losses must have been increased enor-
mously. A letter taken from a soldier of the 118th Regiment
may be cited as corroborative evidence: "We were put in a
motor car and proceeded at a headlong pace to Tahure, by way
of Vouziers. Two hours' rest in the open air with rain falling,
and then we had a six hours9 march to take up our positions.
On our way we were greeted by the fire of the enemy shells, so
that, for instance, out of 280 men of the second company only
224 arrived safe and sound inside the trenches. These trenches,
freshly dug, were barely thirty-five to fifty centimeters (12 to
17 in.) deep. Continually surrounded by mines and bursting
shells, we had to remain in them and do the best we could with
them for 118 hours without getting anything hot to eat. Hell
itself could not be more terrible. To-day, at about 12 noon, 600
men, fresh troops, joined the regiment. In five days we had
iost as many and more/9
The disorder in which the reenforcements were engaged
appears strongly from this fact: On only that part of the front
included between Maisons de Champagne and Hill 189 there
were on October 2, 1915, no fewer than thirty-two different bat-
talions belonging to twenty-one different regiments. During the
THE GREAT CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE - 79
days following the French rush through the first line, the Ger-
mans seemed to have but one idea, to strengthen their second
line to stem the advance. Their counterattacks were con-
centrated on a comparatively unimportant part of the battle
front in certain places, the loss of which appeared to them to be
particularly dangerous. Therefore on the heights of Massiges
the German military authorities hurled in succession isolated
battalions of the 123d, 124th and 120th regiments; of the Thir-
tieth Regular Regiment and of the Second Regiment Ersatz
Reserve (Sixteenth Corps), which were in turn decimated, for
these counterattacks, hastily and crudely prepared, all ended in
sanguinary failures. It was not the men who failed their
leaders, for they fought like tigers when reasonable oppor-
tunities were offered them.
That strong offensive capacity of the Germans seemed also,
on the occasion, to have broken down. General von Ditfurth's
order of the day bears witness to this: "It seemed to me that
the infantry at certain points was confining its action to a mere
defensive. ... I cannot protest too strongly against such an
idea, which necessarily results in destroying the spirit of
offensive in our own troops and in arousing and strengthening
in the mind of the enemy a feeling of his superiority. The
enemy is left full liberty of action and our action is subjected
to the will of the enemy."
It is of course impossible to estimate precisely what the
German losses were. There are certain known details, however,
which may serve to indicate their extent. One underofficer
declared that he was the only man remaining out of his company.
A soldier of the third battalion of the 123d Regiment, engaged
on the 26th, stated that his regiment was withdrawn from the
front after only two days9 fighting because its losses were too
great. The 118th Regiment relieved the 158th Regiment in the
trenches after it had been reduced to fifteen or twenty men per
company. Certain units disappeared completely, as for instance
the Twenty-seventh Reserve Regiment and the Fifty-second
Regular Regiment, which, by the evening of the 25th, had
left in French hands the first 13 officers and 933 men, and
F— War St. 4 ,
80 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the other 21 officers and 927 men. Certain figures may help to
arrive at the total losses. At the beginning of September, 1915,
the German strength on the Champagne front amounted to
seventy battalions. In anticipation of a French attack they
brought there, before the 25th, another twenty-nine battalions,
making a total of ninety-nine battalions. Reckoning the corre-
sponding artillery and pioneer formations, this would represent
115,000 men directly engaged. The losses due to the artillery
preparation and the first attacks were such that from September
25 to October 15, 1915, the German General Staff was compelled
to renew its effectives almost in their entirety by sending out
ninety-three fresh battalions. It is assumed that the units
engaged on September 25-26, 1915, suffered losses amount-
ing to from sixty to eighty per cent (even more for cer-
tain corps which had entirely disappeared). The new units
brought into line for the counterattacks, and subjected in con-
nection with these to an incessant bombardment, lost fifty per
cent of their effectives, if not more. Hence it would be hardly
overstating the case to set down 140,000 men as the sum of the
German losses in Champagne. It must also be taken into
account that of this number the proportion of slightly wounded
men able to recuperate quickly and return to the front was, in
the case of the Germans, very much below the average propor-
tion of other engagements, for they were unable to collect their
wounded. Thus nearly the whole of the troops defending the
first position fell into French hands.
After recounting the losses of one side, let us turn to analyze
the gains of the other. The French Jiad penetrated the German
lines on a front of over fifteen miles, and to a depth of two and
a half miles in some places, between Auberive and Ville-sur-
Tourbe. The territorial gains may be thus summarized : The
troops of the Republic had scaled the whole of the glacis of the
Epine de Vedegrange; they occupied the ridge of the hollow at
Souain; debouched in the opening to the north of Perthes to the
slopes of Hill 195 and as far as the Butte de Tahure ; carried the
western bastions of the curtain of le Mesnil ; advanced as far as
Maisons de Champagne and took by assault the "hand" of
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS 81
Massiges. The territory they had reconquered from the invaders
represented an area of about forty square kilometers. On and
from October 7, 1915, they beat back the furious efforts of the
Germans to regain the lost ground. Nevertheless, in spite of the
utmost resolution on the part of commanders, and of valor on
the part of the French troops, the Germans were not completely
overthrown, and the annihilating results expected from the
action of the mass of troops and guns employed were not
attained. It was a victory, but an indecisive one.
On October 5, 1915, General Joffre issued the following mani-
festo from Grand Headquarters :
"The Commander in Chief addresses to the troops under his
orders the expression of his profound satisfaction at the results
obtained up to the present day by the attacks. Twenty-five
thousand prisoners, three hundred and fifty guns, a quantity of
material which it has not yet been possible to gauge, are the
trophies of a victory the echo of which throughout Europe indi-
cates its importance.
"The sacrifices willingly made have not been in vain. All have
been able to take part in the common task. The present is a sure
guarantee to us of the future.
"The Commander in Chief is proud to command the finest
troops France has ever known."
CHAPTER IX
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS
EVER since August 16, 1915, a persistent and almost continu-
ous bombardment of the German lines had been carried out
by the French and, to a less extent, by the British and Belgian
artillery. The allied gunners appear to have distributed their
favors quite impartially. There was nothing in the action taken
to direct attention to one sector more than to another. The Vosges,
the Meurthe and Moselle, Lorraine and the Woevre, the Argonne,
82 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Champagne, the Aisne, the Somme, the Arras sector, Ypres and
the Yser, and the Belgian coast where the British navy had
joined in, all were subjected to a heavy, deliberate and effective
fire from guns of all calibers. As in Champagne, the rate of
fire quickened up on September 22, 1915. Great concentrations
of guns had been made at various points, and enormous quan-
tities of shells had been collected in readiness for the attack.
But the artillery preparation which immediately preceded that
attack in the west was of a most terrific description. Shortly
after midnight and in the early hours of Saturday morning,
September 25, 1915, the German positions were treated to a
bombardment that had rarely been equaled in violence. From
the Yser Canal down to the end of the French line the Allies9
guns took up the note, and soon the whole of the allied line was
thundering and reechoing with the infernal racket The German
lines became smothered in dust and smoke, their parapets simply
melted away, their barbed-wire entanglements disappeared.
Those sleeping thirty or forty miles away were awakened in the
night by the dull rumbling. The whole atmosphere was choked
with the noise, and so it continued throughout the day with
hardly an interval As if in anticipation of the coming onslaught
the German artillery had also raised the key of its fire to a
higher pitch several days before.
Simultaneously with the attack in Champagne, Sir John
French assumed the offensive on the British front. The main
British attack was directed in the neighborhood of Lens, against
Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. While the French troops were
rushing the German first line in Champagne, the British troops
executed a precisely similar movement south of La Bassfe Canal
to the east of Grenay and Vermelles. With the first rush they
captured the German trenches on a front of five miles, pene-
trating the lines in some places to a distance of 4,000 yards.
They conquered the western outskirts of Hulluch, the village of
Loos, with the mining works around it, and Hill 70. They lost
the quarries northwest of Hulluch again, but retook them on
the following day. Other attacks were made north of the La
Bassee Canal, which drew strong German reserves toward these
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS 88
points of the. lines, where hard fighting occurred throughout the
day with fluctuating success. The British also made another
attack on Hooge on either side of the Menin road. The assault
north of the road yielded the Bellewaarde Farm and ridge, but
the Germans subsequently recaptured this part South of the
road the attack gained about 600 yards of German trench. The
British took 2,600 prisoners, eighteen guns and thirty machine
guns in the first day. The Fourth British Army Corps, under
Sir Henry Rawlinson, had thus taken Loos and overrun Hill
70, a mile to the east, and even penetrated to Cite St. Auguste.
The Fifth Corps, under Sir Hubert Gough, on the left, had
stormed the quarries, taken Cite St. Elie, and occupied a portion
of the village of Haisnes. But the First Army, in its attack, had
not kept adequate reserves on hand; and those at first at
the disposal of the general in chief, which had to serve the
whole front and to be kept in hand in case of unexpected events,
came up too late to enable the British to hold and consolidate all
the ground they had won. The Ypres-Arras sector had been
more formidably fortified than any other portion of the German
front. It is an extremely thickly populated neighborhood, and
the terrain is full of difficulties. It could not be expected that
an advance here, at least from the outset, could be as rapid as
that in Champagne. Whereas in the latter it was a fight for
rivers, ridges and woods, in the close country north of Arras
the struggle raged in and around villages, houses, and for some
particular trench that had to be taken before the French and
British could enter the great plain that stretches down to Lille.
Every house along that part had been converted into a fortress.
When the superstructure had been blown to pieces by shell fire,
pioneers burrowed thirty or fifty feet below the cellars and thus
held on to the position.
To the right of the British in Artois, the French infantry
attack was directed toward the forest of Hache. Only eighty
or ninety yards separated the French from the German trenches,
and the French infantry, which attained its objective in a few
minutes, found the trenches a mass of ruins and almost deserted,
and the Germans retreating into the wood. The first wave of
84 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
attackers followed in pursuit, but they reached the second line
of trenches, situated in the middle of the wood, without meeting
any Germans in considerable force. They pushed on to the
eastern edge of the wood, but the Germans again put up no
defense, and their third-line trenches, on the fringe of the wood,
were likewise taken. Then came a halt in the advance. The
German commander pulled his men together and, with the
reserves which had come up in the meantime, launched a counter-
attack against the French, who had quickly established them-
selves in their newly captured positions. Heavy shells, high
explosives and shrapnel were raining in the trenches occupied
by the French, and but for the new steel helmets which had
recently been supplied, the casualties would have been enormous.
One man's helmet was split clean across the crown by a shell
splinter, but the man escaped with merely a scratch. The Ger-
mans came on in close formations, hurling grenades as they
marched. The atmosphere of the wood became almost insupport-
able with the smoke. Finally, the French hurled a veritable
torrent of grenades, which drove the Germans back and compelled
them to withdraw across the River Souchez. Boise Hache was
entirely won.
The British attack between La BassSe and Lens and the
French attack on the Souchez side were admirably coordinated,
and were directed mainly to assist the French to gain the
heights west of Vimy; which were the unattained object
of their efforts during May and June. By September 27, 1915,
the French had all Souchez in their hands, and were advancing
upon Givenchy. The capture of the Vimy heights was an item
of the highest importance, for to the eastward of them all the
ground was commanded by their fire, and the chances were that
the Germans would fall back on Douai and on the line of the
Lille-Douai Canal, once they were pushed off the high ground.
In the Argonne the German Crown Prince carried out desperate
attacks against the French first-line trenches at La Fille Morte
and Bolante. These the French repulsed with heavy losses to
the Germans, whose dead lay piled in heaps in front of the
positions.
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS 85
One result of the British attack was the hurried recall of the
active Corps of Prussian GuarcL from the eastern front — an
important relief to the hard-pressed Russians. This famous
corps was at the time split up into three groups ; the active corps
was with Mackensen in Galicia and in the advance upon Brest-
Litovsk. It was transferred to the Dvina after the fall of Brest,
and had since been engaged before Dvinsk. The Reserve Guard
Corps was in the central group of the German armies, and the
other, the Third Division, was still in Galicia. The British and
the Prussian Guards had made each other's acquaintance in the
Battle of Ypres.
At the end of the month Haisnes, on the northern flank of
the new British line, was still for the greater part in German
possession ; on the right flank the British were across the Lens-
La Bassee road. The British had captured not only the first
position of their enemy, but also a second or supporting line
which ran west of Loos. They were now up against the third
line. Sir John French reported having taken so far over 3,000
prisoners, twenty-one guns, and forty machine guns. The French
in Artois had taken a matter of 15,000 prisoners and a number
of guns. After obstinate day and night fighting they had
reached Hill 140, the culminating point of tjie crests of Vimy,
and the orchards to the south. The crown prince still plugged
away on this front with heavy artillery and aerial torpedoes.
Columns of flames began to issue from his trenches on September
27, 1915 — the inflammable liquid appeared to be a composition
of tar and petrol — and the smoke and flames, carried by the
wind blowing from the German trenches, soon reached the
French line and made the atmosphere intolerably hot and suffo-
cating for the French troops. Then suddenly out of the thick
fumes began to appear German infantry with fixed bayonets,
sent forward to the attack. They were literally mown down by
the fire from the French machine guns and rifles, but the wave
of attackers seemed unending, and by dint of overwhelming
numbers it poured into the French trenches. A terrible hand-
to-hand fight then ensued in an atmosphere so thick that it was
difficult to distinguish friend from foe. These clouds were not
86
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
0£UO*€TTG
ABiAIN
SCAL£bOFMILe%
RAILROAD
HIGHWAY*
THB FRENCH GAINS IN THE ABTOI8 REGION, SEPTEMBER, 1915
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS 87
poisonous, for the Germans had themselves to fight in them;
they were let loose to cover the infantry charge.
The French were compelled to retire, which they did, contesting
every foot of ground. Meanwhile, reenforcements had arrived
and these were at once thrown into the fighting line. The
French, however, were soon brought to a halt Asphyxiating and
lachrymatory bombs, which emitted bluish smoke as they ex-
ploded, began to fall in their midst Spurred on by their leaders
the men dashed on, passing through yet another of these barriers
of smoke until they came to grips with the attackers, who were
now coming on like a torrent, in close formation, shouting wildly.
Altogether, the scene was one that vividly brings to the imagina-
tion the truth of Sherman's dictum that "war is hell/' A mad
potpourri of dimly visible forms, struggling like demons, shoot-
ing, stabbing, hacking and roaring in an infernal caldron of
tar, poison, sulphur, tears and blood. Truly a worthy theme
for another Dante and a Gustave Dor6. For some time it looked
as if the French would be crumpled up, but reserves were steadily
streaming in, and eventually the attackers began to waver and
fall back. The French 75-millimeter Creusots came into play
again, and after a battle that lasted in all twenty-four hours, the
Germans were driven back to their own trenches.
In the morning of October 2, 1915, the Germans made a dem-
onstration in front of the Belgian trenches at Dixmude, con-
sisting of a bombardment and a violent discharge of bombs. On
one small section alone 400 bombs were dropped. The German
infantry broke into the Belgian trenches, but were dislodged
again in a few minutes.
The position which the British had captured was exceptionally
strong, consisting of a double line, including some large redoubts
and a network of trenches and bomb-proof shelters. Dugouts
were constructed at short intervals all along the line, some of
them being large caves thirty feet below the ground. The French
capture of Souchez was an event of considerable importance, for
the German High Command had issued orders for this section to
hold on to the last, that it was to be retained at all costs. The
road to the Douai plain was to be barred to the French, who
88 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
had to be held back behind the advanced works of the Artois
plateau. In May, 1915, the problem was to prevent the French
setting foot on the summits of Notre Dame de Lorette and of
the Topart Mill. The Germans sacrificed many thousands of
men with this object, but the French nevertheless made them-
selves masters of the heights which the Germans considered of
capital importance, and dislodged them from Carency and
Ablain-St. Nazaire. There remained only one stage to cover —
the Souchez Valley — to reach the last crest which dominated the
whole country to the east, and beyond which the ground is flat.
This task had been accomplished during the last few days of
September and the beginning of October. Souchez and its
advanced bastion, the Chateau Carleul, had been made into a for-
midable fortification by the changing of the course of the Carency
streams. The Germans had transformed the marshy ground to
the southeast of this front into a perfect swamp, which was
regarded as impassable. The German batteries posted at Angres
were able to enfilade the valley on the north. From behind the
crest of Hill 119 to Hill L40, which were covered with trenches
connected by a network of communication trenches, many
batteries were engaged against the French in the district of
Notre Dame de Lorette, Ablain-St. Nazaire and Carency. To
the north of Souchez the German trenches were still clinging to
the Notre Dame de Lorette slope.
The attack of September 25, 1915, was to overcome all these
obstacles. The artillery preparation, which lasted five days, was
so skillfully handled that, even before it was finished, many
German deserters came into the French lines declaring that they
had had enough. The infantry attack was delivered at noon on
September 25, 1915, and with one rush the French troops
reached the objectives which had been marked out for them —
the chateau and grounds of Carleul and the islet south of
Souchez. Meanwhile, other detachments carried the cemetery
and forced their way to the first slopes of Hill 119. On the left
the French troops advanced down the slopes of Notre Dame de
Lorette and made a dash at the Hache Wood, the western out-
skirts of which they reached twenty minutes after the attack
THE BRITISH FRONT IN ARTOIS 89
began. The capture of the wood has already been described.
The French attack on the right, being held up by machine-gun
fire, could not be maintained in the cemetery, and it was decided
to approach Souchez by the main road so that they might pour
in their forces on the east, while, to the north, the French force
that had bitten its way into the Hache Wood was to continue its
advance. This maneuver decided the day. The Germans, who
were in danger of. being cut off in Souchez, abandoned their
positions, and those who had retaken the cemetery, being in the
same perilous circumstances, regained by their communication
trenches their second line on the slopes of Hill 119. Thus fell
Souchez to the French in two days. The allied offensive was a
short and sharp affair, skillfully planned and bravely executed,
but disappointing in result. At the great price of 50,000
casualties the British had overthrown the Germans on a front
of five miles, and in some places to a depth of 4,000 yards, and
had captured many prisoners and guns; but they had not
definitely broken the German lines. At a heavy cost the Allies
on the western front had captured about 160 German guns and
disposed of 150,000 Germans, including some 27,000 prisoners,
and the result of their efforts was to shake the Germans in the
west very severely and to call back to France many troops from
the eastern front. That the blow was regarded by the kaiser
as a serious one was shown by an Order of the Day in which he
declared that every important success obtained by the Allies on
the western front "will be considered as due to the culpable
negligence of the German commanders, who will lay themselves
open to being punished for incompetence." But if the Allies'
successes were due to hard fighting and brilliant dash, the fact
that they did not break right through the enemy's lines is
an eloquent testimony to the wonderful strength of the German
resistance. The marvel was that any were left alive in the first
line after the preliminary bombardment to face the bayonets
and grenades of the attackers. In a report from German Gen-
eral Headquarters, dated September 29, 1915, Max Osborn,
special correspondent of the "Vossische Zeitung," described how
the French artillery swept the hinterland of the German posi-
90 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
tions in Champagne and then concentrated upon these. 'The
violence of the fire then reached its zenith. Hitherto it had been
a raging, searching fire ; now it became a mad drumming, beyond
all power of imagination. It is impossible to convey any idea of
the savagery of this bombardment. Never has this old planet
heard such an uproar. An officer who had witnessed during the
summer the horrors of Arras, of Souchez, and of the Lorette
Heights, told me that those were not in any way to be compared
with the present, beyond all conception, appalling artillery
onslaught. Day and night for fifty hours, at some points for
seventy hours, the guns vomited destruction and murder against
the Germans, the German trenches and against the German
batteries. Strongly built trenches were covered in and ground
to/ powder; their edges and platforms were shorn off and con-
verted into dust heaps; men were buried, crushed, and inevitably
suffocated — but the survivors stood fast." A German soldier
told how, in the fierce hand-to-hand fighting which followed, a
Frenchman and a German flew at each other's throat, and how
they fell, both pierced by the same bullet, still locked in each
other's grip. And so, too, they were buried. Courage is not the
monopoly of any race or nation.
CHAPTER X
THE BATTLE OF LOOS
AT 5.50 a. m. on September 25, 1915, a dense, heavy cloud arose
«**» slowly from the earth — a whitish, yellowish, all-enveloping
cloud that rolled slowly toward the German trenches — a little
too much to the north. Thousands of German bullets whistled
through that cloud, but it passed on, unheeding. The attack
began at 6.30.
A Scottish division had been ordered to take Loos and Hill 70.
It therefore played the first role in the battle, since it was on
Loos, of which Hill 70 is the gateway, that the efforts of all
THE BATTLE OP LOOS 91
converged from the north as well as the south. Brigade "X" of
the Scottish division was to execute an enveloping movement to
the north around Loos and to carry Hill 70 by storm. Brigade
"Y" meanwhile was to attack the Loos front, Brigade "Z"
remaining in reserve. By 7.05 a. m. the whole of the first line
was captured. The second line, covering Loos, was carried with
the same ease. The Germans, taken by surprise, were fleeing
toward Loos, where they put up a stern rear-guard fight, and
toward Lens, which was strongly fortified.
After the capture of the second line in front of Loos, "X" and
"Y" Brigades separated, "Y" surrounding the village with two
battalions, while the rest captured the village and cleaned it up.
It was stiff street fighting, the Germans being hidden away in
all sorts of corners with plenty of machine guns. The Scots
made a quick job of it, not stopping for trifles. It is related
that a sergeant, to whom two Germans had surrendered, pulled
a few pieces of string from his pocket, tied their hands together,
and passed them to the rear with the request, "Please forward/9
Brigade "X" had meanwhile thrown its enveloping net around
Loos without meeting much resistance. The British had reached
the top of Hill 70 by nine o'clock. The climb was a hard and
rough accomplishment, with the right flank under mitrailleuse
fire from Loos, and with the left exposed to fire from Pit 14A;
but it was accomplished far too quickly. Serious disasters fre-
quently occur in war through tardiness; in this case a possible
great victory was missed through being too quick and arriving
too early. When the brigadier got up to Loos he saw his men
vanishing in the distance. A strong German redoubt, over the
ether side of the hill crest, was not even defended. The brigade
crossed the Lens-La Bass^e road, which runs along the height,
carried the third German line on the opposite slope, and at 9.20
it was outside St. Auguste. Unfortunately for the British, the
corps commander, who arrived at this moment with his staff in
hot haste, was unable to get his unit in hand again. Overflowing
with offensive ardor, he had thrown his men forward with a most
impetuous movement, and they got out of hand. The brigade
turned at right angles and got into the suburbs of Lens. It
92 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
seemed as though the gates of the northern plain were about to
be smashed in. Then the great danger appeared. There was
still no great converging movement from the south, where a
British division and French troops were engaged. Touch was
also lost to the north. The neighboring division in this direction
was held up until the afternoon by wire entanglements. The
left flank of the brigade was at the mercy of a German counter-
attack, but the Germans did not launch it, for they had not the
men. What they did, however, was to concentrate on the brigade
a murderous fire from Loos in the south, Lens in the east, St.
Auguste in the north, and Pit 14A and two or three neighboring
houses in the west. They were even seen hastily installing
machine guns along the railway embankment northeast of Lens.
Shattered by fire, uncertain of its direction, shaken by the
very quickness of its previous advance, the brigade hesitated,
sowed the ground with its dead, and retired in good order on
Hill 70, where it intrenched slightly below the redoubt aban-
doned by the Germans during the attack and which was now
reoccupied by them. As a matter of fact, the screening gas
clouds hindered rather than helped the attack. The Scottish
division was exhausted, but if fresh troops had come up and a
fresh attack had been delivered against the Germans, who were
gathering all their men in the Douai region, the German front
would undoubtedly have been pierced like cardboard. Brigade
"X" had made a path, and if only reenforcements had arrived
without delay the path would have become a highroad — would
have become the whole of Douai plain. Not until nightfall were
the reserves forthcoming. It is evident that, in this first day,
advantage was not taken of the results achieved.
Though long-range fighting was incessantly kept up around
Loos, nothing of importance happened till October 8, 1915, when
the Germans, after an intense bombardment with shells of all
calibers, launched a violent attack on Loos and made desperate
efforts to recapture their lost positions. The main efforts were
directed against the chalk pit north of Hill 70, and between
Hulluch and the Hohenzollern redoubt. In the chalk pit attack,
the Germans assembled behind some woods which lay from 300
THE BATTLE OF LOOS 93
to 500 yards from the British trenches. Between these woods
and the British line the attacking force was mown down by
combined rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, not a man getting
within forty yards of the trenches.
Farther to the south, between Hulluch and the quarries, the
attack was also repelled, the British securing a German trench
west of Cite St. Elie. The Germans did succeed in penetrating
the British front in the southern communication trench of the
Hohenzollern redoubt, but were shortly after expelled again by
British bombers.
British flying men played an important part in the Battle of
Loos and in the preparations that preceded it. Troops and guns
had to be moved at night so that the German aeroplanes might
not note the concentration. Hence it was decided that British
aeros should warn off the German flyers by day. They prob-
ably outnumbered the German machines by eight to one. As the
attack proceeded a flock of aeroplanes was cutting circles and
dipping and turning over the battle field as if in an exhibition
of airmanship. They appeared to be disconnected from the
battle, but no participants were more busy or intent than they.
All the panorama of action was beneath them ; they alone could
really "see" the battle if they chose. But each aviator stole only
passing glimpses of the whole, for each one was intent on his
part, which was to keep watch of whether the shells of the
battery to which he reported were on the target or not. To
distinguish whose shell-burst was whose in the midst of that
cloud of dust and smoke over the German positions seemed as
difficult as to separate the spout of steam of one pipe from
another when a hundred were making a wall of vapor. Yet so
skilled is the well-trained airman that he can tell at a glance.
It is not difficult to spot shells when only a' few batteries are
firing, but when perhaps a hundred guns are dropping shells on
a half-mile front of trench, a highly trained eye is required.
Occasionally a plane was observed to sweep down like a hawk
that had located a fish in the water. At all hazards that intrepid
aviator was going to identify the shell-bursts of the batteries
which he represented. The enemy might have him in rifle range,
94 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
but they were too busy trying to hold up the British infantry
to fire at him. Other aeroplanes were dropping shells on railway
trains and bridges, to hinder the Germans, once they had
learned where the force of the attack was to be exerted, from
rushing reenf orcements to the spot For that kind of work,
as for all reconnaissances, the aviators like low-lying clouds.
They slip down out of these to have a look around and drop a
bomb— thus killing two birds with one stone — and then rise to
cover before the enemy can bring his antiaircraft guns to bear.
A German description of the Battle of Loos says that during
the preliminary gas attack the British artillery was hurling gas
bombs upon the Germans. The latter coughed and held their
ground as long as they could, but many fell, unable to resist the
fumes, In the midst of all this the Germans were preparing for
the expected infantry attack. Finally the British appeared,
emerging suddenly as if from nowhere, behind a cloud of gas,
and wearing masks. They came on in thick lines and storming
columns. The first line of the attackers were quickly shot down
by the hail of rifle and machine-gun bullets that rained upon
them from the shattered German trenches. The dead and
wounded soon lay like a wall before the German position. The
second and third lines of the British suffered the same fate. It
was estimated that the number of British killed before this
German division alone amounted to 8,000 to 10,000. The fourth
line of attackers, however, finally succeeded in overrunning the
decimated front line of Germans, who stood by their guns to the
very last ; those of them who had not fallen were made prisoners.
Not one of them returned to tell what happened in this terrific
fighting. The British are stated to have attacked in an old-
fashioned, out-of-date manner that made the German staff
officers stare in open-mouthed wonder. "Eight ranks of infantry,
mounted artillery, cavalry in the background — that was too
much ! A veritable battle plan of a past age, the product of a mind
in its dotage, and half a century behind the times! Splendidly,
with admirable courage, the English troops came forward to the
attack. They were young, wore no decorations ; they carried out
with blind courage what their senile commanders ordered— and
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9fc THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
this in a period of mortars, machine guns and the telephone.
Their behavior was splendid, but all the more pitiable was the
breakdown of their attack/'
Connected with the Battle of Loos there was one little person
who deserves a chapter in history — all to herself — and that is
Mile, Emilienne Moreau, a young French girl who lived — and
probably still lives — with her parents in the storm-battered
village of Loos. She was seventeen years of age at the time she
became famous, and was studying to be a school-teacher. She
was "mentioned in dispatches" in the French Official Journal in
these terms:
"On September 26, 1915, when the British troops entered the
village of Loos, she organized a first-aid station in her house and
worked day and night to bring in the wounded, to whom she gave
all assistance, while refusing to accept any reward. Armed
with a revolver she went out and succeeded in overcoming two
German soldiers who, hidden in a near-by house, were firing at
the first-aid station/9
This, however, was not a complete list of the exploits of la
petite Moreau. She shot two Germans when their bayonets
were very close to her, and later, snatching some hand bombs
from a British grenadier's stock, she accounted for three more
who were busy at the same occupation. Furthermore, "when
the British line was wavering under the most terrible cyclone of
shells ever let loose upon earth, Emilienne Moreau sprang for-
ward with a bit of tricolored bunting in her hand and the
glorious words of the 'Marseillaise9 on her lips, and by her
fearless example averted a retreat that might have meant dis-
aster along the whole front. Only the men who were in that
fight can fully understand why Sir Douglas Haig was right in
christening her the Joan of Arc of Loos."
A more mature French Amazon is Madame Louise Arnaud,
the widow of an officer killed in the war. She commanded a corps
of French and Belgian women who were permitted by the War
Minister to don uniforms. The corps was intended for general
service at the front, one-third of them being combatants, all able
to ride, shoot and swim.
THE BATTLE OP LOOS 97
After the great allied offensive in the west had spent its force
rather the force of its initial momentum — quite an interest-
ing battle broke out, this time on paper. It consisted on the one
side of an attempt to estimate the results of success and to attach
to them the highest possible value. The energy of the other side
was devoted to belittling these results and proclaiming the alleged
futility of the venture. Thus, King George telegraphed to Sir
John French on September 30, 1915 :
"I heartily congratulate you and all ranks of my army under
your command upon the success which has attended their gallant
efforts since the commencement of the combined attack/'
Lord Kitchener sent this message:
"My warmest congratulations to you and all serving under
you on the substantial success you have achieved. . . ."
In his report of October 3, 1915, General French stated that
'The enemy has suffered heavy losses, particularly in the many
counterattacks by which he has vainly endeavored to wrest back
the captured positions, but which have all been gallantly repulsed
by our troops. ... I feel the utmost confidence and assurance
that the same glorious spirit which has been so marked a feature
throughout the first phase of this great battle will continue until
our efforts are crowned by final and complete victory."
The following sentence is culled from the French official report
on the fighting in Champagne:
" . . Germans surrendered in groups, even though not sur-
rounded, so tired were they of the fight, and so depressed by
hunger and convinced of our determination to continue our effort
to the end. . . ."
Rather contradictory in tone and substance were the German
dispatches:
'The German General Staff recently invited a number of news-
paper men from neutral countries — the United States, South
America, Holland, and Rumania — to inspect the fighting line in
the west during time of battle. . . . They are thus enabled to
verify the reports from the German headquarters concerning
this greatest and most fearful battle fought on the western front
since the beginning of the war. They are, accordingly, in a
98 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
position to state that exaggerated statements are made in the
reports from French headquarters, and to confirm the facts that
the Germans were outnumbered several times by the French;
that the French suffered terrific and unheard-of losses, in spite
of several days of artillery preparation ; that the French attacks
failed altogether, as none of them attained the expected result,
and that the encircling movement of General Joffre is without
tangible result" 'The world presently shall see the pompously
advertised grand offensive broken by the iron will of our people
in arms. . . . They are welcome to try it again if they like."
"French and English storming columns in unbroken succession
roll up against the iron wall constituted by our heroic troops.
As all hostile attacks have hitherto been repulsed with gigantic
losses, particularly for the English, the whole result of the
enemy's attack, lastimg for days, is merely a denting in of our
front in two places. . . ." No wonder neutrals were sometimes
puzzled.
CHAPTER XI
THE CAV1LL C A SI — ACCIDE NT TO
KING GEORGE
ON October 15, 1915, the United States Ambassador in London
informed the British Foreign Office that Miss Edith Cavell,
lately the head of a large training school for nurses in Brussels,
had been executed by the German military authorities of that
city after sentence of death had been passed on her. It was
understood that the charge against Miss Cavell was that she had
harbored fugitive British and French soldiers and Belgians of
military age, and had assisted them to escape from Belgium in
order to join the colors. Miss Cavell was the daughter of a
Church of England clergyman, and was trained as a nurse at the
London Hospital. On the opening of the Ecole Beige d'ln-
firmi&res Diptamfas, Brussels, in 1907, she was appointed matron
of the school. She went there with a view to introduce into
THE CAVELL CASE 99
Belgium British methods of nursing and of training nurses.
Those who knew Miss Cavell were impressed by her strength of
character and unflinching devotion. She could have returned to
England in September, 1914, shortly after the outbreak of the
war, when seventy English nurses were able to leave Belgium
through the influence of the United States Minister, but she
chose to remain at her post. The execution, which was accom-
panied by several barbaric features, raised a great outcry of
public indignation not only throughout the British Empire, but
also in most neutral countries. That indignation rose to a still
higher pitch when, on October 22, 1915, the report on the case,
by Mr. Brand Whitlock, United States Minister in Belgium, was
published in the press. From the report it appeared, what the
world had hitherto been ignorant of, that Mr. Whitlock had made
the most strenuous efforts to save the unfortunate lady from
death. His humanitarian labors in that direction were strongly
seconded by the Spanish Minister in Brussels.
Miss CavelPs mother, a widow, residing at Norwich, received
the following letter of sympathy from the king and queen :
"Buckingham Palace,
"October 23, 1915.
"Dear Madam :
"By command of the King and Queen I write to assure you
that the hearts of their Majesties go out to you in your bitter
sorrow, and to express their horror at the appalling deed which
has robbed you of your child. Men and women throughout the
civilized world, while sympathizing with you, are moved with
admiration and awe at her faith and courage in death.
"Believe me, dear Madam,
"Yours very truly,
"Stamfordham."
The report described how Mr. Hugh S. Gibson, the Secretary
of the American Legation, sought out the German Governor,
Baron von der Lancken, late at night before the execution, and,
with the Spanish Minister pleaded with him and the other Ger-
man officers for the Englishwoman's life. There was a reference
100 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
to an appalling lack of good faith on the part of the German
authorities in failing to keep their promise to inform the Ameri-
can Minister fully of the trial and sentence. Mr. Whitlock's
final appeal was a note sent to Von Lancken late on the night of
October 11, 1915, which read as follows :
"My dear Baron : I am too sick to present my request myself,
but I appeal to your generosity of heart to support it and save
from death this unhappy woman. Have pity on her.
"Yours truly,
"Brand Whitlock."
The next day Mr. Whitlock telegraphed to our Ambassador in
London: "Miss Cavell sentenced yesterday and executed at 2
o'clock this morning, despite our best efforts, continued until the
last moment" The sentence had been confirmed and the execu-
tion ordered to be carried out by General von Bissing, the
German Governor General of Belgium.
The British press drew an apposite parallel between the sum-
mary execution of Miss Cavell in Belgium and the course taken
in England in the case of Mrs. Louise Herbert, a German, and
the wife of an English curate in Darlington. She had been sen-
tenced to six months' imprisonment as a spy. According to
English criminal law every condemned person is entitled to
appeal against the sentence inflicted. Mrs. Herbert availed her-
self of this indisputable right, and her appeal was heard at
Durham on October 20, 1916 — eight days after the execution of
Miss Cavell. The female spy admitted that she had sought infor-
mation regarding munitions and intended to send this informa-
tion to Germany. She also admitted that she had corresponded
with Germany through friends in Switzerland. Here, according
to military law, was a certain case for the death sentence, which
would undoubtedly have been carried out in the Tower had the
accused been a man. It must be borne in mind that the Court of
Appeals in England has the power to increase a sentence as well
as to reduce or quash it altogether. Astonished by her frank
answers, the judge remarked: "This woman has a conscience —
she wishes to answer truthfully and deserves credit for that. At
THE CAVELL CASE 101
the same time, she is dangerous/' He then gave judgment that
the sentence of six months' imprisonment should stand. No
charge of espionage was preferred against Miss Cavell. She was
refused the advocate Mr. Whitlock offered to provide her with,
and the details of the secret trial have not been made public.
Whatever may be the right or the wrong of the case, it is
reasonably safe to apply to it the famous dictum of Fouche on
Napoleon's execution of the Due d'Enghien : "It is worse than a
crime ; it is a blunder." It certainly had the effect of still further
embittering the enemies of Germany. Perhaps no incident of
the great world war will be more indelibly imprinted on the
British mind than this. Many thousands of young Englishmen
who had hitherto held back rushed to join the colors. "Edith
Cavell Recruiting Meetings" were held all over the United
Kingdom. A great national memorial service was held in St*
Paul's Cathedral in London, where representatives of the king
and queen, statesmen, the nobility and thousands of officers and
soldiers attended. The Dowager Queen Alexandra, who is the
patron of the great institution now in course of erection and
known as the "Queen Alexandra Nurses' Training School,"
expressed the desire that her name should give place to that of
Miss Cavell, and that the institution shall be called "The Edith
Cavell Nurses' Training School."
Within a month of her death it had been decided to erect a
statue to the memory of Miss Cavell in Trafalgar Square. Sir
George Frampton, R.A., President of the Royal Society of British
Sculptors, undertook to execute the statue without charge.
The most permanent memorial of the death of Nurse Cavell
will be a snow-clad peak in the Rocky Mountains, which the
Canadian Government has decided to name "Mount Cavell."
It is situated fifteen miles south of Jasper, on the Grand Trunk
Pacific Railway, near the border of Alberta, at the junction of
the Whirlpool and Athabasca Rivers, and has a height of more
than 11,000 feet.
A curious sequel followed the execution of Miss Cavell. Nearly
three months later, on January 6, 1916, a young Belgian was
found shot dead in Schaerbeek, a suburb of Brussels. The Ger-
102 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
man authorities took the matter in hand for investigation, but in
the meantime General von Biasing fined the city of Brussels
500,000 marks and the suburb of Schaerbeek 50,000 marks on the
plea that the murder had been committed with a revolver, the
Germans having ordered that all arms should be surrendered at
the town hall. But there was more in this affair than an ordinary
crime. The "Echo Beige/' published in Amsterdam since the
German occupation of Belgium, revealed that the punitive action
by the German authorities was prompted by something other
than an infringement of the regulations. The body found was
that of a certain Niels de Rode, and he it was who denounced
Miss Cavell and also betrayed several Belgians — his own country-
men— who were trying to cross the frontier to join the army.
The "Echo Beige" asserted that De Rode was executed by Belgian
patriots to avenge the betrayal of Miss Cavell. The anger of
the German authorities was explained by the loss of their
informer.
On October 22, 1915, London was officially informed that 'The
king is in France, where he has gone to visit his army. His
majesty also hopes to see some of the allied troops." This was
not the king's first visit to the battle line, and, as before, his
departure from England and arrival on the Continent had been
kept a secret until he had reached his destination. The king
traveled by automobile from Havre to various parts of the
British and French lines, "somewhere in France," inspecting
troops and visiting hospitals. The royal tour was brought to a
premature close on the morning of the 28th owing to an unfor-
tunate accident The king had just finished the second of two
reviews of troops representing corps of the First Army when
his horse, frightened by the cheers of the men, reared and fell,
and his majesty was severely bruised. Twice the horse (a mare)
reared up when the soldiers burst suddenly into cheers at only
a few yards' distance. The first time the mare came down again
on her forefeet, but the second time she fell over and, in falling,
rolled slightly on to the king's leg. The announcement of the
king's mishap came with dramatic suddenness to the assembled
officers and troops. The troops of the corps which he had first
THE CAVELL CASE 108
inspected could hear from where they stood the cheers of their
comrades about a mile away, which told them that the second
review was over, and that the king would pass down the road
fronting them in a few minutes. The orders to raise their caps
and cheer were shouted to the men by the company officers, and
then the whole corps, with bayoneted rifles at the slope, advanced
in brigade order across the huge fallow field in which they had
been drawn up to within thirty yards or so of the road. In a
few minutes a covered green automobile was seen tearing down
the road at full speed, and as it drew up opposite the center of
the corps the cheering began to spread all along the line. In the
enthusiasm of the moment the majority did not notice that the
ear was not flying the royal standard, and even when an officer,
with the pink and white brassard of an Army Corps Staff,
jumped out of the car and began to shout hasty instructions few
realized their mistake and his words were carried away down
the tempestuous wind that raged at the time. Then the officer
hurried here and there calling out that the king had met with
an accident and that there was to be no cheering. A few of
those in the center caught his words, but the news had not spread
to more than a fraction of the whole body before the king's car
drove past A curious spectacle now presented itself. Along
one portion of the front the men stood silently at attention,
while their comrades on either side of them, and yet other troops
farther away down the road, were raising their caps on their
bayonets and cheering with true British lustiness. Some could
catch a glimpse of the king as his car dashed swiftly by. He
was sitting half-bent in the corner of the vehicle, and his f ac*
wore a faint smile of acknowledgment The king's injuries
proved to be worse than was at first supposed, necessitating his
removal to London on a stretcher.
104 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XII
OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE AND ARTOIS —
PREPARATIONS FOR WINTER CAMPAIGN
BY the middle of October operations on the western front cen-
tralized almost entirely in the Champagne and Artois dis-
tricts, where the Germans, fully appreciating the menace to
their lines created by the results of the allied offensive, sought
by continuous violent counterattacks to recover the territory
from which they had been dislodged and to prevent the Allies
from consolidating and strengthening their gains. Their attacks
in the Artois fell chiefly between Hulluch and Hill 70, and south-
east of Givenchy, against the heights of Petit Vimy. The Ger-
mans succeeded in retaking small sections of first-line trenches,
but lost some of their new trenches in return. Whereas the
Allies held practically all they had gained, the Germans were
considerably the losers by the transaction. The British attempted
to continue their offensive by driving between Loos and Hulluch,
the most important and at the same time the most dangerous
section on the British front. By steadily forging ahead south-
east of Loos toward Hill 70, the British were driving a wedge
into the German line and creating a perilous salient around the
town of Angres as the center. To obviate the danger from
counterattacks against the sides of the salient, the British en-
deavored to flatten out the point of the wedge by capturing more
ground north of Hill 70 toward Hulluch. To some extent the
plan succeeded ; they advanced east of the Lens-La Bass6e road
for about 500 yards, an apparently insignificant profit, but it
had the effect of strengthening the British position.
Uninterrupted fighting in Champagne had made little differ-
ence to either side, save that the French had managed to
straighten out their line somewhat, though they were by no
means nearer to their desired goal — the Challerange-Bazan-
court railway. If that could be taken, the Germans facing them
would be cut off from the crown prince's army operating in the
OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE AND ARTOIS 105
Argonne. Bulgaria had meanwhile entered the conflict and
started the finishing campaign of Serbia with the assistance of
her Teutonic allies.
Between October 19 and October 24, 1915, the Germans made
eight distinct attacks in the Souchez sector in Artois, attempting
to loosen the French grip on Hill 140. In this venture the First
Bavarian Army Corps was practically wiped out by terrible
losses. Each attack was reported to have been repulsed. Com-
menting on the same event, the German report said that ". . •
enemy advances were repulsed. Detachments which pene-
trated our positions were immediately driven back.9' Both sides
of the battle line now settled down to the same round of seesaw
battles of the preceding midsummer ; attacks and counterattacks ;
trenches captured and recaptured; here a hundred yards won,
there a hundred yards lost After almost every one of these
events the three headquarters issued statements to the effect
that 'the enemy was repelled with heavy losses,9' or that some
place or other had been "recaptured by our troops." On October
24, 1915, the French in Champagne made some important prog-
ress. In front of their (the French) position the Germans
occupied a very strongly organized salient which had resisted
all previous attacks. In its southwestern part, on the northern
slopes of Hill 196, at a point one and a quarter miles to the north
of Meenil-les-Hurlus, this salient included a valuable strategic
position called La Courtine (The Curtain), which the French
took after some severe fighting. La Courtine extended for a
distance of 1,200 yards with an average depth of 250 yards, and
embracing three or four lines of trenches connected up with
underground tunnels and the customary communication
trenches, all of which had been thoroughly prepared for defense.
In spite of the excellence of these works and the ferocious re-
sistance of the German soldiers, the French succeeded in taking
this position by storm after preparatory artillery fire. On the
same day that this was announced, the Berlin report put it thus :
"In Champagne the French attacked near Tahure and against
our salient north of Le Mesnil, after a strong preparation with
their artillery. Near Tahure their attack was not carried out
106 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to its completion, having been stopped by our fire. Late in the
afternoon stubborn fighting was in progress on the salient north
of Le Mesnil. North and east of this salient an attack was re-
pulsed with severe French losses."
The following two interesting reports were issued on Octo-
ber 27, 1915:
Paris Berlin
After having exploded in the After the explosion of a
neighborhood of the road from French mine on the Lille-Arras
Arras to Lille ... a series of road an unimportant engage-
powerful mines which de- ment developed, which went in
stroyed the German intrench- our favor,
ments . . . our troops immedi-
ately occupied the excavations.
They installed themselves
there, notwithstanding a very
riolent bombardment and sev-
eral counterattacks by the
enemy, who suffered serious
losses. We captured about 30
prisoners.
An important event happened in France on October 28, 1915,
when the Viviani Cabinet resigned, much to the general sur-
prise of the nation. The result of the change of government
was that M. Aristide Briand, one of the aggressive and militant
members of the Socialist party, succeeded as Premier and
Foreign Secretary, M. de Freycinet became Vice President of
the Council, and General Gallieni Minister for War. It was not
a "political crisis/9 but a union of the parties — a coalition, such
as the British Government had already adopted. The change
implied a distribution of responsibility among the leading men
of all parties, a useful measure to stifle criticism and insure
unanimity of purpose. M. Viviani reentered the new Cabinet
as Minister of Justice. For the first time in the history of the
French Republic a coalition ministry of all the opposing factions
was formed.
OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE AND ARTOIS 107
Some stir and much speculation was caused when General
Joffre visited London at the end of October and held another
conference with Lord Kitchener. It was generally understood
that some scheme for central military control was being pro-
moted, to render quicker decisions and coordinate action possible.
It was obvious that matters of vital interest had brought the
French Generalissimo to London. Shortly before his departure
it leaked out that the British Government had for some time
contemplated the creation of a new General Staff composed of
experts to supervise the prosecution of the war, and it was be-
lieved, perhaps with justification, that General Joffre had come
to give his opinion on the matter. On November 17, 1915, the
first meeting of the Anglo-French War Council was held in
Paris. The British members in attendance were the Prime
Minister, Mr. Arthur James Balfour, First Lord of the Ad-
miralty; Mr. David Lloyd-George, Minister of Munitions, and
Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The
French participants were Premier Briand, General Gallieni, Ad-
miral Lacaze, Minister of Marine, and General Joffre.
At the beginning of November a temporary lull had set in on
parts of the western front, and the center of interest was for
the time shifted to the Balkans. The French and British seemed
unable to continue their offensive operations and were, for the
most part, confined to their trenches and such territory as they
had wrested from the Germans during September and early
October. On October 30, 1915, the Germans had again begun
a series of determined offensives in Artois and Champagne.
They met with considerable success in the initial stages, for on
the morning of the 31st they had gained about 1,200 yards of the
French trenches near Neuville-St. Vaast and on the summit of
the Butte de Tahure, capturing 1,600 French soldiers. The
struggle for the Neuville trenches continued for days, during
which the positions changed hands at short intervals.
In Champagne the Germans, after a fresh artillery prepara-
tion, with the employment of suffocating shells of large caliber,
renewed their attacks in the region to the north of Le Mesnil.
They delivered four successive assaults in +he course of the day
?10 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
able regularly to pay these large monthly installments was due
to the fact that the provincial authorities secured large support
from the Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Belgique, which bank expressed its
readiness, on certain conditions, to lend money to the provinces
and make payments for them, these transactions, of course, tak-
ing place under the supervision of the German authorities. On
the other hand, the Soci6t6 G6n6rale was granted by the Ger-
mans the exclusive right to issue bank notes, which had hitherto
been the privilege of the Belgian National Bank.
The uninterrupted and intense activity along the front with
grenades, mines and heavy guns can be only vaguely described
or even understood from the brief chronicles of the official
bulletins. This underground warfare, to which only dry refer-
ences are occasionally made, was carried on steadily by day and
by night. The mines, exploding at irregular intervals along the
lines, gave place to singular incidents which rarely reached the
public. Near Arras, in Artois, where sappers largely displaced
infantry, was related the story of two French sappers, Mauduit
and Cadoret, who were both decorated with the Military Medal.
The story of how they won this distinction is worth repeating:
They had dug their way under and beyond German trenches
when the explosion of a German mine between the lines cut their
gallery, leaving them imprisoned in a space eight feet long. This
happened at ten in the morning. They determined to dig toward
the surface and encouraged each other by singing Breton songs
in low tones while they worked. The air became foul and they
were almost suffocated. Their candles went out and left them to
burrow in absolute darkness. After hours of intense labor the
appearance of a glowworm told them that they were near the
surface. Then a fissure of the earth opened and admitted a
welcome draft of fresh air. The miners pushed out into the
clear starlight. Within arm's length they beheld the loophole of
a German trench and could hear German voices. The thought
seems not to have occurred to them to give themselves up, as
they could easily have done. Instead, they drew back and began
to dig in another direction, enduring still longer the distress
which they had already undergone so long without food or
OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE AND ARTOIS 111
drink. After digging another day they came out in the crater
of a mine. The night was again clear and it was impossible for
them to show themselves without being shot by one side or the
other. So they decided to hold out for another night. They lay
inside the crater exposed to shells, bombs, and grenades from
both sides, eating roots and drinking rain water. On the third
night Mauduit crept near the edge of the crater and got near an
advance sentinel, one of those pushed out at night beyond the
lines to protect against surprise. Cadoret, exhausted, lost his
balance and fell back into the crater. Under the German fire
Mauduit went back and helped his companion out. Both crawled
along the ground until they fell into the French trenches.
Attacks by French aeroplanes upon the German lines were
the main features of the day's fighting for November 28, 1915.
They damaged the aviation hangars near Mlilhausen, in Alsace,
and brought down two German machines. The Germans ex-
ploded a mine in front of the French works near the Labyrinth,
north of Arras, and succeeded in occupying the crater.
Near the end of November the sleet, snow and winds abated
and a dry frost accompanied by clear skies set in. Immediately
a perfect epidemic of aerial activity broke out. French, German,
British, and Belgian aeroplanes scoured the heavens in all direc-
tions, seeking information and adventure. Even the restless
artillery seemed inspired with still greater energy. German
ordnance belched its thunder around Aveling, Loos, Neuve
Chapelle, Armentteres, and Ypres, eliciting vigorous responses
from the opposite sides. Aviators fought in the air and brought
each other crashing to earth in mutilated heaps of flesh, frame-
work and blazing machinery. No fewer than fifteen of these
engagements were recorded in one day. And yet, despite all the
bustle and excitement, the usually conflicting reports agreed
that there was nothing particular to report. Each sector ap-
peared to be conducting a local campaign on its own account.
The Switzerland correspondent of the since defunct London
"Standard" quoted, on November 30, 1915, from a remarkable
article by Dr. Heinz Pothoff, a former member of the Reichstag:
"Can any one doubt that the German General Staff will hesi-
H— War St. 4
112 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tate to employ extreme measures if Germany is ever on the
verge of real starvation? If necessary, we must expel all the
inhabitants from the territories which our armies have occupied,
and drive them into the enemy's lines; if necessary, we must kill
the hundreds of thousands of prisoners who are now consuming
our supplies. That would be frightful, but would be inevitable
if there were no other way of holding out."
On the last day of November a bill was introduced in the
French Chamber of Deputies by General Gallieni calling to the
colors for training the 400,000 youths of the class of 1917, who
in the ordinary course of events would not have been called out
for another two years. The war minister explained that it was
not the intention of the Government to send the new class, com-
posed of boys of 18 and 19, to the front at once, but to provide
for their instruction and training during the winter for active
service in the spring, when, "in concert with our allies, our re-
enforcements and our armaments will permit us to make the
decisive effort/' The bill was passed.
A British squadron bombarded the German fortifications on
the Belgian coast, from Zeebrugge to Ostend, for two hours on
November SO, 1915. The weather suddenly changed on the entire
western front. Rain, mist, and thaw imposed a check on the
operations, which simmered down to artillery bombardments at
isolated points. For the next three months the combatants
settled down to the exciting monotony of a winter campaign,
making themselves as comfortable as possible, strengthening
their positions, keeping a sharp eye on the enemy opposite, and
generally preparing for the spring drive. Great offensive and
concerted movements can only be carried out after long and
deliberate preparations. The Allies had shot their bolt, with
only partial success, and considerable time would have to elapse
before another advance on a big scale could be undertaken.
Hence the winter campaign developed into a series of desultory
skirmishes and battles, as either side found an opportunity to
inflict some local damage on the other. For the Allies it was
part of the "war of attrition," or General Joffre's "nibbling
process."
OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE AND ARTOIS 113
The Germans had gone through a bitter experience in
Champagne; but with military skill and energy they set to
work improving their defenses. At intervals of approximately
500 yards behind their second line they constructed underground
strongholds known as "starfish defenses/9 which cannot be de-
tected from the surface : About thirty feet below the ground is
a dugout of generous dimensions, in which are stored machine
guns, rifles, and other weapons. Leading from this underground
chamber to the surface are live or six tunnels, jutting out in
different directions, so that their outlets form half a dozen points
in a circle with a diameter of perhaps 100 yards. In each of the
tunnels was laid a narrow-gauge railway to allow the machine
guns to be speedily brought to the surface. At the mouth of the
tunnels were two gun platforms on either side, and the mouth
itself was concealed by being covered over with earth or grass.
The defenses were also mined, and the mines could be exploded
from any one of the various outlets. On several occasions when
the French endeavored to press home their advantage they found
themselves enfiladed by machine guns raised to the surface by
troops who had taken up their places in the underground strong-
holds at the first menace to the second line. When one of the
outlets was captured, machine guns would appear at another;
while, if the French troops attempted to rush the stronghold, the
Germans took refuge in the other passages, and met them as
they appeared.
On the French and British side also, underground defense
works were of a most scientific and elaborate character. Trench
warfare has become an art. Away from the seat of war the
importance of the loss or the gain of a trench is measured by
yards. If you are in trenches on the plain, where the water is
a few feet below the surface, and all the area has been used as
a cockpit, you would wonder how any trench can be held. If, on
the other hand, you were snugly installed in a deep trench on a
chalk slope, you would wonder how any trench can be lost. Any
real picture of what a trench is like cannot be drawn or imagined
by a sensitive people. It is, of course, a graveyard— of Germans
and British and French. Miners and other workers in the soil
114 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
drive their tunnel or trench into inconceivable strata. They
come upon populous German dugouts, corked by some explosion
perhaps a year ago. They are stopped far below ground by a
layer of barbed wire, proved by its superior thickness to be
German. Every yard they penetrate is what gardeners call
"moved soil." It is of the nature of a fresh mole heap or ants1
nest, so crumbled and worked that all its original consistency
has been undone. A good deal of it doubtless has been tossed
fifty feet in the air on the geyser of a mine or shell explosion.
It is full of little bits of burnt sacking, the debris of sandbags.
Weapons and bits of weapons and pieces of human bodies are
scattered through it like plums. The so-called trench may be no
more than a yoked line of shell holes converted with dainty toil
and loss to a more perpendicular angle. And the tangled pattern
of craters is itself pocked with the smaller dents of bombs. There
are three grades of holes — great mine craters that look like an
earth convulsion themselves, pitted with shell holes, which in
turn are dimpled by bombs. Imagine a place like the Ypres
salient, a graveyard maze under the visitation of 8,000 shells
falling from three widely separate angles, and some slight idea
may be formed of nearly two years' life in the trenches. It is an
endless struggle for some geographical feature: a hill, a mound,
a river, or for a barn or a house. At Ypres, indeed, the German
and British lines have passed through different sides of the same
stable at the same time. The competition for a hill or bluff is
such that in many cases, as at Hill 60, the desired spot, as well
as the intervening houses and even woods, have been wiped out
of existence before the rival forces.
On November 2, 1915, the British Premier announced in the
House of Commons that there were then nearly a million British
soldiers in Belgium and France; that Canada had sent 96,000
men to the front, and that the Germans had not gained any
ground in the west since April of that year. He furthermore
stated that the British Government was resolved to "stick at
nothing" in carrying out its determination to carry the war to
a successful conclusion. In addition to the troops mentioned
above, the Australian Commonwealth had contributed 92,000
OPERATIONS IN CHAMPAGNE AND ARTOIS 115
men to date; New Zealand 25,000; South Africa, after a brilliant
campaign in which the Germans in Southwest Africa were sub-
dued, had sent 6,600; and Newfoundland, Great Britain's oldest
colony, 1,600. Contingents were also sent from Ceylon, the Fiji
Islands, and other outlying parts of the empire. The premier
said that since the beginning of the war the admiralty had trans-
ported 2,500,000 troops, 300,000 sick and wounded, 2,600,000
tons of stores and munitions, and 800,000 horses. The loss of
life in the transportation of these troops was stated to be lees
than one-tenth of one per cent.
On December 2, 1915, General Joffre was appointed com-
mander in chief of all the French armies, excepting those in
North Africa, including Morocco, and dependent ministry col-
onies. The appointment was made on the recommendation of
General Gallieni, the War Minister, Who, in a report to Presi-
dent Poincar6, said :
"By the decree of October 28, 1913, the Government, charged
with the vital interests of the country, alone has the right to
decide on the military policy. If the struggle extend to several
frontiers, it alone must decide which is the principal adversary
against whom the majority of the forces shall be directed. It
consequently alone controls the means of action and resources
of all kinds, and puts them at the disposal of the general com-
mander in chief of the different theatres of operations.
'The experience gained, however, from the present operations,
which are distributed over several fronts, proves that unity of
direction, indispensable to the conduct of the war, can only be
assured by the presence at the head of all of our armies of a
single chief, responsible for the military operations proper."
General Joffre's new appointment possesses a historic interest,
for it created him the first real general in chief since the days
of Napoleon, independent entirely of the national ruler as well
as of the minister for war and any war council.
In the beginning of December, 1915, Field Marshal Sir John
French was relieved at his own instance and appointed to the
command of the home forces. He was given a viscountcy in
recognition of his long and brilliant service in the army.
116 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
From the landing of the British Expeditionary Force in
France, Sir John French had commanded it on the Franco-Bel-
gian frontier along a front that grew from thirty-two miles to
nearly seventy in one year, while the troops under his command
had grown in numbers from less than sixty thousand to well over
a million. The son of a naval officer, John Denton French began
his career as a midshipman in the navy, but gave that up after
a three years' trial and joined the army in 1874. General French
was essentially a cavalry commander, and as such he distin-
guished himself in the South African War of 1899-1902. His
conduct in the European War has been the subject of some
criticism. The time is not yet ripe to form a just estimate of
his achievements and failures. Nothing succeeds like success,
and nothing is easier than to criticize a military commander who
fails to realize the high expectations of his countrymen. What-
ever may be the verdict of history for or against General French,
it will certainly acknowledge that he did great things with
his "contemptible little army." The figure of Viscount French
of Ypres will stand out in bold relief when the inner his-
tory of Mons, the Marne, Neuve Chapelle, Ypres, and Loos
is definitively written. The present generation may not be per-
mitted to read it, for even to-day, after a hundred years,
military experts are still divided over the mistakes of the great
Napoleon.
The command in chief of the British army now devolved upon
General Sir Douglas Haig, who, though a "born aristocrat/9 had
nevertheless taken his trade of soldiering very seriously. He
had served with distinction in India and South Africa. During
the retreat from Mons General Haig performed marvels of
leadership. By skillful maneuvering he extricated his men at
Le Cateau in the most critical moment of the retreat. He led in
the attack on the Aisne, and is also credited with chief responsi-
bility for the clever movement of the British army from the
Aisne to Ypres. In his dispatch on the battle of Ypres Field
Marshal French highly praised the valuable assistance he had
derived from General Haig. It was said that during the fierce
battle of Ypres, "at one time or another every corps and division
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 117
commander in the lot lost hope — except Haig. He was a rock all
through."
On December 2, 1915, Mr. Asquith announced in the House of
Commons that Great Britain's total losses in killed, wounded, and
missing since the war began amounted to 510,230.
The figures for the western front were: Killed, 4,620 officers
and 69,272 men; wounded, 9,754 officers and 240,283 men; miss-
ing, 1,584 officers and 54,446 men; grand total of casualties,
379,959.
CHAPTER XIII
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN
IT is well-nigh impossible to give a connected story of the
innumerable and far-flung operations of the winter campaign.
It resolves itself into a mere list of dates and a brief description
of what happened on those dates. At this short distance of time
even the descriptive details are by no means altogether reliable,
owing to the contradictory reports that announced them. During
the first week in December, 1915, the Germans concentrated
strong reenf orcements and an immense amount of artillery with
the object of striking a blow at the allied line in Flanders and
Artois. In Champagne they captured about 800 feet of an
advanced trench near Auberive. The French admitted the loss,
but claimed that they had reoccupied a large part of the ground
originally yielded.
Floods in the Yser region compelled the Germans to aban-
don many of their advanced trenches, and two of their
ammunition depots were blown up. Near Berry-au-Bac they
destroyed a French trench with its occupants and blew up
some mines that the French had almost completed. Artillery
engagements in Artois became more pronounced, especially
around Givenchy. On the 8th sixteen British aeroplanes bombed
a German stores depot at Miraumont, in the Somme district, and
the aerodrome at Hervilly. The attack was carried out in a
118 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
high westerly wind, which made flying difficult All machines
returned safely after inflicting much damage on both objectives.
A British cargo boat having run aground off the Belgian coast,
three German hydroaeroplanes attempted to sink her with bombs.
Several of the allied aeroplanes, one of them French, set out
from the land and drove the German flyers away after an
exciting fight Deep snow in the Vosges Mountains prevented
operations beyond artillery action.
On December 16, 1915, in the course of his demand in the
Chamber of Deputies that the Chamber grant three months9
credit on the budget account, the French Minister of Finance, M.
Ribot, said that while the war expenditure at the beginning of
the conflict was 1,500,000,000 francs ($300,000,000) a month,
it had risen to 2,100,000,000 francs ($420,000,000). "At the
beginning of hostilities financial considerations took a secondary
place. We did not think the war would last seventeen months,
and now no one can foresee when it will end."
Artillery activity of more than usual intensity at a number of
points marked the 17th, 18th and 19th of December, 1915. To the
east of Ypres French and British batteries bombarded the Ger-
man trenches from which suffocating gas was directed toward
the British line. No infantry attacks followed. By December
22, 1915, the French had gained the summit of Hartmannsweiler-
kopf, a dominating peak in southern Alsace, overlooking the
roads leading to the Rhine. For eight months they had fought
for the position, and thousands of lives were sacrificed by the
attackers and the defenders. The Germans succeeded in recov-
ering part of the ground next day. The French took 1,300 pris-
oners in the capture, and the Germans claimed 1,558 prisoners
in the recapture. Fighting continued around the spot for
months.
Christmas passed with no break in the hostilities and no mate-
rial change in the situation on the western front The year 1915
closed, in a military sense, less favorably for the Allies than it
began. Only a few square miles had been reconquered in the
west at a heavy sacrifice; Italy had made little progress; the
Dardanelles expedition had proved a failure; the British had not
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 119
reached Bagdad nor attained their aim in Greece; while Russia
had lost nearly all Galicia, with Poland and Courland as well, and
the Serbian army had been practically eliminated. On the other
hand, the Allies had maintained supremacy on the seas, had
captured all but one of the German colonies, and still held all
German sea-borne trade in a vise of steel. Not one of the armies
d the Allies other than that of Serbia had been struck down ;
each of them was hard at work raising new armies and devel-
oping the supply of munitions. The spirit of all the warring
peoples, without exception, appeared to be that of a grim,
unbending determination. Germany, with a large proportion of
her able-bodied manhood disposed of and her trade with the
outer world cut off, was perhaps in greater straits than a super-
ficial examination of her military successes showed. The care
with which the Germans economized their supplies of men, and
made the fullest possible use in the field of men who were not
physically fit for actual military service, was illustrated by the
creation of some new formations called Armierungsbattalionen.
These battalions, of which, it was said, no full description would
be published before the end of the war, consisted of all sorts of
men with slight physical defects, underofficers and noncommis-
sioned officers who were either too old for service or had been
invalided. Their duty was to relieve the soldiers of as much
work as possible. They were employed in roadmaking and in
transporting munitions and supplies in difficult country — for
example, in the Vosges Mountains. Most of these men — and
there were many thousands of them — wore uniforms, but carried
no arms.
It is rather an ironical commentary on "our present advanced
state of culture," as Carlyle put it, that the birthday of the Man
of Sorrows — the period of "peace on earth and good will toward
all men" — was celebrated even amid the raucous crash and mur-
derous turmoil of the battle field. Preparations had long been in
the making for the event. In the homes of France, Germany,
and Great Britain millions and millions of parcels were care-
fully packed full of little luxuries, comforts, tobacco, cigars, and
cigarettes, and addressed to some loved one "at the front"
120 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Newspapers collected subscriptions and busy societies were also
formed for the same purpose, so that there was hardly a single
combatant who did not receive some token of remembrance from
home.
On the occasion of the New Year the kaiser addressed the
following order to his army and navy :
"Comrades : — One year of severe fighting has elapsed. When-
ever a superior number of enemies tried to rush our lines they
failed before your loyalty and bravery. Every place where I
sent you into battle you gained glorious victories. Thankfully
we remember to-day above all our brethren who joyfully gave
their blood in order to gain security for our beloved ones at home
and imperishable glory for the Fatherland. What they began
we shall accomplish with God's gracious help.
"In impotent madness our enemies from west and east, from
north and south, still strive to deprive us of all that makes life
worth living. The hope of conquering us in fair fighting they
have buried long ago. On the weight of their masses, on the
starvation of our entire people, on the influence of their cam-
paign of calumny, which is as mischievous as malicious, they
believe they can still reckon. Their plans will not succeed.
Their hopes will be miserably disappointed in the presence of
the spirit of determination which imperturbably unites the army
and those at home.
"With a will to do one's duly for the Fatherland to the last
breath, and a determination to secure victory, we enter the new
year with God for the protection of the Fatherland and for
Germany's greatness/9
About the same time Count Zeppelin delivered a speech at
Dtisseldorf. The local newspapers reported him as saying:
"Speaking for myself and expressing the view of your Imperial
Master, the war will not last two years. The next few months
will see German arms march rapidly from triumph to triumph,
and the final destruction of our enemies will be swift and sudden.
Our Zeppelin fleets will play an important part in future opera-
tions and will demonstrate more than ever their power as a
factor in modern warfare/9
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 121
The opening of the year 1916 found Great Britain in the throes
of a momentous controversy over the question of adopting con-
scription. In the west the Franco-British armies hugged the
belief that their lines were impregnable to attack. An offensive
on the part of the Germans was certainly expected, but where
and when it would materialize none could foretell, though the
French command had a shrewd suspicion. It was purely a
matter of deduction that the Germans, having so far failed to
break a passage through the circle of steel that encompassed
them on the east and the west, would be forced to concentrate
their hopes on an offensive on the western front They had care-
fully taken into consideration the Battle of Champagne. They
admitted that the French had opened a breach in their line, and
they would probably argue that the imperfect results of the
operations were due only to the inability of their enemies to
exploit the first advantage that they had gained. They appear
to have decided to copy the French example, but to apply to it
a great deal more of thoroughness. The French, they might
argue, fired so many shells on a front of so many miles and
destroyed our trenches ; we will fire so many more shells on a nar-
rower front, so that we can be certain there will be no obstacle
to the advance of our infantry. The French had not enough
men to carry their initial success to its conclusion, consequently
we will mass a very large number of men behind the attack.
With this object undoubtedly in view, the Germans indulged in
a succession of feints up and down the whole frontier, feeling
and probing the line at all points. This procedure cost them
thousands of men, but it probably did not deceive the strategists
on the other side. All that remained indeterminable to the
French Staff was the precise date and locality.
A general survey of the front for the first days of January,
1916, reveals activity all round. In Belgium there was artillery
fighting over the front of the Yser and along the front at
Yperlee, and a similar duel between Germans and Belgians near
Mercken. In front of the British first-line trenches the Germans
sprang mines, but did not trouble to take possession of the
craters. The British sprang some mines near La Poisaelu and
122 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
bombarded the German trenches north of Fromelles and east of
Ypres, the Germans responding vigorously.
The British also attempted a night attack near Frelinghien,
northeast of Armentidres, which failed in its purpose. German
troops cracked a mine at Hulluch and captured a French trench
at Hartmannsweilerkopf with 200 prisoners. The French heavy
artillery in Champagne directed a strong fire against some huts
occupied by Germans in the forest of Malmaison. A German
attack with hand grenades in the vicinity of the Tahure road did
little harm. Between the Arve and the Oise artillery exchanges
were in continual progress ; between Soissons and Rheims a series
of mine explosions ; and in the Vosges the French artillery roared
in the vicinity of Miihlbach. A German long-range gun fired
about ten shots at Nancy and its environments, killing twf
civilians and wounding seven others.
In the north, again, we find the German artillery making a
big demonstration on the front east of Ypres and northeast of
Loos; the British destroying the outskirts of Andechy in the
region of Roye. French and Belgian guns batter the Germans
stationed to the east of St. George and shell other groups about
Boesinghe and Steenstraete. South of the Somme the German
first-line trenches near Dompierre are receiving artillery atten-
tion, and a supply train south of Chaulnes is shattered. In
Champagne the Tahure skirmish goes on, while in the Vosges
an artillery duel of great intensity rends the air in the Hirz-
stein sector.
Along the Yser front the Belgians are shelled in the
rear of their lines, and a German barracks is being bom-
barded. On the southern part of the British front bomb attacks
are being carried out. With all this sporadic and disconnected
expenditure of life, energy and ammunition little damage is
done, and the losses and gains on either side are equally unim-
portant. The Germans are tapping against the wall, looking for
weak spots. By the 5th, however, when General Joffre's New
Year's message appears, in which he tells his armies that the
enemy is weakening, that enemy suddenly grows more active
and energetic. German artillery fire increased in violence
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 123
throughout Flanders, Artois, Champagne, and the Vosges. They
launched infantry attacks against the French between Hill 193
and the Butte de Tahure. North of Arras the French bom-
barded German troops in the suburbs of Roye; in the Vosges
they shelled German works in the region of Balschwiller, and
demolished some trenches and a munitions depot northwest of
Altkirch.
British aeroplanes dropped bombs on the aerodrome at
Douai, and a German aviator dropped a few on Boulogne. The
German War Office statement briefly announced that "fighting
with artillery and mines at several points on the Franco-
Belgian front is reported." The next few days are almost a
blank; hardly anything leaks out; but things are happening
all the same.
To the south of Hartmannsweilerkopf, after a series of
fruitless attacks, followed by a severe bombardment, the
Germans succeeded in recovering the trenches which they had
lost to the French on December 31, 1915. Besides that,
they also captured 20 officers, 1,083 chasseurs, and 15 machine
guns. This move compelled the French troops occupying the
summit of Hirzstein to evacuate their position. Artillery inces-
santly thundered in Flanders, Champagne, Artois, the Vosges,
and on the British lines at Hulluch and Armenti&res. By Jan-
uary 10, 1916, it looked as though the Germans intended to
retrieve the misfortunes of Champagne. An assault by the
kaiser's troops under General von Einem was made on a five-
mile front east of Tahure, with the center about at Maisons de
Champagne Farm, close to the Butte de Mesnil. At this point
the French had held well to the ground won during the previous
September. On the 9th the German artillery opened fire with
great violence, using suffocating shells, and this was followed
by four concentric infantry attacks on that front during the
day and night. The French fire checked the offensive, but at
two points the Germans managed to reach the first French lines.
The battle raged for three days, during which the Germans took
a French observation post, several hundred yards of trenches,
428 prisoners, seven machine guns, and eight mine throwers.
124 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The French counterattack broke down, though it was claimed
that they had recovered the ground.
At Massiges the Germans attacked on almost as large a scale
as the French had done the previous autumn. The German
bombardment increased steadily in intensity, and during the
last twelve hours 400,000 shells were stated to have fallen on
the eight-mile front from La Courtine to the western slopes
of the "Hand" of Massiges. The infantry were thrown for-
ward on the 10th. The first attack was launched on the hill
forming the western finger of Massiges, whence the French
fire broke their ranks and drove them back. Foiled in this
direction, the next attack was delivered against the five-mile
front. Some 40,000 men took part in the charge. But the pow-
erful French "seventy-fives" tore ghastly lanes in their ranks,
and few lived to reach the wire entanglements. Crawling
through the holes made by the bombardment, they captured 300
yards of trenches. A portion of this the French regained. The
British lost four aeroplanes on January 12-13, 1916. Two
German aviators accounted for one each, and the other two
were brought down by gunfire.
The Prussian Prime Minister, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg,
who is also Imperial Chancellor, opened the new session
of the Prussian Diet on January 13, 1916. He as usual blamed
the Allies for the war. "As our enemies forced the war
upon us, they must also bear the guilt of the responsibility
if the nations of Europe continue to inflict wounds upon one
another."
By the 13th the German offensive in Champagne had collapsed.
Operations in the west resumed for the time a normal state of
activity, in which artillery duels were the main features. In
the middle of January the British opened fire on the French
town of Lille, near the Belgian border and inside the German
lines. According to German authority, the damage done was
negligible. Little of import happened till January 23, 1916, when
two squadrons of French aeroplanes, comprising twenty-four
machines, bombarded the railway station and barracks atrMetz,
They dropped 130 shells. The aeros were escorted by two pro-
}
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 125
tecting squadrons, the pilots of which during the trip engaged
in ten combats with giant Fokkers and aviatiks. The French
machines were severely cannonaded along the whole of their
course, but returned undamaged, except one only, which was
obliged to make a landing southeast of Metz. On the 24th the
Germans made another strong feint, this time in Belgium, that
had all the appearance of the expected attack in force. They
began by bombarding the French lines near Nieuport, but the
infantry charge that was to have followed was smothered in the
German trenches, before the men could make a start. Another
German attack north of Arras was held up by French rifle fire.
The chief result of the offensive seems to have been the destruc-
tion of Nieuport cathedral.
Toward the end of January, 1916, activity became more and
more intensified all along the western front in every sector except
that in which the Germans were preparing for the big coup —
Verdun. It will be simpler to review the disconnected operations
by following them separately in the different districts where they
occurred. It will be observed that in practically every case the
Germans assumed the offensive. In Alsace the French batteries
exploded a German munitions depot on the outskirts of Orbey,
southeast of Bonhomme. In the region of Sondernach, south of
Minister, the Germans captured and occupied a French listening
post, from which they were expelled by counterattacks. On
February 13, 1916, they attempted an infantry attack, which was
halted by French artillery fire. The Germans gained 300 feet of
trenches on the 14th. The French took the ground back again,
but were unable to hold it. On the 18th the Germans, after
the usual artillery preparation, directed an infantry attack
against the French position to the north of Largitson, where they
penetrated into the trenches and remained there for some hours
until a counterattack expelled them. In Lorraine, constant artil-
lery duels raged in the sectors of Reillon and the forest of Parroy.
In the Argonne, French mine operations destroyed the German
trenches over a short distance near Hill 285, northeast of La
Chalade. On February 12, 1916, the French shattered some
enemy mine works.
126 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Increased artillery firing at many points in Flanders and
northern France first gave the Allies the impression that the
Germans were planning a new offensive on a large scale against
their left wing, in an attempt to blast a passage through to Calais
and Dunkirk. By February 7, 1916, the Allies were thoroughly
awake to the possibility of a big blow impending somewhere in
the west. The sweep through Serbia had released several hun-
dred thousand men for service elsewhere. For a month the Ger-
mans had been hammering and probing at Loos, Givenchy,
Armentidres, and other points with the evident object of finding
a weak spot. Along the NeuvUle-Givenchy road especially the
Germans made no fewer than twenty-five determined attacks
between the 1st and 17th of February, 1916. Their later attacks
developed more to the north, near Lidvin, where heavy trench
fighting occurred, with no important results either way.
At the beginning of February, 1916, the 525-mile battle front
in the west was held on one side by about 1,250,000 Germans —
an average of 2,500 to the mil*— as against quite 2,000,000
French, about 1,000,000 British, and 50,000 Belgians. But this
superiority in numbers on the allied side was neutralized by the
strength of the German defense works plus artillery. None of the
Allies9 undertakings had, so far, been carried out to its logical
—or intended— conclusion. Whether this was due to weakness,
infirmity of purpose or lack of coordination, remains to be told
some future day. By the middle of the month it became apparent,
from their expenditure of men and munitions, that the German
General Staff were determined to make up for their past losses
and to recapture at least some of the ground taken from them by
the Allies. It seems hardly credible that all these fierce attacks
were mere feints to withdraw attention from their objective —
Verdun. They had no reason to fear a French offensive in the
immediate future. For one thing the condition of the ground
was still too unfavorable. The French at this stage occupied
practically the entire semicircle from Hill 70 to the town of
Thelus, excepting a portion between Givenchy and Petit Vimy.
Hill 140, the predominant feature in the district, was almost all
in French hands. The line between La Folie and the junction of
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 127
the Neuville-St Vaast road covered the Labyrinth, which the
French had won in the summer of 1915, and it was here that the
main force of the German attacks was launched. The French
positions on the heights commanded every other position
that the Germans could possibly take within the semicircle,
and naturally gave the former an immense advantage for their
next offensive.
In Artois the Germans exploded several mines on January 26,
1916, in the neighborhood of the road from La Folie, northeast
of Neuville-St Vaast, and occupied the craters made. Violent
cannonading kept up in the whole of this sector. By the 28th the
Germans had captured three successive lines of French trenches
and held them against eight counterattacks. After exploding
mines the Germans made an attack on both sides of the road
between Vimy and Neuville and stormed French positions be-
tween 500 and 600 yards long. They captured fifty-three men, a
machine gun, and three mine throwers. On the 28th they di-
rected infantry attacks against various points and gained more
trenches. Following up their advantage the Germans stormed
and captured the village of Frise, on the south bank of the
Somme.
While this struggle was in progress, a terrific fight was
raging north of Arras. The real objective of the attack appears
to have been an advance south of Frise in the direction of Dom-
pierre, but this effort met with little success. The French at once
set to work to recover the only ground that was of any real im-
portance. The troops in the section opened a series of counter-
attacks, and in a very short time the French grenadiers had
gained the upper hand again. The capture of Frise brought the
Germans into a cul-de-sac, for their advance was still barred by
the Somme Canal, behind which there lay a deep marsh. Maneu-
vers were quite impossible here, hence the village could not serve
as a base for any further operations. The German gains were
nevertheless considerable, for they took about 3,800 yards of
trenches and nearly 1,300 prisoners, including several British.
Spirited mine fighting marked the first three days of February,
1916. In the neighborhood of the road from Lille the French
I— War ft 4
128 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
artillery fire caused explosions among the German batteries in
the region of Vimy. Between February 8-9, 1916, the Ger-
man infantry stormed the first-line French positions over a
stretch of more than 800 yards, capturing 100 prisoners and five
machine guns. Small sections of these trenches were retaken
and held.
The German report stated that the French "were unable
to reconquer any part of their lost positions/' Five German
attacks were made on Hill 140 on February 11, 1916, all but one
being repulsed by the intense fire of the French artillery and
infantry. Stubborn fighting, accompanied by heavy losses, raged
about the 14th, by which time the French had regained a few
more trenches. The steady underground advance of the French
sappers drove the Germans back upon their last bastion, com-
manding the central plain.
The French trenches gradually crept up the slopes of the
hill until the German commander, the Bavarian Crown Prince,
realized that the next assault was likely to be irresistible
and to involve the abandonment of Lille, Lens, Douai, and the
entire front at this point. A mine explosion west of Hill 140
made a crater fifty yards across. A steeplechase dash across
the open from both sides — French and Germans met in the
crater — a fierce struggle for its possession followed, and the
French won the hole. A furious bombardment from a score of
quick-firing mortars hidden behind La Folie Hill battered the
earth out of shape, and when the Germans occupied the terrain
where the French trenches had been, the "seventy-fives" played
such havoc among them that they were forced to relinquish their
hold. To the south of Frise the Germans were preparing an at-
tack, but were prevented from carrying it out by French and
British barrier fires.
On the British front the artillery was hardly less active than
in Artois. On one section, according to a German report, the
British fired 1,700 shrapnel shells, 700 high explosive shells, and
about the same number of bombs within twenty-four hours.
On January 27, 1916, the Germans attempted an infantry attack
on a salient northeast of Loos, but were held back. A British
EVENTS IN THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 129
night attack on the German trenches near Messines, Flanders,
was likewise repulsed. In the morning of February 12, 1916,
the Germans broke into the British trenches near Pilkellen, but
were pushed out by bombing parties. There was much mining
activity about Hulluch and north of the Ypres-Comines Canal.
At the latter place some desperate underground fighting occurred
between sappers. On the 14th the Germans were again engaged
in serious operations in the La Bass6e region, where they exploded
seven mines on the British front.
By February 15, 1916, the British first-line trenches on
a 600 to 800 yards' front fell to the Germans in assaults
on the Ypres salient, carried by a bayonet charge after artil-
lery preparation. Most of the defenders were killed and
forty prisoners taken. The assaults extended over a front
of more than two miles. The trench now captured by the
Germans had frequently changed hands during the past twelve
months, and for that reason was facetiously called "the inter-
national trench." The brunt of the fighting here fell upon the
Canadians, who were withdrawn from the trench owing to the
furious bombardment, and sheltered in the second-line trench.
The German infantry consequently met with no opposition at the
former, but when they approached the latter the Canadians
opened a murderous fire with rifles and machine guns, dropping
their enemies in hundreds. A few, however, managed to reach
the trenches, when the Canadians sprang out and charged with
bayonets, rushed the Germans back to and across the first-line
trenches again, which were then reoccupied. It was the Cana-
dian First Division that had blocked the German path to Calais
in the spring of 1915 almost at the same point.
Activity on the west front on the 18th was largely confined
to the Ypres district British troops attempted to recapture
their positions to the south of Ypres, simultaneously bombard-
ing the German trenches to the north of the Comines Canal. By
February 20, 1916, as a result of the continuous fighting north of
Ypres, the British had lost on the Yser Canal what the German
official report described as a position 350 meters long, and the
British statement as "an unimportant advanced post." The
130 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
German* took some prisoners and repelled several day and night
attacks by the British to recover the ground.
In Champagne, uninterrupted artillery actions continued ap-
parently without much advantage to either side. The German
works north of Souain were particularly visited. On February
5, 1916, the French bombarded the German works on the plateau
of Navarin, wrecking trenches and blowing up several munition
depots. Some reservoirs of suffocating gas were also demolished,
releasing the poisonous fumes, which the wind blew back across
the German lines. On the 13th the French were able to report
a further success northeast of the Butte du Mesnil, where they
took some 300 yards of German trenches. A counterattack by
night was also repulsed, the Germans losing sixty-live prisoners.
They succeeded, though, in penetrating a small salient of the
French line between the road from Navarin and that of the
St Souplet. They also captured, on the 12th, some sections of
advanced trenches between Tahure and Somme-Py, gaining more
than 700 yards of front
In the Vosges a similar series of local engagements occupied
the combatants. Artillery exchanges played the chief part in the
operations. Three big shells from a German long-range gun fell
in the fortress town of Belfort and its environs on February 8,
1916. The French replied by bombarding the German canton-
ments at Stosswier, northwest of Mtinster, Hirtzbach, south of
Altkirch, and the military establishments at Dornach, near Miihl-
hausen. On the 11th ten more heavy shells fell about Belfort
North of Wissembach, east of St. Di£, a German infantry charge
met with a withering fire and was stopped before it reached the
first line.
While all the fighting just described was in progress, matters
were comparatively on a peace footing in the Argonne Forest
The French and Germans engaged in mine operations, smashing
up inconsiderable pieces of each other's trenches and mine works.
But it was here that affairs of great historic import, perhaps the
mightiest event of the war, were in the making.
In an interview given to the editor of the "Secolo" of Milan,
at the end of January, 1916, Mr. Lloyd-George, the British Min-
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN 181
ister of Munitions, said: "We woke up slowly to it, but I am
now perfectly satisfied with what we are doing. We have now
2,500 factories, employing 1,500,000 men and 250,000 women.
By spring we shall have turned out an immense amount of
munitions. We shall have for the first time in the war more
than the enemy. Our superiority in men and munitions will be
unquestioned, and I think that the war for us is just beginning.
We have 8,000,000 men under arms; by spring we shall have a
million more. . . . Our victory must be a real and final victory.
You must not think of a deadlock. One must crack the nut before
one gets at the kernel. It may take a long time, but you must
hear the crack. The pressure on the enemy is becoming greater.
They are spreading their frontier temporarily, but becoming
weaker in a military sense. Make no mistake about it; Great
Britain is determined to fight this war to a finish. We may
make mistakes, but we do not give in. It was the obstinacy of
Great Britain that wore down Napoleon after twenty years of
warfare. Her allies broke away one by one, but Great Britain
kept on. Our allies on this occasion are just as solid and de-
termined as we are."
CHAPTER XIV
THE BATTLE OF VEKDUN — THE
GERMAN ATTACK
TOWARD the close of 1915 the German General Staff decided
on a vast onslaught on the French front that would so crush
and cripple the fighting forces of France that they would cease to
count as an important factor in the war. A great action was
also necessary owing to the external and internal situation of
the German Empire. The time was ripe for staging a spec-
tacular victory that would astonish the world, intimidate Greece
and Rumania, and stiffen the weakening hold that Germany
had on Turkey and Bulgaria.
The German General Staff knew that Russia was arming
several hundred thousand new troops, that Great Britain had
132 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
reenf orced her armies on the Continent, that the Allies were
amply supplied with guns and shells, and that in the spring they
would undertake an offensive on a large scale that would go far
toward ending the war. In order to anticipate this threatened
onslaught the German staff decided to strike, hoping to gain a
victory before the Allies were entirely ready.
Having arrived at this decision, the next problem was to select
the battle field, and Verdun was decided upon. At first this
choice created general astonishment, for the capture of Verdun
would only mean the gaining of a certain number of square miles
of territory. But the German staff believed that the capture of
the ancient fortress of Verdun would have a powerful effect on
public opinion at home and abroad. As a military operation
they were confident that such a victory might have a decisive
effect on the future of the war. It was hoped that the French
army, already weakened, would receive a crushing blow from
which it could never recover. An intelligent German prisoner
explained the German point of view: "Verdun sticks into our
side like a dagger, though sheathed. With that weapon threaten-
ing our vitals, how can we think of rushing on France elsewhere?
If we had done so, the Verdun dagger might have stabbed us in
the back as well as in the side/'
In order to sustain the German people's faith in the Hohen-
sollern dynasty there was urgent necessity that the crown prince
should gain a success. The capture of Verdun would reestablish
his somewhat tarnished military reputation and might force an
exhausted France to sue for peace.
The loss of Verdun and its girdle of forts would have made
the situation of the defenders very difficult, they would find it a
serious problem to hold back the German hosts while organizing
a new line of defense from St. Mihiel to Ste. M6n£hould. More-
over as the German lines formed a semicircle around the French
position at Verdun an immense number of guns could be massed
against a small area.
In the matter of railway facilities the Germans had every
advantage. They possessed fourteen strategic lines, while the
French had only one ordinary double line, which was in easy
THE BATTLE OP VERDUN 133
range of the German guns south of Vauquois, and a narrow
gauge from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc. This terrible handicap was
in time overcome by the French, who brought to perfection a
system of motor transport by road that enabled them at a mo-
ment's notice to bring up men, ammunition, and supplies to the
defense of Verdun.
The French positions around the fortress had not greatly
changed since the closing months of 1914, when the French car*
ried the village of Brabant and Haumont Wood and occupied the
southeast corner of Consenvoye Wood. Two formidable natural
barriers had been secured by the Germans : Forges Wood on the
left, a long crest east and west confronting the French lines and
bisected its full length by a ravine. Protected from French fire
from the south, it afforded an excellent artillery position, while
the trees served as a screen against aerial observation. The
position also commanded a clear view of the French left at
Brabant. To attack Forges Wood it would be necessary to
advance over an open space entirely bare of any natural pro-
tection. On the right of the French positions the Germans
occupied a strong post on a sort of island that overlooked the
Woevre plain and having on one side a steep cliff.
The possession of these two strong positions by the Germans
exposed the French flanks to artillery fire from every direction.
It was impossible that the French line, bent into a salient in
front of Haumont and Caures Wood, could hold out if the Ger-
mans massed a great number of guns against it.
When the struggle in the Verdun sector began the French left
was resting on the centers of Brabant, Consenvoye, Haumont,
and Caures Wood, their first position. The second was marked
by a line passing through Samogneux, Hill 844, and Mormont
Farm.
The French center included the Bois de la Ville, Herbebois, and
Ornes, with the woods of Beaumont, La Wavrille, Les Fosses, Le
Chaume, and Les Cauri&res as the second position.
The French right included Maucourt, Mogeville, the Haytes-
Charri&res Wood, and Fromezey, with a second position covering
Bezonvaux, Grand-Chena, and Dieppe. Back of these positions
134
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
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THE FORTS AT VERDUN
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN 135
the line of forts was distinguished by the village of Bras, Douau-
mont, Hardaumont, the fort of Vaux, La Laurie, and Eix.
Between this line of forts and the second position an intermediate
position on the reverse side of the slope had been begun from
Douaumont to Louvemont, on the Poivre and Talov Hills, but at
the time of the opening assault the work had not made much
progress.
The Germans prepared for the offensive with the most ex-
haustive labors, and as far as it was humanly possible left noth-
ing to chance. Roads were made through the woods and up the
slopes, firm foundations were laid down, and the heavy guns
were dragged to elevated positions. As the result of these weeks
of herculean toil there were massed against the selected sector
over a thousand guns brought from every quarter — Serbia,
Russia, and the west front. The proportion of heavy guns was
much larger than had ever been employed in preparing attacks of
this kind.
Toward the close of December, 1915, the Germans received
strong reenforcements, the first to arrive being three divisions
which had fought in the campaign against Serbia. From other
fronts also they flowed in, and the two corps which had held the
Vauquois-Etain sector was increased to seven. Some of the
finest German troops were included in these armies, such as the
Third Brandenburg Corps and the Fifteenth Corps. It was
evident that the Germans counted on the battle of Verdun to
decide the fighting in France, for just before the offensive began
General Daimling addressed his troops in these words: "In this
last offensive against France I hope that the Fifteenth Corps
will distinguish itself as it has ever done by its courage and
its fortitude."
Starting from the north of Varennes the German order of
battle on the day of attack was as follows : On the extreme right
were the Seventh Reserve Corps, comprising the Second Land-
wehr Division, the Eleventh Reserve Division (later relieved by
the Twenty-second Reserve Division), and the Twelfth Reserve
Division in the order given. Northeast of Verdun, and facing
the French lines, were the Fourteenth Division and the Seventh
136 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Reserve Corps, with the Eleventh Bavarian Reserve Division in
support. To the left of these armies was a central force, com*
prising the Eighteenth Corps, the Third Corps, the Fifteenth
Corps, and the Bavarian Ersatz Division in the order named.
It was estreated by a competent French military authority
that the Germans had under arms in this sector up to the 16th
of March a grand total of 440,000 men, of which 320,000 were
infantry. When the battle opened, the Germans were at least
three times as strong in numbers as their opponent.
Before the date fixed for the great offensive the Germans
undertook many local attacks on the French front with a view
to deceiving their antagonists as to their real objective. In
Artois, Champagne, and the Argonne Forest there was some
strenuous mine fighting, and at Frise in Santerre the Germans
gained some ground only to lose it a little later.
A bombarding squadron of Zeppelins which the Germans sent
out along the Verdun front to cut railway communications fared
badly. The French antiaircraft guns brought down a number
of Fokkers and a Zeppelin in flames at Revigny, but the raiders
succeeded in cutting the Ste. M6nehould line, leaving only a
narrow-gauge road to supply Verdun.
At 4.15 in the morning of February 21, 1916, the great battle
began, the German guns deluging the sector with shells of every
caliber that smashed and tore the French positions and surround-
ings until the very face of nature was distorted. French trench
shelters vanished and in Caures Wood and La Ville Wood men
were buried in the dugouts or blown to fragments. Telephone
lines having been cut, communication could only be maintained
by runners. News of the great destruction wrought by the
German guns, far from depressing the French fighting units, had
a stimulating effect. The French front lines crumbled away
under the deluge of fire, but their occupants still clung tenaciously
to the debris that remained. The German guns were every-
where, and it was useless for French aerial observers to indicate
any special batteries for bombardment The Germans had the
greater number of guns and the heavier, but the French artil-
lery was better served on the whole, and there was less reckless
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN 137
expenditure of ammunition. As an illustration of the brilliant
work of the French artillery, an eyewitness has described the
defense of a position southeast of Haumont Wood. Here one
battery was divided into flanking guns in three positions — one to
the southeast of Haumont Wood, a second to the south, and a
third to the north of Samogneux. The two other batteries were
to the south of Hill 812; there was also a supporting battery of
six 90-mm. guns. In response to the German attack the French
replied with a curtain of fire, but, unchecked by the fearful loss
of life, they began to swarm in from all sides.
"They reached Caures Wood by the crests between Haumont
Wood and Caures Wood itself, and advanced like a flood on our
positions. The section which attempted to hold them back ad-
justed its range to their rate of progress and mowed them down
wave after wave. Swept by the storm of shells, the Germans
continued to advance and some succeeded in making their way
around to the rear of the guns. The French by this time had
come to the end of their ammunition, but they did not lose their
head, and, destroying their pieces, retreated, bringing a wounded
sergeant major along with them.91
A battery of 90's on the Haumont knoll was forced to stop
firing. Pierrard, an adjutant whose battery had ceased to exist,
was dispatched by the commander to help.
"Pierrard collected his companions and attached himself to the
battery, which opened fire again with tremendous effect. Those
guns were in action under him for forty-eight hours, during
which he kept up constant communication with the group com-
mander, the burden of his song being an incessant demand for
ammunition for this truly epic duel with the Germans.
"Unfortunately it was impossible to get supplies up. The
Germans were so near that Pierrard and his men used their
rifles against them; then, finding the position untenable, they
blew up their guns and retired." It was during this retreat that
the gallant Pierrard was killed.
The indomitable courage of the French gunners in this great
battle is described in another instance by a French officer who
Was present:
138 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR"
"A certain battery was being terribly shelled. A 805-mm.
shell burst and killed the captain, the adjutant, a sergeant major
and five gunners. Do you think that the others stopped? Not
at all; they took off their coats and, working in their shirt
sleeves, increased their efforts to intensify the curtain of fire
and to avenge their leaders and comrades."
The defense of Caures Wood by Lieutenant Colonel Driantfs
chasseurs was one of the most brilliant and dramatic incidents
in the battle of Verdun. The deluge of German shells had de»
stroyed the deepest French dugouts, and before noon their
stronghold had been smashed in, burying an officer and fourteen
men beneath the debris. The bombardment continued until the
French defenders were left without a single shelter worthy of
the name. When the Germans began to attack Haumont, their
front-line skirmishers, to create confusion, wore caps that imi-
tated the French, and were also provided with Red Cross bras*
sards. The attempted deception was soon discovered, and the
Germans were forced to pay heavily for the trick. In spite of
great losses the Germans continued to advance, succeeded in
gaining a foothold in the French first-line trenches, and held on.
Throughout the night there were many counterattacks and con-
stant grenade fighting, but the French maintained their positions.
On the second day of the assault the Germans resumed their
terrific bombardment. Trenches were obliterated, and portions
of the forest were swept away. About noon a large body of
German troops attacked French positions in Caures Wood, try-
ing to turn their flanks from two sides, Haumont and La Ville
Wood. The French fought with desperate energy, but the Ger-
mans had one gun that raked their chief position, and the iron
ring of the enemy gradually contracted. To attempt to defend
the position longer in the face of such conditions would mean
death or captivity and reluctantly the French commanding offi-
cer, Lieutenant Colonel Driant, gave the order to retire. Driant
waited to see the last of his men through Hie wood. He was
never heard of again.
The retiring column, leaving the shelter of the wood, en-
countered heavy machine-gun fire, and, greatly depleted in
THE BATTLE OP VERDUN 139
numbers, finally gained the first line of the second position at
Beaumont.
No attempt was made by the Germans to advance on the
Woevre front In the territory of Soumazannes, La Ville Wood,
and Herbebois the French firmly maintained the supporting line.
The tactics pursued by the Germans during the first days of
the battle of Verdun were ably considered and not lacking in
thoroughness. Their favorite method was to break into de-
fensive sectors with heavy artillery, and then completely sur*
round them by barrage fire. After the destructive work of the
guns they sent forward a scouting parly of a dozen or fifteen
men to report on the extent of the damage. Following them
came bombers and pioneers, and then a strong body of infantry.
Theoretically, this system had merit, but it did not always work
out as perfectly as the German strategists had planned. Their
artillery fire often failed to win the ground and make it safe for
their infantry to advance and occupy it. The French artillery
endeavored to isolate the attacks, should they succeed in reaching
the French lines, and their /earless infantry by vigorous counter-
attacks prevented the Germans from making any important
advance.
The fighting for Haumont was continued on February 22, 1916.
The strong resistance the French had offered to the furious
attacks of the German infantry may be called a failure. But
they succeeded in holding back the Germans until their reserves
had timeio reach the scene and prepare a new defensive line.
Early in the morning of the 22d the Germans had increased
their bombardment. Shells of the largest caliber fell, uprooting
trees and demolishing houses.
When the Germans attacked Consenvoye Wood with flame
projectors and advanced toward the western edge of Haumont
Wood, the French could not move out of the village, so dense was
the curtain of fire around them.
Braving this blasting storm, troops of the Haumont garrison
occupied the hali-ruined works on both sides and in front of the
place, while the southern exit was held by some reserves that
had reached the scene.
140 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Haumont and the ravine to the south were flooded with Ger-
man sheila of the largest caliber. Early in the afternoon they
were falling at the rate of twenty a minute. The French held
on undismayed. The village crumbled into a mass of debris.
The principal French defense, a redoubt of concrete, was
smashed, and some eighty men were buried in the ruins. A
number of machine guns were also lost, and the ammunition
dump was destroyed.
About 5 o'clock in the evening a German battalion attacked
Haumont, advancing in three columns. The remnant of French
troops manned the trenches. The few remaining machine guns
were brought into action and, being well served, wrought havoc
in the enemy's ranks, but the deadly advance continued, regard-
less of the heavy losses incurred.
The French then assembled every survivor in some trenches
southeast of Haumont, and with three machine guns continued
the fight. But the Germans had the advantage of numbers.
They penetrated to the center of the village, and finally sur-
rounded the French battalion headquarters.
After premises were fired by means of flame projectors, the
French colonel and his staff, facing capture or death, were for-
tunate in escaping through the German machine-gun barrage
without a single casualty. They had been forced to evacuate
Haumont, but their sustained and splendid defense of the place
/ was one of the bravest deeds that marked the Homeric struggle
at Verdun.
At the close of the day the French still held the greater part
of Herbebois and Wavrille, but La Ville Wood was in the hands
of the enemy. The French line now ran by Hill 240, the Mor-
mont Farm, and the intermediate position of Samogneux-
Brabant. Their defensive works and trenches having been de-
stroyed or made useless, the French had no cover. Fighting
must now be carried on in the open. Often the French artillery
fired at point-blank range regardless of their own sacrifices so
long as they could mow down the enemy.
Brabant was evacuated by the French during the night of
February 22, 1916. At Samogneux, owing to the intensity of
THE STRUGGLE FOR VERDUN
141
%
3
142 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
the German fire, they remained on the defensive. Several
counterattacks to the east were carried out which greatly im-
proved the French positions.
In the Wavrille sector the French had succeeded during the
night in connecting their new line with the Herbebois sector,
though incessantly bombarded. Wavrille Wood and Hill 351
must be protected, for their capture would enable the Germans to
sweep the Beaumont-Hill 344 line.
After repeated attacks the Germans captured Wavrille Wood,
where they were kept hemmed in by the French barrage and
unable to proceed. Fighting in the Herbebois sector had raged
throughout the day, and during the night the French were forced
to withdraw.
When February 24, 1916, dawned the French line ran by
Beaumont, the northern edge of the Bois des Fosses, and covered
La Chaume Wood. The Germans continued to bombard the
Woevre front, but did not attempt to attack as the French artil-
lery held them to their trenches.
During the day the Germans, who had been hemmed in at
Samogneux, after repeated struggles to debouch from that place,
succeeded when night came in capturing Hill 304.
From the southern edge of Caures Wood the Germans slowly
advanced through the heavily timbered ravines up the slopes of
Anglemont Hill. On the side of Fosses Wood they bombarded
French positions all the morning of February 24, 1916. East of
Rappe Wood and to the north of Wavrille Wood they assembled
strong forces. Two French battalions succeeded in carrying
part of the wood, and were then held up by machine-gun fire.
Fosses Wood and Beaumont were deluged by German shells of
every caliber. An infantry attack gave the Germans the south-
ern edge of Wavrille Wood, where the French clung tenaciously.
Fosses Wood, then Beaumont, were captured, then La Chaume
Wood. The French situation had become serious. At 2.20 in
the afternoon a large force of Germans advanced between Louve-
mont and Hill 347, and though the French made desperate efforts
to stay the advancing waves, Les Chambrettes, Beaumont, and
Fosses and Caures Woods were occupied by the enemy.
Geaersl Joflre coaferrlag wfta Geaeral P«Ufn aoar Vordaa. waere Geaeral Petaia'e forces
meet tae wulii of tae analea of too Crowa Prlaee la tae battle for Iho fortroM
Gift of The People of the United S'^ ;
♦ Through t:i2VM;ry Book Campj: -
(A.L,\--a. il-C— -U.S.O.}
To the Arr.icd Forces and Merchant Marine
PART IV— THE WAR AT SEA
CHAPTER XV
NAVAL SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING
OP THE SECOND YEAR — SUB-
MARINE EXPLOITS
NAVAL events such as the world had never known were
believed to be impending at the beginning of the war's
second year. With the land forces of the belligerents in a fierce
deadlock, it seemed that a decision must come upon the sea.
Assuredly the Allies were willing, and Germany had accom-
plished things in her shipyards that for sheer determination
and efficiency developed to the last degree, were comparable to
her finest deeds of arms. None doubted that she longed with
a grim hope for such a meeting. Helgoland and the newly
enlarged Kiel Canal were hives where an intensive industry
kept every man and vessel fit. And the navy grew while it
waited.
It was not the work of a day, though, nor of a generation,
to match the sea power that Great Britain had spent centuries
in building. Try as she would, strain men, ordnance plants,
and shipyards to the breaking point, Germany could not catch
up with her great rival. The first half of the new year saw
no matching of the grand fleets. It did produce a few gallant
combats, and was marked by a melancholy succession of
German submarine attacks on defenseless craft. The sacri-
fice of lives among neutrals and the Allies cast a pall upon
the world.
Naval losses up to August 1, 1915, had been considerable on
both sides without crippling any one of the belligerents. No
J— War St 4 j^g
144 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sooner was a warship sunk than there were two to replace it.
Every country engaged took effective steps to preserve such
maritime power as it had, and Great Britain worked harder
than any of the others, for her existence depended upon it.
The first year of the conflict cost England thirty-two fighting
craft, great and small. France lost thirteen, Russia five, Japan
three, a total of fifty-three. The combined tonnage was 297,178.
To counterbalance this Germany lost sixty-seven war vessels,
Turkey five and Austria four, the seventy-six ships having an
aggregate tonnage of 206,100. The difference of 91,078 gross
tons in favor of Germany and her partners in war was offset by
the number of fast German cruisers which fell victims to the
Allies, and by the numerical inferiority of the Central Powers9
combined fleets.
On August 1, 1915, the naval situation was identical with that
of August 1, 1914. Great Britain, aided materially by France,
and her other allies, in a lesser degree, stood ready to do battle
with the Teuton sea forces whenever opportunity offered. She
had won every important engagement with the exception of the
clash off the coast of Chile, and could look calmly forward,
despite the gnawing of German submarines at her commerce.
With every gun and man primed for the fight, with the greatest
collection of armed vessels ever known lying at ports, merely
awaiting the word, she felt supremely ready.
The lives of 1,550 persons were lost during the first year of
the war through the sinking of merchant ships, nearly all of
which were torpedoed. This applied to vessels of the Allies alone,
twenty-two persons having been lost with neutral ships. The
total of tonnage destroyed between February 18, 1915, when the
German edict against commercial vessels went into effect, and
August 1, 1915, was 450,000 tons, including 152 steamships of
more than 500 tons each. This was the heaviest loss ever
inflicted on the shipping of the world by any war. But it did
not seriously cripple the commerce of either France or England,
Germany's two major opponents. Their vessels continued to sail
the seven seas, bringing the products of every land to their aid,
while Germany and her allies were effectually cut off from prac-
SUBMARINE EXPLOITS 145
tically all resources except their own. Switzerland and Sweden
were the main dependence of Germany for contraband, and the
activities of the former were considerably restricted when the
Entente Allies really settled down to a blockade of Germany.
Austria and impoverished Turkey had no friends to draw upon,
but must fight their battles alone except for such assistance as
Germany could lend, which did not extend beyond the actual
material of war — guns, shells and bullets.
The submarine was Germany's best weapon. She outmatched
the Allies on land, but in such a small degree that her most
stubborn effort could not win a decisive victory. Meanwhile her
opponents grew stronger in an economic way, while the situa-
tion in Germany became more strained. By issuing a constantly
increasing volume of bank notes against an almost stationary
gold reserve she depreciated the value of her mark at home and
abroad. In the face of this tangled situation her submarines
rendered incalculable aid, destroying and menacing allied com-
merce. Without them Germany would have been helpless upon
the sea, would have ceased to exist as a maritime power. Her
first-line ships lay securely in their harbors, unable to venture
forth and match the longer-ranged, heavier-gunned vessels of
the British, ably supplemented by the French fleet.
Just how many submarines Germany possessed at the begin-
ning of the war cannot be stated. The number probably was
in the neighborhood of fifty. That she has lost many of these
vessels and built even a larger number is certain. As the con-
flict grew older Great Britain in particular learned a method of
combating them. It was estimated that on August 1, 1915, she
had 2,300 small craft specially fitted for running down sub-
marines. Private yachts, trawlers, power boats, destroyers, and
torpedo boats hunted night and day for the elusive undersea boats
of her enemy. The pleasure and fishing craft which had been
impressed into service were equipped with all sorts of guns,
some of them very old ones, but thoroughly capable of sinking
a submarine. These vessels patrolled the British coast with a
zeal that cost Germany dear. Some authorities believed that up to
August 1, 1915, upward of fifty German submarines had been
146 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sunk and more than a dozen captured. The numbers probably
are excessive, but if they had disposed of even twenty-five under-
sea boats the effort was a distinct success.
In addition to this means of defense Great Britain embarked
upon another undertaking that truly was gigantic in its extent
and the difficulties imposed. She stretched wire nets for many
miles under the surface of the waters washing her shores. The
regular channel routes were thus guarded. Once within such
a net there was no escape for the submarine. The wire meshes
fouled their propellers or became entwined around the vessels
in a way that rendered them helpless. The commander must
either come to the surface and surrender or end the career
of himself and crew beneath the waves. A number of sub-
marines were brought to the surface with their crews dead by
their own hands. Others were captured, and it is said that
about twenty of these vessels have been commissioned in the
British navy.
The hazardous character of the work in which the submarine
engaged and the success of British defensive measures undoubt-
edly made it difficult for Germany to man her new undersea craft
Special training is essential for both crew and officers, and men
of particularly robust constitution are required. There have
been reports that men assigned to the German submarines
regarded their selection as a practical death warrant Despite
the fine courage of German sailors as evidenced in this warf
word filtered through the censorship that it was becoming diffi-
cult for Germany to secure men for her submarines.
But the venturesome spirit of many German submarine com-
manders knew no bounds. Previous to the period under consid-
eration at least one submarine had made its way from a German
base to the Dardanelles, establishing a record for craft of this
sort that had seemed impossible up to that time. During August
other submarines made the same trip without any untoward
event. The Allies knew full well that reenf orcements were
being sent to the Mediterranean, but seemed unable to prevent
the plan's success. This inability was to result in serious losses
to both the allied navies and their merchant shipping.
SUBMARINE EXPLOITS 147
The first event during the month of August, 1915, that bore
any naval significance was the sinking of the British destroyer
Lynx on August 9, 1915, in the North Sea. She struck a mine
and foundered within a few minutes. Four officers and twenty-
two men out of a complement in the neighborhood of 100 were
saved. The vicinity had been swept only a day or two before
for mines and it was believed that a German undersea boat had
strewn new mines which caused the loss.
Another British war vessel was sunk the next day. The aux-
iliary cruiser India fell prey to a submarine while entering the
roads at Restfjord, Sweden, on the steamship lane between
England and Archangel, Russia's northernmost port Eighty
of the crew, estimated at more than 300 men, were saved by
Swedish craft The attack came without warning and furnished
another illustration of the submarine's deadly effectiveness
under certain conditions. The India, a Peninsular and Oriental
liner before the war, was well known to many travelers. Built
in 1896, she had a registry of 7,900 tons, and was in the eastern
service for a number of years.
After many months of idleness a clash came in the North
Sea on August 12, 1915. The Ramsay, a small patrol vessel, met
and engaged the German auxiliary Meteor. Although out-
matched, the British ship closed with her foe and kept up the
fight for an hour. The cannonade attracted a flotilla of cruisers,
which came up too late to save the Ramsay, but which did suc-
ceed in cutting off the Meteor.
Four officers and thirty-nine members of the crew were picked
up by the Germans when their antagonist went down and these,
together with the crew of the Meteor, took to the German's boats
when her commander saw that escape was impossible. He blew
up his ship and by a combination of pluck, good seamanship, and
a favorable fortune managed to dude the cordon of British
cruisers, reaching the German shore with his prisoners. The
total crew of the Ramsay was slightly more than 100 men.
Two successful attacks in four days on British war vessels,
and the loss of a third by a mine, stirred official circles, and
demand was made in the papers that redoubled precautions be
148 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
taken. It was believed that the adventure of the Meteor into
hostile waters heralded further activity by the German fleet, but
the days passed without incident, and the British naval forces
settled down to the old routine of watching and waiting.
While these events were transpiring in the North Sea the
British had not been idle elsewhere. From the beginning of
operations in the Dardanelles attempts had been made to pene-
trate the Bosphorus and sink one of the Turk's capital ships.
A number of sailing vessels and one or two transports had been
sunk by British submarines in that sea, but efforts to locate the
larger warships of the enemy failed until August 9, 1915. On
that day the Kheyr-ed Din Barbarossa, a battleship of 9,900 tons
and a complement of 600 men, was sent to the bottom. The
attack took place within the Golden Horn, at Constantinople,
and the event spread consternation in the Turkish capital. It
was the first time on record that a hostile warship had pene-
trated the land-locked waters of the Ottoman city, so favored
by nature that attack had seemed impossible there.
The Barbarossa, although an ancient ship as war vessels are
rated, carried four 12-inch guns and was a formidable fighting
craft, having been overhauled by German engineers about a
year before the war started. Along with the Goeben and
Breslau, which took refuge at Constantinople on the outbreak
of hostilities, and were "sold" to Turkey, she constituted the
Turk's chief naval arm.
News of the feat was received with enthusiasm in England,
coming as the initial achievement of the sort by a British sub-
marine. It helped salve the wounds to British pride, made by
repeated disasters through the medium of German undersea
boats. The event was one of the few bright episodes from an
Ally standpoint in the campaign to capture Constantinople, and
was taken to mean that a new tide had set in for the attackers.
It did serve to clear the Sea of Marmora of Turkish shipping,
and supplies for the beleaguered forces at the tip of Gallipoli
Peninsula were henceforth carried by a single track railway or
transport. It also inspired a heaHAy respect among the Turks
for enemy submarines.
SUBMARINE EXPLOITS 149
A few days later, August 16; 1915, another German submarine
was to set a new record. Early in the morning of that day the
towns of Whitehaven, Parton, and Harrington, on the western
coast of England, were aroused in succession by the boom of
guns and the falling of shells in their streets. It was believed
for a few frenzied moments that the German fleet had come.
But merely one lone submarine had made the attack. This was
enough to cause considerable alarm, particularly when it was
seen that a gas plant at Whitehaven had caught fire. There
were other fires in the same town and at Harrington, none of
which did much damage.
Once more the undersea boat of the enemy had scored. Not
since 1778 had the towns smelled hostile powder. In that year
John Paul Jones surprised the guards at Whitehaven during the
night, spiked the guns of its defenses, and prepared to burn a
number of ships at anchor there. The arrival of reenf orcements
frustrated this plan and the American seamen were recalled to
their vessels. Whitehaven never forgot, and now it has a new
chapter in its martial record.
The Turks were soon to have their revenge for the loss
of the Barbarossa through the medium of a German sub-
marine which, after more than a year of war, accomplished one
of the cherished plans of the Germans — the sinking of a British
troop ship. On August 17, 1915, the Royal Edward, register-
ing 11,117 tons, was hit and sunk in the JEgean Sea. There
were thirty-two officers and 1,350 troops aboard, in addition to
220 officers and men of the ship's company. One thousand were
lost.
The blow was a hard one, coming after the efforts of the
British navy to protect the country's fighting men. It em-
phasized the new activity by German submarines in the Mediter-
ranean. No one believed for a moment that Austria had
ventured upon such an extensive campaign as recent events
pointed to. In addition to the one German submarine known
to have reached the Dardanelles via Gibraltar, it had been
reported that others were being brought overland to Pola and
the parts assembled there.
150 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
A good deal of mystery surrounds an engagement off the west
coast of Jutland on this same August 17th. Berlin announced
that a fight began at 2 o'clock in the afternoon between five
German torpedo boats and a light British cruiser and eight
destroyers. It was alleged that the cruiser and one destroyer
foundered, without any loss to the German force.
The British Admiralty was vague in its report of the encoun-
ter, saying that the British ships were mine-sweepers, of which
one failed to return. Like many other incidents of the war at
sea, the real facts cannot now be established. But there is no
doubt that a clash did take place, and the German report was
the more circumstantial.
CHAPTER XVI
THE SINKING OF THE ABABI C — BRITIS H
SUBMABINE SUCCESSES
WHILE the diplomats were laboring with questions arising
from the loss of the Lusitania, at a moment when tension
between the United States and Germany was acute, came the
sinking of the Arabic, on August 19, 1915, with the death of
two Americans and thirty-odd British citizens out of 391 persons
aboard. The attack took place near Fastnet Light, not far distant
from the spot where the Lusitania was sunk. Like the latter ship
the Arabic was struck without warning, two torpedoes pene-
trating her side. She was a vessel of 15,801 tons and, although
in service for a number of years, was rated as one of the first-
class Atlantic liners. Previous to the attack she had been chased
on several occasions by undersea craft, but had always managed
to elude them.
The outcry that followed this event in the United States gave
the situation as regarded Germany a graver aspect than before.
She had been warned that this country would hold her to strict
accountability for the lives of its citizens. Berlin, asked if a
THE SINKING OF THE ARABIC 151
submarine sank the vessel, followed by immediate disclaimers
of any belligerent intent. It was alleged that a German sub-
marine had been in the act of attacking another British vessel
when the Arabic hove into view and attempted to ram the sub-
marine. In defense the latter's captain sank the liner, Berlin
explained.
This theory was not in the least acceptable to the United
States. Captain Finch of the Arabic and other persons aboard
had seen the attack on the second ship, and the Arabic attempted
to flee but was overhauled and torpedoed. The facts were
attested to by such a number of persons that there could be little
doubt of their correctness. But despite this and Germany's oft-
repeated assurances of respect for American lives, nothing of a
positive character was done by the United States. Negotiations
dragged out to a wearisome length and the submarines continued
to take their almost daily toll from neutrals and belligerents alike.
The British submarine E-7 was sunk by a Turkish land bat-
tery in the Sea of Marmora on September 4, 1915, thirty-two
men being lost. She was the first undersea boat of the Allies to
meet that fate in the Dardanelles operations.
The combination of care and luck that had kept British trans-
ports inviolate for more than a year, which ended with the
sinking of the Royal Edward, was to be reversed during the
coming months when German submarines inflicted heavy losses
on this class of ships. The Mediterranean proved to be the
grave of several thousand men lost in this manner. The
Ramazan, of 3,477 tons, bringing native troops from India, was
torpedoed and sunk on September 19, 1915, in the JEgesm Sea.
Out of about 1,000 men on board some 300 were landed at Malta.
The levy which she had aboard consisted of Sikhs and Gurkhas.
The sea was new to these men, drawn from interior provinces,
and they had embarked upon their first voyage with all the mis-
givings which usually accompany that experience. The panic
among them when the Ramazan was hit may well be imagined.
Hints of it crept into the British press, but it was said that
after a few wild minutes the officers got their men in hand and
all died together with true British fortitude.
152 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
One of the few announcements made by Germany concerning
lost submarines was given out on September 27, 1915, whether
for diplomatic reasons or otherwise it would be difficult to say.
The U-27, it was said, had not been heard from since August
10, 1915, and was deemed to have been sunk or captured. Berlin
concluded with the observation that the U-27 might have been
destroyed after sinking the Arabic, inasmuch as none of her
commanders had reported the torpedoing of the liner up to that
date. It was Germany's plea at the time that she knew nothing
officially of the Arabic's loss. The disappearance of the U-27, a
new and fast submarine having seventeen knots speed on the
surface, therefore, was a matter of diplomatic importance. The
puzzle never was answered.
For some unexplained reason Great Britain never resorted to
submarine attacks upon German shipping in the Baltic Sea until
the fall of 1915. While her own vessels were being sunk she
spared those of her enemy, either because the navy had not been
prepared to undertake an expedition into the Baltic, or because
it had been looked upon as a small issue in the face of graver
problems. This situation was changed by the German threat
against Riga, Russia's important Baltic port, following the fall
of Libau and the progress of German troops in Courland within
cannon range almost of Riga.
It was determined to send a squadron of submarines into the
Baltic as a means of assisting Russia and for the purpose of
stopping supplies being sent to Germany from Sweden. Com-
manders of the undersea boats were specifically directed to see
that all passengers and crews were taken off merchant ships
before they were sunk. These orders were carried out in detail,
not a single noncombatant having lost his life as a result of the
operations that ensued.
The E-13, with several other submarines, was bound for the
Baltic when she ran aground. This was in Danish waters off the
island of Saltholm, between Copenhagen and MalmO. She
struck early in the morning and all efforts to gain open water
failed. At five a. m. a Danish torpedo boat appeared and in-
formed the commander that twenty-four hours would be given
THE SINKING OF THE ARABIC 153
him to leave the three-mile zone. Shortly afterward a German
destroyer came up and remained close by until two additional
Danish torpedo boats reached the scene. The German withdrew,
but reappeared about nine o'clock, accompanied by a second de-
stroyer. The three Danish boats were close at hand, but neither
they nor the British crew had an inkling of what was to follow.
One of the German destroyers hoisted a signal, but this was
pulled down so quickly that the E-13'8 commander failed to read
it. The German then fired a torpedo at the helpless craft, which
struck the bottom near by without doing any damage. This was
followed with a broadside from every gun that could be brought
to bear.
Realizing that escape was impossible the British commander
gave orders to abandon the ship and blow her up. When such
of his men as were still on their feet tumbled over the side, the
Germans turned machine guns and shrapnel upon them. A dozen
men were killed or wounded before a Danish boat of the trio on
hand steamed into the line of fire and stopped the slaughter.
Both of the German destroyers retired.
This attack inflamed England from end to end. It was
pointed out how British sailormen so frequently had risked their
lives to rescue Germans in distress, and demand was made for
reprisals. No direct steps were taken toward that end, but the
German navy soon was to suffer losses from the companion boats
of the E-13, which had reached the Baltic safely.
Hard on the heels of the E-18 incident came formal complaint
from Germany that the British had pushed overboard survivors
from a German submarine sunk by a trawler. Men aboard the
transport Narco&ian gave the first news of this affair on reaching
New Orleans after a trip from England. They said that while
the U-27 was parleying with the Narcosian, preparatory to sink-
ing her, an armed trawler came to their aid and rammed the U-27,
which sunk almost at once. Several of the German sailors swam
to the trawler and climbed over her sides. They were thrown
back and drowned, according to the Narcosian crew's testimony.
Representations upon this subject were made to Washington
by the German authorities, without any expectation that the
154 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
United States would take action, but merely to serve as a record
and basis for future action. The German press cried for re-
venge, and it was not long until the Government itself talked
broadly of similar treatment for British prisoners. Great
Britain suggested that a board of American naval officers
hear evidence in the case and render a decision, providing
that Germany would defend charges of a similar character.
From fighting, the two principal combatants had fallen to
quarreling, Germany refused the challenge and nothing came
of the matter.
A large German torpedo boat was run down and cut in two by
a German ferryboat on October 15, 1915, not far from Trelle-
borg, Sweden. Both vessels were running with all lights out
when the accident took place. Five men were saved and forty
drowned.
The first fruits of the undertaking to clear the Baltic of Ger-
man shipping and interfere with the operations against Riga
was the sinking on October 24, 1915, of the Prinz Adalbert, an
armored cruiser of 8,858 tons. Of 575 men aboard less than 100
were saved. She was the first big German warship to be blown
up by a torpedo. True, the Bliicher was so disposed of during
the Dogger Bank fight, mentioned in another volume, but she
already had been disabled.
The submarine that ended the Prinz Adalbert's career never
was identified, but she did her work well. Berlin announced that
two torpedoes struck the cruiser, both taking effect, and that she
sunk in a few minutes. The attack was made near Libau, ac-
cording to the German statement.
The British cruiser Argyll stranded off the Scottish coast on
October 28, 1915, and broke up a few days later. The mishap
occurred during a storm, and all of her crew were rescued by
other vessels. She was of 10,850 tons burden, and carried a
heavy armament. This same day the Hythe, an auxiliary vessel
was sunk in a collision near Gallipoli Peninsula, with a loss of
twenty lives.
Turkish gunners destroyed the French submarine Turquoise in
the Dardanelles on November lr 1915. Her crew of thirty odd
THE SINKING OF THE ARABIC 155
men were killed or drowned. The incident took place at the nar-
rowest point of the passage into the Sea of Marmora.
November proved to be a bad month for the kaiser's naval
forces. During the first week the U-8 was lost in the North Sea.
Berlin reported that the vessel had stranded. Whether this ver-
sion was correct cannot be learned, the British policy of conceal-
ing submarine captures, in order to befog Berlin, cutting off in-
formation from that source.
This month also cost the British several ships. Torpedo boat
No. 96 collided with another vessel near Gibraltar on November
2, 1915, and sank before all of her crew could escape, eleven men
being drowned. The fifth of the month witnessed a successful
attack by an enemy submarine upon the armed merchantman
Torn of the British navy. She was a vessel of 6,322 tons and
carried from four to five hundred men, of whom thirty-four lost
their lives. The sinking of the Tara, coupled with numerous at-
tacks on merchant ships, proved that the undersea fleet of Ger-
many in the Mediterranean was becoming formidable. Then be-
gan a painstaking search of the many small islands off the Greek,
Italian, and Turkish coasts for submarine bases. Several were
discovered and destroyed. A number of submarines also were
caught or sunk in the Mediterranean.
The Undine, a German cruiser having 2,636 tons registry,
and a crew of 275 men, was torpedoed in the Baltic November
7, 1915. She had been convoying a fleet of merchant ships com-
ing from Sweden when a British submarine cut short her days.
Nearly all of the crew were lost.
Germany now began to feel the pinch of undersea warfare.
Sweden, most friendly of neutral powers on the European con-
tinent, and a source of endless supplies, was almost isolated from
the Baltic side by the half dozen British submarines in that sea.
Unlike the British, the Germans deemed it better to keep their
vessels in port than risk destruction, even in the face of condi-
tions that approached starvation for the poor. The string of
vessels that had been bringing native Swedish products to Ger-
many, and others from the United States and elsewhere, trans-
shipped by the Swedes, were kept idle.
156 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Search for the submarines that imperiled their last water link
with the outside world went zealously on. A number of small,
fast patrol boats and cruisers were assigned to the task. Thus
it was that the Frauenlob, a cruiser of 2,672 tons and some 300
men, came within the range of a British submarine off the Baltic
coast of Sweden on November 7, 1915. She blew up and plunged
to the bottom after a single torpedo had been fired. Practically
every man aboard was lost
As may be well imagined these achievements of her own un-
dersea boats filled England with pride. It was almost a joy, ex-
cept for the loss of life, to see Germany suffer at a business in
which she had caused such distress to others. And the Empire
was suffering acutely from the suspension of connections with
Sweden, as evidenced by the greater haste to run down the elu-
sive submarines that dogged her navy. More vessels were as-
signed to the hunt. Every mile of shore line within the German
reach was searched for a possible base and the vessels in the
hunt kept a lookout on all sides for the telltale periscope.
The British lost another destroyer on November 9, 1915, dur-
ing a storm in the Mediterranean, a half dozen men being saved.
And the Turks accounted for a submarine on the 13th, when the
E-20 was sunk by land fire in the Sea of Marmora. Although
Turkish craft had been compelled to forego trips in those waters
they proved to be most unfriendly for allied submarines. With
experience on the part of the Turks came less respect for the un-
dersea boats, a number of which were hit by land batteries dur-
ing the operations there.
Naval operations continued in this way without notable in-
cident until December 18, 1915. Then the cruiser Bremen joined
the other German war vessels that had been sunk in the Baltic
search. She registered 2,672 tons, and had about 300 men
aboard. The attack took place near the Swedish coast, and
created such a sensation that the Swedes became convinced the
British had a submarine rendezvous on their shores, and took a
hand in the hunt. No evidence of a base could be found.
By this time German shipping had practically disappeared
from the Baltic and it never reappeared. The British tactics
THE SINKING OF THE ARABIC 157
fully served their purpose in this direction. And the few sub-
marines rendered effective aid in the defense of Riga, helping
the Russians stem what promised to be a dangerous onslaught.
It would not be too much to say that the arrival of the little fleet
of undersea boats was a turning point in the German drive along
the Baltic, which overwhelmed Libau. The Russian line stiffened
before Riga with the aid of the navy and the submarines. Riga
was saved, perhaps Petrograd, which it guarded.
There was a considerable loss of life on December 28, 1915,
when the Vitte de la Ciotat, a French channel steamer, became
the mark of a torpedo. Seventy-nine of her passengers and crew
were drowned, the survivors suffering severely from bad weather
in open boats before they reached land. A number of them after-
ward died of pneumonia.
The final tragedy of the year at sea took place on December
80, 1915, shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon at a point 300
miles northwest of Alexandria, Egypt, where the Peninsular and
Oriental liner Persia was torpedoed. Like so many ships that
had gone before she sank immediately. Out of 241 passengers
aboard only fifty-nine were saved, while ninety-four men in a
crew of 159 reached shore. This aroused some criticism, but
there was no evidence to show that the crew had taken advantage
of those intrusted to their protection.
No one saw the submarine that sank the Persia. She un-
doubtedly was torpedoed, as it was scarcely reasonable that a
stray mine had floated to such an unfrequented spot. One
American citizen, Robert Ney McNeely, appointed consul to Aden,
Egypt, lost his life. He was en route to his post at the time and
the United States Government found itself facing another serious
situation. Here was an American official, bound on official busi-
ness, killed by a friendly nation. There the problem became more
complex. It could not be proved to whom the submarine be-
longed that attacked the ship; it could not even be shown that
she had been torpedoed. Germany flatly denied any hand in the
affair and Austria, after delay for reports from her submarines
commanders, likewise disclaimed responsibility. Official Wash-
ington turned inquiring eyes upon Turkey. There were hints in
158 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
the German press that a Turkish boat torpedoed the vessel. Both
Germany and Austria had pledged themselves to respect the lives
of noncombatants, but Turkey, having never sank a passenger
ship, was bound by no such pledge. It even was hinted that Bul-
garia might be the nation to blame. She had entered hostilities
on the side of the Teutonic Powers, and was said to have at least
one or two submarines.
Amid this welter of excuses, explanations and possibilities the
United States Government floundered for several weeks. Then
it gave up the problem and ruled that Mr. McNeely should have
asked for a warship if he wanted to reach Aden and there was
no other way to go. The Persia had several 4.7-inch guns aboard,
which compromised her in the view of Washington.
According to the British Admiralty thirty-nine unarmed steam-
ships and one trawler flying the Union Jack were sunk without
warning by submarines up to the end of 1915. Thirteen neutral
steamships and one sailing vessel were listed under the same
heading. Of these, the GhdfUght and Nebraskan were American.
The Norwegians lost four steamships and the sailing craft, the
Swedes four, the Danes one, the Greeks one, and the Portuguese
one. It was stated that several vessels believed to have been
sunk by submarines, where proof was lacking, had not been taken
into account.
Although this compilation included the Lu&itartia, the Arabic,
and other big vessels on which many lives were lost, the list seems
of small consequence in view of later raids upon allied and neu-
tral shipping by the German undersea boats. It was destined to
reach an ominous length in the succeeding months.
CRUISE OF THE MOEWE 159
CHAPTER XVII
CRUISE OF THE MOEWE — LOSS OF
BRITISH BATTLESHIPS
THE cruise of the Moewe stands out as one of the most impor-
- tant naval achievements of the war. She left Bremerhaven
on December 20, 1915, according to one of her officers who after-
ward reached the United States, and calmly threaded her way
through the meshes of the British navy's North Sea net. After
leaving the shelter of home waters, with the Swedish colon
painted on her hull, the Moewe boldly turned her nose down the
Channel. She answered the signals of several British cruisers
and on one occasion at least was saluted in turn. Having a
powerful wireless apparatus aboard, her commander, Count zu
Dohna-Schlobitten, a captain-lieutenant in the Imperial navy,
was able to keep up with the movements of British patrol vessels.
Several intercepted messages told of a strange white liner that
refused to answer questions. This was the Moewe, and before
passing into the Atlantic she had changed her coat to black.
She was sighted by probably a dozen British warships before
reaching the North Atlantic. By refusing to heed the signals of
distant vessels, which she had a good chance of outdistancing in
a race, and showing every courtesy to those close at hand, the
raider made her escape.
The Moewe had about three hundred men aboard. They were
a picked crew, and her commander a man of daring. Within
a period of less than three months he sunk fifteen merchant
ships, captured the Appam and sent her to Norfolk, Va.,
then returned home with 199 prisoners and $250,000 in gold
bars. And he may have been responsible for the loss of the
British battleship King Edward VII, of 16,500 tons, which
struck a mine in the North Sea on January 9, 1916. It is certain
that the Moewe left a chain of mines behind her on the out-
ward voyage, some of which undoubtedly caused loss to allied
shipping.
K— War St. 4
160 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Once past the British Channel fleet, the Moewe struck for the
steamship lane off the Moroccan, Spanish, and Portuguese coasts.
There she was comparatively safe from pursuit, and so skillfully
were her operations carried on that it was many weeks before
the fact became known that a raider actually was abroad. But
one by one overdue steamships failed to reach their ports and
suspicion grew. Either the Karlsruhe had returned to life as a
plague upon allied shipping, an able successor appeared, or a
flotilla of giant submarines was at large that could cruise almost
any distance. Several vessels brought tales to England of being
chased by a phantom ship near the African coast. But such
stories had been repeated so many times without any foundation
that the British admiralty was in a quandary. To overlook no
clue, a flotilla of cruisers swept the seas under suspicion. They
came back empty handed.
At dawn, February 1, 1916, a big steamship passed into
Hampton Roads, disregarding pilots and the signals of other
craft She hove to at an isolated spot and waited for daylight.
When the skies cleared the German naval flag was seen floating
at her prow. Newport News could scarce believe the report.
Then the city remembered the Kronprinzessin Cecile and the
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, both of which had stolen in under
cover of night from a raiding career.
But this was no raider. It was the Appam, a raider's victim.
She had sailed across the Atlantic from a point on the South
African route, held prisoner thirty-three days by a prize crew
of twenty-two men and one officer, lieutenant Hans Berg, of the
Imperial German Naval Reserve. Aboard the Appam were 156
officers and men, 116 of her own passengers, 188 survivors of
destroyed vessels, and twenty Germans who had been en route to
a prison camp in England when rescued. This large company
was cowed by the lieutenant's threat to shoot the first man who
made a hostile move, or to blow up the vessel with bombs if he
saw defeat was certain. And, like a good stage director, he
pointed significantly to rifles, bayonets, and bombs.
There were several notables among the prisoners, including
Sir Edward Merewether, Governor of Sierra Leone, and his wife.
CRUISE OF THE MOEWE 161
They were homeward bound from his African post for a vaca-
tion when the Moewe took the Appam. All of the persons
aboard, save the Germans, were released and the ship interned.
Then followed a long wrangle as to the status of the vessel, Ger-
many claiming the right of asylum for a prize by the terms of an
old Prussian treaty with the United States. Great Britain pro-
tested this claim and demanded that the ship be released. With-
out actually affirming one or denying the other, the United
States allowed the Appam to remain in German hands, enjoy-
ing the same privileges as other interned ships.
The Appam was a rich prize indeed. Having a registry of
7,781 tons, she was a modern vessel throughout, having been em-
ployed for several years in the trade between South Africa and
England. She was worth $1,000,000 stripped, while her cargo
sold for $700,000. The $250,000 in gold bars which subsequently
went into the Berlin strong box also came from the Appam — a
round $2,000,000. Altogether it was a very good day's work for
the Moewe.
Not till the Appam arrived in the Virginia harbor was it
positively known that a raider had eluded the allied navies. The
search that followed was conducted on a broader scale and with
more minute care than any similar hunt of the war, but to no
avail. On February 20, 1916, the Westburn, a British vessel of
3,300 tons, put into Santa Cruz de Teneriffe, a Spanish port
She, too, had a German captor aboard. One officer and six men
brought in 206 prisoners from one Belgian and six British ships.
Having landed all of those on board the German lieutenant in
command asked for permission to anchor at a different point,
and, this being granted, steamed beyond the three-mile limit,
where the Westburn was blown up. Long use of sea water in
her boilers caused the explosion, her commander said. He was
arrested along with his half dozen men, then paroled. It was
the fortune of war. Once more the Germans had won, the British
lost
Again word was passed that the Moewe must be found. The
British public took her feats much to heart. They rivaled the
finest accomplishments of British sailormen in the days when
162 TOT STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
privateers went forth to destroy French commerce. But the
Moewe never was caught. On the morning of March 5, 1916, she
put into Wilhelmshaven with 4 officers, 29 marines and sailors,
and 165 men of enemy crews as her prisoners. And the gold
bars were secure in the captain's safe.
Immediately a fervor of enthusiasm ran through Germany.
The Moewe was back after a trip of many thousand miles, with
prisoners and bullion aboard. She had sunk fifteen allied vessels —
thirteen British, one Belgian, and one French — with an aggregate
tonnage of nearly 60,000. This had been accomplished in the
face of her enemies' combined sea power. The Moewe first sailed
through the blockade and then came home again by the long way
round. She skirted the whole of Iceland to reach Wilhelmshaven
safely, making a perilous voyage into Arctic waters at the worst
season of the year. All this and more the German papers re-
counted with pardonable pride. It was said that Germany had
flung the gauntlet in the British face and escaped unscathed.
Count zu Dohna-Schlobitten had the honor paid him of a visit
from the kaiser aboard his ship, where he received the Iron Cross.
Wilhelm was much pleased, as may be imagined, and the example
of the count was held up to the German navy as an illustration
of what daring could achieve.
The Moewe' s exploits evidently were part of a concerted plan.
Whether the raider actually sunk all of the vessels accredited to
her is a question that probably never will be answered. The
evidence tends to show that it was Germany's aim to create a
fleet of auxiliaries in the mid-Atlantic. It seems likely that the
naval board in Berlin conceived the idea of having a number of
their interned vessels break for the sea on a stated day and meet
at a common rendezvous, or undertake raiding upon their own
account.
Whatever the plan, it was carried out in part. Two German
liners escaped from South American ports on February 12, 1916,
and never were heard from again, so far as the records go. They
were the Bahrenfeld and the Turpitu As the identity of the
Moewe already had been established and allied warships were
scouring the seven seas for her, it appears plausible that the
CRUISE OF THE MOEWE 163
Bahrenfeld and Turpin both assumed the same title, and that
one or other of the vessels was taken to be the original Moewe by
persons on ships which they sunk. Or one or both may have
been run down and the fact kept secret.
The Bahrenfeld and Turpin commanders were wily men. They
told the authorities at Buenos Aires, where the first named had
sought asylum, and Puenta Arenas, Chile, where the second was
interned, that the machinery of their ships was suffering from
disuse, and requested permission for a day's run in the neigh-
boring waters that the engines might have exercise. This was
granted, and they quietly put to sea. That was the last seen of
them by the South American folk. But the port officials at Rio
de Janeiro were suspicious when the Asuncion tried the same
ruse. As she began to edge beyond bounds a shot across her bow
cut short the plan.
Both the Bahrenfeld and the Turpin were built in England,
the former having a registry of 2,357 tons, and the latter 3,301
tons.
The first day of the new year was marked by the explosion of
the British armored cruiser Natal in an east-coast port. Three
hundred men of a crew numbering 700 were killed, the others
escaping because they had shore leave. Not a man on board
lived to tell how the explosion came. It was one of a mysterious
chain that had shaken even British nerves in the early days of the
war when a half dozen warcraft were blown up in home ports.
The explosions were, in every instance, extremely violent, liter-
ally blowing the vessels to bits. Several of them were affirmed to
have been accidental by the British admiralty, which rendered
that verdict upon the Natal, but these official explanations never
were convincing.
The Natal, a vessel of 3,600 tons, had but recently returned
from sea service and was in good condition throughout. The
explosion that rent her apart came in the quiet of the evening
when the men either were sleeping or preparing for supper.
Suddenly there was a crash, and the Natal was no more. Such
of her hull and superstructure as had not been scattered in every
direction sank beneath the surface of the water.
164 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Just nine days later the King Edward VII, a predreadnought
of 16,500 tons, collided with a mine in the North Sea and soon
foundered. She was a second-line ship of heavy battery and
carried a crew of 777 men, all of whom were taken off before the
big craft sunk. This was one of the few instances in which there
was no loss of life from mine or torpedo explosions. The accident
occurred at a time when the King Edward VII was accompanied
by a number of other vessels, or most of the men aboard prob-
ably would have been drowned. On a warship, even more than
a passenger vessel, it is impossible to carry enough boats for all.
The price of defeat in a naval action inevitably is death. For this
reason there was general thanksgiving in England that the crew
of the battleship had been saved, even though the ship was lost.
During the month of January, 1916, three British sailing
vessels and ten steamships were sunk by enemy warships, with
a respective tonnage of 153 and 81,481. Four hundred and ten
lives were lost. Three steamships struck mines and foundered
in the same month, having a tonnage of 8,357. Two persons
died in the trio of accidents.
The Amircti Charner, an old but serviceable French armored
cruiser of 4,680 tons, was torpedoed in the Mediterranean near
Syria on February 8, 1916. She went down within a few
minutes, although about a hundred men managed to reach the
lifeboats and rafts. The weather was bitterly cold, and only one
survivor lived to bring the news. He was picked up on a raft
with fourteen dead companions and told an incoherent story that
bore little relation to the truth. But it was only too easy to guess
what had happened.
During the early period of the war the French navy escaped
the heavy blows that fell upon the British, partly because Ger-
many concentrated on her larger antagonist's navy, and partly
due to the fact that the British ships were nearly all engaged in
the Atlantic, while the French confined themselves more espe-
cially to the Mediterranean. With the opening of operations at
the Dardanelles and the coming of German submarines the losses
of the French sea forces began to grow rapidly. But they held
the Mediterranean against all attacks.
WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING 165
The Arethusa, which torpedoed the Blilcher after she had been
put out of action by the Lion in that famous fight, collided with
a mine near the east coast of England on February 14, 1916. She
went down with a loss of ten men, neighboring vessels doing
notable rescue work. The Arethusa was a cruiser of 3,600 tons
and had taken an active part in all of the work that fell to the
British fleet. She was one of the pet ships of the navy, having
a reputation for speed and luck that made her name familiar to
readers the world over. A half dozen brushes with the enemy
had found her well up in the fighting line, and she was said by
sailormen to have a charmed existence, never having been hit.
But she sunk quickly after striking the mine. The passing of
so gallant a ship was one of the chief developments of the month
in its naval history.
The Peninsular and Oriental liner Maloja was blown up in the
Channel on February 28, 1916, supposedly by a mine. The loss
of life was large, 147 persons being drowned.
CHAPTER XVIII
CONTINUATION OF WAR ON MERCHANT
SHIPPING — ITALIAN AND RUSSIAN
NAVAL MOVEMENTS — SINKING
OF LA PROVENCE
THROUGHOUT the months of January and February, 1916
while negotiations between Germany and the United States
were in a critical stage, the submarine war on merchant shipping
continued with little abatement Seeing that her armies could
thwart the Allies' offensive efforts, but were unable to crush any
one of the larger powers, Germany turned longing eyes to the
sea. There was much talk of risking a major engagement. The
kaiser's naval advisers worked feverishly with figures and plans.
An echo of this scarce suppressed excitement crept into the Ger-
man press, and was duly noted in London and Paris.
166 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
One of the principal German journals came out with a frank
discussion of the elements involved and the chances of success.
It was said that three possibilities lay open. The first con*
templated an attack upon the Allies' flank in Flanders, made from
the sea, to coordinate with a drive on land. Another section of
the fleet would try to hold off the British until the action was over
or, failing that, combine forces with the first squadron and stake
the Empire s fortune on the result of a general battle.
The second plan provided for a dash to sea with the purpose
of running the blockade and effecting a junction with the Aus-
trians in the Mediterranean, to be followed by an attack upon
the Suez Canal. A land attack was to take place at the same
time. The third scheme called for minor raids on exposed points
by the two fleets and relentless submarine activities.
This estimate was not far short of the actual plans before the
German naval authorities. Their realization of the pressing need
for action, the tightening blockade, and the desperate possibilities
of defeat, made them a trifle unwary. News was flashed abroad
many times that revealed this state of mind. For instance, on
February 20, 1916, it was announced that cooperative action at
sea had been settled upon in accord with the proposals of Arch-
duke Charles Stephen and Prince Henry of Prussia, the kaiser's
brother. Such information, whether genuine or not, could only
make the Allies redouble their watch.
Early in February, 1916, it was established that 70,000 naval
reservists had been gathered at Kiel and Helgoland ready for
duty on auxiliary vessels and cruisers of newly-formed squad-
rons. Many facts that pointed to Germany's resolution in the
face of odds never reached America. The Ally censors kept
Germany's secret well. But the whole world expected that a big
engagement would be fought any day. The intervening hours,
almost the minutes, might be counted.
Then Germany changed her mind. She gave notice that after
March 1, 1916, a new submarine campaign would be launched.
Certain concessions were granted to the demands of the United
States, but it was proposed to consider many vessels as warcraf t
that other nations regarded as merchant ships. It was agreed
WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING
167
tied Kaiser .
KIEL CANAL
168 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
that warning should be given passenger vessels unless they made
an offensive move. This broad ruling gave Germany a free
hand, at least from her own standpoint
The new campaign was widely advertised, a succession of
brusque threats and veiled insinuations leading up to a fine
climax of publicity. The tactics were those of diplomacy and
the drama, with the world for an audience.
But the campaign failed to accomplish what had been claimed
for it. The number of vessels lost did not materially increase,
nor did allied shipping halt No matter what efforts Germany
has made the ports of her enemies never have closed — have in
reality been far busier than before the war. And the British
navy's nets and traps, and her thousands of patrol boats made the
submarine commanders' task ever more difficult. Within a few
weeks after the latest German policy was in effect the Allies
could again breathe easy. Casualties at sea continued, but there
was no general destruction as had been promised.
The principal achievement of Italy's navy in the war has been
the protection of her coast line. Indisputably she has dominated
the Adriatic, bottling up the Austrian fleet at Pola. Not a single
engagement, worthy the name, has been fought in that narrow
strip of water, only forty-five miles wide at its southern extrem-
ity, ninety at the northern end and 110 at the widest point
Across this limited space Italy has transported about 200,000
troops, with the loss of but two transports, the Mart Chiaro and
the Umberto, both of which were small. A good part of the
Serbian and Montenegrin armies were carried to places where
they might recuperate, and a considerable force of her own
troops landed on the coast of Albania. This was accomplished
in defiance of Austria's numerous submarines, which never have
achieved anything like the success of the German undersea craft
After Italy's entrance into the war Austrian squadrons of
light cruisers and destroyers shelled several coast cities. But
these attacks soon ceased and all of the 500 miles of Italy's
Adriatic shore, dented as it is with small harbors and flanked by
many islands, has been strangely immune from enemy depreda-
tions. This is a tribute to the Italian navy that cannot be easily
WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING 169
explained. The Italian censorship, stricter than that of any other
belligerent power, has let through almost nothing about her naval
activities. The Austrians simply have refused to fight, pre-
ferring to keep their warcraf t safe in the harbor at Pola rather
than risk the fortune of battle.
During the period under review in this volume the Italians
lay and waited for their foe as they had done for weary months.
Nothing happened. A few merchant ships, sailing vessels for the
most part, were torpedoed, but there was no attempt by the Aus-
trians to sink enemy warships. Italy kept up her vigil and the
Austrians dozed in their strong harbor at Pola.
When Bulgaria cast her lot with Germany the Russian Black
Sea fleet shelled Dedeagatch and other Bulgarian coast cities,
damaging fortifications, destroying shipping in the harbors and
causing a few casualties among troops and citizens. These
demonstrations were taken to herald a landing of soldiers on the
Bulgar coast, but this expected event never developed. Russia,
having abundant troubles in other quarters, has been in no posi-
tion to undertake an invasion of her newest foe's territory.
While allied vessels were pounding the forts at the Dardanelles
it was reported several times that the Russians would cooperate
in a grand assault, endeavoring to reduce the Black Sea defenses
of the Ottoman capital. The fortifications there were shelled a
few times and various cities on the Asiatic shore of the Turks
have been bombarded. But all of this work was desultory, having
no special purpose and accomplishing little. Turkish shipping
was driven from the Black Sea in the early days of the war, al-
though a few transports and supply vessels have made the
hazardous trip to Trebizond and other Turkish ports. The Rus-
sian fleet has taken heavy toll among such craft and to all pur-
poses pinned the Turk to his side of the sea, while enjoying all
of its privileges.
The successful operations of the Russian Caucasian army in
the first months of 1916 and the movement down the Black Sea
coast was aided by the fleet, which brought supplies across the sea
to newly won points and prepared the way for an attack upon
Trebizond. That city is of considerable importance, being a mili-
170 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
tary base and having a number of industries. It was a busy port
before the war began and would be a valuable rallying point for
future operations against Constantinople. All signs indicated a
Russian offensive with Trebizond as its immediate objective.
The harbor's fortifications already had been damaged by the
Russian fire, and the fleet undoubtedly could cooperate in any
attack upon the city.
The Turkish navy, like the Austrian, kept to home waters.
Scarcely a month passed that engagements were not reported
between the Goeben and Breslau with vessels of the enemy.
Many of these were circumstantial, one of which recounted a
long range fight between the Goeben and Russian warships, in
which the Goeben was said to have been severely damaged. Ac-
cording to subsequent reports a great hole in her hull was patched
with cement, armor plate being unavailable in Constantinople.
Losses inflicted upon British shipping up to the end of Feb-
ruary, 1916, were slightly under 4 per cent of the vessels flying
the British flag, and a shade more than 6 per cent in point of
tonnage. The loss of the other Allies, on a basis of tonnage,
was as follows : France, 7 per cent; Russia, 5 per cent; and Italy,
4% per cent.
How heavy the hand of war has fallen upon neutrals may be
judged from a comparison of sea casualties. Italy lost twenty-
one steamers with a gross tonnage of 70,000 in the period before
the reader, while Norway, a neutral, lost fifty steamers having
an aggregate tonnage of 96,000, more than 25 per cent larger.
Total allied shipping losses numbered 481 steamships having a
tonnage of 1,621,000, and fifty-seven sailing vessels, with a ton-
nage of 47,000. One hundred and forty-six neutral craft were
junk, whose tonnage reached 293,375, while sailing vessels to the
iiumber of forty-two, with a tonnage of 24,001, were lost. Ger-
many's methods cost innocent bystanders among the nations al-
most one-fifth of the damage done to her foes' commercial fleets.
Inclusive of trawlers, 980 merchant craft had been sunk by the
end of February, of which 726 were vessels of good size. It was
destruction upon a scale never seen before, an economic pressure
that made former wars seem mere tournaments. And Germany's
WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING 171
most desperate attempts failed to accomplish her end — the
halting of allied commerce. Although it was mathematically
certain that a percentage of the ships sailing every day would be
torpedoed, the world's trade went on in the usual channels.
There was a brighter side to the situation. "After more than
a year of war," says a British admiralty statement, "the steam
shipping of Great Britain increased eighty-eight vessels and 844,-
000 tons. France at the end of 1915 was only short nine steamers
and 12,500 tons of the previous year's total. Italy and Russia
both show an increase in tonnage.
"It is therefore clear that the shortage of tonnage is due not
to the action of submarines, but to the great requirements of the
military and naval forces. The latest published statement of
these show that they are demanding 3,100 vessels."
Another turn was given to the controversy over sea laws dur-
ing the first quarter of 1916 by the arming of many British and
a considerable proportion of Italian passenger vessels. Earlier
in the war a few British ships came into New York harbor with
guns aboard, but they were forced to abandon the plan because
of American protests. The second attempt was different and
so were the circumstances. Germany had shown a disregard for
the helplessness of passenger craft that did not permit of forcible
objection to the adoption of defensive methods by such vessels. The
Italians, in particular, displayed a resolute spirit Diplomatic
hints had no weight at Rome and one after another the Italian
liners came into New York with trim three-inch pieces fore and
aft They had a most suggestive look and were manned by crews
trained in the navy. Not since the days of open piracy had armed
merchant ships been seen in American waters. Their presence
recalled the time when every ship that sailed was prepared to
fight or run as necessity might dictate.
Germany flatly refused to consider merchantmen with guns
aboard as anything but warships, and gave notice that she would
sink them without warning. Once more the relations of Ger-
many and the United States reached a point that bordered on an
•pen break. Although this never quite happened, the United
States temporising and the kaiser's agents granting just enough
172 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
to prevent a rupture, the situation was exceedingly delicate.
American contentions ultimately were met by the promise that
armed craft would not be attacked unless they made an offensive
move. This left things as they had been before. There was no
world court to decide what an offensive move meant, nor to en-
force a decision.
The White Star line announced in the closing week of Feb-
ruary, 1916, that passenger service between the United States
and England would be discontinued until further notice. This
meant that all of the company's ships had been requisitioned for
the carrying of munitions. It betokened a more intensive prep-
aration for the prosecution of the war by England and her
Allies. It also pointed to the swelling tide of supplies flowing
from America.
France was to sustain the supreme affliction of the war at sea
on February 26, 1916. La Provence was sunk that day. She had
sailed from Marseilles with 3,500 soldiers and a crew of 500
men, bound for SalonikL A torpedo sent her to the bottom,
along with 3,300 of those on board, representing the greatest
tragedy of the sea in history. The attack took place in the Medi-
terranean and the big liner plunged beneath the waves in less
than fifteen minutes after she had been struck.
Few vessels enjoyed such fame as the La Provence. Built in
1905, she broke the transatlantic record on her first trip across,
defeating the new Deutschland of the Hamburg-American line
in a spectacular dash that brought her from Havre to New York
hours ahead of the best previous record. With a registry of 19,-
000 tons and engines generating 30,000 horsepower she was a
ship of exceptional grace. Not until the Lvmtania came into
service did the La Provence surrender her distinction of being
the fastest vessel afloat, and strangely enough both she and the
Lueitania were to fall victims of German submarines.
When the torpedo that cost so many lives exploded within
the hull of the La Provence, killing a good part of the engine-
room crew, it was seen that only a few of her large company
could escape. Lifeboats, rafts, and the makeshift straws to
safely that could be seized upon in emergency accommodated a
WAR ON MERCHANT SHIPPING 178
bare 700 and odd men. The troops gathered on the upper decks
and sang the "Marseillaise" as the great hull settled in the water.
Officers embraced their men, some indulged in a last whiff of
tobacco, others prayed for the folks at home. Commandant
Vesco stood on the bridge and directed the launching of the few
boats that got away. Then, as the vessel came even with the
waves, he tossed his cap overboard and cried : "Adieu, my boys."
As one man they answered :
"Vive la France/'
PART V— THE WAR ON THE EASTERN
FRONT
CHAPTER XIX
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS
AFTER the last days of that fateful July, 1914, had passed,
-bringing mobilization in Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and
Russia, and the outbreak of war between the former two coun-
tries, the dance of death was on. On August 1, 1914, Germany
ordered the general mobilization of its armies, and on the same
day declared war against Russia. Within a few days the first
Russian advance into East Prussia began under the leadership
of Grand Duke Nicholas, who, by a special order of the czar, had
been made commander in chief of all Russian forces on August 3,
1914. Germany, fully occupied with its advance into Belgium
and France, offered hardly any resistance, and its forces, con-
sisting almost exclusively of the few army corps permanently
stationed along its eastern border and reenforced only by local
reserves, advanced only in a few places, and there only for short
distances, into Russian territory.
On August 5, 1914, Austria-Hungary, too, declared war against
Russia, and the next day brought immediately engagements
along the frontier of the two countries, which, however, did not
develop seriously for some time. The Russian advance into
East Prussia had reached Marggrabova by the 15th, and from
then on proceeded fairly rapidly during the following week.
Memel, Tilsit, Insterburg, Kdnigsberg, and Allenstein — to name
only a few of the more important cities of East Prussia — were
either threatened with occupation by the Russian forces or had
174
SUMMARY OP FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS 175
actually been occupied by them. The entire Mazurian Lake dis-
trict in the southeast of the Prusso-Russian border region was
overrun with Russian troops. But about August 22, 1914, Ger-
many awoke to the danger of the Russian invasion. General
von Hindenburg was put in command in the east, and in the
battle of Tannenberg, which lasted from August 22 to 27, 1914,
inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Russian armies, capturing
tens of thousands of its soldiers and driving as many more to
their deaths in the swamp lands of the Mazurian Lakes. Not
only did this end for the time the Russian invasion of Germany,
but the latter country's armies followed the retreating enemy a
considerable distance into his own territory.
But although such important points as Lodz and Radomsk
were occupied during the last days of August and the first days
of September, the German advance into South Poland quickly
collapsed- In the meantime the Russians had successfully in-
vaded Galicia, and by September 3, 1914, the Austro-Hungarians
evacuated Lemberg. In the north, too, the Russian forces had
resumed the offensive and once more were invading East Prussia.
But they were again beaten back by Von Hindenburg on Sep-
tember 10-11, 1914, and, four days later, on September 15, 1914,
suffered another serious defeat in the Mazurian Lakes. The
Galician invasion, however, was meeting with great success. By
September 16, 1914, the important Austrian fortress of
Przemysl — sixty miles west of Lemberg — had been reached and
its siege begun. By September 26, 1914, the Russians had
reached the Carpathian Mountains and were flooding the fertile
plains of the Bukowina, threatening an imminent invasion of
Hungary itself.
The first week of October, 1914, brought a third invasion of
East Prussia which, however, did not extend as far as the two
preceding it, and which was partly repulsed before October was
ended. In the meantime Austria had called upon Germany for
immediate help in Galicia, and by October 2, 1914, strong Ger-
man-Austrian forces had entered Poland in order to reduce the
Russian pressure on Galicia, reaching the Upper Vistula on
October 11, 1914, and advancing against Poland's capital, War-
L— War St 4
176 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
saw. On the same day the siege of Przemysl was lifted, after a
Russian attempt to take it by storm had been successfully beaten
off a few days earlier. Throughout the balance of October, 1914,
the heaviest kind of fighting took place in Galicia and the
Bukowina. In the latter district the Austro-Hungarian troops
were successful, and on October 22, 1914, reoccupied Czernovitz
in the northeastern part of the province.
By November 7, 1914, the Russians were back again in East
Prussia, but encountered determined resistance and suffered a
series of defeats. However, although they were repulsed in
many places, they succeeded in retaining a foothold in many
ethers. At the same time very strong Russian forces had ad-
vanced from Novo Georgievsk across the Vistula toward the
Prussian provinces of Posen and Silesia. In the face of these
the Austro-Hungarian-German forces immediately gave up their
attempted advance against Warsaw and retreated beyond their
own borders into Upper Silesia and West Galicia. By the middle
of November an extensive Russian offensive was under way
along the entire front Nowhere, however, did it meet with
anything but passing success. In East Prussia and in North
Poland the Germans won battle after battle and steadily ad-
vanced against Lodz. About November 22, 1914, it looked as if
the tide was going to turn in favor of the Russian arms. One
German army group seemed completely surrounded to the north-
east of Lodz. But, although losing a large part of its effective-
ness, it managed to break through the Russian ring and to con-
nect again with the other German forces by November 26, 1914.
At the same time heavy fighting occurred around Cracow and in
the Bukowina where the Russians again occupied Czernovitz on
November 27, 1914.
Lodz fell on December 0, 1914. On the 7th the Russians were
again repulsed in the Mazurian Lakes region. Throughout that
month and January, 1915, very severe fighting took place in the
Carpathian Mountains, and by the end of January, 1915, the
Austro-Hungarian forces were in possession of all the passes,
but had not been able to drive the Russians from the north side
of the mountains. In the meanwhile the Russians were pressing
SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR'S OPERATIONS 177
their attacks against East Prussia with renewed vigor and
greatly augmented forces, and by February 7, 1915, had again
advanced to the Mazurian Lakes. In a battle lasting nine days,
Von Hindenburg once more defeated the Russian army and drove
it back into North Poland, inflicting very heavy losses. At the
end of another week, February 24, 1915, the Russians had been
driven out of the Bukowina.
Von Hindenburg had followed up his new success at the
Mazurian Lakes with a drive into North Poland, undoubtedly
with the object of invading Courland. Hardly had it gotten under
way when the Galician fortress of Przemysl was forced to sur-
render on March 22, 1915. This not only gained for the Russians
a large booty in prisoners, munitions, and equipment, but also
released the great army that had been besieging the fortress. It
was thrown immediately against the Austro-Hungarian forces
in Galicia, who were driven back again rapidly into the Car-
pathian Mountains. Again Austria appealed to Germany for
help. General von Mackensen was sent to the rescue with an
army made up largely from troops taken from Von Hindenburg's
forces. Thereby the latter again was forced to stop further
operations in the north. Von Mackensen's combined Austro-
Hungarian-German armies had an immense supply of guns and
munitions, both of which were beginning to run short in the
Russian army. With these they blasted away Russian line after
line, driving the Russians finally almost completely out of Galicia,
after retaking Przemysl on June S, 1915, and Lemberg on June
24, 1915.
In the north, in the meantime, the Germans had received re*
enforcements filling the gap that Von Mackensen's Galician
operations had caused. With these they invaded Courland while
other forces landed on the Gulf of Riga. With these two groups
they pushed south and soon connected with Von Hindenburg's
army before Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw. The latter had been
there practically ever since early in January, 1915, when after
the fall of Lodz it had gradually advanced against Poland's
capital, but was held within seven miles of it along the Bzura
and Rawka Rivers, where many bloody engagements were fought.
178 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
At the same time that these two groups formed a junction Von
Mackensen tame up with his forces from the south, taking
Zamost and Lublin and investing Ivangorod. Immediately the
drive for Warsaw began from all sides. Pultusk, on the Nareff,
fell on July 25, 1915, and on July 30, 1915, the Russians began
the evacuation of Warsaw and retreated toward a very strongly
fortified line that had been prepared and ran from Kovno south
through Grodno and Brest-Litovsk.
CHAPTER XX
TBI FALL OF TH1 KI1MBN AND
NABIFF FOBTR1S8BS
THE 5th of August, 1915, was a fateful day for the Russian
armies. The fall of Warsaw, on that date, was confirmed by
the occupation of Poland's ancient capital by German forces
under the command of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, brother of
King Ludwig III of Bavaria and son-in-law of Emperor Francis
Joseph of Austria-Hungary. This in itself would have been a
severe setback to the Russian arms. But the consequences which
this event was bound to have were of even greater importance.
In an earlier part of this work we heard at some length of
the arrangement of Russia's girdle of fortresses which — to
repeat only the most important — stretched from Kovno in the
north through Oliha, Grodno, Ossovetz, Lomza, Osholenka, and
Novo Georgievsk to powerful Warsaw and from there to the
south and east to Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk. These perma-
nent fortifications were supported by strong natural barriers or
obstacles in the form of rivers. The Niemen, Bobr, Nareff,
Vistula and Bug, with their interminable windings, made more
difficult to cross in some places by extensive swamp lands, had,
together with the fortified places, offered ideal means for strong
defense. Again and again, throughout the first thirteen months
of the war, German and Austrian froops had driven the Russian
THE FALL OF NIEMEN AND NAREFF 179
forces back to these defensive lines — but no farther. Behind
this shelter the Russians were able to recuperate from the
severest reverses and, thanks to a very extensive and compara-
tively scientific network of railways, reserves and reenforce-
ments could be brought up from interior points until armies
which apparently had been beaten to a standstill emerged again,
stronger than ever in number and equipment, to undertake a
new offensive against the German masses.
Just previous to the fall of Warsaw the eastern front, roughly
speaking, was formed by the two sides of an equilateral triangle,
with the northern side starting from a point on the Gulf of
Riga, about forty miles northwest of Riga, and with the southern
side starting from Chotin on the River Dniester in Russian
Bessarabia, very close to the point where that Russian province
touches Rumania and Galicia. The apex was at Warsaw. When
this apex caved in with the withdrawal of the Russians, it fol-
lowed logically that something had to happen to the two lines
that met there. That the Russians retreated from Warsaw on
account of some insurmountable difficulties which made the
further holding of this most important center impossible, is
quite clear. It has been established by now, almost beyond all
doubt, that this step became necessary because of insufficient
munitions. But whether this is so or not, it still remained true
that whatever caused their retreat from Warsaw would exert a
similar influence on their capacity to hold their second line of
permanent fortifications. And events immediately following the
fall of Warsaw proved this contention. Backward and back*
ward fell the Russian lines during the following weeks until by
the end of October, 1915, the two sides of the erstwhile triangle
had disappeared entirely, and the Russian front was found now
along the base of the triangle stretching from Riga through
Friedrichstadt, through a point somewhat west of Dvinsk, thence
almost due south, skirting Pinsk slightly to the east, and again
running south in front of Rovno, entering Galicia at a point
about halfway between Zlochoff and Tarnopol, and following,
slightly to the west, the River Sereth to a point on the Dniester
only a few miles west from where it had ended in August, 1915.
180 THE STOBY OF THE GREAT WAR
How immense a loss this involved for the Russians can be
easily seen by a glance at a map. The territory that fell into
German hands exceeded 60,000 square miles, with millions of
inhabitants, containing some of the most valuable railway lines
from a strategic point of view, and including besides Warsaw
such important places as Mitau, Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Bialystok,
Brest-Ldtovsk, Ivangorod, Cholm, Kovel, Pinsk. Though the
Russians destroyed many of the railways, drove off men and
cattle alike, and moved vast quantities of supplies, equipment,
and valuables of all kinds, the time and the facilities at their
disposal were so insufficient that the victorious German armies
were bound to find still untold quantities of all these. The out-
break of winter, it is true, finally halted the German advance,
the force of which gradually would have spent itself anyhow on
account of the ever-lengthening lines of communication with its
bases. In spite of this, however, it is next to miraculous that
the Russians were at all able to form a new line and to withdraw
beyond this line, after all, the largest part of their forces. This
accomplishment was only a renewed proof of the remarkable
ability of the Russian leaders at least along one line — the orderly
withdrawal of immense masses. It also showed once more the
wonderful resiliency of the Russian armies and the immense
advantages which are to be derived from a practically inexhaust-
ible supply of men.
Almost as remarkable as the compactness and efficiency of
the Russian retreat was the swiftness and insistency of the
German advance. Throughout the German offensive leading up
to and following the fall of Warsaw the German armies in the
north and center of the eastern front cooperated closely with
the Austrian forces in the south. This must be borne in mind
as well as the fact that for this entire campaign the General
Staffs of the Central Powers had conceived one plan, according
to which all their armies proceeded. This frequently neces-
sitated the halting of the advance on one or more points in order
to enable some other army at some other point to overcome
obstacles which had proved more difficult Considering the
immense extent of the eastern front — which from considerably
THE PALL OF NIEMEN AND NAREPF 181
over 700 miles at the beginning of August, 1915, gradually
shortened to about 600 miles by the end of October, 1915 — it is
little short of marvelous that the German-Austrian offensive
should at no time have lost its cohesion. In order to get a
clearer perspective of the somewhat complicated operations of
a large number of separate army units, we will divide the entire
eastern front into three sections and follow separately the
operations of each.
In the north — from the Gulf of Riga to Novo Georgievsk —
Field Marshal von Hindenburg was in command. Under him
there were four armies, each under a German general: that
under Von Billow in the extreme north; that under Von Eich-
horn to the south of the former and facing the Niemen River
and the fortress of Kovno; the two other armies under Von
Scholtz and Von Gallwitz — the latter the farthest south— were
to attack the Nareff-Bobr line between Novo Georgievsk and
Lomza.
The central group was under the command of Field Marshal
Prince Leopold of Bavaria and was reenf orced by another army
under General von Woyrsch, which previous to the fall of War-
saw had been fighting' more independently somewhat to the
south and, a day before the fall of Warsaw, had forced the
strong fortress of Ivangorod on August 4, 19J5.
The southern group was originally exclusively Austro-Hun-
garian. But during the early summer of 1915 a German army
under General von Mackensen had been sent into Galicia to
cooperate with the Austrian forces in freeing Przemysl and
Lemberg after they had assisted in throwing back the left wing
of the Russian forces then fighting in Galicia and in forcing
them to relinquish their hold on the mountain passes of the
Carpathians. This problem having been solved, these mixed
Austro-Hungarian-German forces were rearranged and reen-
f orced, and, under the command of Von Mackensen, were to at-
tack the retreating Russians around Brest-Litovsk. The left
wing of this group was under the command of Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand. To the southeast of this entire group was another
army under the Austrian General Pflanzer-Baltin, which in the
182 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
early summer (1915) had driven the Russians out of the
Bukowina.
On August 8, 1915, the attack on Kovno was begun. At the
same time the German forces advanced against Lomza and still
farther south advanced nearer and nearer to the Warsaw-
BialystokrVilna-Petrograd railroad, their main objective for
the present. All these advances found serious opposition at the
hands of the Russians, who successfully attempted to hold up
the enemy everywhere in order to insure the safety of their
retreating armies. On August 10, 1915, the Russians attempted
an unsuccessful sortie from Kovno. Farther south, as far as
Lomza, the Russian forces continued their retreat, fighting con-
tinuous rear-guard actions for the purpose of delaying the hard-
pressing enemy, who, however, gradually came closer and closer
to the Nareff-Bobr line. Of course the losses on both sides
throughout this continuous fighting were severe. The Russians
lost thousands of men by capture, for although they succeeded
in withdrawing, practically intact, the principal parts of their
armies before the Germans could come up in strong enough
numbers to risk attacks, smaller detachments here and there
lost contact with the main body and fell in the hands of the
Germans and Austrians, so that there passed hardly a day when
the official reports did not contain some claims about a few thou-
sand men having been captured.
South of the Niemen the Russians attacked Von Eichhorn's
army along the Dvina River, but were thrown back with severe
losses. On August 11, 1915, Von Scholtz's group occupied the
bridgehead at Vilna, which had been stubbornly defended until
the Russian retreat had progressed far enough to make its fur-
ther possession unessential. The same forces succeeded in
crossing the Gac River, south of the Nareff, capturing during
three days' fighting almost 5,000 men. Von Gallwitz with his
army stormed on the same day Zambroff and then pressed on
through Andrzejow toward the east South of the Nareff,
toward the Bug and Brest-Idtovsk, the fighting continued
throughout the following days. Wherever possible the Russians
resisted, and every little stream was wed by them to its utmost
THE FALL OF NIEMEN AND NAREFF 188
possibilities in delaying the advance of the enemy. On August
18, 1915, a strongly fortified position in the Forest of Domini-
kanka fell into German hands. On the same day an outlying
fortified position north of Novo Georgievsk had to surrender and
other forces fighting between the Nareff and Bug reached the
Slina and Nurzets Rivers. The latter was crossed late on August
15, 1915, after the most severe kind of fighting.
Kovno's garrison attempted on that day another unsuccessful
sortie, resulting in the capture of 100 men and in slight gains
on the part of the besieging forces. The latter success was also
repeated before Novo Georgievsk. By this time the general
retreat, and the ever-increasing pressure on the part of the
advancing enemy made itself felt even in the most northern part
•f the Russian line. There, as well as in the farthest south of
the line, the least changes took place. But on August 15, 1915,
German troops attacked the Russians near Eupishky, at the
point where the original Russian front turned toward the south-
west, and threw them back successfully in a northeasterly direc-
tion, capturing at the same time some 2,000 officers and men.
August 17, 1915, marks the beginning of the end for Kovno
and Novo Georgievsk. On that day both of these fortresses lost
some of their outlying forts, and before Kovno alone 4,500 Rus-
sians and over 200 guns fell into the hands of the Germans.
During the night of August 18, 1915, Kovno fell, after having
been defended most valiantly against the ever-repeated attacks
«n the part of the Germans under General von Eichhorn. It was
me of the strongest Russian fortresses, with eleven outlying
forts on both sides of the Niemen, commanding this river at the
point where it turns from its northerly course toward the west
and defending the approach to Vilna from the west. Over 400
guns and vast quantities of supplies and equipment as well as
about 4,000 officers and men made up the booty. On the same
day additional forts of Novo Georgievsk fell, although the
fortress itself still held out. The fall of Kovno, expected and
discounted as it undoubtedly was by the Russians, was a serious
blow. It now became absolutely necessary to withdraw all their
forces in that sector beyond the Niemen, in order to avoid their
184 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
being cut off by German columns advancing from Kovno to the
south along the east bank of the Niemen. This need found
expression in the immediate withdrawal of the Russians from
the line Kalvarya-Suvalki. For the Germans an additional
advantage arose in their ability to establish contact between
Von Hindenburg's forces in Poland and Von Billow's army in
Courland and thereby remove all possibility of having the tatter's
right wing enveloped.
As if the fall of Kovno had given a new impetus to the
Germans, their attacks on Novo Georgievsk were now renewed
with redoubled vigor. On August 20, 1915, this last of the
important strongholds of the Niemen-Nareff-Vistula line fell,
although the less important fortresses of Olita, Grodno, and
Ossovetz were still in Russian hands. There, too, large numbers
of men and guns and immense amounts of equipment and sup-
plies were the rewards of the victor. It is said that the total
number of men taken before and in Novo Georgievsk aggregated
85,000, while the number of guns exceeded 700. While the town
was still burning from the final bombardment — in which some
of the famous Austrian mortars of heavy caliber participated —
the German Emperor, accompanied by Field Marshal von
Hindenburg, General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German Gen-
eral Staff, General von Beseler and many other high officers,
entered this latest conquest of his victorious armies, over which
he later held a review.
The continued retreat of the Russian army and the menacing
and ever-increasing pressure of the advancing Germans, of
course, could have only one result on the fate of the few posi-
tions which were still held by the Russians by now west of the
Vilna-Grodno-Bialystok line. Unless they were willing to risk
the loss of large numbers of troops by having their lines of
retreat cut off, it became necessary to withdraw as many as
their means of transportation and their efforts to delay the
Germans permitted. As a result the fortified town of Ossoveta
on the Bobr was evacuated and occupied by the Germans on
August 28, 1915. A few miles south, beyond the Nareff, Tykotsyn
suffered the same fate. In the latter instance the Russians lost
THE CONQUEST OP GRODNO AND VILNA 185
ever 1,200 men and 70 machine guns. Still farther south, near
Biebk, Russian resistance was not any more successful. East
of Kovno the German advance was not as successful; at least
the Russians were able in that region to delay the enemy to a
greater extent, although the delay had to be bought dearly. But
eonsidering the short distance at which Viha was located and
the great importance of that city as a railroad center for the
safe withdrawal of the Russian main forces, any effort that
promised success was well worth even heavy losses. Through-
out the following days the forces of the northern group pressed
on relentlessly to the east and south, delayed here and there,
but succeeding in forcing back the Russian troops step by step.
CHAPTER XXI
THE CONQUEST OF GKODNO AND VILNA
WITH the fall of Olita, Bialystok, and Brest-Litovsk, which
took place on August 25-26, 1915, and is described in more
detail in another chapter, the northern group under Von Hinden-
burg immediately increased its activities. In Courland, south of
Mitau, near Bausk, heavy fighting took place, and the Russian
fines, which had held their own throughout the entire retreat of
. the Russian armies in Poland, began to give way. At one other
point the Russians had fought back inevitable retreat with special
stubbornness, and that was due west of Grodno, in the neighbor-
hood of Augustovo, which had seen such desperate lighting dur-
ing and following the Russian invasion of East Prussia. But
there, too, now the Germans began to make headway and were
advancing against the Niemen and the last Russian stronghold
on it, Grodno.
At about the same time that considerable activity developed
at the utmost southern end of the line in eastern Galicia, opera-
tions of equal extent and of great importance took place at the
extreme northern end, in the vicinity of Riga. On August 30,
186 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
1915, parts of Von Hindenburg's northern group, under Genera*
von Beseler, reached positions south of Friedrichstadt on the
Dvina. Other troops under General von Eichhorn advanced to
the northeast of Olita in the direction of Vilna, while still other
forces farther south stormed the city of Lipsk, less than twenty
miles west of Grodno, after having forced a crossing over the
Vidra River, a tributary of the Sukelka. The fighting around
Friedrichstadt continued throughout the last days of August,
1915. To the south of the Niemen the advance against the
Grodno-Vilna railway continued without cessation. Whatever
troops were not engaged in pursuing the retreating Russian
forces were now being concentrated on the approaching attack
against the last Russian fortress in Poland — Grodno. To the
south of it, by August SI, 1915, they had reached Kuznitsa, on
the Bialystok-Grodno railway. The investment of Grodno may
be said to have begun with that day. It was then that the first
reports came that heavy artillery had been brought up by the
Germans and was throwing its devastating shells into the fort-
ress from the western front Little hope was left to the Rus-
sians for a successful resistance. For whenever these heavy
guns had been brought into play before, they had blasted their
way to the desired goal, no matter how strong or modern had
been the defenses of steel and cement.
For the withdrawal of the Russians from Grodno there were
available two railroads, one running north to Vilna and another
running at first southeast to Mosty, and there dividing into two
branches by both of which finally in a roundabout way either
Minsk or Kieff could be reached. The Germans, of course, were
eager to cut off these lines of retreat. The latter road was
threatened by the forces approaching Grodno from the south.
Before they reached it, however, troops from Von Hindenburg's
group on September 1, 1915, cut the Grodno-Vilna railroad at
Czarnoko. On the same day some of the western outer forts of
Grodno fell, Fort No.- 4 being stormed by North German
Landwehr regiments and Fort No. 4a by other troops from
Baden. In both cases the Russians resisted valiantly, with
numerically so inferior garrisons that the Germans could report
THE CONQUEST OF GRODNO AND VILNA 187
the capture of only 660 Russians. After the fall of these two
fortified works the balance of the advanced western forts of
Grodno were evacuated by the Russians. This, indeed, was the
beginning of the end for the last great Russian fortress. On
September 2, 1915, Grodno was taken by Von Hindenburg's army
after a crossing over the Niemen had been forced. The Rus-
sians, however, again had managed to escape with their armies.
Hie entire lack in the official German announcement of any
reference to the Russian garrison of Grodno suggests that
there was no garrison left by the time the Germans took the
fortress. In spite of this fact, however, the Germans of course
continued to capture Russians in fairly large quantities for,
naturally, numerous detachments lost contact with the main
body during the retreat
With the fall of Grodno the next objective of the German
troops became Vilna. Indeed, on the very day of Grodno's occu-
pation, German cavalry reached the northwest and western
region immediately adjoining Vilna, in spite of the most deter-
mined Russian resistance. These, of course, were troops that
had not participated in the drive against Grodno, but during that
time had been fighting the Russians farther to the north, and now
that Grodno was no longer to be feared, started a drive of their
own against Vilna. Vilna is second in importance among Polish
cities only to Warsaw itself. By September 8, 1915, detach-
ments of General von Eichhorn's army had reached Troki, hardly
more than ten miles west of Vilna.
The Russian front had now been pushed back everywhere over
a wide extent, which varied from about twenty miles in the
extreme southeast and about fifty miles in the regions east of
Grodno and Kovno, and to the north of this territory to almost
200 miles in the center east of Warsaw and Brest-Iitovsk. Of
the great Russian fortresses of the first and second line, built as a
protection against German and Austro-Hungarian advances, none
remained in the hands of the Russians. It was true that the
main body of the Russian armies had succeeded in extricating
itself from this disaster and withdrawing to the east to form
there a new line. But it was also true that this retreat of the
18* THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Russian army had cost dearly in men, material, and, last but not
least, temporarily, the morale of the troops themselves. For a
considerable period of time during the retreat rumors were
heard of changes in the leadership of the Russian armies. These
rumors gained strength when it was announced that General
Soukhomlinoff had resigned as minister of war and that some of
the commanding generals of the different individual army groups
had been replaced by others. In view of these changes it did not
come as a surprise when on September 7, 1915, it was announced
that the czar himself had taken over the supreme command of
All his armies, which up to that time had been from the beginning
of the war in the hands of his uncle, Grand Duke Nicholas.
The announcement reached the outside world first in the form
of the following telegram from the czar to President Poincarg of
France:
"In placing myself to-day at the head of my valiant armies I
have in my heart, M. President, the most sincere wishes for the
greatness of France and the victory of her glorious army.
"Nicholas."
This was followed on September 8, 1915, by the publication of
the official communication by which the czar relieved the grand
duke from his command and appointed him viceroy of the
Caucasus and commander in chief of the Russian army in the
Caucasus. It read as follows:
"At the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented
from following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the
head of the army. That was why I intrusted you with the com-
mandership in chief of all the land and sea forces.
"Under the eyes of all Russia Your Imperial Highness has given
proof during the war of a steadfast bravery which has caused a
feeling of profound confidence and called forth the sincere good
wishes of all who followed your operations through the inevitable
vicissitudes of war.
"My duty to my country, which has been intrusted to me by
God, compels me to-day, when the enemy has penetrated into
THE CONQUEST OF GRODNO AND VILNA 189
the interior of the empire, to take supreme command of the
actice forces, and to share with the army the fatigue of war,
and to safeguard with it Russian soil from attempts of the
enemy. The ways of Providence are inscrutable, but my duty
and my desire determine me in my resolution for the good of
the state.
"The invasion of the enemy on the western front, which neces-
sitates the greatest possible concentration of civil and military
authorities as well as the unification of command in the field, has
turned our attention from the southern front At this moment
I recognize the necessity of your assistance and counsels on the
southern front, and I appoint you viceroy of the Caucasus and
commander in chief of the valiant Caucasian army.
"I express to Your Imperial Highness my profound gratitude
and that of the country for your labors during the war.
"Nicholas."
The grand duke addressed his former armies before departing
to his new sphere of activity as follows:
"Valiant Army and Fleet : To-day your august supreme chief,
His Majesty the Emperor, places himself at your head; I bow
before your heroism of more than a year, and express to you my
cordial, warm, and sincere appreciation.
"I believe steadfastly that because the emperor himself, to
whom you have taken your oath, conducts you, you will display
achievements hitherto unknown. I believe that God from this
day will accord to His elect His all-powerful aid, and will bring
to him victory.
"Nicholas,
"General Aide de Camp/9
Another of the small southern tributaries of the Niemen which
offered excellent opportunities for resistance of which the Rus-
sians promptly availed themselves, was the Zelvianka River,
which joins the Niemen just west of Mosty. The fighting which
went on there for a few days was almost exclusively in the form
of rear-guard actions, and was typical of a great deal of the
,190 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
fighting during the Russian retreat. Whenever the Germans
advanced far enough and in large enough numbers to endanger
the retreating armies, the latter would speed up as much as
possible until they reached one of the many small rivers with
which that entire region abounds. There sufficiently large forces
to delay the advance, at least for a day or two, would be left
behind to use the natural possibilities of defense offered by the
waterway to the best possible advantage, while the main body
of the army would move on, to repeat this operation at the next *
opportunity. In most instances these practices held up the
German and Austrian advance just exactly in the manner in
which it had been designed that it should. Furthermore, the
Russians would not give way until they had inflicted the greatest
possible losses on their enemies, and in that respect they were
frequently quite successful. For first of all many of these rivers
have either densely wooded or very swampy banks which lend
themselves admirably for defense to as brave a fighting body as
the Russian army, and which proved exceedingly treacherous to i
the attacker; and in the second place the Russians, of course,
had the advantage that they were fighting on their own soil,
while the Germans were in a strange and often hostile country.
In spite of this, however, the German advance, taken all in all,
could not be denied, and in practically every one of the cases
just described, the final outcome was in a very short time de-
feat for the Russians and a successful crossing of the watery
obstacle by the Germans. This was true also at the banks of
the Zelvianka, where the Germans on September 9, 1915,
stormed successfully the heights near Pieski, capturing 1,400
Russians. This success was followed up by further gains on the
next day, September 10, 1915, that again yielded a few thousand
prisoners. A few days later the crossing was forced and the
Germans began to attack the Russians behind the next Niemen
tributary, the Shara.
Farther to the north especially heavy fighting occurred for a
few days around Skidel, a little town just north of the Niemen
on the Grodno-Mosty railroad, and it was not until September
11, 1915, that the Germans succeeded in storming it. On the
THE CONQUEST OF GRODNO AND VILNA 191
game day German aeroplanes attacked the important railroad
junction at Lida on the Kovno-Vilna railway, and also Vileika on
the railway running parallel to and east of the Warsaw-Vilna-
Dvinsk-Petrograd railroad. In a way this signified the opening
of the German offensive against Vilna. Concurrent with it the
fighting on the Dvina between Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt
waxed more furious. Farther south the Germans advanced
toward Rakishki on the Kupishki-Dvinsk railroad and between
(hat road and the River Vilia they even reached at some points
the Vilna-Dvinsk railroad. Without any lull the battle raged
now all along the line from the Dvina to Vilna, and from Vilna
to the Niemen. South of this river the attack of the Germans
was directed against the Russian front behind the Shara River.
By September 14, 1915, Von Hindenburg stood before Dvinsk
with one part of his army group. The other parts were rapidly
pushing in an easterly direction from Olita and Grodno with the
object of attacking Vilna from the south, but they encountered
determined resistance, especially in the region to the east of
Grodno. With undiminished vigor, however, the Germans
continued their advance against Dvinsk and Vilna. To the
south of the former city they pushed beyond the Vilna-Petrograd
railway, taking Vidsky, just north of the Disna River, in the
early morning hours of September 16, 1915.
At that time the fall of both Vilna and Dvinsk seemed to be
inevitable. On September 18, 1915, the Germans reported con-
tinuous progress in their attacks on Dvinsk. On the same day
they broke through the Russian front between Vilna and the
Niemen in numerous places, capturing over 5,000 men and 16
machine guns. Of railroad lines available to facilitate an
eventual Russian retreat from Vilna, the northern route to
Petrograd by way of Dvinsk had been in German hands for some
days. The southern route by way of Lida to Kovno was im-
minently threatened at many points. The only other railroad on
the eventual line of retreat to the southeast by way of Minsk was
likewise threatened both from the south and north. Vilna taken,
the Germans immediately bent all their energies to the task of
pursuing the retreating Russians.
M— War St. 4
192 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On September 18, 1915, Vilna fell into the hands of General
von Eichhorn's array. With it the Russians lost one of the most
important cities of their western provinces. Vilna is one of the
oldest Russian towns, its history dating back as far as 1128. It
is the capital of a government of the same name* In the Middle
Ages it was the capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but
became a Russian possession as a result of the partition of
Poland in 1795. Of its population of more than a quarter million
almost one-half are Jews. Possessing an ancient Roman Catholic
cathedral, it is the seat of a bishop of that church, as well as of
a Greek archbishop.
On the same day on which Vilna's fall was reported, part of
Von Hindenburg's army, its left wing, was reported at Vornjany,
Smorgon, and Molodechno, all places east of Vilna, the last
about eighty miles on the Vilna-Minsk railway. In vain did the
Russians try to pierce this line, which, by the very nature of the
advance, must have been exceedingly thin. It not only held, but
managed to force the Russians to continue their retreat, and
during this process captured large numbers of them* General
von Eichhorn's army, the actual conquerors of Vilna, and Von
Hindenburg's center reached Osmiana, thirty miles southeast
of Vilna, on September 20, 1915. The right wing, on the same
day, had pushed on to the east of Lida and to a point just west of
Novogrudok. By September 21, 1915, the crossing of the Gavia
River, a northern tributary of the Niemen, was forced north and
south of Subolniki, and on September 22, 1915, the Russian
front extending from Osmiana to Subolniki and Novogrudok
was forced to retreat a one day's march, ten miles, taking new
positions on a line: Soli (on the Vilna-Minsk railroad) -Olshany-
Traby-Ivie to a point slightly northeast of Novogrudok. A
German attempt to outflank the retreating Russians from the
north, made on September 23, 1915, at Vileika on the Vilia, about
ten miles north of the railway junction at Molodechno, failed.
During the next day the Germans again forced back the Russian
front eastward for about ten miles, or a one day's march. Along
this new front — Smorgon-Krevo-Vishneff-Sabresina-Mikolaieff,
just southeast of which latter place the historical Beresina joins
THE CAPTURE OP BREST-LITOVSK 193
the Niemen — the Russians made a firm stand during the rest of
September, 1915.
The German advance was stopped, which fact undoubtedly
was partly due to the renewed activity of the Franco-English
forces on the west front, as well as to the absolute necessity of
giving a chance to recuperate to the armies on the east front,
which had been fighting now incessantly for months. September
28, 1915, may be considered approximately as the date at which
the Battle of Vilna ended. After that date fighting along the
eastern front assumed the form of trench warfare, except in the
extreme northern section, and in Volhynia, eastern Galicia. In
the sector, bounded in the north by the Vilia, and in the south by
the Niemen, the Russian front was along a line running through
the towns of Smorgon, Krevo, Vishneff , Sabresina, Mikolaieff.
As a result of the Battle of Vilna and the Russian retreat fol-
lowing it the Germans captured 70 officers, about 22,000 men, a
large number of cannon and machine guns, and a great quantity
of equipment. Along the entire eastern front the German forces
captured men and equipment during the month of September,
1915, as follows: 421 officers, 95,464 men, 37 cannon, 298 ma-
chine guns, and 1 aeroplane.
CHAPTER XXII
THE CAPTURE OP BREST-LITOVSK
THE central group under Prince Leopold had hardly entered
Warsaw proper when it continued its advance in an easterly
direction toward Brest-Litovsk after having occupied Warsaw's
eastern suburb, Praga. At the same time other forces com-
pleted the investment of Novo Georgievsk, covering the sector
between the Nareff and the Vistula. By August 10, 1915, the
left wing of the central group had reached Ealuszin and Gen-
eral von Woyrsch's army had become its right wing, taking the
Russian positions just west of Lukoff. On the same day German
194 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
aviators threw bombs both at Novo Georgievsk and Brest-
Litovsk. Under heavy fighting a crossing was forced over the
Muchavka and Lukoff was occupied on August 11, 1915.
One of the most awful consequences of the Russian retreat
was the sad plight in which the civil population of the stricken
country found itself. In the beginning of the retreat the Rus-
sians forced these poor people to join in the retreat. This itself,
of course, meant untold hardships and frequently death. But
as the advance of the Germans became more furious and the
retreat of the Russians more rapid, it often happened that these
unfortunate persons — irrespective of age, sex or condition —
were forced by their Russian masters to turn around again and
thus place themselves squarely between the two contending
forces.
With the fall of Lukoff an important railroad leading into
Brest-Litovsk had fallen into the hands of the invading enemy.
Along this line, which is part of the direct line Warsaw-
Brest-Litovsk, Austro-Hungarian forces now progressed rap-
idly in an easterly direction and by August 14, 1915, had
reached Miendzyrzets.
In spite of the heaviest kind of bombardment and of almost
uninterrupted infantry attacks on Kovno and Novo Georgievsk,
both of these fortresses still held out By August 1, 1915, how-
ever, the German lines had advanced far beyond these places
and it became clear that their next chief objective was Brest-
Litovsk. Each one of the three main army groups directed
strong parts of their forces toward this Russian stronghold.
From the northwest detachments of Von Hindenburg's group,
coming from Lomza and OstroflF , had crossed in a wide front
the Warsaw-Bialystok section of the Warsaw-Vilna-Petrograd
railway. After taking Briansk they had forced the crossing of
the Nurzets, a tributary of the Bug, and the only natural barrier
in front of Brest-Litovsk from that direction. They were
rapidly approaching the Brest-Litovsk-Bialystok railway. The
central group's front — Lukoff -Siedlets-Sokoloff — had been
pushed forward to Drohichin on the Bug, only about forty-five
miles to the northeast of the fortress. Parts of Von Macken-
THE CAPTURE OP BREST-LITOVSK 195
sen's southern group under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had
even reached Biala, less than twenty miles west of Brest-Litovsk,
and still other detachments from this group were advancing
along the eastern bank of the Bug. Three railroads leading out
of the fortress were still in the hands of the Russians — to Bialy-
stok to the north, to Pinsk and Minsk to the east, and to Kovel
and Kovno to the south. This continuous offensive against all
the Russian lines, of course, cost both sides dearly. The
attackers, however, seemed to have had the better end of it. The
Russians, according to official figures, lost almost 100,000 men
by capture alone during the first two weeks of August, 1915.
The German successes before Kovno and Novo Georgievsk
had the result of increasing the vigor of the drive against Brest-
Litovsk. Those detachments of Von Hindenburg's army group
which had forced a crossing of the Nareff between Bialystok
and Lomza pushed on rapidly to the south and threatened as
early as August 18, 1915, the northern section of the Bialystok-
Brest-Litovsk railway. On the same day Prince Leopold's forces
reached the south bank of the Bug, north of Sarnaki. Parts of
Von Mackensen's army kept up its attack against the Russians
around Biala, forced them across the Bug and into the very
forts of Brest-Litovsk and at the same time began the bombard-
ment of the outlying forts with the heavy artillery that had
been brought up. Other parts, on that day, August 19, 1915,
crossed the northern part of the Cholm-Brest-Litovsk railway
east of Vlodava. At the same time Austrian forces under Field
Marshal-Lieutenant von Arz and Archduke Joseph Ferdinand
cleared the left bank of the Bug, east of Janoff, and thereby
completed the investment of the fortress from the west.
Closer and closer the girdle was drawn. Every day the
German advance progressed. In the evening of August 19, 1915,
Prince Leopold's forces crossed the Bug at Melnik and began to
threaten the fortress from the northwest. Still closer to Brest-
Litovsk Austrian troops belonging to Von Mackensen's group
crossed to the north bank of the Bug near Janoff, while other
parts of this group advanced from the south beyond Vlodava
and forced the Russians to withdraw from the east bank of the
196 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Bug north of this town. On the Germans and Austrians pushed
from all directions except, of course, the east. By August 20,
1915, the lower part of the Brest-Litovsk-Bialystok railway was
crossed and the only railway leading out of the fortress toward
the east, which at Shabinka separates into two branches, one
to Minsk and another to Pinsk, seemed threatened. The German-
Austrian advance from the south that day reached Pishicha,
apparently directly toward the southern railroad from the for-
tress to Kovel and from there to Kovno and Kieff.
From all sides now the circle around Brest-Litovsk was drawn
closer. The important railroad center at Kovel was taken on
August 24, 1915, and immediately the combined German and
Austrian forces swung around toward the north along both
sides of the road leading to Kobryn, east of the fortress and on
the railroad to Pinsk. In the meantime heavy artillery
had been brought up and began the bombardment of the for-
tress. During the night of August 25, 1915, the storming of the
forts began. Austrian troops under General von Arz took the
three forts on the western front, while a Brandenburg Reserve
Corps attacked from the northwest and penetrated into the cen-
tral forts. The Russians then evacuated the fortress. Its fall
immediately imperiled the entire Russian positions and resulted
in a general retreat of all Russian forcec. The question for
them now was no longer how long they were able to delay the
enemy, but how much they could save out of the wreck. On the
same day that saw the fall of Brest-Litovsk the Russians lost
Bialystok, and on the next day, August 16, 1915, they evacuated
the fortress of Olita on the Niemen, about halfway between
Kovno and Grodno; the latter, the last of Russia's proud string
of western fortresses of the first line, of course was now not
only seriously threatened but had become practically untenable.
In a way the victory at Brest-Litovsk was an empty one, for
the Russians apparently had decided that the fortress would
become untenable before long and had withdrawn from it in
good time not only practically the entire garrison but also what-
ever supplies or equipment they could possibly transport,
destroying mosf of what they were forced to leave behind and
THE CAPTURE OF BREST-LITOVSK 197
blowing up many of the fortifications. The strategical value
of the victory was, of course, not influenced by this action. After
the fall of the fortress the combined forces of the Germans and
Austrians did not rest on their laurels. Without wasting any
time they immediately took up in all directions the pursuit of
the retreating Russians. For a short time the retreating Rus-
sian troops made a determined stand in the neighborhood of
Kamienietz-Litovsk, northeast of Brest-Litovsk, but could not
withstand the German pressure for long. A great deal of very
heavy and bloody fighting took place in this period, August 25
to August 31, 1915, in the dense forest south of Bialystok and
east of Bielsk, sometimes known as the Forest of Bialystok and
sometimes as the Forest of Bieloviee, a little town at the end
of a short branch railroad, running east from Bielsk. The
Upper Nareff flows through this forest and much of the fighting
was along its banks. Austrian troops, a few days earlier, had
reached Pushany, just north of the Brest-Litovsk-Minsk rail-
road and from there pressed on in an easterly direction. By
August 21, 1915, the Upper Nareff had been crossed after the >
hardest kind of fighting on both sides, and the advance continued
now toward Grozana. It was not, however, until September 1,
1915, that these troops were able to fight their way out of the
forest At the same time Von Mackensen's troops were follow-
ing the retreating Russians into the Pripet Marshes. Other
parts of this group which had advanced east from Brest-Litovsk
along the Minsk railroad reached the Jasiolda River, a tributary
of the Pripet, at a point near Bereza, while Austro-Hungarian
troops forming part of Von Mackensen's army advanced to east
and south of Boloto and Dubowoje. Further north, Prince
Leopold's army was still fighting the retreating Russians just
north of Pushany, but on September 4, 1915, finally fought its
way out of the marshes which — outrunners of the vast Pripet
Marshes — are abundant in that region.
Back the Germans and Austrians forced their retreating
enemy during the following days, although the pursuit lost a
little in force and swiftness. For the troops which were
engaged in these operations had been steadily on the move prac-
198 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
tically ever since the attack on Warsaw began. On September
6-7, 1915, the Russians again made a stand on a wide front east
and south of Grodno. This line stretched south from the Niemen
near Mosty to Volkovysk, then southeast to Rushana, thence
east of the Pushany Marshes across the Jasiolda River near
Chenisk to Drohichyn, on the Bresfc-Litovsk-Pinsk railroad. On
the German and Austrian side these engagements were fought
by the armies of Prince Leopold of Bavaria and Field Marshal
▼on Mackensen. At the same time troops belonging to Von
Hindenburg's group attacked a newly formed Russian line
farther north which extended from Volkovysk in a northwest-
erly direction to the village of Jeziory and the small lake on
which the latter is situated, just north of Grodno. Volkovysk
itself and the heights northeast of it were stormed by the Ger-
mans on September 7, 1915, on which occasion again almost
8,000 Russians were captured by the Germans.
During the next few days the left wing of this army group
fought in close cooperation with the ri^ht wing of Von Hinden-
burg's army along the upper Zelvianka, a southern tributary of
the Niemen. The rest of Prince Leopold's army were making
the Kobryn-Minsk railroad their objective and were fighting on
September 9, 10, and 11, 1915, for possession of the station at
Kossovo.
While Von Hindenburg's army group was occupied with the
drive on Vilna and Von Mackensen's forces advanced against
Pinsk, Prince Leopold's regiments, as we have learned, fought
continuously in the sector between the Niemen and the Jasiolda
Rivers. The problem assigned to them apparently was that of
gaining the Vilna-Kovno railroad in order to cut off the Russian
retreat, and by the time Vilna fell, September 18, 1915, they had
just succeeded in forcing a crossing over the Shara River, which
runs practically parallel to the Lida-Baranovitchy section of the
Vilna-Kovno railroad. In a way this gave them command of
that section; but they first had to cross the country between the
Shara and the railroad, over a width of about twenty miles.
Although they were reported on September 19, 1915, as partici-
pating in the pursuit of the retreating Russians, they seem to
THE CAPTURE OF BREST-LITOVSK 199
have arrived just a little too late to capture large numbers of
them. In fact, not until September 20, 1915, were they reported
actually at Dvorzets, on the Vilna-Eovno railway, while on that
day the right wing of this army was fighting west of Oshoff,
which, indeed, is to the east of the Brest-Litovsk-Minsk railway,
but still a considerable distance (about twenty-two miles) west
of Moltshad, a little to the southeast of Dvorzets; stormed
Ostroff , and crossed the Oginski Canal at Telechany, after first
throwing the Russians across it These operations netted some
1,000 prisoners. September 22, 1915, brought their left wing
about ten miles farther east at Valeika, while farther south
the fighting continued in the same locality as on the previous
day during the following days. By September 23, 1915, the left
wing again had advanced about ten miles along the Servetsh
River at Korelitchy, as well as the Upper Shara, east of Barano-
vitchy and Ostroff. The Russian resistance along this river was
maintained during September 24, 1915, although the Germans
gained its eastern bank south of Lipsk.
Just as in the Vilna-Niemen sector to the north, the German
advance in the region bounded in the north by the Niemen and
in the south by the Jasiolda was halted during the last week of
September, 1915. And the line of positions which had been
reached by the German forces was maintained throughout the
rest of the fall and the entire winter, excepting a few minor
changes. In a rough way, that front extended as follows:
Starting south of the junction of the Beresina with the Niemen,
it followed the course of the latter river through the town of
Labicha for about thirty miles in a southeasterly direction, then
bent slightly to the southwest at Korelitchy, passing to the west
of Tzirin, crossed the Brest-Litovsk-Minsk railway about half-
way between Baranovitchy and Snoff and about ten miles
farther south the Vilna-Kovno railway between Luchouitchy
and Nieazvied, at which town it again bent to the southwest,
along the Shara River, passing east of Lipsk, and then along
the entire length of the Oginski Canal to its junction with the
Jasiolda, northwest of Pinsk. Along this line both the Russians
and Germans dug themselves in, and throughout the winter a
200 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
bitter trench warfare netted occasionally a few lines of trenches
to the Russians and at other times had the same results for the
other side, without, however, materially changing the position
of either.
CHAPTER XXIII
THE STRUGGLE IN EAST GALICIA AND
VOLHYNIA AND THE CAPTURE
OF PINSK
THE fall of Ivangorod and Warsaw was the signal for advance
for which the southern group under Von Mackensen had been
waiting. General von Woyrsch's forces pressed on between
Garvolin and Ryki, northeast of Ivangorod. Other forces
threw the Russians back beyond the Vieprz and gradually
approached the line of the Bug River. Still farther south, on
the Dniester, Austrian troops, too, forced back the Russians
step by step. On August 11, 1915, Von Mackensen's troops
attacked the Russians, who were making a stand behind the
Bystrzyka and the Tysmienika. This hastened the Russian
retreat to the east of the Bug.
Throughout the following days the story of the Russian
retreat and the German-Austrian advance changed little in its
essential features. As fast as roads permitted and as quickly
as obstacles in their way could be overcome, the forces of the
Central Powers advanced. With equal determination the Rus-
sian troops availed themselves of every possible, and quite a
few seemingly impossible, opportunities to delay this advance.
Every creek was made an excuse for making a stand, every
forest became a means of stalling the enemy, every railroad or
country road embankment had to yield its chance of putting a
new obstacle into the thorny path of the advancing invader.
Whenever the latter seemed to ease up for a moment, either to
gain contact with his main forces or to rest up after especially
severe forced marches, the Russians were on hand with an
THE STRUGGLE IN EAST GALICIA 201
attack. But just as soon as the attack had been made the Ger-
mans or Austrians or Hungarians, or all three together, were
ready to forget all about the temporary let-up and were pre-
pared to meet the attack. Then once more the pursuit would
begin.
During the drive on Brest-Litovsk, covering practically all of
August, 1915, after the fall of Warsaw, the operations of Von
Mackensen's southern group were so closely connected and inter-
twined with those of the central group that they have
found detailed consideration together with the latter. During
all this time the extreme right wing in Eastern Galicia did com-
paratively little beyond preventing an advance of the Russian'
forces at that point With the fall of Brest-Litovsk, however,
and the beginning of the Russian retreat along the entire front,
activities in the southeastern end of the Russo-German-Austrian
theatre of war were renewed.
On August 28, 1915, German and Austro-Hungarian forces
under Count Bothmer broke through the Russian line along the
Zlota-Lipa River, both north and south of the Galician town of
Brzezany, about fifty miles southeast of Lemberg, and in spite
•f determined resistance and repeated counterattacks drove the
Russians some distance toward the Russo-Galician border. At
the same time other parts of Von Mackensen's army successfully
attacked the Russian line at Vladimir Volynsky, a few miles east
•f the Upper Bug and somewhat north of the Polish-Galician
border. The combined attack resulted in a gradual withdrawal
of the entire Russian line as far as it was located in Galicia,
aggregating in length almost 160 miles. These operations alone
netted to the Austro-Germans about 10,000 Russian prisoners.
This attack came more or less unexpectedly, but in spite of that
was carried on most fiercely. By August 30, 1915, the right
wing had forced the Russians back to the river Strypa and was
only a few miles west of Tarnopol.
Farther north another army under the Austrian General
Boehm-Ermolli encountered determined resistance along the
line Zlochoff-Bialykamien-Radziviloff , where the Russians were
supported by very strongly fortified positions. Still farther
202 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
north the attack progressed in the direction of the strongly
fortified town of Lutsk, on the Styr River, less than fifty miles
west of the fortress of Rovno, in the Russian province of
Volhynia. This fortress, together with Dubno, farther south on
the Ikwa, a tributary of the Styr, and with Rovno itself formed
a very powerful triangle of permanent fortifications erected
by Russia in very recent times. The purpose for which they had
been intended undoubtedly was twofold ; first, to offer an obstacle
to any invasion of that section of the Russian Empire on the
part of Austro-Hungarian troops with Lemberg as a base, and
secondly, to act as a base for a possible Russian attack on Galicia.
In view of these facts, it was surprising that on August 31,
1915, only three days after the resumption of actual fighting
in Eastern Galicia, the fall of Lutsk was announced. The
very form of the official Austrian announcement rather indicates
that the Russians must have evacuated Lutsk of their own
accord, possibly after dismounting and either withdrawing or
destroying its guns. For the report states that only one— the
Fifty-fourth Infantry — regiment drove the Russians by means
of bayonet attacks out of their first-line trenches and then fol-
lowed them right into Lutsk. This, of course, could not have
been accomplished so quickly unless the Russians had already
withdrawn at that point as well as everywhere else. At the same
time their line was also pierced at Baldi and Kamuniec, which
forced their withdrawal from the entire western bank of the
Styr. German troops, fighting under General von Bothmer in
cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian army of General Boehm-
Ermolli, on the same day (August 31, 1915) stormed a series of
heights on the banks of the Strypa, north of Zboroff, although
they encountered there the most determined resistance on the
part of the Russian forces.
The immense losses in men, guns, and materials which the
Russians suffered throughout the month of August, 1915, in
spite of their genius for withdrawing huge bodies of men at the
right moment, will be seen from the following official statement
published on September 1, 1915, by General Headquarters of
the German armies. These figures do not include the losses suf-
THE STRUGGLE IN EAST GALICIA 203
fered by the Russian armies which in Eastern Galicia were
fighting against Austro-Hungarian troops.
"During the month of August the number of prisoners taken
by German troops in the eastern and southeastern theatres of
war, and the quantities of war materials captured during the
same period, totaled more than 2,000 officers and 269,800 men
taken prisoners, and 2,000 cannon and 560 machine guns.
"Of these, 20,000 prisoners and 827 cannon were taken at
Kovno. About 90,000 prisoners, including 15 generals and more
than 1,000 other officers, and 1,200 cannon and 150 machine guns
were taken at Novo Georgievsk. The counting up of the cannon
and machine guns taken at Novo Georgievsk has not yet
been finished, however, while the count of machine guns
taken at Kovno has not yet begun. The figures quoted as totals,
therefore, will be considerably increased. The stocks of ammu-
nition, provisions, and oats in the two fortresses cannot be
estimated.0
The fall of Lutsk had serious consequences for the Russians.
With this fortress gone the entire line south of it was endan-
gered unless promptly withdrawn. It was, therefore, not sur-
prising that when on September 1, 1915, the left wing of the
Austro-German forces crossed the Styr on a wide front north
ef Lutsk the entire Russian line down from that point should
give way. That, of course, meant the evacuation of Galicia by
the Russians. Brody, about halfway between Lemberg and
Rovno on the railroad connecting these two cities, was taken by
Boehm-Ermolli's army on September 1, 1915, and these troops
immediately pushed on across the border. General von Both-
Boer's forces, slightly to the south, kept up their advance from
Zaloshe and Zboroff in the direction of Tarhopol and the Sereth
River. Still farther south the third group under General
Pflanzer-Baltin drove the Russians from the heights on the east
bank of the Lower Strypa. The general result of all these opera-
tions was the withdrawal of the Russian front along the Dniester
between Zaleshchyki in the south and Buczacz in the north, to
a new line along the Sereth, starting at the bitter's junction with
the Dniester. But there the Russians made p stand. The
204 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
hardest possible fighting took place on September 4, 1915, all
along the line in Galicia, Volhynia, and on the Bessarabian
border. Much of it was of the "hand-to-hand" kind, for both
sides had thrown up fortifications and dug trenches, which they
took turns in storming and defending.
One of the heaviest battles of this period took place on
September 6, 1915, lasting into the early morning hours of the
7th, along a front about twenty-five miles wide, with its center
about at Radziviloff, a little town just across the border of
the Lemberg-Rovno railroad, a few miles northeast of Brody.
There the Russians had strongly intrenched themselves. The
fighting was most bitter, especially around the castle of Podka-
men, which Boehm-Ermolli's troops wrested from the Russians
only through repeated and most fierce infantry attacks and by
means of terribly bloody hand-to-hand fighting. However, finally
the Russians had to give way, leaving over 8,000 men in the hands
of their adversaries. Farther south the armies of Generals von
Bothmer and Pflanzer-Baltin, too, had to withstand continuous
attacks of the Russians and more or less fighting went on all
along the southeastern front as far down as Nova-Sielnitsa, a few
miles southeast of Czernovitz at the point where the borders of
Rumania, Galicia, and Bessarabia meet.
The result of the Austrian victory of September 7, 1915, near
Radziviloff was the further withdrawal on September 8, 1915,
of the Russian line, extending over fifty-five miles to the east
bank of the Ikwa River, a tributary of the Styr, on the west
about thirty miles northeast of Radziviloff on the Lemberg-
Rovno railroad. This withdrawal, of course, seriously threatened
this fortress, which, being on the west side of the Ikwa, was
open to direct attack from the west and south as soon as the
Russians had been thrown back beyond the Ikwa. And, indeed,
the next day, September 9, 1915, brought the fall of the city
and fortress of Dubno. Austrian troops under General Boehm-
Ermolli took it by storm, while other detachments advanced to
the Upper Ikwa and beyond the town of Novo Alexinez. This
was as serious a loss to the Russians as it was a great gain for
their enemies. For Dubno commanded not only the valley of
THE STRUGGLE IN EAST GALICIA 205
the Ikwa, but it also blocked the very important railway and
road that run from Lemberg to Rovno.
Farther south along the Sereth the Russian lines had been
greatly strengthened by new troops brought up from the rear
by means of the railroad Kieff-Shmerinka-Proskuroif-Tarnopol.
This enabled the Russians to make determined attacks all along
the river, which were especially severe in the neighborhood of
Trembovla. General von Bothmer*s German army at first suc-
cessfully withstood these attacks in spite of Russian superiority
in numbers, but was finally forced to withdraw from the west
bank of the Sereth to the heights between that river and the
Strypa River, which are between 760 and 1,000 feet above the
sea level. But on September 9, 1915, the German forces
advanced again and threw the Russians along almost the entire
Kne again beyond the Sereth. Farther south on that river, near
its junction with the Dniester, Austrian regiments under Gen-
eral Benigni and Prince Schoenburg stormed on the same day
the Russian positions northwest of Szuparka, capturing over
4,000 Russians.
While Von Mackensen's army was pushing its advance toward
Pinsk, the principal city in the Pripet Marsh region, along both
sides of the only railroad leading to it — the Brest-Litovsk-
Kobryn-Pinsk-Gowel railroad line— heavy fighting continued in
Volhynia and East Galicia. West of Kovno the Russians were
thrown back of the Stubiel River on September 9, 1915, by the
Austrians. General von Bothmer's German army, which formed
the center of the forces in Volhynia and Galicia, advanced from
Zaloshe on the Sereth toward Zbaraz, a few miles northeast of
Tarnopol. Before the latter town, which the Russians seemed to
be determined to hold at any cost, new reenf orcements had ap-
peared and opposed the advance of the Austro-German forces
with the utmost fierceness. In that sector they passed from the
defensive to the offensive, and with superior forces threw back
the enemy again from the Sereth to the heights on the east bank
of the Strypa on September 10, 1915. But with these heights at
their back the German line held and all Russian attacks broke
down.
206 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
In spite of this they were renewed on September 11, 1915,
with such strength that small detachments succeeded in gaining
a temporary foothold in the enemy's trenches, where the bloodi-
est kind of hand-to-hand fighting occurred. At that moment
General von Bothmer ordered an attack on both flanks of the
Russians, who thereby were forced to give up the advantage
which they had so dearly bought However, this did not make the
Russians lose heart. Again and again they came on, and so
fierce were their onslaughts that the Austro-German line was
finally withdrawn to the west bank of the Strypa on September
13, 1915. To the north, along the Ikwa from Dubno to the
border, reenforcements were also brought up by the Russians
and succeeded in holding up any further advance on the part of
the Austrian troops. Especially hard fighting took place in the
neighborhood of Novo Alexinez, a little village just across the
border in Volhynia.
On September 15, 1915, Von Mackensen took Pinsk after hav-
ing driven the Russians out of practically all the territory
between the Jasiolda and Pripet Rivers. Considering that this
city is, in a direct line, more than 220 miles east of Warsaw, this
accomplishment was little short of marvelous, especially in view
of the fact that the territory surrounding Pinsk— the Pripet
Marshes — offered immense difficulties. However, the same
difficulties were encountered by the retreating Russians in even
greater measure, because, while there is some solid ground west
of Pinsk, there is practically nothing but swamps to the north,
south, and east of the city, the direction in which the Russian
retreat necessarily had to proceed. It was thus possible for Von
Mackensen to report on September 17, 1915, the capture of 2,500
Russians south of Pinsk.
In the Volhynian and Galician theatre of war the struggle
continued without any abatement. Neither side, however, suc-
ceeded in gaining any lasting and definite advantages. One day
the Russians would throw their enemies back across the Strypa,
only to suffer themselves a like fate on the next day in respect to
the Sereth. More or less the same conditions existed east of
Lutsk and along the Ikwa, in both of which regions the Russians
THE STRUGGLE IN EAST GALICIA 207
continued their attempts to drive back the Austro-Germans by
repeated attacks.
After the conquest of Pinsk, Von Mackensen's army for a few
days continued its advance from that town in a northeasterly,
easterly, and southeasterly direction. But here, too, the advance
stopped about September 23, 1915, after some detachments which
had crossed to the north and northeast of Pinsk, over the Oginski
Canal at Lahishyn, and over the Jasiolda between its junction
with the canal and the Pinsk-Gomel railroad, had to be with-
drawn on that date. In this sector — f rom the Jasiolda to the Styr
at Tchartorysk just south of the Kovel-Kieff railway — the fight-
ing assumed the form of trench warfare, just as it did along the
rest of the front south of the Vilia River. The front there was
along the Jasiolda from its junction with the Oginski Canal,
swung around Pinsk and east of it in a semicircle, through the
Pripet Marshes, crossed the Pripet River at Nobiet and then con-
tinued in a southerly direction to Borana on the Styr, along that
river for a distance of about twenty miles, across the Kovel-Kieff
railroad at Rafalovka to Tchartorysk on the Styr.
Farther south the Russians gained some slight successes, and
even forced the Germans to retreat to the west bank of the Styr
at Lutsk. The fighting in that vicinity and along the Ikwa was
very severe. Especially was this true in the neighborhood of
Novo Alexinez, where, in very hilly country, the Russians
launched attack after attack against the Austro-German forces,
without, however, being able to dislodge them from their very
strong positions. The battle raged furiously on September 25,
1915, when some Russian detachments succeeded in advancing
a few miles to the southwest of Novo Alexinez into the vicinity
of Zaloshe. However, the Austrian resistance was so strong that
the Russians lost about 5,000 men. When on September 27, 1915,
a German army under General von Linsingen had again forced
its way across the Styr at Lutsk and threatened to outflank the
right wing of the Russian forces, the latter finally gave way and
retreated in the direction of Kovno. A Russian attempt to break
through the Austro-German line, held by General von Bothmer's
army, on the Strypa west of Tarnopol, was made on October 2,
N— War St 4
208 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
1915, but failed. The same was true of attacks on the Ikwa
west of Kremenet and north of Dubno near Olyka, made on
October 6, 1915. These were followed up on the next day, Octo-
ber 7, 1915, with further attacks along the entire Volhynian,
East Galician, and Bessarabian front.
At that time this front extended as follows: Starting at
Tchartorysk on the Styr, a few miles south of the Kovel-Gomel
railroad, it ran almost straight south through Tsuman, crossed the
Brest-Litovsk railroad a mile or two north of Olyka, passed about
fifteen miles west of Rovno to the Rovno-Lemberg railroad, which
it crossed a few miles east of Dubno, then followed more or less
the course of the Ikwa and passed through Novo Alexinez. There
it turned slightly to the west, crossed the Sereth about ten miles
farther south, passed through Jezierna on the Lemberg-Tarnopol
railroad and crossed the Strypa at the point where this river is
cut by the Brzezany-Tarnopol railroad, about fifteen miles west
of the latter city. Again bending somewhat, this time to the
east, it continued slightly to the west of the Strypa to a point
on this river about fifteen miles north of Buczacz, then followed
the course of the Strypa on both sides to this town, bent still
more to the east, passing through Pluste, about ten miles south-
east of which it crossed the Sereth a few miles north from its
junction with the Dniester, coming finally to its end at one of
the innumerable bends in the Dniester, practically at the
Galician-Bessarabian border and about twenty miles northwest of
the fortress of Chotin. Although the amount of territory gained
by the Austro-Germans in the period beginning with the fall of
Warsaw was smaller in that section than in any other on the
eastern front, it was still of sufficient size to leave now in the
hands of the Russians only a very small part of Galicia, little
more than forty miles wide at its greatest width and barely
eighty miles long at its greatest length.
IN THE PRIPET MARSHES 209
CHAPTER XXIV
IN THE PRIPET MARSHES
A GREAT deal of the fighting after the fall of Brest-Litovsk,
August 27, 1915, occurred in and near the extensive swamp
lands surrounding the city of Pinsk and located on both sides
of the River Pripet. To the Russians this part of the country is
known as the Poliessie; its official name is the Rokitno Marshes,
after the little town of that name situated slightly to the west,
but it is usually spoken of as the Pripet Marshes. Parts of this
unhealthy and very difficult region are located in five Russian
governments: Mohileff, KiefF, Volhynia, Minsk, and Grodno,
and these swamps therefore are the border land of Poland, Great
Russia, and Little Russia. A comparatively small section of
them has been thoroughly explored and their exact limits have
never been determined. In the west and east the Rivers Bug and
Dniester respectively form a definite border, which is lacking in
the south and north, while to the northwest the famous Forest of
Bielovies may be considered its boundary. According to a very
rough estimate the Pripet Marshes are approximately one-half
as large as the kingdom of Rumania ; only one river of importance
runs through them, the Pripet, from which, indeed, the marshes
take their popular name. On both of its sides the Pripet has a
large number of tributaries, among which on the right are : the
Styr, the Gorin, the Usha, and on the left the Pina, the Sluch,
and the Ptych. A large number of small lakes are distributed
throughout the entire district. Quite a large number of canals
have been built, one of which connects the Pina with the Bug,
another the Beresina, of Napoleonic fame and a tributary of the
Dnieper, with the Ula and through the latter with the Dvina. In
this manner it is possible to reach the Baltic Sea by means of
continuous waterways from the Black Sea.
It is very difficult to conceive a clear picture of this region
without having actually seen it. In a way one may call it a
gigantic lake which away from its shores has been filled in with
210 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
sand to a small extent and to a larger extent has turned into
swamps. It is densely covered with rushes, and out of its waters,
which are far from clear, a multitude of stony islets rise up
covered with dense underbrush. Its center is surrounded by
an even more dense seam of pine forests. Its rivers and brooks
are so slow that they can hardly be distinguished from stagnant
waters. The only town of any importance within its limits is
Pinsk on the Pina.
In a general way five railroad lines have been built through
various parts of the Pripet Marshes; the most important being
a section of the Rovno-Vilna railroad; two others of special im-
portance to the Russian retreat were the Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-
Gomel and the Ivangorod-Lublin-Cholm-Kovel-Kieff road. The
Brest-Litovsk-Minsk railroad also passes in its greatest part
through the outlying sections of the Pripet Marshes. The effect
of these swamp lands on the Russian retreat and the German
advance, of course, was twofold: it increased the difficulty of the
Russian retreat, throwing at the same time very serious obstacles
in the way of the advancing Germans.
To the southward, and in a region very similar in all its char-
acteristics, is the Volhynian triangle of fortresses : Lutsk, Dubno,
and Rovno. Here too, during the fighting around these three
places, the Russian and German armies had to contend with
tremendous difficulties, which were caused chiefly by the fact that
this part of the country, with the exception of a few sections,
was almost impassable. This fact, undoubtedly, was primarily
responsible for the decision of the Russian Government to locate
these three powerful fortresses at that particular point, because
the very difficulties which nature had provided became valuable
aids to a strong defense against an invasion of Russian territory
by Austro-Hungarian troops from the south.
The fortresses of Lutsk and Dubno date with their beginning as
far back as 1878, at which time they were built according to the
plans of the Russian General Todleben. A little later the forti-
fications of Rovno were added to this group, and one of the
strongest triangles of Russia's fortifications was formed thereby.
The sides of this triangle measure thirty, twenty-five, and forty
IN THE PRIPET MARSHES 211
miles respectively. The longest of these is the line between
Lutsk and Rovno, with its back toward the Pripet Marshes. Of
the three fortresses Rovno is the most important from a stra-
tegical point of view, for it defends the junction of three of the
most valuable railroads, the railway leading from Lemberg into
Volhynia, that running south from Vilna into Galicia, and the
railroad which by way of Berticheff indirectly connects Kieff with
both Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk. The three fortresses, therefore,
acted as a wedge between the most southeastern and the Polish
zones of operations. They secured the connection of any Russian
forces in Poland with the interior of Russia, and made possible
the transfer of forces through the protection which they gave
to the various railroad lines necessary for such a transfer. On
account of the conditions of the surrounding territory it was
impossible for any attacking army to dispose of the fortresses
by investing them with part of their available forces while the
balance of them continued on their advance; for the only way to
reach the country in back of the three fortresses was by way
of the fortresses themselves, which meant, of course, that they
would have to be taken first before the advance could be con-
tinued. Furthermore, the fortresses also acted as a barrier, pro-
tecting the approaches to Kieff, enabling the undisturbed con-
centration of an army in that protected zone while the enemy
would be busily occupied in battering his way through the
fortress triangle. The latter were still more strengthened by
the Rivers Ikwa and Styr, which flow to the southwest and north
of them.
The fortifications of all these three points were not of par-
ticularly recent origin, although they had been remodeled at
various times since their original creation. Lutsk, a city of some
twenty thousand inhabitants, is located on a small island of the
Styr, and controls the Kovel-Rovno section of the Brest-Litovsk-
Berticheff railroad. Some ten forts of various degrees of strength
surrounded the central fortifications, forming a girdle of forts
with a circumference of approximately ten miles. Dubno, south-
east of Lutsk, a town of about fifteen thousand inhabitants, is lo-
cated in the valley of Ikwa on its left bank, and protects the
212 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Brody-Zdolbitsa section of the Lemberg-Rovno Vilna railroad,
with its branches to Kovel, Brest-Litovsk, and to Kieff . The forts
are not as numerous as at Lutsk, but are more advantageously
located and, therefore, proved more difficult for the attacking
Austro-Hungarian-German troops. Besides the Styr and Ikwa
Rivers this comparatively small sector offers other natural ad-
vantages in the form of a number of smaller streams, the defense
of which is greatly assisted by the marshy condition of their
banks and the heavy growth of underbrush to be found there.
Rovno, the largest of the three cities, with about twenty thou-
sand inhabitants, was first fortified in 1887, and as a railroad
junction is even more important than either Lutsk or Dubno.
Its fortifications are built to serve as a fortified bridgehead. They
amount to seven forts of which five are located on the left bank
of the Ustje and two on the right. These forts were built in the
form of a semicircle, at a distance of four to six miles from the
city itself and with a circumference of approximately twenty-
five miles. Originally this group of fortresses undoubtedly was
intended to act as a basis for a Russian invasion of Galicia and
Hungary rather than as a means of defense against an invasion
from these countries. And, indeed, in the earlier part of the
war, when the Russians forced their way into Galicia and to the
Carpathian Mountains, they fulfilled their purpose with greater
success than they were destined to achieve now as a means of
defense.
CHAPTER XXV
FIGHTING ON THE DVINA AND IN THE
DVINA-VILNA SECTOR
AT the time Warsaw fell, in the beginning of August, 1915, the
- eastern front north of the Niemen extended as follows:
Starting on the western shore of the Gulf of Riga, at a point
about twenty miles west of Riga and about thirty miles north-
west of Mitau it ran in » slightly curved line in a southeasterly
FIGHTING ON THE DVINA 213
direction to the town of Posvol on the Musha River, passing just
west of Mitau and the River Aa, about ten miles west of Bausk.
From Posvol a salient with a diameter of about twenty miles
extended around Ponevesh on the Libau-Dvinsk railroad, with its
most eastern point a few miles west of KupishM on the same
railroad line. From there the southern side of the salient passed
through Suboch and RogofF to Keydany on the Nievraza, and
along the banks of that stream to its junction with the Niemen,
about five miles west of Kovno.
In a preceding chapter we have learned how this line was
pushed back by the Germans during and following the drive on
Kovno and Vilna. After Vilna's fall on September 18, 1915, the
Germans had advanced along the western shore of the Gulf of
Riga to Dubbeln, about ten miles west of Riga, at the Aa's delta.
But, although the Germans succeeded in crossing the Aa at Mitau
and establishing their positions to the east of that city, they were
unable then, and in fact during the following months, to approach
closer to Riga at that point, so that a salient was formed west of
Riga, which at its widest point was over twenty miles distant
from this point. Just south of Mitau, the south side of this
salient bent almost straight to the east for a distance of thirty
miles until it reached Uexkuell on the Dvina, about twenty
miles southeast of Riga. From there the line followed almost
exactly the east bank of the Dvina, passing through the im-
portant towns of Friedrichstadt and Jacobstadt, from where
it bent due south, gradually drawing away to the west of
the Dvina River and passing west and southwest of Dvinsk
at a distance of about ten miles. All along this line con-
siderable fighting took place throughout September, 1915, as has
already been narrated.
During September 21-22, 1915, this fighting was especially
severe west and southwest of Dvinsk, where the Germans were
making unsuccessfully desperate efforts to break the Russian
lines and get within striking distance of Dvinsk. However, al-
though they managed to maintain their own lines against all
Russian attacks and to gather in some 5,000 prisoners, they could
not break the Russian defensive.
214 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The Russian forces at this point were led by General Russky,
among whose commanders was Radko Dmitrieff, of Balkan War
fame. Both of these generals are to be counted among the great-
est Russian leaders and they were especially expert in everything
that pertained to fortresses and their defense. As wonderful as
the German military machine had proven itself, as severe as their
often repeated offensives were, as superior as their supply of
artillery and munitions was both in quality and quantity, Russky
and Dmitrieff proved a good match for them all. The possession
of Dvinsk at that particular moment would have meant an almost
inestimable advantage to the Germans, just as its loss would have
been apt to mean the complete rout of the Russians. For once the
line broken to a sufficiently great width at that point, all the
Russian forces having their basis on Petrograd, Smolensk, and
Moscow might have been turned completely.
This supreme importance of Dvinsk was understood equally
well by both sides. On the part of the Germans this under-
standing resulted in unceasing attacks by all available means
and forces, while the Russians on their part were prepared to
defend their positions with a stubbornness and determination
unequaled by the case of any other fortress with the possible
exception of Riga and Rovno. The harder the Germans drove
their armies against Dvinsk the harder the Russians fought to
repulse them. The latter were greatly assisted in this by the
fact that strong reenforcements had been sent to this crucial
point from Petrograd and from other interior points. Still more
important was the beginning of considerable improvement in the
Russian supply of guns and shells. Even though, in that respect,
Russky was undoubtedly still far behind his German opponent,
Von Hindenburg, yet he was at that moment in a much better
position than any other Russian general. Dvinsk had to be held
at all costs — the Russian General Staff apparently had decided —
and to Dvinsk, therefore, were sent all available guns and
munitions.
Originally the fortress of Dvinsk was far from being up to
date or particularly effective and imposing. It consisted of an
old citadel which, it is true, had been improved considerably; but
FIGHTING ON THE DVINA 215
even then its outworks extended hardly farther than a mile beyond
its own range. As soon as General Russky assumed command he
began feverishly to improve these conditions. In this undertak-
ing he was greatly assisted by the nature of the countryside sur-
rounding Dvinsk. Immediately to the northwest, west, south, and
southeast the River Dvina formed a strong line of natural de-
fense. Beyond that was a region thickly covered with small and
big lakes, which swung around Dvinsk as a center, in the form
of an immense three-quarters circle, starting to the south of the
Libau-Ponevesh-Dvinsk railroad and stopping just west of the
Dvinsk-Pskoff-Petrograd railroad. The diameter of this circle
varies from thirty miles to sixty. The ground between these
lakes is swampy in many places, difficult of approach, and com-
paratively easy to defend even against superior forces, especially
because most of it is not entirely flat, but interspersed with hills
and woodlands.
Throughout this entire district the Russians built a dense
network of trenches, and it was especially by means of these
that the Germans were repulsed not only successfully but
with great losses to their attacking forces. The more important
of these earth fortifications were built in a novel fashion. The
main part of each had the form of a crescent with its horns turned
toward the enemy. Every attack from the latter, in order to find
a point big enough for an effective attack, had to be frontal in
nature; that means, it had to be directed against the main part
of the crescent-shaped trench. But, whenever such a frontal at-
tack would be executed and just as soon as the attackers would be
inside of the sides of the crescent, machine guns and rifle fire
from its two horns would hit them on both flanks and frequently
destroy them utterly. In order to make the Germans advance far
enough into the crescent, advanced trenches had been built in
front of its horns, which were connected with the main part of
the crescent by communicating trenches.
These advanced trenches were manned by comparatively small
forces, whose duty it was to offer a sufficiently strong resistance
to draw a fairly good-sized number of Germans. This purpose
having been accomplished the troops in the advanced trenches
216 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
would give way and retire by means of the communicating
trenches into their main positions. Again and again the Ger-
mans followed them into the death-dealing hollow, to be decimated
unmercifully in the manner described above. At the same time
Russian guns would open fire and direct a sheet of shells toward
the back of the attacker, thus cutting off most effectively any
reenforcements which might have made it possible for the Ger-
mans to either storm the main trench or withdraw at least that
part of their attacking party which had not yet fallen prey to
Russian ingenuity. It is said that General Russky contrived to
throw out fortifications of this nature around Dvinsk in an im-
mense circle which had a diameter of twenty miles and with its
circumference formed a front of almost two hundred miles. Of
course, this front was not in the form of an unbroken line. There
were any number of places along it that could be occupied by the
Germans practically at will. But once there the next advance
would invariably bring them face to face with a new obstacle, kill
hundreds of them, and frequently result in the withdrawal of the
remnant to its main line, from where another advance would be
attempted promptly on the next day.
One other feature of these fortifications contributed a great
deal to their becoming practically impregnable. The Russian
engineering troops saw to it that all these works were built as
narrow as possible and were dug as deep as the ground per-
mitted. It was this fact which made the German artillery fire
so surprisingly ineffective at this point. In spite of its unceasing
fierceness the results it accomplished were as nothing compared
with the effort and expense it involved. For, of course, no matter
how brilliant the gunnery, how wonderful the cannon, how de-
vastating the shells, if the target at which they are aimed is
sufficiently far away and sufficiently small, the result will be dis-
appointing; and the Russians at Dvinsk saw to it that the Ger-
mans experienced a long series of costly and heartbreaking dis-
appointments of that nature.
A Hungarian staff correspondent, who was with Von Hinden-
burg's army, had this to say about the siege of Dvinsk, or rather
about the attacks on its outlying fortifications: "The German
FIGHTING ON THE DVINA 217
army could not make use of its heavy artillery, for it proved
quite useless, owing to the extreme narrowness of the Russian
trenches. In the lake district south of Dvinsk the Russians made
the utmost of their natural defenses, and even the advanced
trenches there were only occupied after very heavy losses, and
then retained under the most trying circumstances. In taking
Novo Alexandrovsk — a village about fifteen miles southwest of
Dvinsk on the Dvinsk-Kovno post road — the losses incurred on
our part were unprecedented in severity."
Another correspondent in writing to his paper, the "Vossische
Zeitung," describes the fortifications of Dvinsk as follows:
"Every rod of land is covered with permanent trenches, roofed
securely against shrapnel and shell fragments and connected
with so-called 'fox holes' — small shelters in which the garrisons
are safe against the heaviest shells. Sand trenches, skillfully
laid out, so that they are mutually outflanking, smother explod-
ing projectiles. The flanking fire of the machine guns often
annihilates the assailants when they are apparently success-
fully attacking. One company alone thus lost fifty-one dead
in one day. Between September 15 and October 26, 1915,
Dvinsk, in a way, was captured fifteen times, but it is still
in Russian hands. The bombardment has reduced the fortress
in size one-half without affecting in the least the strength of the
remainder."
South of Dvinsk, however, the Germans had been able to ad-
vance their line slightly farther to the east. On September 27-28,
1916, and the following days they were fighting on the shores of
Lake Drysvidly, about ten miles east of the Dvinsk- Vilna railroad,
and at Postavy, ten miles south of the Disna River, a southern
tributary of the Dvina. Again on October 1, 1915, the Russians
attacked north of Postavy, as well as south on the shores of Lakes
Narotch and Vishneff , but without success. Throughout the next
day the fighting continued, although not particularly severe. But
on October 6, 1915, stronger Russian forces were again thrown
against the German lines. In the beginning they gained ground
at Koziany, on the Disna, and south on Lakes Drysvidly and Vish-
neff, but the day's net results left the Germans in possession of
218 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
their old positions. Russian attacks in that region during Oc-
tober 7-8, 1915, suffered the same fate.
On the latter day the Germans made an attack in force south
of Ilukst, ten miles to the northwest of Dvinsk, and took the
village of Garbunovka, capturing over 1,000 Russians and some
machine guns. On the next day, October 9, 1915, the Russians
attempted unsuccessfully to regain these positions and were also
defeated to the west of Ilukst, north of the Ponevesh-Dvinsk rail-
road. On the 10th, attacks west of Dvinsk and Vidzy, north of the ^
Disna, had no better results.
Throughout the following week, October 10 to 17, 1915, the
Russian army continuously attacked along the entire line
west and sduth of Dvinsk. In some instances they suc-
ceeded in breaking temporarily and for short distances through
the German line. But in no case did this lead to a lasting
success and, in some instances even, the Germans closed the line
again so quickly that the Russian detachments who had broken
through were cut off from their main body and fell into the
hands of the Germans.
Both on October 22 and 23, 1915, the Russians launched strong
attacks near Sadeve, south of Kosiany, which were repulsed in
both instances. On the latter day the Germans again attacked
northwest of Dvinsk, near Ilukst, and captured some Russian posi-
tions as well as over 3,500 men and twelve machine guns, main-
taining their hold on the former in the face of strong Russian
counterattacks on October 24, 1915. Small German detachments
which had advanced toward the north of Ilukst on that day, how- ,
ever, had to give way promptly to superior Russian forces. In
spite of this the Germans repeated the experiment on the follow-
ing day with stronger forces and at that time gained their point.
On October 26, 1915, the Germans broke through the Russian line
south of the Ponevesh-Dvinsk railroad, between the latter city
and the station of Abele, but had to give up part of the newly-
gained positions during the night only to regain it again the next
morning. A Russian attack against this position undertaken
later on that day, October 27, 1915, broke down under German
artillery fire, before it had fully developed.
FIGHTING ON THE DVINA 21*
In a similar way the most furious kind of fighting took place
throughout this period on the Riga salient. There, too, the
Russians, successfully held the Germans at a safe distance. In
the second half of October, 1915, when Von Hindenburg ap*
parently had become convinced that he would not succeed in tak-
ing Dvinsk before the coming of winter, if at all, the German
general began to shift the center of his operations toward the
aorth and massed large forces against Riga. According to some
reports as many as six army corps were concentrated at that
point. The country there, though different from that in the
vicinity of Dvinsk, was hardly less difficult for the Germans and
offered almost as many opportunities for natural defenses to the
Russians.
- We have already described at the beginning of this chapter
the exact location of the salient that ran around Riga from Dub-
beln on the Gulf of Riga by way of Mitau to Uexkuell on the
Dvina. The first sector of it — Dubbeln-Mitau — was approxi-
mately twenty-five miles long, and the second — Mitau-Uexkuell —
about thirty miles. On its western and northwestern side it was
bounded to a great extent by the River Aa and by the eastern half
of Lake Babit. The latter is about ten miles long, but only a
Mttle more than one mile in width and runs almost parallel to part
of the south shore of the Gulf of Riga, at a distance of about
three miles.
On its southern and southeastern sides the salient followed, for
some ten miles, first the post road and then the railroad from
Mitau to Kreutzburg on the Dvina — about fifty miles northwest
of Dvinsk — and then turned to the northeast for another twenty
miles or so. On this latter stretch it crossed two tributaries of
the River Aa, the Eckau and the Misse. Through the entire depth
of the salient, in a southwesterly direction from Riga, runs a
section about twenty-five miles long of the Riga-Mitau-Iibau
railroad, cutting it practically into two equal parts. Another
railroad connects Riga with Dubbeln and still another with Uex-
kuell, so that the Russians had good railroad communications to
every point of the salient The inside of the latter, besides the
rivers mentioned, contained some half dozen other smaller water-
220 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ways, tributaries of the Aa and Dvina, and was covered almost
entirely with dense forests. In the center of these there are
located extensive swamps known as the Tirul Marshes, and
smaller stretches of swamp lands are also found in various other
sections of these woods.
With the exception of the Mitau-Riga railroad there are only
two means of approaching Riga, a fairly good road that leads
along Lake Babit from the Aa to Riga, and another that runs
from Gross Eckau on the Eckau River through the woods by way
of Kekkau to Riga and in its northern part parallels the Dvina.
The latter stream widens considerably about ten or fifteen miles
above Riga and forms many small islands, the largest of which
is Dalen Island, just to the north of Kekkau. Separating it from
the mainland is only a comparatively narrow arm of the Dvina.
The northern tip of the island is solid, somewhat elevated
ground, and commands the eastern main arm of the Dvina as
well as its eastern bank. If the Germans could gain this island
their chances of reaching Riga from the south would be many
times increased. An attack in that direction had nothing to fear
from a flanking movement on the part of the Russians, because
the latter would be prevented from getting at their advancing
enemy either from the west or northwest by the impassable Tirul
Marshes.
On October 16, 1915, the Germans decided to attempt this
maneuver and made a rather unexpected attack east of Mitau
and north of Eckau and forced the Russians back of the Misse
River, an eastern tributary of the River Aa, near Basui, on which
occasion they claimed to have captured over 10,000 men. Some
more ground was gained in that neighborhood during the next
three days.
Immediately the Russians retaliated by an equally unexpected
naval operation far to the north, at the western entrance to the
Gulf of Riga. A Russian fleet appeared there and bombarded
the ports of Domesnaes and Gipken. Detachments were landed.
Although they destroyed some of the fortifications that had been
erected there by the Germans and scattered the small forces
which the Germans had there, they withdrew within a few days.
FIGHTING ON THE DVINA 221
This operation had practically no influence on the further devel-
opments along the balance of the front, except that, threatening
as it was for the time being to the German rear, it resulted in
a temporary reduction of the pressure that the Germans were
trying to exert from the south.
One other attempt to reach Riga before the coming of winter
was made toward the end of October. Apparently the German
plan was to make a triple attack on the Baltic fortress. From
the south another drive was made against Dalen Island. From
the southwest the new offensive started from Mitau in the direc-
tion of Olai along the Mitau-Riga railroad, and from the west
reenf orcements that had been concentrated at Tukum advanced
on both sides of Lake Babit. However, this offensive, too, was
unsuccessful. Especially that started along the north shore of
Lake Babit pro zed costly to the Germans. There the stretch of
land between the gulf and the lake is nowhere more than three
miles wide, and in many places not that wide. Through its entire
length flows the Aa. It is only sparsely wooded. Comparatively
small Russian forces successfully opposed the advancing Ger-
mans, whose narrow front was easily dominated and driven back
by machine guns and field artillery; from the gulf, too, Russian
war vessels trained their guns on the Germans, and the attack
was quickly broken up with considerable losses to the attackers
and only small losses to the defenders. Against these conditions
the Germans seemed to be helpless. They fell back along the
north shore of Lake Babit and along the Aa toward their base
at Schlock. This, of course, necessitated a simultaneous with-
drawal of the German forces on the south shore of the lake. The
Russians immediately followed up their advantage, and by No-
vember 6, 1915, the Germans had withdrawn all their forces
from along the north side of the Tirul Marshes. About that
time the Germans withdrew beyond the Aa to its west bank,
and on November 8, 1915, the Russians stormed the village of
Kemmern, about five miles west of Schlock. During the next
two weeks, November 8 to 22, 1915, continuous fighting took
place to the north of the Schlock-Tukum railroad. This resulted
in the storming by the Russians of the villages of Anting and
222 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Ragasem on the shores of Lake Kanger and the withdrawal #f
the Germans beyond the west shore of this lake.
As early as the beginning of November weather conditions
had made fighting on a large scale impossible for a few weeks.
Attacks and counterattacks, such as we have just described, were
still kept up in front of Dvinsk and Riga, it is true, but they
gradually lost in extent and severity and brought practically no
changes of any importance. Along the rest of the front, down
to the Vilia, the fighting assumed, like everywhere else on the
eastern front, the form of trench warfare, interrupted occasion-
ally by artillery duels of considerable severity, doing, however,
more damage to the landscape than to the military forces. Aero
attacks on a small scale, too, were the order on both sides when-
ever opportunity and climatic conditions permitted. This state
of affairs continued throughout the months of November and
December, 1915, and January and February, 1916.
Throughout this period the Russo-German lines in the Dvina-
Vilia sector remained practically unchanged, although, of course,
minor readjustments took place here and there. In the north,
along the Aa and Dvina, and before Dvinsk, it was still in the
same position that has been described in the beginning of this
chapter, except that it had been pushed back from Dubbeln to
Lake Ranger, Kemmera, and the River Aa. At the point where it
crossed the Vilna-Dvinsk railroad, about ten miles southwest of
Dvinsk, it bent still more to the southeast, passed east of Lake
Drysvidly, then about ten miles east of Vidzy, crossed the Disna
near Koziany, and reached its most easterly point a few miles
west of the village of Dunilovichy. From there it bent back
again in a westerly direction, but ran still toward the south,
about ten miles east of Lake Narotch, and at the same distance
to the west of the town of Vileika to the Vilia, just north of
Smorgon.
In spite of all the severe fighting before Dvinsk and Riga,
neither of these cities had yet been brought within the range
of the majority of the German guns, even though continuous
local successes had been gained on the part of the German troops.
The losses which the latter suffered cannot be stated definitely.
WINTER BATTLES ON THE STYR 223
because no official figures, either Russian or German, are avail-
able. They must have been severe, however. The net result
of all the fighting in the region before Dvinsk, which had then
been in progress practically for fifty days, therefore, was next
to nothing for the Germans and hardly more for the Russians.
Neither had been able to gain any definite success over the other.
Throughout all this time the Germans not only made innumera-
ble infantry attacks, but also kept up an incessant artillery fire,
throwing as many as 100,000 shells a day against the Russian
positions. That they did not gain their point speaks well, not
only for the valor of the Russian army, but also for the ability
of its leader, General Russky.
CHAPTER XXVI
WINTER BATTLES ON THE STYE AND
STRYPA RIVERS
AS the autumn of 1915 drew to an end and winter approached,
- the fighting along the eastern front changed from attacks
over more or less extensive spaces to trench warfare within very
restricted territory and to artillery duels. This change took
place, as we have already seen, as far as the front from the Vilia
River down to the southern limits of the Pripet Marshes was
concerned, as early as the end of September, 1915. Farther
south, however, along the Styr and its tributary, the Ikwa, and
in the region through which the Strypa, Sereth, and Dniester
flow, in the Russian provinces of Volhynia and in Austro-Hun-
garian East Galicia, the severest kind of fighting was kept up
much longer.
The preceding chapter carried us, as far as this territory was
concerned, up to October 7, 1915. On that day the Russians
attacked with all available forces of men and munitions along
the entire Volhynian, Galician, and Bessarabian front. One of
the principal points of contention was the little town of Tchar-
O— War St.*
224 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
torysk on the Styr, about five miles south of the Warsaw-Kovel-
Kieff railroad. To the northwest of it the Germans under Gen-
eral Linsingen began a counterattack on October 7, 1915, and
threw the Russians across the Styr. A Russian counterattack,
undertaken on the 8th with the object of regaining their lost
position, was frustrated by artillery fire. To the north, just
across the railroad at Rafalovka, attacks and counterattacks
followed each other as regularly as day and night. For about
two weeks a series of local engagements on this small front of
ten or fifteen miles took place with such short periods of rest
that one may well speak of them as the Battle of Tchartorysk.
Neither side, however, seemed to be able to gain any marked
advantage.
About the 18th of October, 1915, the Russians succeeded,
after bringing up reenforcements, in driving a wedge into
the Austro-German line which they were able to maintain
until October 21, 1915. On that day the Austro-Germans, too,
brought up reenforcemento and started a strong offensive move-
ment. From three sides the small salient was attacked near
Okonsk, and after furious resistance it caved in. Russian coun-
terattacks to the north and south, undertaken in order to relieve
the pressure on the center, had no effect. The Russians were
forced to retreat, and left 15 officers, 8,600 men, 1 cannon, and
8 machine guns in the hands of their enemies. However, the
Russians came on again and again, and the battle continued for
a number of days. Step by step the Russian troops were forced
back again toward the Styr. Village after village was stormed
by the combined Austro-German forces. In many cases small
villages changed hands three or four times in as many days.
Not a day passed without repeated attempts on the part of both
sides to break through the line. But though some of these were
successful, sometimes for the Russians and sometimes for their
adversaries, the gains were only temporary and local, and were
usually wiped out again before long. On November 16, 1915,
however, the Austro-German forces gained a decided victory
over the Russians, who were thrown back to the east bank of
the Styr under very heavy losses. By that time the winter
WINTER BATTLES ON THE STYR 225
weather had become too severe for extensive operations, and
comparative inactivity ruled along: that part of the front.
While the Battle of Tchartorysk was raging, engagements of
varying importance and extent, but all of great severity and
costly to victor and vanquished alike, took place at other parts
of the Volhynian, Galician, and Bessarabian front. Just south
of Tchartorysk, near Kolki on the Styr, Austrian troops gained
additional territory on October 7, 1915, Still farther south at
Olyka, west of Rovno, the Russians were thrown back by a
bayonet attack, carried out by two Austro-Hungarian infantry
regiments. On the Ikwa, northwest of Eremenets, a very bitter
struggle ensued for the village of Sopanov, which during one
day, October 7, 1915, changed hands not less than four times,
but finally remained in the possession of Austro-Hungarian
forces west of Tarnopol. Russian attacks gained temporary
successes, which were lost again when German and Austro-
Hungarian reenforcements were brought to their assistance.
On October 8, 1915, these attacks were not only repeated, but
new attacks developed on the Strypa at Buczacz, Tluste, and
Burkanov, which, however, were all repulsed. During these two
days the Russians lost over 6,000 men on the Styr and Strypa
Rivers. Again, on October 9-10, 1915, the Russians attacked
along these two waterways and on the Ikwa. On the latter day
four separate attacks were launched at Burkanov alone. On
the 14th another attempt was made to break through the line
west of Tarnopol. Then a period of comparative rest set in for
about a week.
But on October 20, 1915, a new Russian attack near Novo
Alexinez, a small border village, resulted in a slight gain, which,
however, could not be enlarged in spite of heroic efforts. An
attack east of Zaloshe on the Sereth was likewise without suc-
cess. Both of these were repeated on October 21-22, 1915, without
better results. During the next week the fighting was reduced
considerably in volume and severity, until on October 30, 1915,
a new attack with replenished forces against the Strypa line
started the ball rolling once more. On the same day a Russian
aeroplane was brought down southeast of Lutsk.
226 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
According to official figures published by the General Staffs
of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies respectively, the
Russian losses during the month of October, 1915, amounted to
244 officers, 41,000 men, 23 cannon, and 80 machine guns, all
captured by German forces, and 142 officers, 26,000 men, 1 can-
non, 44 machine guns, and 3 aeroplanes captured by the Austro-
Hungarian troops. Corresponding figures for the armies of the
Central Powers are not available.
On the last day of October, 1915, renewed fighting broke out
again on the Strypa, near Sikniava, where the Russians had con-
centrated strong forces. The Austrians met a strong attack
with a prompt counterattack and carried the day. As before,
the fighting, once started at one point on the Strypa, quickly
spread. On November 2, 1915, the engagement at Sikniava was
continued, and a new attack developed near Buczacz with the
usual more or less negative result for both sides — maintenance
of all attacked positions without gain of new territory. Another
series of very bitter clashes occurred between November 4-7,
1915, near the village of Sienkovce on the Strypa. During the
same period fighting went on also at many other points of that
small river, which by this time had seen the flow of almost as
much blood as water.
Southeast of the village of Visnyvtszyk on the Strypa seven
separate Russian attacks were launched within these four days.
On the 7th a strong attack was made also in the neighborhood of
Dubno from the direction of Rovno without gaining ground.
Isolated attacks of varying extent took place for a few more days.
But by that time severe winter weather restricted operations in
this sector just as it had done along the balance of the eastern
front. Of course occasional attacks were started whenever a lull
in the snowstorms or a favorable change in temperature made it
possible. But, generally speaking, the Styx and Strypa section
now settled down to trench fighting, artillery duels, and minor
engagements between advanced outposts. The Russian losses
during the month of November, 1915, as far as they were in-
flicted by Austro-Hungarian troops, totaled 78 officers, 12,000
men, and 32 machine guns.
WINTER BATTLES ON THE STYR 227
Late in December, 1915, on the 24th, the Russians, disregard-
ing climatic conditions, once more began an extensive offensive
movement in East Galicia and on the Bessarabian border, with
Czernovitz, the capital of the Austro-Hungarian province of
Bukowina, as its apparent objective. It lasted until January 15,
1916, or twenty-three days, interrupted only occasionally by a day
or two of slightly decreased activity. Its net result for the Rus-
sian army, in spite of very heavy losses in killed, wounded, and
captured, was only the certainty of having inflicted fairly heavy
losses on the German and Austro-Hungarian troops opposing
them. Territory they could not gain, at least not to a large
enough extent to be of any influence on the further development
of events. The severest fighting during these operations took
place near Toporoutz and Rarawotse on the Bessarabian bor-
der. Much of it was at very close range, and on many days the
Russians made three and four, sometimes even more, successive
attacks against one and the same problem. Especially bitter
fighting occurred on January 11, 1916, when one position was
attacked five times during the day and a sixth time as late as
ten o'clock that night.
Coinciding with the Russian attempt to break once more
through the Austro-Hungarian line into the Bukowina, attacks
were launched from time to time at various places on the
Dniester, Sereth, and Strypa, especially in the vicinity of
Buczacz. None of these, however, had any effect, nor were
other very occasional attacks west of Rovno and on the Styr of
more avail. During the three weeks of fighting the Russians,
according to official Austro-Hungarian figures, lost over 5,000
men by capture.
After a few days' lull the Russian armies began another
battle with strong forces near Toporoutz and Bojan, east of
Czernovitz, on January 18, 1916. The severity of the fighting
increased on the next day, January 19, 1916, and at the same
time heavy artillery fire was directed against many other points
along the East Galician front. Again the Russians suffered
severe losses during their repeated storming attacks against the
strongly fortified positions of the Austro-Hungarian troops.
228
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
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THE BATTLE FRONT IN RUSSIA, JANUABY 1, 1916
ON THE TRACKS OF RUSSIAN RETREAT 229
After two days' preparation, by means of artillery fire, another
attack was thrust against the Toporoutz section on January 22,
1916, but when this, too, did not bring the desired result the
Russians apparently lost heart. For, from then on for the bal-
ance of January, 1916, as well as through the entire month of
February, 1916, they made further attacks only at very rare
intervals, but otherwise restricted themselves to artillery duels
and trench fighting.
CHAPTER XXVII
ON THE TRACKS OF THE RUSSIAN
RETREAT
TN the preceding chapters we have followed, day by day, the
-*- military events of the Russian retreat and of the German
advance after the fall of Warsaw and Ivangorod. With admira-
tion we have heard of the deeds of valor accomplished by the
various armies of the three belligerents. The endurance that
they displayed, the hardships that they had to bear, the losses
that they suffered — both victor and conquered — have given us a
clearer idea what war means to the men that actually wage it.
Occasionally we have had glimpses of the devastation that it
brings to the country over the hills and valleys and over the
plains and forests of which it rages. Again and again we have
been told of the horrible suffering and utter ruin which was the
share of the civic population, rich and poor, young and old, man,
woman, or child. But these latter features are apt to be over-
shadowed by the more sensational events of battle and siege,
and in the excitement of these we easily lose sight of the tremen-
dous drama in which not trained soldiers act the parts, but
ordinary everyday beings, farmers and merchants, working men
and women, students and scholars, people of every age, race,
and condition, people just like we ourselves and like those with
whom we come in daily contact throughout our entire life. And
230 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
yet their numbers run into the tens of millions as compared
with the hundreds of thousands or perhaps four or five millions
of soldiers, and it is their suffering — bared as it is of the glory
and excitement that usually lightens the life of the fighting man
— that is the quintessence of war's tragedy.
No one who has not been himself a participant or an actual
observer of these horrors can really and truly gauge their full
extent or describe them adequately. But a clear record of them
is as much an essential requirement of a war's history as a
chronological narration of its various events. In the following
paragraphs will be found gathered reliable reports based on the
keen observation of men who in their capacity as special cor-
respondents of various newspapers had opportunities to collect
and observe facts at close range and the very vicinity where
they transpired. They come from various sources, but chiefly
from the narrative of a war correspondent published in the
Munich "Neueste Nachrichten," who was himself an eyewitness
of what he describes. Although they refer more especially to
that part of Russia that is situated between the Galician border
and the fortress of Brest-Litovsk — the region of the Bug River
— they might have been written equally well of any part
or all of the eastern theatre of war, for they are typical
of what happened throughout that vast territory that stretches
from the eastern front as it stood at the time of Warsaw's
fall in the beginning of August, 1915, to that other line
that formed a new front, much farther to the east, when the
German advance into Russia came to an end in the latter part of
October, 1915:
"The first anniversary of the war had just passed. Again
summer was upon us, like in those days of mobilization. The.
atmosphere was full with memories of the beginning of the
campaign. Out of Galicia an endless column rolled to the north
into Poland. The old picture: the creaking road, overloaded
with marching troops, with artillery lustily rolling forward,
with caravans of supply trains. Repeating itself a thousandfold,
the sum total of the mass deepened the impression and made
the idea of the 'supreme command of an army' appear like a
ON THE TRACKS OF RUSSIAN RETREAT 231
fairy tale. Supply wagon after supply wagon, mile after mile,
in a long, never-breaking chain!
"The greater the distance of the observer, the deeper becomes
the impression of the general impulse of advance, of the same-
ness of its direction and motion. Can we see a difference as
compared with earlier times? Can we notice if the new class
•f soldiers are equal to the older; if the horses are in the same
good condition as before? All in all, it is the same play, even
if with new actors in its parts, which was acted before us during
the very first days of the war, never to be forgotten : a variety
•f types, unified by the purpose that was common to all. . . .
Of course, the close observer will always be able to make distinc-
tions. To him all soldiers are not just soldiers. Through their
uniforms he will recognize the farmer, the artisan, the factory
hand, the slim young volunteer, the genial *Landwehr' or *Land-
sturm' man, the teacher, schoolboy, student, clerk, and profes-
sional soldier.
"Before them stretches a new country. Broader plains, lower
ranges of hills than in Galicia. To the right and left, as far as
the eye reaches, fields, meadows, and swamps. Here and there,
v'ndmills. Immense forests, different from those they knew at
home: pines, oaks, and birches, all mixed together, with some
ash-trees and poplars, only slightly cut down and low of growth.
The retreating Russians have tried everywhere to burn down
forest and field, but have destroyed in most places only narrow
strips and small spots that look now like islands : there the trees
have been bared of their foliage in the middle of the summer
as if it were the early spring, and the pines are red and brown
like beech trees in the winter time. Every few miles trenches
and shelters had been cut into the landscape and ran across field
and forest, hills and valleys, masterpieces of their kind, cun-
ningly hidden, partly untouched. Alongside the road there were
many, many soldiers1 graves, singly or sometimes combined into
small cemeteries. The Russians bury their dead with devotion.
Double-armed Greek crosses betray their burial places. . . . But
not always did they find time during their retreat. Occasionally
a penetrating odor of decay announces the fact that some of
232 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
their dead had to be deprived of burial. Then, very rarely only,
indeed, one comes across black, swollen corpses, so terribly
gnawed and disfigured by millions of small crawling animals,
that all individuality, all humanity, has been destroyed.
"The advance moves on for miles on curious roads. Are these
still roads? There is no foundation. Just cuts have been made
into the ground, which is sandy here and muddy there and again
swampy. During dry weather they take turns in being dusty
like the desert, or hard as stone or gently yielding; during rain
they are without exception unreliable, spiteful, dangerous. The
burden of the uninterrupted transport traffic escapes to the left
and to the right farther and farther into the edges of the Adds,
cutting off continuously new widths of wheel tracks so that
roadways are formed 150 to 300 feet wide, which narrow down
only at bridges or fords by sheer necessity. All bridges, even
those that have been spared by the Russians, have to be solidly
renewed and supported, for they had never been intended for
such demands. Across furrows and deeply cut wheel tracks,
across loose footbridges, through puddles that are more like
ponds, and through deep holes, motorcars — fast automobiles and
gigantic motor trucks — rush and rumble madly, from time to
time helplessly sinking down into the mud and mire till relays
of horses and the force of the next detachment pushing forward
on its way rescues them and they are off again.
"The road is lined with a sad seam of dead horses. Still other
cadavers poison the air and entice swarms of greedy crows. The
Russians have killed all cattle which they were unable to carry
along quickly enough or to eat upon the spot, and then left the
carcasses on or alongside the road : cattle, pigs, sheep have been
shot down in this fashion, so that the pursuer should find no
other booty than ashes and carrion.
"At some distance from the line of march there may be left
some untouched villages, sound, normal, human settlements. But
one does not see them. Wherever the fighting has been going
on, we pass by debris and ruins. Big villages have been burned
from one end to the other into empty rows of chimneys and
blackened heaps of tumbled-down houses.
ON THE TRACKS OF RUSSIAN RETREAT 28S
"The churches alone sometimes have been shown some respect.
As far as they have not been riddled by shells or have not lost
their roofs, they are still standing, clean and almost supernat-
ural with their white or pink wooden walls, their shrilly blue
er deep red domes, and their shining gilt decorations. Every-
thing else has gone up in flames or has been shot to pieces.
"Out of the general wreckage a few utensils and pieces of fur-
niture stick out here and there : bent beds, crumpled-up sewing
machines, half-melted pans and pots. Sometimes it is even
possible to form an idea of the former appearance of a house
from the design of its blackened wall paper or from a few rem-
nants of some other decorations. Here and there small corners
and nooks have been preserved as if by a miracle, and, in some
unaccountable way, have survived the ruin that surrounds them
en all sides: strips of a flower garden, or perhaps a summer-
house with a table in it and a cover and breakfast dishes on the
table.
"Up on a chimney, half of which has tumbled down, stands a
stork, as if he were meditating over the ruin wrought by human
lumds; suddenly he pulls himself together, spreads out his wings
with quick decision, floats down into his familiar pond and for-
gets the raving of maddened mankind in the enjoyment of a
juicy frog. Through the labyrinth of a fallen-down barn limps
a big black cat, tousled and scratched, already half-maddened
from hunger, vicious like a wounded panther. Along what had
been once streets run packs of dogs gone wild, restlessly smelling
at dirt and corpses, growing bolder day by day until finally they
have to be shot down.
"Only few people can stand it on this God-forsaken stage of
misery. Occasionally a few thin Jews in their long coats walk
across the ruins of the market place, which look like a stage
setting. On their shoulders they carry in a bundle their few
belongings, like pictures of the Wandering Jew. Their families
live for a short time from whatever they can scratch together
from the ruins or out of the trampled-down fields. They cook
and bake on one of the stoves standing everywhere right out in
the open road and offer their poor wares for exhibition and sale
234 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
on a few boards, a last effort to support life by trade. In the case
of the women, no matter what the nationality, it always seems as
if they had saved out of the horrible destruction only their best
and brightest clothes. At a distance their colors shine and
smile as if nothing at all had happened. But upon coming up
closer, one can easily see how little these unfortunate beings
carry on their poor backs.
"More than once we stand perplexed before the touching pic-
ture of a short rest on the 'flight to Egypt/ A little family — is
it the only one that has remained behind when everybody else
wandered away, or have they already come back home because
there was nothing better to be found out in the world? In the
garden of a plundered farmhduse they have put up a poor imita-
tion of a stable out of charred boards, and in it they live more
poorly than the poorest gypsies. Their lean cow has been tied
to a bush; among the trampled-down vegetables their equally
lean mule grazes. The mother squats on the ground, nursing a
child, while father and son are stirring up a heap of glowing
ashes and roasting a handful of potatoes that they have dug
up somewhere.
"The return pilgrimage of the natives has already begun at an
extensive rate. The advancing Germans are met everywhere
by long lines of them, on foot and in wagons, carrying with them
carefully and lovingly the few remnants of their herds. What
has been their experience?
"One nice day the Cossacks had appeared at their farms and
had told them : 'Not a soul is allowed to remain here. The Ger-
mans are approaching and the Germans will torture you all to
death if they catch you. Take with you whatever you can carry.
Everything else must be burned and destroyed, so that the Ger-
mans won't find anything that they can use/ That was enough
to make these poor, ignorant farmers take leave of their
homesteads. By the thousands they wandered off quickly and
without much hesitation. Some were driven away like so much
cattle, day by day farther into an uncertain future. Others
were carried in long columns of wagons to the nearest railroad
and still others were led orderly by their own mayors and vil-
ON THE TRACKS OF RUSSIAN RETREAT 235
lage elders. In the inland of the Empire they were to found for
themselves new homes. The czar was going to look after them.
Russia is powerful and rich. It will lure the Germans into
its swamps so that they will drown there miserably. It will
draw them all the way to Moscow and there they will experience
the deadly fate of 1812. Just like Napoleon will the Germans
suffer this time. This patriotic hope, however, did not com-
pensate the farmers for their lost homes. It is true the;
get enough to eat every day. At their resting places they
are fed from field kitchens supplied and equipped by the Rus-
sian army and administered by civil committees. Hunger
they did not need to suffer. But for all that, their home-
sickness will not down, and the dislike of the continuous
wandering, the aversion to strange places, the loathing of the
tmorderly, irregular life of nomads strengthens their deter-
mination to turn off their road at the first opportunity and to
seek the long way back to their village, in spite of the terrible
Germans.
"But in the meantime the world has been turned upside down,
their homes are unrecognizable; nothing, absolutely nothing, is
as it used to be. Wherever there is the smallest nook that has
remained inhabitable, some stranger has built a nest. The new
authorities speak German, rule German, and run things in a
German way. The need to protect themselves against epidemics,
and political prudence, demand that these homeless wanderers
should not be permitted to wander around any longer at will.
Into cities they are not allowed to enter, or even to pass through
them. Out in the country, the field police watch them care-
fully, for more and more frequently adventurous groups are
formed — states in a very small way and without any regard for
anybody else. Strong fellows with plenty of nerve use this rare
opportunity, make themselves leaders and dictators of these
groups, organize new communities, which they rule with a
strong hand, make laws, inflict punishments, and impose their
will just as they please. That makes it necessary for the Ger-
man authorities to interfere promptly and to bring order and
authority to bear on these insecure conditions. The population
236 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
is registered and no one is allowed to immigrate or to emigrate
without the proper papers.
"Of course, there are also good, carefully tended main roads
besides the bad country paths, and some of them are even paved
for miles. One of these runs right straight from the south
toward the Polish city of Cholm. For miles one can see this
road, which looks like a ribbon that grows narrower and nar-
rower all the time; in the background is a forest, through and
beyond which the road runs. At the farther end of the forest,
on the shoulders of a hill, are the white buildings of the monas-
tery of the Russian bishopric of Cholm. Only when one comes
within a few hundred steps of these buildings does one see the
low, long, stretched-out little town in line with the ridge of the
hills that drop away to the north. . . .
"A little farther on, to the northweot of this little eountry
town, is the larger, rich city of Lublin. There all the advantages
of civilization are in evidence : street cars, electric lights, depart-
ment stores, coffee houses. But here, too, war, want, and misery
have left their impression on everything: old men, women, chil-
dren in rags, asking for shelter and stretching out their thin
arms for bread. On all the squares troops pass and cross each
other, delaying the traffic. There are Germans and Austro-
Hungarians in long columns and then again a long line of Rus-
sian prisoners of war, marching to work. Among the well-
dressed ladies and gentlemen only rarely some figures remind
one of the fact that this is Eastern Europe : tall, thin Jews in
their long caftans and Jewish women with their unnatural wigs;
male and female beggars there are in great numbers, and they
are so hungry looking and ragged, so deep-eyed and sickly, that
one can hardly manage to swallow one's food in their vicinity,
if one happened to have chosen a seat on the terrace of one of
the hotels.
"A few days later Brest-Litovsk was taken. Behind the
troops that stormed the fortifications during the night and thus
forced the fall of the city, pressed from early morning great
masses of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies. They
came on over all the roads: infantry, artillery, cavalry,
ON THE TRACKS OF RUSSIAN RETREAT 237
engineering troops, supply detachments, and in between, impa-
tiently puffing, the automobiles of the higher staff officers, every-
body eager to enter the big fortress and to get hold of the big
booty.
"But what a disappointment! From far off clouds of dust
and smoke announced the fate of this famous fortress. The
bridges across the Bug had all been destroyed, those of steel
blown up and the wooden ones burned. Only slowly separate
small units managed to cross on temporary narrow bridges to the
citadel. Everything else crowded together on both sides of the
road and spread out into the fields, filling the flat surrounding
country as far as the eye could reach with one single, immense,
many colored war camp: groups of horses, field kitchens, resting
infantrymen, innumerable white backs of wagon after wagon.
'Whoever managed to enter Brest-Litovsk saw for the first
time a big city devastated and ruined as pitilessly as formerly
only villages had been made to suffer. Hundreds and hundreds
•f houses, once human habitations, now smashed down to their
very foundations, or mangled so as to have lost all meaning,
ruins containing nothing but broken stones and ashes and at
the best here and there a stair banister, suspended in midair.
And all destruction had not been wrought as a result of a long
siege and its continuous assaults of gunfire and shells. In one
night, at the command of the Russian authorities, this Russian
city had been laid waste. Only about one-quarter of it had
remained entirely or partly habitable. Only in the citadel were
there left supplies of any great amount. There quite some
quantities of flour and canned food, weapons and munitions,
war and railroad equipment, had escaped the well-prepared
explosion, and had been saved only because there had not been
enough time to complete the work of destruction and to explode
all the mines that had been laid. A happy exception among this
horrible riot of wholesale destruction was found occasionally in
the case of some few estates of the Polish nobility. In some way
they escaped here and there and were passed by without suffer-
ing demolition and despoliation in spite of the fact that the vil-
lages near which they were usually located were almost always
238 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
masses of smoking: ruins. The manor houses of some of these
estates often became the temporary lodging of some division or
even some army corps staff. For they filled one of the chief
requirements for such headquarters : a sufficiency of many large,
light rooms which permitted to combine the necessary offices
with the officers9 quarters under the same roof. Every high
command needs a number of offices for its various branches of
service, in war as well as in peace. At that, war demands a
hundredfold measure of ready cooperation and punctual working
together. What happens from early in the morning, far into
the night and often throughout the night in these offices dur-
ing the course of a lively action on the battle field is nothing more
or less than administrative activity as it is known to us and
practiced in peace, but of a degree of activity, responsibility, and
decision, of an importance and variety as times of peace do not
demand from an army officer.
"Day and night numerous telegraphs and telephones, estab-
lished often by means of very skillful and exposed connections,
receive reports, communications, inquiries, and requests from the
front and transmit orders, instructions, decisions, and informa-
tion to the front, and at the same time maintain a similar service
with superior headquarters. The number of subjects which have
to be watched continuously is legion: movements of their own
and the enemy's forces ; changes in their own and the opponent's
positions; news and scouting service; losses, reserves; lodging,
provisioning, arming of the troops; sanitation, prevention of
epidemics, ambulances, hospitals; counting and handling of
booty and prisoners; military law, religious matters, gifts;
health and continuity of the supply of mounts ; climate, weather,
condition of the water; condition of streets, bridges, fortifica-
tions; means of intercourse and traffic of all kinds; railways,
mails, wagons, motors, pack animals; aeroplanes; telegraph and
wireless stations.
"And all these matters, within a certain group of the army,
change hourly, perhaps, and are continuously subject to unex-
pected modifications; at the same time they depend in their
outward relations on events that happen in other adjoining army
i
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ON THE TRACKS OF RUSSIAN RETREAT 239
groups, on the general military and political conditions, on the
decisions and interference of general headquarters. And if the
staff quarters of two or three army groups have to consult with
each other about every action and re-action before they make
their various moves, unceasing activity must be displayed by
everyone in order to accomplish all that each day demands. This
activity which at one and the same time actuates and report*,
acta, observes, and accounts, requires the possession of many
manly virtues : the energy of strong nerves, clearness, wisdom,
knowledge, self-consciousness, and decision. Every commander
shares in it. But the greatest demands are made by it on the few
supreme commanders on whom depends the fate of millions.
"Thus the summer months quickly passed by. As they passed,
the advance continued. In spite of this, however, the crops were
brought in from the fields so recently conquered. And what was
accomplished in this direction will some day form a separate
chapter in the economical history of this war.
"Much of the crops, of course, had been destroyed. In many
other cases all the agricultural machines and implements had
been carried off or destroyed. And then there was a great lack
of labor. What was there to be done? Under the leadership of
officers with agricultural experience separate commissions were
formed. They gathered up all the implements and machines that
could be found or could be repaired again and then ordered by
the hundred and thousand from the country in the rear what
they still lacked and soon battalions of war prisoners were busy
peacefully gathering in Hie wheat in the fields. Before long
the harvest had been completed. Threshers and threshing ma-
chines were put to work. Wherever flour mills were in condition
to allow of repairs, mechanics were set to this task. And soon a
steady stream of flour poured forth that enabled the invaders to
feed their armies, their prisoners, and whatever part of the civil
population had returned, to a great extent from supplies raised
and gathered in the occupied region itself, a remarkable success
gained from a combination of German organization, Russian
labor, and Polish versatility."
P— War St. 4
240 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXVIII
SIDELIGHTS ON THE RUSSIAN RETREAT
AND GERMAN ADVANCE
THE difficulties which the Austro-German troops encountered
in pursuing the withdrawing Russians were in many in-
stances greatly increased by the very strong field fortifications
which the Russians had thrown up everywhere to stem the ad-
vance of the enemy. How effective these fortifications were
may be readily understood from the following description
which is taken from the report of a special correspondent of
a south German newspaper who had an opportunity to in-
spect these positions soon after they had been wrested from the
Russians :
"In fortifying this position the Russians had indeed created
a masterwork of modern field fortification. Deep, broad trenches
had been fitted so closely to the landscape that in most
instances they could be recognized as such only at very close
distances. Almost all these trenches had been covered with a
fivefold layer of tree trunks, on top of which there was to be
found another layer of earth and over that again a solid layer
of sod. The wooden pillars which supported this covering had
in many places been fastened by means of wooden plugs into
strong tree trunks, which in turn had been deeply imbedded in
the bottom of the trench. Everywhere there were to be found
openings for one and sometimes even two or three sharpshooters
or for machine guns. Powerful shelters had been erected as a
protection against shrapnel. Everywhere the trenches had been
located in such a manner that one would outflank the other. In
all the trenches there were to be found shelters, many of which
were spacious enough to allow a whole company to retreat to
them, and to these the Russians withdrew whenever the Ger-
man artillery fire was directed against the trenches. These
shelters were deep down below the ground ; their entrances were
comparatively small and protected with manifold layers of rail-
RUSSIAN RETREAT AND GERMAN ADVANCE 241
road rails. In front of these positions had been erected strong
successive lines of entanglements which consisted partly of
barbed wire and partly of strong abatis, formed of trees and
their branches. In front of one section of these trenches the
Russians had cut down a piece of woodland between 150 and 300
feet wide. They had then left the trees on the ground wherever
they happened to have fallen and covered the entire space with
a confusion of barbed-wire entanglements."
Another difficult problem which confronted both the Russians
in their retreat and the Germans in their advance was that of
transportation, especially in the region between the Vistula and
the Bug Rivers. Not only is the number of railroads in that terri-
tory very small, but neither side had available a large enough
number of railroad cars to transport the large number of men
and vast quantities of equipment involved. This necessitated the
creation of new means of transportation. Acording to a corre-
spondent of the Hungarian newspaper "Az Est" the problem was
solved by the Austro-German armies in a remarkable way. In
the first place the number of horses before each wagon was in-
creased. Where formerly two horses had been used, four were
employed now, and where four used to be considered sufficient the
number was increased to six. This resulted in an unending line
of giant transports drawn by teams of four and six horses like
they had never been seen before.
The work of these horses was greatly lightened by field rail-
ways. So quickly were these built that they seemed to grow
right out of the ground. In some places industrial railways of
this nature, already in existence, were utilized. Both steam and
horsepower were used on these railways. Valleys were bridged
over; gradients were reduced by every available means.
At regular distances pleasant little block houses were to
be found, which served as stations and guardhouses. The con-
dition of the roads did not permit the use of motor trucks to any
great extent, but wherever there was even a thread of possi-
bility for motor trucks to get through they were promptly called
upon to assume a leading part as a means of transportation.
The immensity of the problem may well be understood by the fact
242 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
that approximately two thousand automobiles of all kinds were
employed by the German army of the Bug River.
All of this could be moved quickly. Everything that was
necessary to make repairs was carried along. Supplies were
heaped on motor trucks, and the officers in charge of supplies
and equipment lived in automobiles which had been fitted up
like rooms. The supply and equipment departments had their
own electric-lighting system and their separate wireless. This
vast establishment could be mobilized in twenty-four hours, and
its completeness, swiftness, efficiency, and punctuality were not
only a triumph of modern industry, but were among the chief
contributing causes for the Austro-German success in over-
powering obstacles and difficulties, and for the fact that through-
out the entire campaign in Russian Poland the troops never
suffered lack of provisions and munitions.
The Russian retreat brought untold misery to the civil popu-
lation of those parts of Russia which were affected by it. Espe-
cially true was this of those sections in which the Russian
authorities decreed that the civil population had to become
participants in the retreat and leave their homes and goods to
the mercy of the invaders. The terrible suffering and misery
resulting from these conditions will, perhaps, become more
vivid from the following details taken from some Russian
newspapers which will give an idea of the conditions: "In
Moscow all railroad stations are overcrowded with refugees.
Most of these are unable to leave the freight cars in which they
had arrived because the tortures of hunger and thirst which they
had to suffer during their trip had been too much for them.
Thousands upon thousands of these unfortunate beings had been
struck down by sickness, and as far as the capacity of the Mos-
cow hospitals allowed had been cared for, while still other thou-
sands had to be satisfied with accommodations in the open squares
and streets of the city, while others were removed farther east in
order to reduce the overcrowded conditions of the city. Every
day some ten thousand refugees were sent east by way of
Smolensk, Orel, and Tula. Among these were many thousands
of German colonists who had formerly been residents of Cholm
RUSSIAN RETREAT AND GERMAN ADVANCE 243
and Volhynia, but had been removed from there by order of the
Russian Government previous to the Russian retreat. The fate
of all these hundreds of thousands of refugees by the time winter
will have arrived will be horrible. What, for instance, will
happen to about thirty thousand farmers from Galicia who
were removed by force and now are located in a concentration
camp on the River Slucz with nothing over their heads except
the sky?"
From all parts of the Russian Empire involved in the German
advance, streams of these unfortunate victims of war were con-
tinuously flowing toward the east. One of the chief reasons for
the extensive misery which they had to suffer was the fact that
the Russian organization, which even in times of peace does not
work any too well, broke down completely under this unexpected
and unparalleled demand on its resources. In spite of the fact
that the larger number of these refugees were driven east by
the special and express command of the Russian authorities, the
latter had made no preparations to take care of them nor did
they seem to show much worry concerning their fate. Even
some of the high Government officials pointed out to the respon-
sible Government departments that, as long as the Government
had driven these unfortunate human beings away from their
own homesteads without, in most cases, giving them time to
gather in even their most necessary belongings, it had become
the Government's duty to provide for them elsewhere in some
fashion. If one considers that most of these people were without
any resources whatsoever, and that the housing and feeding of
such vast masses demanded the expenditure of large sums of
money, which apparently were not available, it will easily be
understood that all these men, women, and children of all ages
and conditions suffered not only untold inconveniences, but actu-
ally the pangs of hunger and thirst, which in a great many
instances resulted in the outbreak of epidemics and in the
decimation of whole camps.
How a civilian observer was struck by some of the conditions
in Poland may be gleaned from a description in one of the Ger-
man monthly magazines rendered by an artist who accompanied
244 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
one of the German armies on its invasion of Poland : "Of course
the first thing: one learns to know is the horrible condition of
roads in Russia. . . . One of the other main difficulties is the
lack of cleanliness which results in so many epidemics among
the population. These two conditions presented serious problem*
to the invading army; for, of course, it became necessary to
remove the difficulties arising from them as much as possible. . . .
"The water supply also is of the worst on the eastern front,
and when I wandered in the great summer heat through the
trenches or drove by the hour with wagon and horse through the
sandy wastes of Poland, I could not help but think of the many
occasions when the fighting armies, in spite of all fatigue and
hardships, had to go without drinking water of any kind what-
soever. , . ."
One of the greatest successes which the Germans gained in
the summer of 1915 was the taking of the fortress of Kovno.
Indeed it was the fall of this Russian bulwark as much as any-
thing else that precipitated most of the Russian losses after the
fall of Warsaw. Considering the importance of Kovno the fol-
lowing report of a special correspondent of the ''Berliner
Tageblatt," who was present during its bombardment, will be of
interest. He says :
"The bombardment had reached a strength which made one
believe that he was present at a concert in the lower regions.
Guns of every variety and caliber, up to the largest, had been
concentrated here and attempted to outroar each other. In un-
ceasing activity the batteries spit their devastating sheaths of
fire against the Russian forts and against the fortified positions
which had been thrown up by the Russians between the forts
and which had been supplied by them with very strong artillery.
The latter did its best to keep up with the efforts of the besieg-
ing army. Day by day the Russian guns began firing against the
German lines almost as soon as the German lines had opened
their fire and the combination swelled the noise to a terrible
height.
"Exactly at seven o'clock in the evening the German guns
paused for a while in order to permit their infantry to advance.
RUSSIAN RETREAT AND GERMAN ADVANCE 245
This was an almost daily occurrence and day by day the German
lines drew nearer to the Russian forts.
"Hardly had the fire of the German guns stopped when a
furious crackling of rifle fire would begin. The German lines
had left their trenches and were advancing against the Russian
position from which they received heavy fire. Machine guns,
too, joined the uproar. It was impossible to follow the infantry
attack in detail, but its success could be gleaned from the fact
that the German gun fire, which gradually was taken up again,
had to be advanced in the direction of the fortress/9
This fortress of Kovno, for which the Germans were making
such a tremendous drive and which the Russians tried to hold
with all die resources at their command, occupies in respect to
the Niemen line the same position which the fortress of Lomza
occupies in respect to the Nareff line, only in a much greater
measure. And, indeed, the city is specially adapted by its entire
location to act as protector of this important river. Between
steep banks, which rise as high as 200 feet, the stream rushes
along here, surrounding the city picturesquely with its heights
and protecting it at the same time from attack. There Kovno is
situated where the Vilia joins the Niemen, and only a short
distance down the latter the Nieviaza adds its waters, so that
Kovno forms a natural center of a number of extensive valleys
which join here. It is upon these natural conditions of its situa-
tion that the unusual importance rests which Kovno has occupied
for centuries in a historical, economical, and military respect in
the history of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia.
Founded in the eleventh century, it belonged from 1384 to
1398 to the Order of the German Knights, who made a military
point of the first order out of it. In 1400 the Grand Duke of
Lithuania attacked and captured the town. The height of its
career was reached in 1581, when it was raised to the center of
the export trade and received a custom house. The commerce
of the city at that time reached annually the sum of three
million ducats, an immense amount for that period. The Rus-
sian czars, therefore, attempted at various times to capture the
rich city, but it was not until the third partition of Poland in
246 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
1795 that Kovno became definitely a possession of the Russian
Empire.
After that Kovno suffered many reverses. In 1806 a dis-
astrous fire broke out and destroyed three-fourths of the city,
but in spite of this disaster and others which followed, the city
recovered and gained a certain importance in a political way,
when in 1842 it was made the capital of the newly created gov-
ernment of Kovno. From then on the trade of the city grew in
bounds and leaps, and it became a center of the trading to and
from Prussia. Its industries, too, were developed extensively.
Seven fortifications are situated to the south of the city, three
more protect the road to Vilna, and one the bridge across the
Vilia.
During the series of engagements near Dvinsk, in the fall of
1915, especially severe fighting occurred on the shores of Lake
Sventen. The colonel of a Russian regiment which participated
in these engagements gave the following vivid description to a
staff correspondent of the London "Times" :
"We had to secure a lodgment on the promontory nicknamed
by our men the 'Dog's Tail.9 My scouts crossed the lake at
night, dug themselves in and annoyed the enemy holding the
brickyard, situated upon a slight eminence at the northern part
of the promontory. A Lettish officer commanded the scouts and
organized the whole landing. Being a native of the place, he
was able to take advantage of every latent resource afforded by
the country. Thus he managed to discover a small fleet of boats,
and added to them by constructing a number of rafts. During
the night our men gradually reenforced the scouts. On the fol-
lowing day we rushed the brickyard. This gave us a larger foot-
hold to deploy one of our regiments, and storm what we called
'Bald Hill/ while another regiment gave its attention to 'Red
Hill/ to the southwest.
"Our advance was very slow. The Germans had a large num-
ber of Maxims, three times as many as we had, also automatic
rifles, and freely used explosive bullets. But on our side we had
our artillery massed in several lines east of Sventen and Medum,
including field and heavy guns under good control, so that we
RUSSIAN RETREAT AND GERMAN ADVANCE 247
could pour in direct or flanking fire at will. Three days passed
chiefly in artillery preparation for our final attack. The infantry
advanced slightly. Our artillery observers were in the trenches
correcting the fire of our guns. On November 3, 1915, the enemy
began to pour in a fierce flanking fire from their guns west of
Ilsen.
'When the scouts and supports moved from the 'Dog's Tail9
promontory, our neighboring corps began to advance also, and
we finally extended our right flank and gained direct contact,
But all this time we were suffering heavily from the enemy'p
Maxims on the heights.
" 'Bald Hill' and 'Red Hill' were won on the third day. The
enemy counterattacked and retook the first named heights. Our
position was now a critical one. The waters of the lake in our
rear cut off all hope of immediate reenf orcements or of eventual
retreat We had to retake 'Bald Hill' at all costs, and we did it.
My men were tremendously encouraged by the hurricane fire
kept up by our artillery. Many of them had witnessed the ter-
rible effects of the German hurricane fire. For the first time
they saw that our own artillery was not only equal but even
superior to anything the Germans could do. Our gunners tele-
phoned asking me when they should stop, so that our men should
not suffer from their fire. It seemed to me that our shells were
bursting perilously near, and I asked them to cease fire. A half
company then attacking 'Bald Hill' was immediately mown down
by the German machine guns. I at once signaled to the gunners
'keep on firing' and only when our skirmishers were within 250
paces of the German trenches the hurricane was suspended and
we went for the Germans with the bayonet, but they did not wait."
Many of the successes gained — both by the Russians in their
retreat and by the Germans in their advance — were due to the
effective work of the aviation corps. Scouting and bomb drop-
ping were daily occurrences. A picturesque description of such
a trip made by an aeroplane "somewhere in Poland" is taken
from "Motor" and gives a very clear idea of the dangers to
which pilot and observer are subjected at all times as well as of
the practical results of their work:
248 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"The departure had been set for nine o'clock in the morning
and, while the pilot has already taken his place in the aeroplane
and is trying out his motor, his companion comes out of his tent.
The latter wears a wide brown leather coat, a storm cap is
drawn deep down over his forehead, a long shawl covers his
throat and in order to protect himself against the oil which the
motor puffs out during the flight he has covered his eyes with
big spectacles. A sergeant with some soldiers carry bombs to
the aeroplane and pack them carefully next to the seat of the
observer. The latter takes his seat, the motor starts, the pro-
peller turns around quicker and quicker, and at last the pilot
waves his arm — the wedges are withdrawn from under the
wheels. The plane begins to roll along, lifts itself up from the
ground and mounts in elegant spirals higher and higher; smaller
and smaller appear men and houses; at last the aerostat shows
3,000 feet; the observer gives a sign and the plane turns in the
direction of the enemy. It is comparatively easy to find the way :
the railroad tracks which run toward the lines of the enemy
serve as a guide; the aeroplane follows them above villages
chopped into ruins by gunfire, whose houses look like small toy
boxes. Suddenly, dark lines appear which run toward the west:
trenches of the enemy which unroll themselves to the observer
as if they were on a map. And right away small white clouds
arise, the first greetings which the enemy fires toward the aero*
plane, but under which the latter rushes by descending quickly.
"At last the trench zone has been crossed ; the country in back
of it appears to be strewn with pits and funnels caused by the
explosion of big caliber shells. Here and there destroyed villages
are to be seen from which dark pillars of smoke arise. Then the
first roadway about which information is to be gathered appears.
Peacefully it lies in the sunlight. Farther toward the west, how-
ever, the street becomes more lively; but the black specks which
move down there are only a few automobiles which most likely
carry some members of the general staff of the enemy and offer
nothing worth while observing. But a little farther back a dark
line and many small specks appear — detachments on the march.
The observer leans over his map, compares, looks down once
RUSSIAN RETREAT AND GERMAN ADVANCE 249
more, then marks the observation on his map and the time at
which it was made, and on goes the journey. In the streets of a
larger place, which is reached soon afterward, a crowd of people
are observed ; in front of a church are standing at regular dis-
tances a number of wagons, a short wagon in front and back of
it shapes that look like a frame— cannon. The observer con-
tinues to make marks on his map and at the same time a sharp
sound is heard at his side and in the upper plane a slash appears.
He waves his hand and the pilot sharply turns to the left. The
observer reaches for a bomb and holds it over the edge of the
aeroplane, drops it, and immediately afterward a flash appears
among the cannon and the crowd on the market place disperses
in wild flight. Another wave of the hand, another turn to the
left, another bomb. The result is satisfactory; at least one can-
non has been destroyed. But now it begins to become unpleas-
ant; to the right and to the left, in front and in back, small white
clouds arise; down there the bombardment has begun and
it must make quite a loud noise which, however, is drowned in
the noise of the motor. The pilot stops the motor and silently
and gently the aeroplane descends into less dangerous heights;
then the motor again begins to work and the aeroplane quickly
turns its course toward the southwest following the white band
of the country road.
"Suddenly white wisps of smoke arise over the tree tops of a
near-by forest; again the observer makes some entries and, while
the aeroplane rushes furiously forward, marks down with his
pencil one body of troops after another. Above a freight station
, another stop is made; on the platforms of its storehouses men
rush along busily. Their work will have to be disturbed: a mo-
tion of the hand, a pull on the motor which starts the descent, a
grasp for the third bomb — and a railway guardhouse collapses
into itself. The last bomb hits its mark even better; it explodes
right in the middle between two cars without, however, hurting
anybody; for the workmen have run away as quickly as their
feet will carry them; pillars of fire roar up high; gasoline or
coal oil supplies apparently have been hit. To determine this
definitely is impossible, for the aeroplane must rush on. After
250 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
a short time, its commission executed, it turns back toward the
east; the batteries which had been observed a short while ago
and the lines of trenches are again passed and at last the tents of
the hangar come into view; the cross, showing the place for
landing, becomes visible ; the descent begins ; the wheels touch the
ground with a sharp jolt; the observer jumps out of his seat and
runs up to his commander to make his report"
CHAPTER XXIX
WINTER ON THE EASTERN FRONT
BY the end of November, 1915, winter had set in along the
eastern front. Especially along the northern part of the
eastern line this necessitated almost a complete stoppage of
operations. For there the weather becomes very severe. Th6
ground freezes sometimes to a depth of three and more feet,
which, of course, makes it impossible to dig trenches quickly.
But just as soon as trench digging at short notice became im-
possible operations had to cease. For whenever armies advance
over closely contested ground — as was the case all along the
eastern line — the advance by necessity is slow, possibly over
only a few miles every day. And every time the line is pushed
forward, and trenches previously occupied are left behind, it
becomes necessary with each step of the advance to dig new
trenches unless the advanced line was fortunate enough to be
able to stop the day's work in the trenches of the enemy, a possi-
bility which, of course, did not offer itself any too frequently.
And even then a lot of digging was necessary, because what
was previously, during the enemy's occupation, the back of a
trench line now had to be turned into its front. All of this dig-
ging, or at least most of it, had to be done quickly, in order to
avoid the loss of the newly gained positions by the success of
hostile counterattacks. But both sides alike found it impossible
to dig quickly, or, for that matter, in most cases to dig at all
WINTER ON THE EASTERN FRONT 251
when the ground was frozen solid. So both sides found them-
selves condemned to a more or less continuous state of inactivity
as far as all war operations were concerned, excepting only artil-
lery duels, mining, aeroplane attacks, sniping from each other's
trenches, and all those other more or less insignificant opera-
tions that are usually called by the generic term "trench war*
fare/'
Although the Russians were acknowledged masters of trench
digging and of throwing up well-planned and efficiently defended
field fortifications of every kind, and also the great mass of their
soldiers were much more accustomed to severe winters than the
German forces, because a very much larger part of the Russian
than of the German Empire is subject to very low winter tem-
peratures, still the Germans, all in all, had the advantage over
their adversaries under these conditions. In the first place the
percentage of mechanically and scientifically trained men in the
German army is far greater than that in the Russian army, be-
cause the latter is recruited primarily from an agricultural popu-
lation, whereas the former draws its largest numbers from an
intensively industrial body. Furthermore, organization within
and without the army had been developed to a far higher degree
by the Germans than by their eastern neighbors. It is, there-
fore, not at all surprising to hear of the marvelous preparations
that the Germans had made for the approaching winter, and
inasmuch as most of this information is gathered from Russian
sources, there can be little doubt of its correctness.
Down below in their trenches, covering the walls of their dug-
outs, the Germans had erected light metal buildings. These had
been manufactured back in Germany in immense quantities in
simple, standardized parts. Easily shipped in a "knockdown"
condition, they were just as easily put up and put together,
and all of them were fitted with heating apparatus of some kind.
Warm clothing of every kind and description had either been
manufactured at the Government's expense or had been collected
from private sources throughout the empire by appealing to the
nation at large by means of the newspapers. Although the state-
ment, frequently heard, that each man had a sleeping sack un-
252 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
doubtedly was vastly exaggerated, vast quantities of these use-
ful articles had been distributed. Then, too, officers, from cap-
tains down, gave their men detailed instructions and orders
how to protect themselves efficiently against severe cold, and
how to treat promptly and effectively any of the many ailments
that are apt to afflict people unused to very low temperatures in
a rather moist region, from frostbite down to colds.
From every possible line of human enterprise the Germans,
according to Russian reports, apparently tried to learn lessons
which might become applicable in these near-arctic conditions
on the east front. Having been taught by the previous winter's
experience the impossibility of trench digging, they promptly
organized extensive mining detachments among their engineer-
ing troops, augmenting the latter in great quantities by soldiers
from other branches of their general service who, from their
experiences in times of peace, had become particularly adaptable
to such work. These mining troops, later on in the winter, were
to creep forward under the protection of night's shadows and
blast with dynamite those trenches that were absolutely essen-
tial for cover of advancing troops and that could not be dug in
the frozen ground with more simple tools. Long before this,
however, while winter had not yet shown its full severity, these
troops were busily occupied with the preparation of land mines,
which were to act as substitutes for barbed-wire entanglements
when freezing snow, piling up many feet high, rendered the lat-
ter useless. Previous experience, too, had taught that, when such
weather conditions arose, the immense quantities of snow that
fall in these regions not only completely covered barbed-wire
entanglements, but as repeated snowstorms thickened the mass
day by day, and sleet and thaw, caused by an occasional hour's
sunshine, hardened it, made it even possible for the enemy's
forces to advance securely on it in spite of, and on the very top of,
all barbed-wire obstacles.
Throughout the first winter of the war the Germans had also
used ski detachments. Most of these were employed in the
mountainous regions of the western front. But small troops had
been sent to East Prussia and had proven themselves very valu-
WINTER ON THE EASTERN FRONT 253
able there. Again and again Russian troops, attempting opera-
tions on ground covered with two or three days9 snowfall, had
sunk to their waists and chests into the snow and had become
easy prey to attacks made by German soldiers on skis. So the
Germans early in the fall, when certain parts of south Germany
and Austria, covered with high mountains, lend themselves ad-
mirably for ski practice, had sent time after time detachments
of carefully selected infantry troops to these regions and had
made ski experts out of them. Sledges too — large and small —
had been provided in quantities, because they had proven their
value as means of transporting men and supplies where all other
means had failed absolutely.
With the approach of real winter all these comparatively new
features of warfare were put to use. Of course the Germans
were by no means the only ones to profit from past experience
and from the modern advance of the sciences and mechanical
industries. But from all reports it is clear that they outdid the
Russians in inventiveness as well as in the thoroughness and
extent of their preparations.
"Jack Frost'9 also definitely stopped regular fighting. With
its arrival war at the eastern front deteriorated into more or less
of a guerrilla war. Instead of attempts to break through the line
by miles, both sides settled down to a bitter contest for choice
pieces of ground here and there. An exchange of a bit of high
ground for a nasty, damp trench in a bog was considered quite
a victory. The capture of a small supply train by a small de-
tachment that had managed to sneak through the line at some
point unobserved or unoccupied, because it apparently was im-
possible for occupation on account of the nature of the ground,
was as much talked about as only a victory in a real engagement
would have been two or three months ago. In a way, both the
Russian and German and Austro-Hungarian armies had a much
more severe time of it on the east front than the German and
Franco-English forces had at the west front. First of all, the
latter was located in much more civilized regions, cleaner, there-
fore, and healthier. Then, too, the nature of the ground in the
west was less hard on the fighters, higher in most places, and,
254 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
therefore, drier. Furthermore, the western line was practically
an unbroken line from the English Channel down to the Swiss bor-
der. In the east, however, marshes, lakes, and rivers made an
unbroken line impossible. All along the front there were innu-
merable gaps. Of course many of these were gaps because ne
human being could find a foothold on them, and, therefore,
needed no watching. Others, however, while impossible for
occupation, were not equally impossible for passage, provided
those that attempted to pass were willing to take great risks.
And there was no lack of such on either side. So Russians, Ger-
mans, and Austro-Hungarians had to be continuously on the
jump to prevent such raids of their lines which, though they
might have been very small in the beginning, might have had
very serious consequences. These conditions, therefore, made
war on the east front for everybody concerned truly a war of
attrition, equally racking for nerves and bodies.
Only one other event of importance occurred on the east front
during the winter of 1915-16. General Russky, commanding
the Russian forces fighting before Riga and Dvinsk and in the
Dvina-Vilia sector, was forced by illness to retire from his com-
mand. He was succeeded by General Everth, who up to then had
commanded the next adjoining army group, from the Vilia down
to the Pripet Marshes, and who now assumed command over all
the Russian forces from the Gulf of Riga to the Pripet Marshes.
Farther down the line General Ivanoff continued the leadership
that he had assumed after the German advance had come to a
standstill at the end of October.
Thus the winter passed. As we have learned in some of the
preceding chapters, operations were resumed in a small way at
certain points along the line from time to time. With the ap-
proach of the spring of 1916 these activities slightly increased
in extent and severity. But both sides, as long as frost con-
tinued, were satisfied with this state of conditions and with
never-ceasing preparations for new offensive operations to begin
as soon as nature would permit.
PART VI— THE BALKANS
CHAPTER XXX
BATTLE CLOUDS GATHER AGAIN
rpHOUGH Serbia had been the first to be attacked by the Cen-
J- tral Powers when the world war began, the end of the first
year's fighting was to find her still unconquered, though she had
passed through ordeals quite as severe as those suffered by
Belgium.
Let us review, briefly, the events of the first year :
Hardly had hostilities been declared by Austria-Hungary, on
July 28, 1914, when the armies of the Dual Empire began gather-
ing along the Serbian frontiers; then, within a few days, they
hurled themselves into Serbia, hoping to overwhelm her by the
sheer weight of their numbers. Not only did the soldiers of the
little Balkan nation withstand the onslaught of the imperial
troops, but within the week they had swept them back, driving
them across the frontiers.
So astounded was the Austrian General Staff, so dumfounded
was it by this unexpected disaster, that it required some
weeks to realize what had happened, and to prepare for a
second and mightier attempt to overcome the resistance of the
Serbians.
On came the Austrians again, only to suffer a second defeat.
Then they made their third and mightiest effort, and this time
every available resource of the empire was strained to the utmost ;
every soldier not absolutely needed elsewhere was utilized. And
this time, indeed, the Austrian forces did penetrate some distance
within Serbian territory, and for over a fortnight the Serbian
Q— War St 4 255
256 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
capital was theirs. But their initial success only made their
final defeat the more complete. For the third time the Serbian
soldiers beat them back, and from that date, December 14, 1914,
Serbia remained undisturbed by foreign invasion for almost a
year.
Shortly after the beginning of the New Year, came an enemy
for whom the Serbians were not so well prepared: a typhus
epidemic, which took almost as many victims as had the fighting.
Realizing their helplessness, the Serbians uttered an appeal for
help, and almost every nation, not an enemy, including the United
States, responded generously with money, and by sending Red
Cross corps to nurse the plague victims. By the summer of 1915,
the epidemic had spent itself, after decimating the army and the
civil population.
Meanwhile a danger threatened the Serbians which over-
shadowed even that from the Austrians ; namely the danger that
other Balkan nations, and especially Bulgaria, might join the
Teutonic Powers. Serbia had already shown that she could take
care of the Austrians alone, but with Bulgaria attacking her
flank, even the most optimistic realized that the fight against
such odds probably would be hopeless.
Turkey, even while Serbia was hurling back the Austrians for
the second time, in November, 1914, was the first to declare
herself in favor of the Teutons by attacking the Russians. Then
began the game of diplomacy to win over the Christian states to
the Allies. All had declared themselves neutral, even Greece,
though she was bound by a treaty to assist Serbia against foreign
attack. But it was generally realized that each was only watch-
ing for the first signs of weakness on either side before deciding
which to support. To give weight to her diplomacy Great Britain
began her military operations on GaUipoli, on the understanding
with Greece, of which Venizelos was then premier, that Greek
troops should assist But Venizelos was forced to resign by the
Greek King and the governing clique, and Greece continued to
maintain her neutrality.
Rumania, in spite of her leanings toward the Allies, remained
firm in her neutrality. Bulgaria was more explicit; she made it
BATTLE CLOUDS GATHER AGAIN 257
understood that she would join that side which could most effectu-
ally guarantee her possession of the territory in Macedonia which
she considered she had won in the First Balkan War and which
was given over to Serbia and Greece after the Second Balkan
War by the Treaty of Bucharest. Throughout the year the negotia-
tions continued whereby the Allies attempted to persuade Greece
and Serbia to agree to Bulgaria's terms, but Greece continued
obdurate in her determination to hold all she had, and Serbia
yielded only in part, and very reluctantly. In August, 1915, be-
ginning the second year of the war, these negotiations were still
in progress. As it was still unknown publicly that Bulgaria had
already signed a secret alliance with Germany, the situation was
considered favorable to the Allies, especially as on August 22,
1915, it was announced that Venizelos was again to become prime
minister of Greece.
The first indication that King Ferdinand and his cabinet had
come to a decision was in the agitation that appeared in Bul-
garia itself among the leaders of the opposition parties, protest-
ing against the Germanophile policy of the Government. On
September 18, 1915, a deputation of these leaders had an inter-
view with the king, in which they made their protest; the report
was that a stormy scene occurred, in which several members of
the deputation used language to the effect that should the king
go against the popular feeling, which was in favor of the En-
tente, it would cost him his throne. They also demanded that the
National Assembly be convened.
The king's reply was to order a general order of mobilization
of the Bulgarian army. At the same time a note was issued to all
foreign representatives in which the Government stated explicitly
that Bulgaria had no intention of entering the war; that she had
called her men to the colors only to maintain an "armed neu-
trality/' as Holland and Switzerland were doing. In spite of
these assurances, Greece also began mobilizing. On September
20, 1915, there appeared a significant statement in the German
official report of military operations, to the effect that German
artillery, stationed on the Danube opposite Semendria, had
opened fire on a Serbian position. Never before had there been
258 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
mention of German guns so far south. Altogether, the situation
in the Balkans was now becoming acute.
On September 28, 1915, Sir Edward Grey made a statement
in the British Parliament which made the world realize that a
crisis in the Balkans was imminent. He announced that efforts
were still being made to arrange an agreement between Bul-
garia and Serbia and Greece regarding Macedonia, "but," he
added significantly, "if Bulgaria assumes an aggressive attitude
on the side of our enemies, we will support our friends in the
Balkans with all our power, in concert with our Allies and with-
out reserve or qualification/'
This was followed up by another statement on October 1, 1915,
to the effect that German and Austrian officers were arriving in
the Bulgarian capital, creating a situation of "the utmost grav-
ity." Within forty-eight hours, Russia issued an ultimatum to
Bulgaria demanding that the German and Austrian officers in
Sofia be removed within twenty-four hours, otherwise Russia
would sever all diplomatic relations with King Ferdinand's Gov-
ernment To this Bulgaria made no immediate reply, with the
result that the Russian Minister left Sofia the next day. Premier
Radoslavov, however, on the same day, published an official state-
ment that there were no German or Austrian officers in Sofia and
that Bulgaria had no intention of breaking her neutrality. Mean-
while came reports through Greece stating that Bulgarian troops
were being massed up against the Serbian frontier. As subse-
quent events soon proved, Bulgaria was determined to hide her
real purpose to the last moment; not until she actually made her
first attack did she cease denying her hostile intentions.
That Bulgaria was acting in cooperation with the Teutonic
allies was obvious, for already the Serbians had observed that
great forces were being mobilized across the rivers, along her
northern and northwestern frontiers, along the banks of the
Danube, the Save, and the Drina.
What did not develop so soon was the fact that this new in-
vasion was to be under the leadership of the German General
von Mackensen, and that the invaders were to consist in large
part of German regiments. During the summer Mackensen had
BATTLE CLOUDS GATHER AGAIN 259
been engaged in directing a strong Austro-German offensive
against the Russians, with conspicuous success. For weeks after
he had left this front and was busy organizing a similar offen-
sive against the Serbians, the German official dispatches con-
tinued to associate his name with actions on the Russian front
that the preparations in the south might continue secret as long
as possible.
Not long after the first Austro-German guns began hurling
their shells across the Danube, against the Serbian position at
Semendria, the Serbians learned of the disposition and the re-
sources of the enemy. The troops under Mackensen were divided
into two armies, each in close contact with the other. One of
these wings was under the command of a German, General von
Gallwitz, who had distinguished himself against the Russians a
short time previously. The men under him were entirely Ger-
mans. The other army was under the command of an Austrian,
General von Kovess von Kovesshaza. His men were both Ger-
man and Austrian, the latter predominating.
The army under Gallwitz extended from Orsova, near the Ru-
manian frontier, along the Danube westward to a point opposite
Semendria. Here his right flank joined Kdvess's line, which
extended up past Belgrade, along the Save and part way up the
Drina. The rest of the frontier up the Drina was covered by a
smaller Austrian army.
Altogether, the Austro-German armies comprised at least 300,-
000 men. The Austrians were picked troops, for it was only
natural that the general staff wished to retrieve, in some measure,
the humiliation of the previous year. The Germans, numbering
fully half of the total force, were also hardened veterans, who
had seen plenty of fighting on the Russian front or in France
or Flanders.
Mackensen's overwhelming success in driving the Russians out
of Galicia had been mainly due to his artillery, that arm of the
military service in which the Germans excelled all their enemies.
And here, too, the artillery was to play an important part, for
fully 2,000 cannon, nearly all of mid-caliber and heavy caliber,
had been brought down against the Serbians. During the first
260 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
three invasions the Austrians had thrown their infantry up
against the Serbian lines. Now German tactics were to be
tried: the Serbian trenches and other defensive positions were
to be pulverized with powerful explosives, then rushed with
infantry.
Though they had been undisturbed for so long, the Serbians
were by no means in doubt as to what was yet to come. They
had realized that eventually the enemy would return more de-
termined and more powerful than ever. Therefore, they had
spent the nine months since the last defeat of the Austrians in
extensive preparations. Line after line of trenches had been
built back into the interior of the country, and all the possible
crossings on the rivers had been heavily fortified. Moreover,
they had drained the civilian population of every male person
strong enough to carry a gun.
At this time, when the fourth invasion began threatening, their
army mustered fully 310,000 men, slightly more than the Aus-
tro-German. In regard to small arms and ammunition they
were also at least equal to the enemy, for vast consignments of
military stores had been sent into the country by the Allies.
Only in heavy artillery were they inferior, but then this was also
true of all the armies facing the Germans throughout Europe.
Therefore, had the Serbians been called upon to defend them-
selves only against General von Mackensen's armies, it is highly
probable that they would have been able to give the same answer
as they had the year previous. So probable, in fact, that Macken-
sen would hardly dared to have attacked them with only 800,-
000 men. To be sure, their enemy was no longer made up of raw
recruits and there was now the heavy artillery as well as a com-
mander of great ability to face, but the preparations they had
made in defensive works, as well as the mountainous nature of
their country, more than made up for these advantages possessed
by their opponents. It was the Bulgarians who would turn the
scale.
Because of the greed for territory of their governing clique,
the Serbians now faced dangers which even their rugged quali-
ties could not contend against long. For now, while they were
BATTLE CLOUDS GATHER AGAIN 261
steeling themselves to meet the impact of the blow from the
Austro-Germans from the north, the Bulgarian army, fully as
strong as themselves, was gathering on their right flank. In
spite of the diplomatic protests of Ferdinand and Radoslavov,
the Serbians were not deceived.
The danger from the Bulgarian army meant more to the
Serbians than the mere doubling in number of their enemy's
forces. It was the position of the Bulgarians which made the
situation especially precarious, impossible.
A glance at the map will show that the main line of railroad,
running down from Belgrade to Saloniki by way of Nish, passes
within a few miles of the Bulgarian frontier, just opposite Sofia.
Indeed, from Klisura on the froYitier the distant whistle of the
locomotives and the rattle of the trains across stretches of trestle
work can be heard plainly on still days. From Klisura on the
frontier to the railroad is all down hill. Farther south, at Kus-
tendil, the danger was even greater, though the distance from
frontier to railroad somewhat more, for at Kustendil was the
terminus of a short railroad from the Bulgarian capital. From
this point on the frontier toward the railroad at Kumanova the
terrain was all in favor of the Bulgarians, for Kustendil is at the
top of a chain of mountains and the railroad runs along the
bottom of a valley, the famous Morava Valley.
This railroad, from Upper Serbia down to Saloniki, was the
only line of communication and transportation between the main
Serbian armies and the Allies. Cut this, and they would wither
like a flower separated from its stem.
So keenly did the Serbians realize their danger that they asked
permission of the Allies to attack Bulgaria before the Bulgarian
army was completely mobilized. They hoped thereby to disable
Bulgaria with one sharp blow while she was not yet prepared,
then turn their whole attention toward the enemy in the north.
But to this plan the Allies would not consent, still hoping that
Ferdinand would reconsider his resolution.
Just before the fourth invasion actually began, the Serbians
held their frontier along the Danube and the Save with three
armies, consisting of nearly eight divisions, or half of all their
262
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
5!
s
THE INVASION BEGINS 263
available men. On the west the First Serbian Army, of three
divisions, commanded by General Mishitch, occupied the angle
formed by the Save and the Drina, with its headquarters at
Shabatz, the scene of such bloody fighting a year before. To the
eastward came a force of a division and a half under command
of General Zivkovitch, known as the Army for the Defense of
Belgrade, which indicates its position. Between Belgrade and
the Rumanian frontier lay the Third Serbian Army, of three
divisions, with General Jourishitch at its head, protecting the
mouth of the Morava Valley.
Facing the Austrians over in the west, in the vicinity of
Vichegrad, was the army of Ushitze, of less than two divisions,
under General Goykovitch.
These were the forces, about two-thirds of the total Serbian
army, which faced the Austro-Germans. But another 100,000
had also to be deployed along the Bulgarian frontier to protect
the railroad as best they could. Thus it was that wherever she
faced her enemies, Serbia was hopelessly outnumbered.
CHAPTER XXXI
THE INVASION BEGINS
AS already stated, the first of Mackensen's huge shells began
L bursting over the Serbian defenses across the river on Sep-
tember 20, 1915. While the wheels of diplomacy continued turn-
ing during the following weeks, the roar of the big guns grew
louder and more persistent and swept up and down the long
line. Then came several attempts on the part of the Austro-
Germans to cross the rivers ; all these the Serbians successfully
repulsed, though they may have been mere feints, as a boxer
jabs at his opponent's jaw while he really aims for his wind.
There were seven of these attempts. In one, near Semendria,
the Serbians reported that a whole battalion of an enemy was
destroyed. Meanwhile German aeroplanes whirred back and
264 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
forth over the Serbian lines, reconnoitering their positions and
sometimes dropping bombs. One of them flew south as far as
Nish, then turned eastward and disappeared over the mountain
ridges toward Bulgaria. And all this while the frontier guards
reported that the Bulgarians were massing their troops day by
day.
As already noted, the Serbian frontier in Macedonia was left
practically unguarded. Possibly the Serbians still hoped the
Greeks would hold to their treaty and join them from that di-
rection. And, indeed, the Greek army was being mobilized,
frankly to meet the Bulgarians. More encouraging still, the
news came that France and England, at the request of Venizelos,
had agreed to send to Saloniki 150,000 men to make up for an
equal number which, by the terms of the Serbo-Greek treaty
for mutual defense against Bulgaria, Serbia would have pro-
vided had she been able to do so.
This force began landing in Saloniki on October 5, 1915, but
cm the same day Venizelos was again compelled to resign by
King Constantine, who was determined to keep the Greek nation
out of the war. This was a sad blow to the hopes of the Serbians.
Still, the British and French troops continued landing, in spite of
the "protest" from the Greek Government.
Beginning on October 3, 1915, the fire of the Austro-German
artillery became doubly insistent, thundering up and down the
whole front with increasing vigor. Again the Teutons began
poking their pontoons out into the river, and again they were
smashed by the Serbian guns. The lighting waxed hottest at
Ram, Dubrovitza, and Semendria, on the Danube, and in and
about Ciganlia Island (Island of the Gypsies), at Obrenovatz,
Shabatz, and Jarak on the Save, where it is joined by the Drina.
Ram and Semendria, both fortified places, guarded the mouth of
the Morava Valley, and these Gallwitz subjected to an especially
heavy fire. By October 5, 1915, the shelling became heaviest in
this sector: the enemy's guns and howitzers belched forth a
steady hail of big shells.
Belgrade, also, became the object of an increasingly tremen*
dous effort on the part of the Austro-German artillery. Here
THE INVASION BEGINS 265
they had brought up long-range guns, and with these inflicted
heavy damage.
Nevertheless, the Serbians in Belgrade gave a good account of
themselves. There were stationed there the big naval guns,
4.7-inch and 6-inch, sent into the country by Great Britain,
France, and Russia, and served by their expert gunners. For
several days the foreign gunners, under command of Rear Ad-
miral Troubridge, swept the broad surface of the Danube and
the Save, sinking two of Hie enemy's gunboats that happened
to come within range.
On October 5, 1915, the German fire on Belgrade intensified
and became terrific. They no longer satisfied themselves with
pouring their deadly fire on the fortress of Belgrade and the
neighboring positions at Zamar, but they began a systematic
bombardment of the city itself, hurling vast quantities of in-
flammatory bombs, as though they meant to burn down every
building before attempting to take it. Into the suburbs beyond,
through which ran the highways leading into the interior, they
rained a curtain of fire which made flight for the inhabitants
almost impossible.
On October 6, 1915, the Austro-German forces finally managed
to effect a crossing which the Serbians were not able to repulse;
at several points they landed on the opposite bank, including
Belgrade itself. The first attempts had been made at Jarak,
Podgorska Island, and Zabrez, and had been driven back again
and again, but this time the enemy put such energy behind his
efforts that eventually the Serbians were no longer able to drive
him back. Gypsy Island, too, a short distance from Belgrade,
was captured, whence a landing was made under the Lower
Fortress and on the Danube Quay in the city itself. In the first
attempt all the Austrians or Germans who landed under the
Lower Fortress were either killed or captured. Finally the
invaders established themselves permanently on the quay. Dur-
ing that day the fighting was of a bloodier character than had
as yet taken place.
Next day, October 7, 1915, the Austro-Germans pushed on to
further success; their big guns raked the river shore up and
266 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
down and tore down all defensive works, making them untenable
for the defenders. And on the day following, October 8, 1915,
the Austro-Hungarian troops of Kovess penetrated into the
northern sections of the city, taking the citadel by storm. At the
same time a German contingent, attached to KSvess's command,
landed west of the city and took the heights in that section, fight-
ing its way to the Konak and finally to the Royal Palace, in the
center of the city, over which they hoisted the German and Aus-
trian flags. Though there was still much to do, Belgrade was now
practically in their hands.
Little by little the foreign naval guns in Belgrade had been
silenced by the big shells of the German howitzers. In the after-
noon General Zikovitch, seeing that the city was now lost and
hoping to save it from complete destruction, ordered his forces
to retire on the fortified positions lying behind and south of the
capital. Several detachments of the defenders, however, had
already been cut off and were obliged to remain. Some fought
grimly to the bitter end, inflicting heavy losses on the invaders;
others were obliged to surrender. In some of the streets the
fighting took on a bloody, hand-to-hand character, in which some
of the civilians took part All through the night Mannlicher rifles
sputtered back and forth, interspersed here and there with the
deeper detonation of the hand bombs which the Serbians hurled
in the skirmishes from street to street and from terrace to
terrace. When morning dawned the last of the firing died down
and the greater part of Belgrade was a vast field of charred
timbers and tumbled-down stones.
Belgrade was taken, as the official German and Austrian re-
ports announced joyously next day, but its taking had been at an
enormous cost and, aside from the political value of its posses-
sion, with very little gain. The official list specified the war
material captured as only 9 naval guns, and 26 unmounted field
pieces, the prisoners amounting to 10 officers and 600 men, many
of whom were wounded. The Serbian Government had been
established in Nish since the beginning of the war.
What had happened at Belgrade was typical of the fighting at
a number of other points along the banks of the three rivers. On
THE INVASION BEGINS 267
the same day that Belgrade was taken the Austro-Germans
crossed the Danube between Gradishte and Semendria, near the
village of Zatagna and the small fort called Kosolatz. Ram, too,
after having been heavily bombarded, was taken. Then, from
these points they tried to blast their way through farther south,
away from the river into the interior, but the Serbians held them
back from the neighboring heights.
In the west, on the Save, toward the mouth of the Drina, the
invaders were not so successful. In this area were some of the
best of the Serbian soldiers, among them the Shumadia Division,
which especially distinguished itself during all the later fighting.
Here Marshal Mishitch, who had led his men so ably during the
third invasion ten months previously, was in command. He also
had charge of the defenses along the lower Drina, and opposite
Badovintse he drove back the Austrians with bloody slaughter.
Between Obrenovatz and Kratinska, on the Save, the Austro-
Germans had delivered heavy attacks for three nights success-
ively, but were effectively checked. The operations were directed
specially against Zabrez. On October 10, 1915, this Serbian posi-
tion was still holding out. In the afternoon of that date the
Austrians bombarded heavily, using great quantities of asphyxi-
ating bombs. Then they charged in solid masses, believing that
the gases had thrown the Serbians into disorder. The latter,
however, were provided with masks, and when the enemy charged
they sprang from their trenches and met them on the open
ground in hand-to-hand bayonet fighting, driving them back in
panic.
Again the Austrians showered gas shells on the Serbians; then,
toward dusk, came on again, but the Serbians once more broke
through the Austrian ranks and captured many prisoners.
But in spite of these local successes by the Serbians, the fight-
ing was beginning to go against them; the invaders had crossed
the frontier and could no longer be dislodged. On October 11,
1915, the official German dispatches were able to announce that
Mackensen's forces were in possession of the Serbian banks of
the Danube and the Save between Gradishte and Shabatz, a
stretch of over a hundred miles* On the D-ina* too, the Aus-
268
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
THS BEGINNING OF THE GERMAN-AUSTBO-BULGAB CAMPAIGN
AGAINST SERBIA
BULGARIA ENTERS THE WAR 269
trians had been able to cross over in several places. To all these
points they hurried large bodies of reserves to push their ad-
vantages and so continue a vigorous offensive east, south, and
west of Belgrade, in a wide, sweeping movement along the entire
front.
The main effort was made in the east, to secure possession of
the Morava Valley and its railroad. Near Semendria, Gallwitz'?
right wing was in touch with KSvess's left. The plan was that
they should advance up the Morava together, each covering one
side of the valley. But it was first necessary to reduce the Ser-
bian forts at Semendria and Pojarevatz.
It was now two weeks since the heavy artillery had begun
playing on Semendria. By October 11, 1915, the invaders had
succeeded in taking Semendria, the garrison retiring to Pojare-
vatz. Here a very severe battle was fought, but finally the
Serbians were forced back, though not without inflicting the
heaviest losses that the enemy had as yet suffered. After two
days the fort was taken and the Serbians retired to the hills be-
yond. Thus the invaders were now ready to begin their advance
down the Morava Valley.
But just then there came a pause in the fighting. The Serbians
observed that Gallwitz waited. What he waited for was not im-
mediately obvious to them. Within a few days they were to
know.
CHAPTER XXXII
BULGARIA ENTERS THE WAR
THE Bulgarian Government suddenly threw aside all dissimula-
tion and declared war on Serbia, on the pretext that the Ser-
bians had crossed the frontier and attacked Bulgarian troops.
On October 11, 1915, the Bulgarian army began operations by
attacking the Serbians at Kadibogas, northwest of Nish, the at-
tack gradually extending up and down the frontier. This was
270 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
the fatal blow. To oppose the 300,000 men that the Bulgarians
could easily put into this field, the Serbians had not over a third
as many.
Bulgaria had two large armies against the Serbian frontier.
The First Army, under General Boyadjieff, was fully 200,000
strong and was concentrated in the north from Vidin to Zaribrod,
threatening the Timok Valley and that part of the Belgrade-Sofia
railroad running from Pirot to Nish.
The Second Army, under the command of General Todoroff,
was only half as large, and directed itself toward Macedonia and
especially toward Uskub, both on account of the strategic im-
portance of that place as a railroad center and as the best point
from which a wedge might be driven into the side of Serbia,
separating the north from the south. The headquarters of this
second force was in Kustendil, its left wing extending down to
Strumitza in Macedonia.
On this eastern front, to oppose the Bulgarians, the Serbian
forces were in three groups. In the north, its left flank touching
the forces operating against the Austro-Germans, lay the Timok
group, commanded by General Zivkovitch, whose headquarters
were in Zaichar. South of this force came the second group — ter-
ritorial troops — numbering three divisions of infantry and one
of cavalry, altogether about 80,000 men, and commanded by
Marshal Stepanovitch. It was based on Pirot and was especially
charged with the defense of the railroad. Lower down, with
headquarters in Vranya, was the detachment of the Southern
Morava. Farther down in Macedonia, concentrated around
Uskub, Veles, and stretched down along the Vardar toward the
Greek frontier at Doiran, were another 25,000 men under the
command of General Bojovitch.
As a slight offset to the disheartening news that the Bul-
garians had at last definitely joined hands with the Teutonic
forces, came the tidings that Prance and England had declared
war on Bulgaria and that their forces, which had been landing in
Saloniki, were already advancing up the Vardar with the inten-
tion of making a junction with the southern Serbian forces. Al-
ready, on that same day, October 15, 1915, the allied vanguard had
i!
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BULGARIA ENTERS THE WAR 271
advanced as far as Valandova and was there attacked by the Bul-
garians, the latter being beaten back and heavily defeated. These
were the French troops, under command of General Sarrail ; hay-
ing thrown back the Bulgarians he worked his way northward
along the railroad until he reached Krivolak and Gradsko, a few
miles below Veles. But transporting troops from France and
England was a slow business, and General Sarrail had not then,
nor had he later, enough forces to advance north any farther.
Meanwhile the Bulgarians in the north, under Boyadjieff, begam
operations against the Serbians.
The country in this section is extremely rough, being all rocky
ridges and deep ravines, with roads little better than mountain
trails. Boyadjieff succeeded at once in crossing the Lower Timok,
then divided his force into two main divisions. One of these he
advanced against Pirot, the other against Zaichar and Kniashe-
vatz. But now the Serbians began a strong resistance.
On October 15, 1915, the Bulgarians began three strong as-
saults, east and southeast of Zaichar, all of which the Serbians
repulsed successfully. East of Eniashevatz another series of bit-
terly contested encounters took place, neither side making any
decided gains. On the following day the fighting extended to
Svinski Vis. By this time the Serbians east of Kniashevatz be-
gan giving way slowly and the Bulgarians pushed forward and
on October 19, 1915, they arrived before Negotin. Toward Pirot
they also succeeded in making some advance.
For several days the two fighting lines of men swayed back
and forth. Here artillery played not so important a part. Both
Bulgars and Serbs, primitive, rugged fighters, threw military
science to the winds and plunged into the battle face to face and
breast to breast, thrusting each other with cold steel. In some of
the struggles the men lost their guns ; they picked up the bowlders
that lay about them thickly and hurled them at their enemies or
they gripped each other with their hands and fought as animals
fight. Quarter was neither asked nor given.
Witnesses state that in neither of the two Balkan wars was
there such ferocious fighting, such awful slaughter, as during the
encounters between the Serbians and Bulgarians along this sec-
B— War St 4
272 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
tion of the frontier. Both sides lost heavily; whole companies
and even battalions were hemmed in against the rock walls, then
exterminated to the last man.
But finally numbers began to show the advantage, and the
Serbians were obliged to retire from ridge to ridge. Village
after village was taken and burned.
In Macedonia, Todoroff, though his force was much smaller,
was having comparatively easy work. A large part of the vital
railroad line passed through this section and it was Todoroff s
first aim to throw himself astride of it, thus effectually breaking
off communication between the vanguard of the French army and
the Serbians. It was this portion of the country that the Greeks
would have defended, had they joined the Allies.
The first thing that Todoroff did was to detach a strong force
from his main body, with which he struck at the railroad between
Vranya and Zibeftcha and succeeded in cutting it. The detach-
ment of the Southern Morava was driven back'at the first encounter
and on October 17, 1915, the Bulgarians entered Vranya. On the
same day the main body of the Bulgarians advanced down the
slopes from Kustendil and took Egri Palanka, on the road toward
Kumanova and Uskub. Farther south they penetrated the Valley
of the Bregalnitza, the scene of the Bulgarian defeat in the
Second Balkan War, where they captured the important strategic
point, Sultan Tepe, and the town of Katshana, taking twelve field
pieces. Passing rapidly on through Ishtip, they occupied that
part of Veles lying east of the Vardar River, where, on October
20, 1915, they again cut the railroad line and so made any further
advance on the part of the French almost impossible. The next
day the Bulgarians captured Kumanova and then, on the day fol-
lowing, drove the Serbians on through Uskub. The Serbians re-
tired fighting to Katshanik Pass, north of Uskub, where they
made a stand that became one of the notable achievements, on
their part, of the whole campaign. For by the defense of this
pass they made the Bulgarian effort to cut Serbia in two for some
time fruitless.
THE TEUTONIC INVASION ROLLS ON 273
CHAPTER XXXIII
THE TEUTONIC INVASION ROLLS ON
MEANWHILE, Bulgaria having plunged into the fighting, the
Teutonic allies in the north resumed their efforts to advance
southward. But for some time they had all they could do to
maintain themselves on the banks of the rivers. Before them
rose the rock-ribbed hills skirting the mountains of the interior,
and along these hills the Serbians had, during the previous ten
months, built up line after line of strong intrenchments, one be-
hind the other. To carry one line was only to gain a few hun-
dred yards of territory.
Just as soon as Kovess felt his hold on Belgrade secure, he
began an attack on the heights to the south. After three days
of intense bombardment he succeeded in taking Mount Avala, an
eminence some 1,600 feet in height and ten miles from the city.
On the same day, October 18, 1915, Obrenovatz fell into his hands,
and Shabatz three days later. However, these two places were
still only on the banks of the river.
The chief efforts of the invaders, however, were directed
toward making an advance down the Morava Valley. Their first
assault was made against the Serbian positions in the moun-
tainous country of the Podunavlie. Gallwitz here had an exceed-
ingly difficult task, for the ground rose in rocky, steplike forma-
tion, offering all the advantages to the defenders. But the
bombardment from the heavy artillery had its effect and slowly
the Germans advanced. By October 23, 1915, they had reached
the southern bank of the Jesenitza, not far from Palanka and
had passed Rakinatz on the road to Petrovatz on the Mlava.
During this same period the German left wing, having smashed
Tekia with gunfire, crossed the Danube near Orsova and suc-
ceeded in taking the heights overlooking the river. On the ex-
treme western front the Austrians crossed the Drina at Vishe-
grad. Thus all the rivers forming the frontiers had passed com-
pletely into the hands of the invaders. But it had been a costly
274 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
gain. By this time the Austro-Gennan forces had lost very
heavily. The Serbians also had had heavy losses, but not half so
many as the enemy.
It was the policy of General Putnik, the Serbian Chief of Staff,
to prolong the fighting as much as possible, for during this time
the transports of the Allies were disembarking troops in Salo-
nika at the rate af 5,000 men a day, and there was hope that even-
tually they would be able to advance northward, and at least save
the Serbians from the Bulgarians. This same hope had stiffened
the resistance of the soldiers in every skirmish. Then came word
that the Russians would relieve the pressure by attacking the
Bulgarians, either through Rumania, or by landing troops in
either Bourgas or Varna. And once indeed the Russian ships did
bombard Varna, but without any attempt at disembarking troops.
As the days passed and no help from outside came, the belief
began gradually to dawn on the Serbian people that they were
doomed as a nation. This feeling first manifested itself in the
flight of the civil population. At first the noncombatants had
merely retired with the fighting line. The first three invasions
had shown that the Austrians did not always refrain from com-
mitting atrocities, especially when their armies had suffered un-
usually. Nor was there any reason to suppose that the German*
were any kindlier to civilians. Thus it was that hardly any oi
the civil population remained behind in conquered territory.
Then, gradually, came the conviction that Serbian soldiers
alone must face the enemy, and even the most patriotic realized
what a hopeless fight it was. The whole population began mov-
ing southward; along every available road trailed long lines
of slowly moving ox carts, loaded with the few movable belong-
ings of their peasant owners. South continued the exodus and
then — the Bulgarians blocked the way. The roads to Greece
were closed. There remained nothing for them to do but to turn
toward the awful mountain wilderness intervening between them
and the Adriatic sea coast, infested by fierce bands of Albanian
brigands and tribesmen.
The weather was bad; rain fell heavily and incessantly, the
roads were deep in mud and the plight of these people, most of
THE TEUTONIC INVASION ROLLS ON 275
them old men and women and children, became intensely mis-
erable.
The Austro-German lines in the north continued their slow but
persistent southward advance; the invasion rolled on, the Ser-
bians retiring before them step by step. During the last week of
the month Gallwitz came to the heights east of Banitzina, south
of Jesenitza, and began storming them. Then followed another
spurt of severe fighting and Livaditza and Zabari, on the Morava
River, fell into their hands, after which they occupied the region
south of Petrovatz. By the 28th they had gained Svilajnatz, beat-
ing down the Serbian resistance by sheer weight of men and
guns, and by the last day of the month they were within a day's
march of Kragujevatz, in which was located Serbia's chief
arsenal. Situated on the Lepenitza, a branch of the Morava, it
lay about half way between Belgrade and Nish, on a branch line
of the main railroad. It was a point well worth defending, and
the Serbians did defend it stubbornly, but on November 1, 1915,
they were compelled to evacuate it, after first destroying the
arsenal and all the materials it contained.
It was here that the Shumadia Division especially distinguished
itself. The regiments of that unit had been recruited in this sec-
tion; it was literally defending its native soil. During the first
part of the fighting it had been intrenched in the hills to the north
of the town. The day was wet and dense mists rolled through the
mountain passes down over the hills. The Germans had effec-
tually shelled the positions of the Shumadians and were under
the impression that they had retired, wherefore they advanced
upward to occupy the deserted trenches.
And then, suddenly, wild yells and shouts burst out from the
rolling mist and the Shumadians fell upon the invaders with set
bayonets. The latter, who had been growing accustomed to the
purely defensive tactics of their enemy, were completely taken by
surprise and thrown into disorder.
The first line of the Teutons wavered, then broke and scattered.
Coming up against reenforcements behind, they re-formed and
advanced again. And again the Shumadians burst down on them
and engaged them hand to hand. Fighting like savages, they
276 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
drove the invaders before them for a considerable distance, tak-
ing over 3,000 prisoners and several guns. When finally they
retired just as the main body of the advancing foe was coming
up, they left behind them hundreds of enemy dead, the fallen
literally covering the ground in heaps.
The mixed forces of Kovess, keeping in touch with Gallwitz's
right wing, had been advancing more or less in line with the Ger-
mans, marching along the railroad from Belgrade and Obreno-
vatz toward the Western Morava. South of Belgrade the Ser-
bians had put up a stout resistance at Eosmai, but were finally
dislodged by the heavy artillery fire. On October 25, 1915,
Kovess arrived at Ratcha, south of Palanka, on the right side of
the Morava. After a hard fought battle at Gorni Milanovatz, he
reached Cacak on November 1, 1915, a few miles west of Kragu-
jevatz. Here it was that he struck the Western Morava and the
railroad passing along it eastward from Ushitze to its junction
with the main line. Farther to the westward his cavalry, on
October 26, 1915, had occupied Valievo on the Upper Kolubara
and one of his divisions had crossed the Mai jen Mountains, where
the Austrians had been so humiliatingly defeated the year before.
Farther west, but more to the south, the Austrians, who had
pushed on from Vishegrad, arrived in Ushitze on November 2,
1915, and presently effected a junction with the main body.
Meanwhile, a day or two before the end of the month, an in-
cident up in the northeast foreshadowed the attainment of the
main objective of the Austro-German forces. The Serbians had,
naturally, withdrawn from this section and now a German cav-
alry patrol, scouting in advance of its own lines, met with a body
of Bulgarian scouts. The Bulgarian and the Teutonic forces had
come in contact with each other. But the chief significance of
this fact was that now the road was open for communication be-
tween Germany and Turkey. Even if the railroad running from
Belgrade to Constantinople, by way of Sofia, should be tem-
porarily cut, or should not be captured throughout its entire
length for some time, shipments of war material could already
be made to Turkey by way of the Danube down to Rustchuk in
northern Bulgaria and thence by railroad. Thus the Turks at
THE TEUTONIC INVASION ROLLS ON 277
Gallipoli, who had been running short of ammunition, could now
be relieved.
This opening of communication with Turkey was made much
of in the German official reports and some of the newspapers be-
gan referring to Mackensen's army as "the army of Egypt"
On the first day of November, 1915, Mackensen could really say
that he had conquered all of northern Serbia. But the fact re-
mained that the Serbian army was still in the field ; not even a
part of it had as yet been captured or annihilated. And it is
a military axiom that no matter how far an army may retreat
and no matter how much territory may have been conquered, no
battle is decisive until the enemy has been destroyed, either en-
tirely or in large part. The Germans were to be reminded of this
fact more than once on the Russian front.
Up till this time Boyadjieff, at the head of his Bulgarian army,
was attacking the Serbians from two directions : along the Timok
against Kniashevatz, Zaichar, and Negotin, and along the
Nishava against Pirot. Both movements were directed ultimately
toward Nish, but the more northerly had also the purpose of
effecting a junction with the left wing of the Germans under Gall-
witz, which was advancing from Tekia, in the northeast corner
of Serbia. Negotin and Prahovo, the latter a port on the Danube,
had been taken on October 25, 1915. Lower down, the Bul-
garians, who were in overwhelming strength, occupied both
Zaichar and Kniashevatz on the 28th. Meanwhile, the Serbians
were also compelled to abandon the commanding heights of
Drenova Glava, fifteen miles northwest of Pirot, and on the 28th
Pirot fell, though not without heavy fighting. With Pirot on the
south and Kniashevatz on the north in the hands of the Bul-
garians, the situation of Nish became very precarious. The Ser-
bian Government was now shifted to Kralievo.
Down in Macedonia the Second Bulgarian Army, under
Todoroff, seemed to have come to an end of its initial success.
After its occupation of Uskub it had advanced to Katshanik Pass,
which was occupied by the Serbians under General Bojovitch.
Todoroff at once began a violent attack and by October 28, 1915,
part of the defile seemed to have been cleared of the Serbians.
278 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
But presently the Serbians were reenf orced by two regiments of
the Morava Division and two of the Drina Division, whereupon
Bojovitch suddenly turned and once more possessed himself of
the pass.
Again and again the Bulgarians attacked, determined to take
the pass, but as often as they hurled themselves up the defile,
just so often the Serbians drove them back with fire and
bayonet.
During this same period another Serbian force under Colonel
Vassitch was fighting farther south. On October 22, 1915, he
succeeded in recapturing Veles, which, it will be remembered,
Todoroff had taken in his rapid advance during the first few days
of his fighting. Here it was that the Serbians expected to make a
juncture with the French forces under Sarrail, and for several
days they could even hear the thunder of the French guns repell-
ing a Bulgarian attack, so close together were they.
For a whole week Vassitch held Veles against the overwhelm-
ing attacks of the Bulgarians ; then, finally, on the 29th, he was
compelled to retire to the Babuna Pass, the narrow defile also
known as the Iron Gate, through which passed the highway from
Veles to Monastir, by way of Prilep. By the first of November,
1915, the Serbians were still holding this pass, which was all that
prevented the Bulgarians from driving in the wedge that was to
separate Upper Serbia from Macedonia.
While it was true that no important part of the Serbian army
had as yet been eliminated from the field ; that it was, as a whole,
still intact, yet it was now evident that the little nation had come
very near to the end of her resistance. By this time it was quite
obvious that no real help could be expected from the Allies.
Great Britain had offered the island of Cyprus to the Greeks, if
they would stand by their agreement by joining the Serbians,
against the Bulgarians, at least. But even that tempting offer
would not induce them to risk themselves in a fight whose out-
come seemed so doubtful. On October 20, 1915, Italy had given
her moral support by declaring war against Bulgaria, but for the
time being she offered nothing more material. On October 21,
1915, British and French ships bombarded the Bulgarian port of
THE TEUTONIC INVASION ROLLS ON 279
Dedeagatch, on the Gulf of Enos, and also a junction of the rail-
road connecting Saloniki with Constantinople, but this had no
material result in deterring the Bulgarians from pressing their
campaign against the Serbians in Macedonia. On October 28,
1915, Russian ships bombarded Varna, on the Black Sea coast
of Bulgaria. This was done, not so much for any material
damage that could be done to Bulgaria, but for the moral effect
it might have on the population, which was supposed to have very
deep feelings of regard for Russia, because she had freed them
from the Turks in 1878. But the Bulgarian troops previously
stationed at this point had been replaced by Turkish forces, so
that it is probable that the Bulgarian population was not much
affected.
On land, the French troops under Sarrail had advanced
farthest north ; on October 23, 1915, they defeated the Bulgarians
severely at Rabrova and pushed on to Krivolak, where they again
engaged the Bulgarians on the 30th and repulsed their attack.
By November 2, 1915, the French were at Gradsko, where the
Tcherna joins the Vardar River, hoping to get in touch with the
Serbians who were defending the Babuna Pass and whose guns
they could hear pounding over the ten miles of intervening moun-
tain ridges. The British bore little of this lighting, having made
their advance over toward Lake Doiran.
But though the French had arrived within hearing of the
Serbian guns, they lacked the numbers that would give them the
strength to push farther. The French were, indeed, redoubling
their efforts to support the Serbians; but the Allies were paying
the penalty of their blind confidence that Bulgaria and Greece
would join them in the Balkan campaigns. In Great Britain
public sentiment was aroused by the belief that British military
authorities had somehow failed to do all that might be expected
for Serbia, a feeling which became more acute when a telegram
from M. Pachitch, the Serbian premier, was published, in which
he said : "Serbia is making superhuman efforts to defend her ex-
istence, in response to the advice and desire of her great ally.
For this she is condemned to death. ... In spite of the heroism
of our soldiers, our resistance cannot be maintained indefinitely*
280 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
We beg you to do all you can to insure your troops reaching us
that they may help our army. . . ."
On the same day this was published in the London papers, there
was also printed a speech made by Lord Lansdowne in the House
of Lords, in which he stated that the British had landed in
Saloniki a force of only 13,000 men.
In France the sentiment in favor of assisting the Serbians was
so strong that the Cabinet, which did not approve of a Balkan
campaign, was forced to resign. The French president thereupon
found a new prime minister in M. Briand, the ex-Socialist, who
once before had been premier, and, associating with himself M.
Viviani and other ex-ministers, he formed a Cabinet which was
prepared to push the campaign in aid of Serbia to the fullest ex-
tent On the following day, October 29, 1915, General Joffre
went to London to consult with the British Government and to
agree with them upon more energetic measures with regard to
transporting troops to Saloniki. Apparently his mission was
successful, for after that large forces were sent to the Near East,
but so far as any effectual help to Serbia was concerned, it was
now too late.
Greece now showed a decided change of attitude. Evidently
this change was not a little due to the success of the Austro-
Germans and the Bulgarians in the north, and the nearer they
came to her own frontier, the less cordial became Greece to the
Allies. King Constantine saw to it that every obstacle, short
• of armed interference, was put in the way of transportation
of troops and supplies to the front up in Macedonia. This atti-
tude was to continue until the Serbians were finally swept out of
| their native land and the question came up of retiring the allied
'm troops back to Saloniki, when the British and French took very
severe measures against the Greek authorities.
Meanwhile, the invasion of Serbia was rolling onward. Hav-
ing taken Kragujevatz, where they began restoring the arsenal
to working order with feverish haste, the Austro-Germans
crossed the Cacak-Kragujevatz road and continued onward.
Kovess advanced over the Posetza and the Germans entered
Jagodina on November 3, 1915.
THE TEUTONIC INVASION ROLLS ON 281
By this time the Serbian headquarters at Kralievo was seri-
ously threatened ; in fact, the Serbian Government was able to
withdraw just in time to prevent capture and establish itself in
Rashka. On came the enemy, along both banks of the Western
Morava. In the streets of Kralievo there was fierce fighting, at
times hand-to-hand, between the defenders and the Brandenburg
troops of the invaders, but finally, on November 5, 1915, the
town was taken.
Here the invaders made their first large capture of war mate-
rial, which included 130 guns, though most of them were said to
be of an obsolete pattern, the others being without breech-
blocks. Within forty-eight hours the Germans had reached
Krushevatz, where 3,000 Serbian soldiers were captured, not
counting 1,500 wounded lying in the hospital.
The whole Western Morava was now in the hands of the in-
vaders. To the eastward Gallwitz pressed on until he came to
the hills south of Lugotzni, where he was held up for a short
space by the Serbian rear guards. Finally, the heights were taken
by storm. On November 4, 1915, Parachin on the railroad was
taken; from this point a branch line runs back to Zaichar, al-
ready in possession of the Bulgarians, so that now the two armies,
German and Bulgarian, were almost in touch with each other.
And next day, in fact, their lines joined up at Krivivir, which
was taken that night by an assault under cover of darkness.
Their lines were now only thirty miles from Nish.
During this time other large bodies of Bulgarians under
Boyadjieff were also advancing on Nish; one from Pirot, in a
southerly direction, and another along the road from Kniashe-
vatz, marching north. They were now closing in on that city
in overwhelming strength.
282 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXXIV
THE PALL OP NISH — DEFENSE OP
BABUNA PASS
AT a small village called Svrlig, six miles outside the city, the
**• Serbians began a fight which presently assumed the char-
acter of some of the bloody battles they had fought earlier in the
campaign. Again and again the Bulgarian attacks were hurled
back ; thus the battle lasted for three days, from November 2 to 5,
1915. The Serbians retired only when the Bulgarians began
bringing up their big guns, and the shells were already drop*
ping into Nish, On November 5, 1915, the Bulgarians entered
the city and took possession, where even yet the British and
French flags were flying, raised by the Serbians when they still
thought that only a few days intervened until they would be
welcoming the allied troops. A hundred guns were taken
with Nish, though the Serbians claimed that they were old and
obsolete.
The fall of Nish, from a political point of view, at least, was
the worst blow that the Serbians had suffered since the capture
of Belgrade. The German and Austrian papers made the most
of it, and indeed all Europe now realized that the last days of
the Serbian resistance were at hand.
In Macedonia the Bulgarians under Todoroff were not having
an easy success. They were being held up still at Katshanik
Pass, where the Serbians under Colonel Bojovitch were daily
beating back the Bulgarian assaults and thus keeping open the
retreat of the main Serbian army. Down in the Babuna Pass the
Serbians were making a similar stubborn defense, hoping against
hope that the French would come to their relief. And possibly,
had it not been for the defeats that the Bulgarians were receiv-
ing from the French at Strumitza, they would have been able to
take the pass long before. For in that direction Todoroff had
been suffering great loss ; so severely was he pressed that he was,
for the time being, unable to press his advance into the heart of
THE FALL OF NISH 283
Macedonia. To this extent, at least, the Allies, and especially
the French, did help the Serbians.
The Bulgarians were in exactly the same position, and trying
to accomplish exactly the same thing, as in the Second
Balkan War. At that time they were endeavoring to drive a
wedge in between the Serbians and the Greeks. Now the situa-
tion was the same, except that the French were in the place of
the Greeks.
From Eatshanik to Krivolak the railroad was in Bulgarian
hands. From Krivolak south to Doiran it was in the hands of
the Allies, though parts of it were at times under the fire of the
Bulgarian artillery. South of Katshanik the Bulgarians had
crossed the road and had pushed westward until they were held
up at the Babuna Pass. Should the pass be forced the Serbian
line was in immediate danger of being flanked and the French,
too, would be in a similar danger, for by striking south the Bui*
garians could make a move around toward the French rear.
Hence the almost superhuman efforts both Serbians and French
were making to close this gap.
The stand that the Serbians made in Babuna Pass was one of
those feats which will remain inscribed on the pages of history
through the ages and will excite the admiration of all people,
regardless of how their sympathies may lie toward the main
issues of the war. During the first week of November Colonel
Vassitch had only 5,000 men with which to dispute the right of
way against 20,000 Bulgarians. And not only had the Bulgarians
a great advantage in the matter of numbers, but they were well
supplied with big guns. Day after day and night after night,
the little force of Serbians crouched among the deep shadows of
the defile, sometimes without food, always under a heavy fire,
now and again making the rock cliffs about them echo with
bursts of their plaintive, national folk songs. After November
4, 1915, the Bulgarian attacks became more persistent, and their
infantry would hurl itself up into the pass; then the Serbians
would spring up from behind rocks and ledges and throw them-
selves at their hated kinsmen with naked bayonets, shouting
such words in their common language as send the flush of rage
284 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
burning through the cheeks of men and make things red before
their eyes. Again and again were these sanguinary hand-to-
hand struggles enacted under the towering rock walls of those
forbidding mountains, and again and again the Bulgarians were
thrown back. Meanwhile, the French, only ten miles away,
were within sound of the firing.
As a matter of fact, General Sarrail had already done won-
ders, considering the shortness of the time he had had and the
small forces and few facilities at his disposal It seemed, to
those at a distance, such a small gap to fill. And indeed, so
nearly did Sarrail effect the junction that nothing but the absence
of reenf orcements at a critical moment caused him to fail.
As soon as he had landed at SaloniM he had sent every soldier
under his command along the railroad up the valley of Vardar,
toward Veles. Unfortunately, transportation facilities were
poor; the road was only single track; curving and twisting in
and out among the rising foothills and mountain spurs.
His first fighting had been at Strumitza station, where he
defeated the Bulgarians and so assured himself of possession of
Demir Kapu defile, a cleft in the mountains ten miles in length
and from which, had they held it, the Bulgarians could easily,
with a comparatively small force, have prevented any further
advance. Having secured this pass, Sarrail pushed through it to
Krivolak, which was reached on October 19, 1915. But here he
was compelled to make a halt, to fortify this advanced position
and to await further reenforcements.
When news of the proximity of the French advance reached
Vassitch, he redoubled his efforts, and on October 22, 1915, he
thrust his little army forward and succeeded in recapturing
Veles. This town lay along the railroad, about thirty-five miles
northwest of Krivolak.
Three miles north of Krivolak, on the road to Ishtip, rises a
steep and forbidding height, called Kara Hodjali (the Black
Priest), which the French were fortunate enough to take before
the Bulgarians came up in force. It was this height which en-
abled them, when the Bulgarians did swarm down on them, some
days later, to hold their position. From October 30, 1915, until
THE FALL OP NISH 285
November 5, 1915, the fighting here was furious, but finally the
Bulgarians were driven back. Meanwhile, however, the advance
had been delayed and Vassitch, after holding Veles a week* was
forced to retire to Babuna Pass again.
From Krivolak to the pass was twenty-five miles, due east. For
fifteen miles the road lay across a rolling plain, to the River
Tserna, as the Macedonians and Serbians called it, or Tcherna,
meaning "Black,11 in Bulgarian. Beyond that rose steep and
difficult mountain ridges, which the Bulgarians had occupied and
fortified. Yet Sarrail determined to make an effort to force' his
way across.
By this time reenforcements had arrived from Saloniki, so he
began moving across the plain through Negotin and Kavadar to
th* Tcherna. This stream, though narrow, was deep and un-
f ordable. It could be crossed only in one place, by a small plank
bridge, at Vozartzi.
On November 5, 1915, the French troops began crossing this
bridge and scaling the heights before them, some of whose peaks
towered fully a thousand feet above the river. And here it was
that they first heard the booming of the Serbian guns, on the
other side of the ridge.
Sarrail now advanced his men northward, along the west bank
of the Tcherna, and next day he delivered an assault on the
Mount of the Archangel, ten miles below Vozartzi. Here was the
renter of the Bulgarian positions, and here their lines must be
pierced, if Babuna Pass was to be reached.
But not only was this position well fortified, but the Bulgarians
were in superior force to the French. Moreover, as soon as
Todoroff heard of what was going on, he hurried reenforcements
to the Bulgarians on Mount Archangel. And this Sarrail knew;
yet, without hesitation, he began the assault.
At the first attack the Bulgarian advance lines were driven
out of the villages at the base of the mountain. The French
continued their advance, and on November 10, 1915, they
began a circling movement which resulted in the Bulgarians
being squeezed out of Sirkovo, a village some distance up the
mountain.
286 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
But by this time the Bulgarian reenforcements were begin*
ning to arrive, and by the end of the second week of the month
they began to take the offensive. They now had 60,000 men;
against this force it was obviously impossible for the French to
make any further headway.
The Bulgarian commander now showed that it was his inten-
tion to circle about the French, cut off their retreat by destroy-
ing the wooden bridge over the Tcherna in their rear, then pin
them up against the mountain and pound them until they sur-
rendered, all of which might have been accomplished by a more
skillful general.
For three days a violent battle raged, in which the fate of the
French army more than once hung in the balance, but superior
military skill counted in the end. Possibly, too, the hearts of the
Bulgarian soldiers were not in this fight, for the Bulgarian people
have an almost reverential respect for the French. At any rate,
they did not show here the same qualities that so distinguished
them in the war gainst the Turks. At the end of the third day
their lines began wavering, then broke. So completely were they
routed that the French were compelled to bury nearly 4,000 of
the dead they left behind. So close had the fighting been that at
times the Bulgarian infantry charged the French positions to
within a dozen yards, but in the last moment lacked the dash to
carry them through the machine-gun fire and into the French
ranks. At such moments the French would countercharge,
whereupon the Bulgarians would turn and flee. Had the
French been only a few thousand men stronger, they could
have followed up their advantage, completely routed the Bul-
garians, pushed their way across the mountains to Babuna
Pass and so relieved the Serbians, as well as closing the gap
through which the Bulgarians were yet to penetrate into
Macedonia.
The French completed their victory on November 14, 1915;
until the next day the Serbians held out, hearing the French
guns, now loud and clear, then receding, hoping every hour to
see them come streaming over the mountains to their aid. But
the French could not do the impossible. The Bulgarians had
THE PALL OP NISH 287
been thrown back, but not crushed. Sarrail dared not leave that
slender crossing over the Tcherna too far behind.
On November 16, 1915, the Serbians finally fell back from the
pass on Prilep. The French, however, not knowing of the Serbian
retirement at the time, continued to hold their advanced position
at Mount Archangel until November 20, 1915, when the Bul-
garians returned to give them fresh battle. And again the
French were able to repulse their attacks, but further advance
was now out of the question.
The situation of the Serbian armies up in the north was now
truly desperate. The combined Austro-German and Bulgarian
lines, beginning at Vishegrad, north of Montenegro, swept in a
straight line across the heart of Serbia to Nish, where it curved
downward to Vranya, then swept into Veles and down to where
the French army prevented it from reaching the Greek frontier.
It was, in fact, like a great dragnet, which had only to be con-
tracted to sweep the Serbians inward, over against the awful
defiles of the Montenegrin and Albanian Mountains, a country
through which no organized army could pass in a body, and
through which only the strongest of the noncombatants could
hope to escape alive. And for a time it seemed as though the
French would prick a hole through this net, through which, by
rending it into a wide gap, the Serbians could have been saved.
But with the retirement of Colonel Vassitch from Babuna Pass
that last chance was gone ; Serbia was left to her fate.
Meanwhile the pressure from the north continued irresistibly;
steadily the Serbian armies were being pushed back against the
mountain ranges, in comparison to which their own mountains
were mere hills. And while the Serbians were waxing weaker
every day, their enemies were growing stronger, not only because
their long line was contracting, but because now they were being
constantly reenforced. Also, with the cutting of the railroad, all
means of supply were gone; the Serbians must now continue
the fight with their own resources. They were now becoming
woefully short, not only of ammunition, but of food as well.
Yet they continued the struggle, retreating before the enemy
facing them, step by step backward, taking advantage of every
S— War St 4
288 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
little natural position to cause the invaders as much loss as
possible.
During the two weeks following the fall of Nish the three
commanders of the invading armies began, and continued, a great
converging movement on the Eossovo Plain, their object being
to completely encircle the main Serbian armies. Kovess was
advancing his forces toward Mitrovitza on the north side of the
plain from Kralievo up the valley of the Ibar, branching out of
the Western Morava. In the hills north of Ivanitza the Serbian
rear guards made a stubborn attempt to hold him back, but
finally they were dislodged and the Austrians occupied Ivanitza
on November 9, 1915. Four days later, after driving the Ser-
bians from their intrenchments in the Stolovi ranges, he reached
Rashka, which had been the seat of the Serbian Government
after its flight from Kralievo and which was situated on the Ibar,
some distance along the road to Mitrovitza and only a few miles
from Novi Bazar. This place he took on November 20, 1915, and
with it a small arsenal, in which were fifty large mortars and
eight guns, which even the German reports described as of
"somewhat ancient pattern."
To the eastward the Austrians had taken possession of
Sienitza and Novi Varosh, up toward the Montenegrin frontier.
Being expelled from Zhochanitza, the Serbians retired to Mitro-
vitza. By November 22, 1915, the Austrian lines had followed
to within five miles of that point.
Gallwitz and his Germans, in the meanwhile, operating on the
left flank of the Austrians, was pushing southward, his object
being to take Pristina, on the east side of the Kossovo Plain and
about twenty miles southeast of Mitrovitza. But this was a task
that could not be accomplished without much difficulty, for before
him towered the backbone of Serbia's main mountain ridges, each
ravine and each ledge sheltering strong Serbian forces.
As usual, however, the big guns cleared the way before Gall-
witz, though at Jastrebatz the Serbians made him pay a heavy
price in the losses he suffered. On this front the Bulgars were
now coming close enough to the Germans to support them;
against the two the Serbians had not the slightest chance.
THE PALL OP NISH 289
By November 8, 1915, Gallwitz was starting out from Krushe-
vatz, after which he followed the banks of a small branch of the
Western Morava in a southwesterly direction, toward Brus, with
one part of his force, another being sent due south across a range
of high hills toward Kurshumlia. He soon reached Ribari and
Ribarska Bania, where the retreating Serbians gave him what
he himself described in his official report as "very stiff fighting/'
Next he stormed the pass through the mountains and thus gained
an entrance to the valley of the Toplitza, through which flows
a river westward into the Morava, the main stream by that name,
though in this district it is known as the Southern Morava.
A week's hard fighting and marching followed before Kur-
shumlia could be taken, which the Serbians evacuated without
resistance, though not before they had stripped it of everything
that might be of value to the enemy. Here was located a Serbian
hospital, full of wounded soldiers, all of whom fell into the hands
of the Germans.
Moving on from this town, which lay about halfway between
Krushevatz and Pristina, the Germans next pushed on to Prepo-
latz defile in the eastern part of the Kopaonik Mountains, which
they reached on November 20, 1915, then scaled the intervening
ridges on their way southward. The Serbians struggled on, but
the same day on which Kovess came within striking distance of
Mitrovitza, Gallwitz was threatening Pristina from the north
end of the Lab Valley.
Thus the Serbians were finally driven out of the last corner
of their native land, on November 20, 1915. Only a week previ-
ously Mackensen had communicated with the Serbian leaders,
offering them terms that certainly should have seemed alluring
to them in their dire extremity. This offer had been to the effect
that if they would make peace they should lose nothing but
Macedonia and a strip of territory along the Bulgarian frontier,
including Pirot and Vranya.
The answer of the Serbian Premier, M. Pachitch, to this offer
of separate terms was :
"Our way is marked out We will be true to the Entente and
die honorably/'
290 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
After the evacuation of Nish the Serbians, under Marshal
Stepanovitch, retreated to the west bank of the Morava, blowing
up the bridges as soon as they were across. Here they held up the
Bulgarians for some time, the river acting as a screen. It will
have been noted that the Serbian forces always offered the most
stubborn resistance to the Bulgarians, often coming to close
quarters with them, whereas the Austro-Germans drove them on
miles ahead of them. The reason was that the Bulgarians were
not so well provided with heavy artillery, such as they had being
more or less matched by the Serbian field pieces. The Germans,
however, could stand off several miles and shell a Serbian posi-
tion without the Serbians being able to reply with one effective
shot.
In this battle along the Morava, King Peter appeared, hobbling
up and down the lines under fire, talking to the men here and
there and uttering words of encouragement This had the effect
of reviving some of the old enthusiasm which was somewhat
dampened after such a continuous series of reverses and retreats.
CHAPTER XXXV
BULGARIAN ADVA N CE — SERBIAN
RESISTANCE
ON November 7, 1915, the Bulgarians captured Alexinatz in
the north. The Serbian army of the Timok, retiring from
Zaitchar, barely succeeded in crossing the bridge over the river
in time to avoid complete disaster. In the south, and on that
same day, the Serbians were compelled to abandon Leskovatz.
With the capture of these two towns, and several other minor
points along the line, the enemy secured complete possession
of the main line of railroad from Belgrade through Nish to Sofia
and Constantinople, and of the Nish-Saloniki railroad as far
south as the French intrenchments at Krivolak. This was to them
a very material triumph, for hitherto they had been transporting
BULGARIAN ADVANCE 291
munitions to the Turks by the water route, along the Danube
to Rustchuk in northern Bulgaria. This route was not only-
more direct, but much quicker. Their main object had now been
accomplished in full. Thus Germany was now in direct railroad
communication with Asia, and again the German and Austrian
papers made frequent references to a possible Egyptian cam-
paign in the future. Another great advantage resulting to both
Bulgaria and the two Teutonic empires from the capture of
the railroad was the fact that Bulgaria, whose cereal crops
had been accumulating in big stores because they could not be
exported, could now send them into Germany and Austria, where
they were badly needed, thus defeating in some measure the ob-
ject of the British blockade.
Prom Alexinatz the hard-pressed army of the Timok had
only a single line of retreat, which was by the road to Prokuplie
and Kurshumlia, and, in danger of being cut off by the Germans
in the west, it began a hurried march, though fighting rear-
guard actions all the while, and was thus able to make a junction
with the Serbians retiring from Krushevatz. Prokuplie did not
fall into the hands of the Bulgarians until November 16, 1915.
Northwest of Leskovatz, where the pressure was not quite so
extreme, the Serbians under Stepanovitch made a determined
stand on November 11-12, 1915. Charging the Bulgarian center
suddenly, they broke through their lines and threw them back in
great confusion and took some guns and a number of prisoners.
But as usual, the Serbians were not strong enough to follow up
their advantage, and presently strong reserves came up to re-
enforce the Bulgarian forces. Two days later the fight was re-
newed and the Serbians were compelled to retire down the road
toward Tulare and Pristina.
Meanwhile the Bulgarians in Uskub were sending forces north
toward Pristina, and this sector of the campaign was to witness
the battle of Katshanik Pass, in which the Serbians were yet to
put up a fight as heroic as any of the whole campaign.
It has now become quite obvious to the Serbians that they
were not to receive from the Allies the assistance that was
necessary to save their main armies. At this time there were
292 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
reports of a Russian invasion of Bulgaria to be led by General
Kuropatkin, and it was even said that the czar had himself
sent a telegram to the Serbian Premier, M. Pachitch, promising
him such aid if only he could hold out until the end of November,
1915. How much of these rumors reached the Serbians is not
known, but at any rate they did not materially affect their
plan of action. There was only one plan now possible, and that
was to effect an orderly retreat to some territory where their
enemies could not follow, and thus keep the army intact. The
way behind them, into the mountains of Montenegro or Albania,
lay open. But without railroads, without even one good wagon
road, it was impossible for an army to pass this way in a body.
It would have to break into small bands, each taking a separate
trail by itself. Aside from that there was no food supply; the
soldiers would starve to death. It was true that the ships of the
Allies controlled the Adriatic, but without roads no adequate
food supply could be forwarded to the retreating armies. Nor
did those barren regions offer any local supply; the poverty-
stricken natives could barely maintain themselves. The only
alternative to a retreat through this wilderness was to escape
south over the Greek frontier, where they could join the French
and British forces outside SalonifcL
But this was just the alternative which the Austro-Germans
and the Bulgarians were determined to deny them. The Serbian
forces still numbered somewhere around 200,000; this body,
combined with the allied troops, who would presently be number
ing another 100,000, would form a military force, its rear pro-
tected by the British and French ships, which the Teutons
and Bulgarians would never dare to attack, even though the
Greeks still continued neutral. Moreover, there was no doubt
that the Greeks would interfere should the Bulgars cross their
frontier.
This force, then, would continue a constant threat to the lines
of communication and transportation which had just been opened
up between the Central Powers and Turkey, and along which
they would soon be sending large quantities of war munitions
to the Turkish forces at Gallipoli. At any moment the enemy
BULGARIAN ADVANCE 293
at Saloniki might strike, and to guard against such a possibility,
the Austro-Germans would have to maintain larger forces along
the railroad than they could spare. At all costs the Serbians
must be prevented from joining the Allies. And this was the ob-
ject of the powerful effort made by the Bulgarians to hurl their
forces through the gap between Sarrail and the Serbians in the
Babuna Pass.
However, the Serbians decided on a determined effort to break
through the net that was being drawn around them. This meant*
first of all, that the Katshanik Pass, which in the second week
of November, 1915, was still in the hands of the Serbians but
was being attacked from the south by the Bulgarians, had to
be first cleared of the enemy, who must then be driven out of
Uskub, whence the Serbians would then be able to force their
way west to Tetovo, and then south by the main highway
through Gostivar and Kitchevo, to Monastir. Once at Monastir
the road would be comparatively easy to Saloniki, by way of
the short branch of railroad whose terminus was at Monastir.
In the effort to carry out this plan one of the most desperate
battles of the whole Serbian campaign was fought, quite as
bloody and as heroic as any of the large engagements that were
fought in the beginning of the invasion. It failed, but it was a
failure of which no army need to have been ashamed.
On about November 10, 1915, Bojovitch's army with which
he had been holding the pass against overwhelming numbers of
Bulgarians, had dwindled to 5,000. At about that time he was
reenforced by three regiments, including one from the famous
Shumadia Division and one from the Morava Division, which
were sent to him along the railroad, the only bit of railroad re-
maining to the Serbians, leading from Pristina to Ferizovitch,
the latter point being some ten miles distant from the Katshanik
Pass. The weather had begun getting cold and raw by this time,
and the roads were in a miserable condition. The Serbians,
though exhausted by their many hardships, and weak from the
want of proper food, set out from the terminus of the railroad
and pressed on toward the pass. As soon as they arrived
Bojovitch prepared to deliver his final attack on the Bulgarians.
294 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The Serbian general had now about one hundred field pieces,
mostly of the French 75 and 155 type; 3 inches and 6 inches.
With these he began a vigorous bombardment of the Bulgarian
trenches, raining a continuous shower of shrapnel and high
explosive shells on them. Under this terrible fire the Bul-
garians were compelled to retire from their defensive works and
retreat south for four miles, out of range of the Serbian artillery.
Then the Serbian infantry charged, pouring volley after volley
into the ranks of the retreating Bulgarians. The latter began
fleeing in disorder, but presently they came up against their
reserves, whereupon they rallied. On came the Serbians with
cries of "Na nosh! Na nosh!" and "Cus schtick! Cus schtick!"
('With the knife!" and "With the bayonet!")
Those were cries that the Bulgarians knew well, and they
too set up the same shouts. The rifle firing died down. The two
lines charged each other silently, like warriors of old, with
points of glittering steel before them. Then came the merging
clash, and the rows of running men broke into turbulent metees,
knots of struggling, writhing bodies. Shouts and hideous curses
sounded up and down the lines like the snarls of savage ani:
mals. Wounded men reeled, panting and sobbing, sometimes in
their savage agony springing on their friends and rending them
with their hands and teeth before they finally collapsed into
inert heaps, dead. Others, throwing down their unloaded rifles,
picked up jagged rocks and hurled them into knots of struggling
men, regardless of whether they smashed in the skulls of friends
or foes. There had been greater battles in that campaign, but
never had the fighting been so savage, so bitter; even the
battle of Timok, the first encounter between Bulgar and Serb,
was far outdone.
For a while it seemed as if the Serbians would actually batter
their way through. One Serbian regiment charged seven times
and each time captured three guns, only to have them wrested
out of its hands again. Once the Bulgarians9 center was pierced
by a tremendous effort on the part of the Shumadians and the
Morava troops. The Bulgarians sagged back, and some broke
and fled.
BULGARIAN ADVANCE 295
But again reserves came on the scene, whereas the Serbians
were, every last man of them, on the front line of the fighting.
Fresh forces of Bulgarians, being shipped up from Uskub by
rail, were constantly arriving on the field, and in the end they
were enough to turn the balance.
For three days the battle had raged, one continuous series
of sharp, hand-to-hand encounters, by night as well as by day.
But finally, on November 15, 1915, the Serbians had reached the
limit of their strength; the battle was going against them. And
then they retired from the pass by way of the Jatzovitza Hills
toward Prisrend.
Thus the plans of the Serbians to cut their path south to their
Allies on the Greek frontier were defeated, and they were
forced back into the north again. The effect of the collapse of
this effort was immediately seen in the withdrawal from Mitro-
vitza of the Serbian staff, such members of the Serbian Govern-
ment as had remained there and the diplomatic representatives
of the Entente nations.
The Bulgarians had been perfectly well aware of the plans
that lay behind the tremendous effort made by the Serbians at
Eatshanik Pass and they had caught to forestall part of it by
attacking Kalkandelen, a point which had been taken and retaken
more than once. On November 15, 1915, they took it again,
and finally, driving the small Serbian force that had oc-
cupied it before them, they took Gostivar on the following day,
the Serbians retiring to Eichivo, on the road to Monaster. On
about the same day, or a little later, Boyadjieff, after a stiff
fight, stormed the heights near Gilan, northwest of Kutshanik
Pass, and, after occupying Gilan itself, advanced toward
Pristina, reaching its vicinity by November 22, 1915.
The invaders had succeeded in their main object, which
was to round up and if possible corner the main Serbian forces;
they were now rolled back on to the great Kossovo Plain, where
they were united, but considerably confused and hampered by
the vast crowds of fugitives fleeing from all parts of the north,
center and east of the country. Near Mitrovitza, on the north
of the plain, near Pristina on the east of it, and at Eatshanik
296 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
at its southern extremity, the Austro-Germans and the Bulga-
rians had, by the beginning of the fourth week of November, 1915,
absolutely rounded up and hemmed in all the larger forces of the
Serbians. Here they must either surrender, engage in one last
desperate battle that meant certain destruction, or retire back*
ward into the mountains of Montenegro and Albania, which by
this time were covered with deep snow.
It was finally decided to give the enemy one more battle and
if that failed, as seemed inevitable, to retreat into the wilderness,
thus defeating the main hope of Mackensen, which was to elimi-
nate the Serbians entirely as a factor in the war, either by cap-
turing the whole army or destroying it King Peter himself
was present, hoping by his presence to revive the spirits of his
soldiers to such a pitch that they would make a hard fight, for by
this time they had undoubtedly lost a good deal of their morale.
Von Gallwitz had passed through Nish and was now driving
back the Serbian advance posts in the Toplitza Valley, while
the Austrians, on his right, were pressing on toward Novi Bazar.
As will be seen by a glance at the map, the Serbians were there-
fore bearing the concentrated attack of four armies; that which
operated from Vishegrad, the mixed forces under Edvess, Gall-
witz's army and the main Bulgarian forces. The pressure was
incessant. Reenf orcements had been hurried through from Ger-
many to make good the heavy losses which had been sustained
during the campaign. Communication between the main Ser-
bian armies and the Serbians in the south had now been cut
completely and only Prisrend and Monastir remained to be taken
before the whole of Serbia and Serbian Macedonia would be
cleared of the Serbian fighting forces.
The fight in the region of Pristina was to be the last grand
battle of the retreat. Here what remained of the Serbian main
forces took battle formation, finally to dispute the enemy's ad-
vance. To this end the remaining stock of gun ammunition and
rifle cartridges had been carefully saved and a store of war
material gathered at Mitrovitza in readiness for such a stand.
The weary bullocks were turned loose from the gun carriages
they hauled, for there could be no taking them along up among
BULGARIAN ADVANCE 297
the crags of the mountain country. The guns themselves were
brought into position on the surrounding hills, trenches were dug
wherever possible. Machine guns were located to cover the
mountain paths and valley roads, and strong redoubts, which had
been thrown up with civilian labor before the army had arrived,
were manned. And then there remained a brief period during
which the weary soldiers could take some much needed rest.
There was something tragically significant that this last stand
should be made on the plains of Kossovo, or the "Field of the
Ravens/' as it is sometimes called by the natives, on account a
the great flocks of those birds that frequent it For on this same
field it was that Lazar, the last of the ancient Serbian czars,
whose empire included the whole of Macedonia, Albania, Thes-
saly, northern Greece, and Bulgaria, had fought just such a last
desperate battle against the Turks in 1389, and had gone down
before the Moslem hordes, and with him the Serbian nation.
Each year the Serbians had commemorated the anniversary of
this event by mourning.
Kossovo Plain is a high plateau, forty miles long and ten wide ;
from its rolling fields the forbidding crags of Montenegro and
Albania are plainly visible, black in summer and white with snow
in winter.
The gray dawn of a November day brought the first mutterings
of the storm that was presently to break in fury up and down
the whole front. The ragged, mud-stained cavalry of Serbia
came trotting wearily through the infantry lines, bearing signs
of the many skirmishes they had taken part in. The outlying
posts were exchanging rifle fire with the advance guards of the
enemy and now, through his powerful field glasses, the Serbian
commander could see great masses of the invading troops deploy-
ing against his front.
"You have come to see the death of a nation," he remarked to
an American correspondent who was present.
"It is sad that a stranger's eyes should see us die," said an-
other officer in high command.
Soon the crackling and sputtering fire of the Mannlicher rifles
was rippling up and down the lines; the whole front from
298 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Pristina to south of Marcovitza blazed flame, and the last big
battle of Serbia's resistance was on. Two lines of men, the one
thick and heavily equipped, the other attenuated and half-
starved, were locked together in a desperate hand-to-hand
struggle.
As though to afford a proper setting for the scene, nature
herself broke into a wild fury; overhead the sky darkened, then
the black clouds burst into a howling storm, full of cold sleet
and rain. Amidst the black, stark hills, in a ceaseless downpour,
men trampled and slipped through the clay mud, dripping wet
from head to foot, stabbing, shooting, hurling hand bombs,
until this peaceful valley echoed to the shouts and roar of com-
bating armies.
And as the first day's fighting increased in intensity, the fury
of the elements overhead intensified, and presently it was im-
possible to distinguish the roar of the big cannon from the
deep crash of thunder; intermingling with the shouts and cries
tf men roared the blast of the gale as it whipped over rocky
eminences.
Here again was raised that dreaded battle cry: "Na nosh!
Na nosh!" With such a shout a whole regiment of the fierce
Shumadians leaped out of its trenches and tore across the inter-
vening ground between its trenches and the rocks of a near-by
eminence which a force of Magyars had made into a position*
Haggard from pain and starvation, their hair long and matted,
Borne still in ragged uniforms, but most of them in the sheepskin
coats of peasants, their eyes bloodshot with rage, they formed not
a pleasant picture to the intrenched Huns. The rifle fire from
the eminence leaped to a climax; the Hungarians knew they
were fighting for their lives. In the horde rushing up the steep
slope lay an appalling danger. Up they surged, without firing
a shot, the bayonets gleaming in the lightning flashes. Among
the rocks appeared white faces behind black rifle barrels. And
then, with one fierce yell, the men in the shaggy sheepskin coats
were hurling themselves in among the men in blue-gray uni-
forms. For a few brief moments there was a wild metee; then
the men in blue-gray broke and ran.
BULGARIAN ADVANCE 299
Such scenes were common throughout the three or four days of
the battle.
What made the resistance of the Serbian soldiers so fierce was
the knowledge possessed by each that there was no alternative
to victory but a retreat into those white, bleak wilds behind
him. And there was not a Serbian boy in those ranks who
did not realize what a winter's march through that country
would mean.
From the fall of Nish, in fact, the Serbians had been fighting
with their backs to a wall, and grim and bloody were the
struggles between Serb and German in the wild tangle of hills
that surrounded the Plain of Kossovo. Quarter was neither
given nor asked, and unlucky was the too venturesome
Austrian regiment that penetrated the Serbian lines the first
few days without sufficient support.
"The 184th Regiment," said one of the soldiers9 letters, which
were published in the Austrian papers, "went into a valley and
was never seen again." One Serbian regiment, stationed to hold
the mouth to a small valley, to cover the retirement of another
Serbian regiment, remained at its post for four days, fighting
off the greater part of an Austro-German division, until, of the
1,200 men of the original detachment, only sixty-three remained
on their feet, and most of those wounded.
To his credit be it said that the aged King of Serbia remained
with his battling men to the end. While the guns were thunder-
ing against Pristina and the thin line of the last resistance was
frenziedly holding back the German and Bulgarian lines, there
came to an ancient church, which was under fire, a mud-stained
old man in a field service uniform. The few foreign cor-
respondents who saw him pass into the church did not recognize
in this old man, bent, haggard and unshaven, the king who had
sat on the throne of Kara-Georgevitch — the grandson of that
famous swineherd.
Before the high altar the old man knelt in prayer while a
group of staff officers stood at a distance, watching him in silence.
The crash of bursting shrapnel came to them from outside and
once a window was shattered and the little church was filled with
300 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
splinters of flying glass and still the King of Serbia knelt at his
devotions, praying that at the last moment his kingdom might be
saved from destruction.
But in spite of his appeals the end came.
CHAPTER XXXVI
END OF GERMAN 0 PER A T I 0 NS — P L IG HT
OF SERB PEOPLE — GREECE
WITH the fall of Pristina and Mitrovitza on November 28,
1915, ended the operations against Serbia, so far as Mac-
kensen and his Germans were concerned. On November 28, 1915,
German Headquarters issued an extraordinary report in which it
announced that with the flight of the scanty remains of the
Serbian army into the Albanian Mountains "our great operations
in the Balkans are brought to a close. Our object, to effect com-
munications with Bulgaria and the Turkish Empire, has been ac-
complished/' After briefly describing these operations and ad-
mitting the "tough resistance" of the Serbians, who had "fought
bravely," this communique asserted that more than 100,000 of
them, almost half their original force, had been taken prisoners,
while their losses from killed and desertions could not be esti-
mated. The impression left by this document was that there were
very few of the Serbian soldiers left. On the other hand, the
Allies claimed that on the date mentioned Serbia still had 200,-
000 fighting men left.
At any rate, it was true that Germany had now opened rail-
road communications with the Orient. Her engineers and mili-
tary railroad staff had repaired the damage the retreating Ser-
bians had done to the main trunk line, and early in December
through trains were running from Berlin to Constantinople.
Having accomplished this, Germany withdrew most of her troops
from the Balkans, leaving the Bulgarians to finish Macedonia, and
Austria to deal with Montenegro.
END OF GERMAN OPERATIONS 301
It was a nation, rather than an army, that was in flight; not
for many hundreds of years has there been such an instance in
history. When Nish had fallen into the hands of the enemy, the
population in general had realized that the whole land was go-
ing to be overrun by the invaders. Then almost the whole people
had set out in flight for Monastir, near the Greek frontier, where
the Bulgarians had not yet closed in. On its retreat from Kossovo
Plain the Serbian army caught up with the rear of this fleeing
throng. Winter had set in unusually early that year. Even at
Saloniki on the shores of the tepid iEgean and sheltered behind a
ring of hills, where snow had not fallen in November in ten years,
a fierce northerly gale, known as the "Vardar wind/9 had sprung
up on November 26, 1915, and kept the air swirling with snow-
flakes, while up in the near-by hills the snow was already two feet
deep. Up in the Albanian Mountains the paths and trails were
already choked, while chilling blasts of sleet-laden winds howled
through the defiles.
The way from Upper Serbia to Monastir led across great,
bleak slopes, which were now being lashed by these terrible winter
storms. Old women and children fell by the wayside; young
mothers, hugging their babies to their breasts, sought shelter
behind rocks and died there of weakness and starvation. All
along the road of retreat was marked by the abandoned dead
and dying. One of the very few descriptions of this phase of the
Serbian flight that has appeared was written by Mr. William G.
Shepherd, special correspondent of the American United Press :
"The entire world must prepare to shudder," he writes from
Monastir, "when all that is happening on the Albanian refugee
trails finally comes to light. The horrors of the flight of the hap-
less Serbian people are growing with the arrival here of each new
contingent from the devastated district.
"They say that nearly the whole route from Prisrend to Mon-
astir, ninety miles, is lined with human corpses and the car-
casses of horses and mules dead of starvation, while thousands
of old men, women, and children are lying on the rocks and
in the thickets beside the trail, hungry and exhausted, await-
ing the end.
302 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
"At night the women and children, ill-clad and numbed with
cold, struggle pitifully around meager fires of mountain shrub,
to resume in the morning the weary march toward their supposed
goal of safety — Monastir. But by the time this dispatch is
printed Monastir, too, may be in the hands of the enemy. This
will leave them to the mercy of the inhospitable mountain fast-
nesses, where for the past two days a terrific blizzard has been
raging, or to the Bulgarians/'
The chief of the Serbian General Staff, Field Marshal Putnik,
old and now very ill, was driven along the road in a carriage until
his horses fell dead of exhaustion. His escort of soldiers carried
him for two days in an ordinary chair to which poles had been
tied for handles and so brought him to safely. One account re-
ported that the carriages of the retreating Serbians literally
passed over the dead who had fallen in the road, for it was im-
possible either to spare the time to drag them out of the way or
to make a detour to avoid them.
King Peter himself had escaped from Prisrend by motor car,
accompanied by three officers and four men, arriving in Liuma
over the Albanian frontier. Thence the monarch and his remain-
ing handful of followers set out through the mountains, the
king traveling part of the way on horseback and partly in a litter
slung between two mules, through mud and a constant downpour
of rain. During the evening of the second day they lost the trail,
which was only rediscovered after much wandering.
After two weeks9 rest at Scutari, King Peter continued his
journey to San Giovanni di Medua, Durazzo, and Avlona, whence
the party crossed over the Adriatic to Brindisi in Italy, where the
king remained incognito for six days. After a two days9 sea
voyage from Brindisi the old monarch finally arrived in Salonikt,
where he was received with all honors by the Greek authorities
and the Allies.
It is estimated that the number of civilians in flight over these
terrible roads numbered fully 700,000. And of these fully 200,-
000 died.
"It seems so useless,99 writes a German officer, in a letter which
was published in a German paper, "for there is nowhere else for
END OF GERMAN OPERATIONS 808
us to reach except the sea and there is nothing but the smelfof
dead bodies of horses, men, cattle — a discord of destruction that
seems contrary to all our civilization. Our own men are apathetic
and weary, and have no heart in the business. The Bulgarian
soldiers are not very popular with us. In the first place they
are more like Russians than Germans, and there is something
about the Slav that makes one's hair bristle. Their cruelly is
terrible/9
Meanwhile, Prisrend, on the extreme right of the Serbian main
force, did not fall till November 80, 1915. From Mitrovitza a
part of the Serbian army had retired and fought the Austrians
again at Vutchitra, but was beaten and driven across the Sit-
nitea, on the western bank of which stream it continued fighting
until finally it fled into the mountains.
The main line of retreat was along the highway from Pristina
to Prisrend. The Bulgarians, pressing on after, took the heights
west of Ferizovitch and also advanced northward toward Ipek,
against which point KOvess had sent a detachment. The retreat
to Prisrend was covered by the Shumadians. On November 27,
1915, 80,000 Serbians stood at bay in front of this town, but next
day, after a few hours9 fighting, and having used up all their am-
munition, they unbreeched their guns and fled across the frontier
into Albania, making along the White Drin for Eula Liuma, while
several thousands of them fell prisoners into the hands of the
enemy. Thus was the last shot of the Serbian resistance in the
northern section of the country fired.
The retreat of the Serbian armies through the mountains of
Albania was almost as heartrending as the flight of the civilian
population. Day by day, thousands of men, ill-clad and ill-shod,
or with bare and bleeding feet, so famished that they fed on the
flesh of dead horses by the wayside, stumbled painfully and
wretchedly along, over trails deep in snow, some going west
toward Scutari, others attempting to reach Greece through El-
bassan and Dibra. All semblance of military formation or order
was lost; they were now nothing more than a fleeing mob of
disorganized peasants, some unarmed, others with guns but no
ammunition. Officers and men trudged on side by side, on equal
T— War St 4
804
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
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terms. Once an Austrian light mountain battery, following on
the heels of the retreat, had arrived at the mouth of a long defile
through which the last of the retreating Serbians were winding
their way into the mountains, in single file. The Austrian bat-
tery immediately opened fire and swept the defile from end to end
of all human life.
While the main Serbian armies were being driven out of their
native land, the Bulgarians, after taking Babuna Pass and Kit-
chevo and Kruchevo, on November 20, 1915, halted on their way
to Monastir, now only a few miles distant. Monastir itself is
practically an unfortified city; it lies on the edge of a broad level
plain, offering not the least advantage to a defending force. A
few guns might easily sweep the city into a heap of ruins. But
above Monastir towers a lofty mountain, so steep that even under
peaceful conditions a strong man finds it hard to climb. A few
guns placed in position among the rocks on top of this mountain
could command the city and all of the surrounding plain within
range of their fire. Therefore, the problem of an invading force
is to take the mountain outside the city, rather than the city it&elf .
Beyond this lofty eminence, to the westward, rise thickly
wooded ridges, rugged mountain fastnesses, through which, along
the bottom of a winding defile, runs the road to Resen and Ochrida
and three large lakes : Ochrida, Prespa, and Little Prespa. Below
these lakes, which almost join, is the Greek frontier; above them,
and some distance beyond, lies the Albanian frontier.
For some days Vassitch and his remaining force of a few thou-
sand footsore soldiers remained at Prilep, awaiting the Bul-
garians. When finally they took Brod, with the object of cutting
off his retreat, he quitted Prilep and fell back on Monastir, then
retired over the mountains to Resen. Here he was joined by two
barefooted regiments that had come down from the north with
the refugees, but they were too exhausted to be of much value for
fighting. Altogether they numbered about 7,000, while the pur-
suing Bulgarians were at least 30,000 strong. At Resen, where
the roughness of the country enabled them to make some re-
sistance, they fought the last battle, or skirmish rather, that was
to take place between the Serbians and the invaders, then retired
306 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
down along the eastern shore of Lake Prespa and so over into
Greece. And now not one Serbian soldier remained either in
Serbia proper or Serbian Macedonia. Many of them were yet
to do some more fighting, against the Austrians at least, for Aus-
tria had yet to invade and conquer that other little Serbian state,
Montenegro. As yet the Austrian right wing of Kdvess's army
had not entered Montenegro, but maintained itself at Vishegrad,
from which, using it as a pivot, the center and left wing had
swept over Serbia. From Vishegrad across the northern bound-
ary of Montenegro stretched another force of Austrians, meant
only to hold the Montenegrins back. Hitherto, the Montenegrin
army had been facing this line, without being able to afford the
Serbians much assistance. It was not until after the last of the
Serbians had been dealt with that the Austrians turned their
attention toward the Montenegrins and the conquest of their
rugged country. Nor did they seriously undertake this task un-
til toward the end of the year; the whole of this campaign is an
episode by itself and will be dealt with presently.
With the disappearance of the last of the Serbian armies into
the defiles of the Albanian Mountains, the French and British
forces, which had been vainly endeavoring to save Serbia, had no
longer any special object in holding their advanced positions in
Macedonia, especially as they were not strong enough to under-
take an offensive movement, even after the last Serbian defeat,
though during November, 1915, large reenforcements had been
arriving and disembarking in Saloniki. As already stated, the
rumors of military action on the part of Russia against Bulgaria
had proved unfounded and a second bombardment of Varna had
had no effect on the course of the campaign. Italy had done
nothing in the Balkans as yet, except to fire a few shells into
Dedeagatch on November 11, 1916. A month later she landed an
army on the Albanian coast, at Avlona and elsewhere, but, while
this facilitated the escape of many of the Serbian refugees, it
was too late to have any effect on the military situation.
Throughout the latter part of November, 1915, after the battle
between General Sarrail's army at Mt. Archangel, the British
had sent up considerable forces which were deployed on the
END OF GERMAN OPERATIONS 307
French right and were holding the mountain chain to the north
of Lake Doiran, forming a natural boundary between Greek and
Bulgarian territory.
Though Sarrail had repulsed all the Bulgarian attacks, his
position was rendered embarrassing by the fact that the Greek
Government had decided to concentrate a large part of its army
in that particular corner of its frontiers. Obviously, the Greeks
had a right to make whatever movements they wished on their
own territory, but the consequences were singularly unfortunate,
both for the French and the British, for the Greek commander
in chief found it necessary to move troops and stores along the
same line of railroad which the British and the French were
using. This meant a curtailment of supplies and the checking
of effective and continuous supports for the fighting line.
Added to this was the sudden coming of an early winter.
While snow was falling even in Saloniki, up in the hills where the
advanced lines were deployed a furious blizzard was blowing,
against which the soldiers were only prepared with small tents
of waterproof sheets for shelters. Down in the base camps the
gale swept down the tents so that the men were practically unpro-
tected from the fury of the freezing blasts. At the front the
enemy's positions were no longer visible, the intervening valleys
being full of swirling clouds of snow. On November 27, 1915, the
French War Office issued an official communique, which gave the
first indication of what was about to happen:
"In view of the present situation of the Serbian armies our
troops, which have been occupying the left bank of the Tcherna,
have been removed to the right bank of the river, the movement
being effected without difficulty."
308 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER XXXVII
ALLIES WITHDRAW INTO GREECE — A TTIT UDE
OF GREEK GOVERNMENT
A GENERAL withdrawal into Greece, with Saloniki as base,
had been decided on by General Sarrail, in accordance with
instructions from Paris and London.
This now brought up a very peculiar and delicate situation
between the Allies and Greece. As a neutral, Greece was
strongly disposed to take up the same attitude toward the bellig-
erents as Holland, who during the early part of the war had been
interning great numbers of the English and Belgian soldiers who
had sought refuge inside her boundaries when the Germans had
taken Belgium. The Allies, on the other hand, were not inclined
to accept this point of view, as Greece was bound to Serbia by a
defensive treaty and therefore could not assume full neutrality
without repudiating this treaty. To this Greece opposed the con-
tention, based on a technicality, that the treaty with Serbia had
in view only a defensive alliance against Bulgaria, whereas now
the Austrians and Germans were attacking, as well as the Bul-
garians. The successes of the Austro-German forces had stiff-
ened the determination of the Greek King and his Government to
stand by this policy.
However, there was ample room for a diversity of opinion
among the Greeks themselves; on which side Greece's political
interests lay was largely a matter of individual opinion. The
chief, and probably the only, reason why there was any popular
feeling in favor of the Allies was because they were opposed to
the Bulgarians, whom the Greeks hate in season and out.
But on the other hand, Greek ambitions and Italian ambitions
clash in Albania, in the islands of the Archipelago and in Asia
Minor. Both nations hope to acquire territory in those countries.
And Italy was one of the Allies. Had Italy not entered the war
it is very probable that Greece would have aligned herself with
the Serbians, French, and British in the early stages of their
ALLIES WITHDRAW INTO GREECE 309
operations. But when Italy declared war on the side of the
Allies, there was no doubt in the minds of the Greek politicians
that she had been promised much, if not all, of the territories on
which they had their own eyes. Added to this, the King of Greece
was related to the German Emperor through marriage, his queen
being a sister of Emperor William.
All through November, 1915, and during the early part of
December, 1915, the ambiguous, doubtful attitude of Greece was
causing the French and the British much anxiety. It was a
curious and, for the Allies, a very dangerous situation. Faced
as they were by an enemy much their superior in numbers, there
was danger of finding that disadvantage considerably intensified
by the inclusion of Greece among their enemies.
The unrestricted command of the base at Saloniki was now
indispensable for the safety of the allied forces. They had
landed under the terms of a "benevolent neutrality/9 even at the
request of the Greek Government, while Venizelos was at its
head. With the change in premiers had come a complete change
in attitude. The Greeks had begun hampering the Allies at every
turn. Prices were raised; they were called upon to pay in ad-
vance, and in gold, for the use of the railroads in transporting
the troops. Further, the Greek troops were actually occupying
the defensive positions around Saloniki; positions which the
Allies should occupy and strengthen, if they were to make their
base secure. The Greeks stretched barbed-wire entanglements
between themselves and the allied troops. Submarine mines,
stored as if ready to be launched, were discovered at the month of
the Vardar River, and the fort at the entrance to the upper Gulf
of Saloniki had been secretly strengthened and heavy guns
mounted. The port swarmed with German and Austrian and Bul-
garian spies; its atmosphere was heavy with hostility to the
Allies. Prince Andrew of Greece, in an interview with a neutral
journalist, said that as long as 80,000 French soldiers were
hostages to the Greek army for the Allies9 good behavior, the
Allies would never dare to bombard Athens or any other Greek
port. So critical did the situation become that one Sunday the
British ships cleared for action.
310 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
And now, after the failure of the French troops to join up
with the Serbians in Babuna Pass, arose the probability of with-
drawing their forces in Serbian and Bulgarian territory across
the frontier to Saloniki. Thus arose the question : How would
Greece comport herself on their retirement? Would she give
them complete freedom of communication south of the frontier to
Saloniki? Or would she seek to disarm and intern them and
such Serbians as crossed the border?
A brief review of the political events that had been happening
in Athens since the situation of the Serbians had become acute
will show how divided Greece herself was on these questions.
When France and Groat Britain decided to assist Serbia by
sending forces to her support, Venizelos was premier of Greece
and it was with his consent that the first contingents began dis-
embarking in Saloniki on October 5, 1915. His policy of thus
aiding the operations was thoroughly discussed in the Greek
Chamber of Deputies and approved by a majority of 45 in a
house of 257.
The following day King Constantine summoned the premier
and told him that he could not support his policy and demanded
his resignation, which was given. In his place the king installed
M. Zaimis. In a meeting of the Chamber a day or two later, on
October 11, 1915, the new premier defined the policy of his Gov-
ernment as one of armed neutrality, adding that "our attitude
in the future will be adapted to events, the course of which will
be followed with the closest of attention." Whereupon Venizelos
arose, protesting, and made a speech that clearly defined the
attitude that he thought Greece should follow, and which he felt
was supported by a majority of the people.
"Even if there did not exist the treaty with Serbia," he said,
"our interests oblige us to depart from neutrality, as another
state wishes to aggrandize itself at our expense. The question
is not whether we ought to make war or not, but when we ought
to make war. In any case we ought not to allow Bulgaria to
crush Serbia. The national soul will say that it is to the interest
of Greece that Bulgaria should be crushed. If Bulgaria should
conquer, Hellenism will be completely vanquished."
ALLIES WITHDRAW INTO GREECE 311
That Venizelos spoke for the majority of the deputies was soon
to manifest itself. On November 4, 1915, in the course of a debate
in the Chamber, a Venizeloist deputy, M. Vlachos, made some
criticism of the minister of war, which caused the latter to leave
the Chamber in violent anger. The scene provoked a tumult,
in which cheers and protests mingled. The deputy finally
apologized and order was reestablished, the minister of war re-
turning to his seat It was then that Venizelos arose and ex-
pressed the opinion that an apology was also due from the war
minister because of his disrespectful behavior in leaving the
House. The premier, M. Zaimis, thereupon declared that, in the
opinion of the Government, the war minister's conduct had been
perfectly correct and he demanded a vote of confidence from the
assembled deputies.
M. Venizelos replied by delivering a strong attack on the Gov-
ernment's war policy, which, he said, was not supported by a
majority, deploring that Bulgaria was being allowed to crush
Serbia, that she might fall on Greece later.
As a result of the vote that followed this discussion, the
Chamber refused to express confidence in the present Govern-
ment by a vote of 147 against 114, in consequence of which the
premier, Zaimis, was compelled to resign. The king, however,
still persisted in his opposition to the policy of the Venizelos
parly and immediately called upon M. Skouloudis, one of his own
partisans, to form a new cabinet. To avoid any more expressions
of disagreement with the king's policy on the part of the Cham-
ber, the new premier, only a week later, ordered the dissolution
of that body, his pretext being that the country at large should
have an opportunity of expressing itself through a general elec-
tion. This was a move which Venizelos had always opposed ; for,
he pointed out, so long as the Greek army was mobilized and
Greek soldiers were excluded from casting their votes, the true
opinion of the people could never be determined. And even if
the soldiers were allowed to vote, they would be under the influ-
ence of their officers, who always supported the king's policy.
This high-handed procedure on the part of the Government
created a bad impression in France and Great Britain. What
812 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
added to that was the dispatch which announced, only a few days
before, the arrival in Saloniki in a special train from Sofia of
four German officers : Baron Falkenhausen, Colonel von Erbst-
ner, General von der Goltz's A. D. C., Prince von Bttlow's son, and
another. After a short stay in Saloniki they departed for Athens
in a Greek torpedo boat, accompanied by Greek officers of high
rank. It was just after the arrival of such a mission in Sofia
that Bulgaria had made her agreement with Germany, promising \
her support i*> driving out the Serbians. And meanwhile Premier
Skouloudis, doing as Radislavov, the Premier of Bulgaria, had
done, was protesting daily that Greece had no intention of going
against the Allies.
But incidentally he also expressed the opinion publicly that
Greece's "benevolent neutrality" did not extend to protecting
the allied troops, whether French, British, or Serbian, from the
operation of international law, and that, therefore, these troops
would be disarmed and interned on their passing over into
Greek territory.
His words created some alarm in the allied countries, which
was deepened when it became known that Greece was concen-
trating 200,000 men in and around Saloniki. The question
now arose, Should the Allies submit quietly while Greece
carried out this publicly declared intention, or should they
persuade her to a change Of opinion by the application of armed
force?
Ordinary arguments had proved unavailing and much time
was lost in talk. Opinion and feeling began growing heated in
France and Great Britain over the delay, as well as over the
question itself. France in particular called for immediate and
energetic action, urging that it was necessary to show the iron
hand under the velvet glove. The iron hand was not a mere
figure of speech, for the British and French fleets could not only
bombard the coast cities of Greece, but institute a blockade which
would cut off all her supplies.
On November 19, 1915, the British Legation in Athens, com-
municated a statement to the press, beginning with the following
passage:
ALLIES WITHDRAW INTO GREECE 813
"In view of the attitude adopted by the Hellenic Government
toward certain questions closely affecting the security of the
allied troops and their freedom of action (two privileges to
which they are entitled in the circumstances in which they landed
on Greek territory), the allied powers have deemed it necessary
to take certain measures, the effect of which is to suspend the
economic and commercial facilities which Greece has hitherto
enjoyed at their hands."
At the same time came a dispatch from Athens announcing
that the French and British ships had begun to institute a
severe search on board all steamers flying the Greek flag in the
JEgean and in the Mediterranean.
Thus a partial embargo was placed on Greek shipping, only
severe enough to make the Greek Government realize what might
happen should a thorough blockade be established. At the same
time two visits that were paid to King Constantine while this
crisis was acute had a favorable influence on it. One was from
M. Denys Cochin, a member of the French Cabinet and a man
held in the highest esteem in Greece; the other was from Lord
Kitchener, who was on his way back from an inspection of the
British forces in Gallipoli, whither he had been dispatched by his
colleagues in the British Cabinet to report on the advisability or
the reverse of abandoning that peninsula.
Still the negotiations were spun out and it was not till
November 23, 1915, that matters were brought to a head by the
presentation of a combined note to Greece.
This note demanded formal assurances that the allied troops
should under no circumstances be disarmed and interned, but
should be granted full freedom of movement, together with such
facilities as had already been promised. Greece was only re-
quired to live up to her previous promises ; she need not abandon
her attitude of neutrality. On the other hand, the note categori-
cally stated that the Allies would make restitution for all terri-
tory occupied and pay suitable indemnities. Two days later the
Greek Government replied in friendly but somewhat vague terms,
which were not considered satisfactory, and on the 26th the
Entente sent a second note asking for a precise assurance regard-
814 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
ing the liberty of movement of the allied troops* The Greek
answer was liked so little that it was decided to tighten some-
what the grip of the iron hand.
Thus what is known to international law as a "measure of
constraint short of war" was instituted. The pressure was at
once felt. At Saloniki particularly the people were obliged to
live from hand to mouth, the supply boats being able to bring in
only enough flour to last two days. So great was the need of
grain in Greece itself that a cargo of flour which had been
condemned at Piraeus was baked into bread. The Bulgarians
attempted to relieve the situation by sending in 15,000 tons of
wheat by rail from Sofia, but as the line over which it passed
through Drama was presently occupied by the British, this source
of supply could not be maintained, nor would it have been
sufficient to have relieved the situation.
The Greek public and their Government were strongly im-
pressed. One dispatch stated that Greek troops were patrolling
the streets of Athens and that a heavy guard had been placed
around the royal palace in fear of revolutionary attempts. Mean-
while the Cabinet Council was sitting in permanent conference
with the chiefs of the General Staff trying to come to a decision.
"You are wicked/9 said M. Rallis, Greek Minister of Justice,
to a British newspaper correspondent; "the only thing we want
is peace and you force us to make war. You are starving us;
two wheat vessels were stopped to-day. You want us to save you
when no English soldiers shed their blood for Serbia, when
scarcely an English rifle has been fired. We do not wish to be
another Serbia."
The newspapers which supported Venizelos, on the other hand,
accused the Government of having precipitated the country to
the verge of a conflict with the Entente Powers by want of
foresight and a policy of deception.
Finally, however, the Greek Government came to terms, ac-
cepting practically all that the Allies demanded and withdrawing
most of the Greek soldiers from Saloniki, while the Gevgheli-
Saloniki and the Doiran-Saloniki railroads were handed over to
the Allies with their adjacent roads and land. King Constantino
ALLIES WITHDRAW INTO GREECE 315
complained that he was between the devil and the deep sea, or
words to that effect, and protested that Greek neutrality was
violated, though he did not deny that he had at first acceded to the
invitation Venizelos had extended to the Allies to send troops to
Saloniki. The king, anxious to be rid of his unwelcome guests,
let it be understood that if the Allies would only retire from
Greece altogether, he and his army would protect their retreat
and see that they were not molested on embarking. But this was
a proposition which the Entente Powers were not inclined to
consider at all by this time.
Meanwhile, before Greece was finally compelled to come to a
complete understanding with the Allies regarding her attitude
in the event of a general retirement on Saloniki, General Sarrail's
position was becoming decidedly dangerous, The Bulgarian
armies were, for the time being, busy pursuing the last remnants
of the Serbians out of the country beyond Monastir, but presently
they would be able to give their full attention and strength to
an attack on the Allies. Thanks to the difficulties occasioned
by the concentration of Greek troops in that section of the
country, the British forces had not been afforded ample means of
transportation and they were arriving but very slowly, though
gradually they had established a line along the rugged hills to
the north of Doiran. They had not, at the end of November,
1915, fought a general action as yet.
General SarraiPs position was a remarkably insecure one.
The taking of Prilep, and subsequently the occupation of Mona-
stir by the Bulgarians, practically turned his line and exposed
him to a perilous flanking movement against his extreme left on
the Tcherna. His troops were bunched up in a very acute salient,
the head of which was just south of Gradsko, and his front very
largely conformed to the convolutions of this and the Vardar
River. On his right, from before Strumitza Station, the British
continued the line to the north of Lake Doiran.
It will seem somewhat strange that, though the British were
the first to disembark in Saloniki in the first week in October,
1915, two months should elapse before they took any prominent
part in the fighting. The British commander, General Mahon,
316 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
reached Greece on October 12, 1915, to be followed a month later
by General Munro, but the British made no move of any im-
portance. There were some trifling encounters with outposts,
and these had bedn magnified into battles by the dispatches from
Greece, but the truth was that the French had borne the brunt of
the struggle on the Tcherna, perhaps because they were then
more numerous than the British, who were not actively engaged
in force until the first week of December. Their trenches, north
and west of Lake Doiran, among bleak hills covered with snow,
spread out fanwise in the direction of Strumitza, which they
had taken over from the French when the latter had gone up the
Vardar to Krivolak.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
BULGARIAN ATTACKS — ALLIES CON-
CENTRATE AT SALONIKI
ON December 5, 1915, the Bulgarians gave the first indica-
tions of their preparations to break through the thin lines
of the Allies. On that date the British were to have their first
taste of heavy fighting. The Bulgarians delivered a massed at-
tack at two points; one at Demir Kapu, another against the
British positions on the Rabrovo-Doiran road.
The first assault of the enemy succeeded in gaining a foothold
in the British trenches, but the British were presently able to
regain their positions and drive the Bulgarians back. Here again
it was obvious that the hearts of the Bulgarian soldiers were
not in this fighting. Most of the British soldiers had never
seen any fighting before, yet they were able to accomplish what
the fierce Serbians had not been able to do; drive a superior
force of Bulgarians back at the point of the bayonet. Numbers
of the Bulgarians were taken prisoners, willingly enough, it
seemed, and they told their captors that up to the actual fight-
ing, until they actually saw the troops they were engaging, they
had been under the impression they were to fight Greeks.
BULGARIAN ATTACKS 317
This first attack made the British commander realize, how-
ever, that the enemy opposing him was vastly his superior in
numbers. A second assault, delivered in the face of a hot
fire from the British, but with overwhelming numbers, drove
the British soldiers from their first line of trenches; but they
held on to their second line and every effort to expel them was
a costly failure.
Meanwhile, Sarrail, on the Vardar, under cover of a feigned
attack on Ishtip from Kara Hodjali, drew in his men from the
Tcherna, and before the enemy had realized what he was doing,
he had retired from the Kavaar Camp with all his stores, of
which there was by this time a tremendous accumulation, and
entrained at Krivolak, blowing up the bridges and tearing up
the railroad behind him. On December 5, 1915, he had reached
the north end of the Demir Kapu Gorge (Defile) practically
without opposition, but in the gorge he had to fight hard to get
out of it.
He had had the forethought, however, to throw up strong de-
fensive works at the entrance and this enabled him to repel
the attacks of the Bulgarians in spite of the determination with
which they were being pushed. The retreat through the defile
was an extremely precarious and difficult task, as there was no
way out except along the railroad, running along a narrow
shelf cut out of the steep, rocky banks of the Vardar. Yet the
retreat was successfully accomplished, with all the stores,
and, after destroying a tunnel and a bridge across the Vardar, it
was continued to Gradetz, where heavy intrenchments had been
thrown up.
Here, on December 8-9, 1915, the Bulgarians delivered
a very violent attack, but were driven off with heavy losses. On
the 10th the French announced that they were now occupying
a new front, along the Bojimia, a branch of the Vardar, and
that they were in touch with the left flank of the British.
Meanwhile, on the east side of the Vardar, General Todoroff
was continuing his attack on the British. He had massed to-
gether about 100,000 men. On the morning of the 6th, after the
first assault and under cover of dense mists thai were rolling up
318 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
from the swamps down near Saloniki, he was able to get in close
to the British without being seen. As the dawn began break-
ing he poured a rain of high-explosive shells on the British,
which here consisted mostly of Irish regiments.
As on the day before, the enemy came on in successive waves,
so thick that the later ones carried the first before them, even
when they turned to flee from the heavy fire of the British
Finally the British were again compelled to give way before the
heavy impact of numbers. By evening they had retired two
miles, not a great deal, considering the masses that were driving
them. More than once it looked as though the British would be
literally overwhelmed and annihilated. Eight guns were lost
and about 1,800 men were killed or wounded.
The retirement had been in the direction of the Vardar and by
the end of the second week of December, 1915, the British were
able to make another stand over on the banks of the Vardar,
below the right wing of the French.
The whole Bulgarian field army was evidently divided between
the Rabrovo road and north of Strumitza Junction. It was
clearly the enemy's intention to drive a wedge into the center,
thus to isolate all the northern divisions and to bring about a
general disaster.
Sarrail recognized his danger and began to retire his northern
units, covering the movement with a fiercely contested action
in the region of Strumitza.
By December 11, 1915, the French and British lines were
close back on the Greek frontier, and although the Bulgarians
delivered a heavy attack on that day, it was their final effort;
the following day the Allies were across the frontier and the
Bulgarians made no attempt to follow them. Possibly they were
restrained by their German allies, or possibly they had no desire
to involve Greece, for had the Bulgarians set foot on Greek
soil, it is more than likely that Greek troops would have re-
sisted them, and once such an encounter had taken place, Greece
would probably have thrown herself into the war on the side of
the Allies. As they retired, the allied troops destroyed the rail-
road behind them and set fire to Gevgheli and other towns on the
i
1*
it
u
I
BULGARIAN ATTACKS 319
other side of the border. And, by a fortunate coincidence, it
was on the day before they crossed the frontier that Greece had
finally accepted the proposals of the Allies that their forces were
to be allowed freedom of movement.
Considering the tremendous difficulties he had had to contend
with, in the face of the immense strength of his enemy, General
Sarrail's retreat by no means diminished his reputation as a
military leader. Although his men had at their disposal only one
single-track line of railroad and no roads, their retirement was
conducted in such order that they were able to save and with-
draw all their stores, while the total of their casualties did not
exceed 3,500, a very moderate loss under the circumstances.
In less skillful hands the retreat might easily have developed
into an irretrievable disaster. In its main object, saving Ser-
bia from being crushed, the campaign had certainly been a
failure, but this was rather the fault of the allied govern-
ments, and not because of the inefficiency of the leaders in the
field.
The Bulgarians, naturally, felt that they had attained a great
victory, and in a measure they had. On December 14, 1915,
they published their version of the operations as follows:
"December 12, 1915, will remain for the Bulgarian Army and
nation a day of great historical importance. The army on that
day occupied the last three Macedonian towns that still remained
in the hands of the enemy : Doiran, Gevgheli, and Struga. The
last fights against the British, French, and Serbians took place
near Doiran and Ochrida Lakes. The enemy was everywhere
beaten. Macedonia is free! Not a single hostile soldier remains
on Macedonian soil. . . . In the course of ten days the ex-
peditionary army of General Sarrail was beaten and thrown back
on neutral territory. On December 12, the whole of Macedonia
was freed. The pursuit of the enemy was immediately stopped
when the neutral frontier of Greece was reached."
This communique further pointed out that Serbia had been
beaten in forty, and the British and French in ten, days. An
official paper in Sofia declared that the "victories won over the
Franco-British hordes" was even more glorious than those won
U— War St 4
320 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR .
over Serbia and declared that Bulgaria had given a lesson to the
so-called Great Powers, Great Britain and France, showing them
at the same time the manner in which small nations could fight
for their independence.
That the Bulgarians did not pursue the allied troops across the
Greek frontier was one of the surprises of the campaign. What
the Greeks would have done had their hereditary enemies in-
vaded their soil, even though not for the purpose of attacking
them, was a question which perhaps the Greek Government
itself had not fully answered. Certainly the critical character
of the situation placed the Greeks in a very uncomfortable
position. It had been at their suggestion that the Allies
had come to Greece, and though a protest had been made
against their landing, that protest was the last word in
formality.
Consequently the Allies had some shadow of a moral right
to the use of Saloniki, but now that Sarrail was falling back,
with every prospect of his bringing the battle front down with
him into Greek territory, the diplomatic situation became ex-
tremely delicate. To add to the confusion of the situation,
it must be remembered that two or three divisions of the Greek
Army had been concentrated in the very district through which
the Bulgarians must pass, should they decide to follow the re-
tiring column of the Allies' troops. Here, then, was the Greek
dilemma; they had allowed, under formal protest, a pacific pene-
tration of their country in accordance with the agreement they
had made with Serbia, that the latter should be allowed to
import armies, munitions, and other military material over the
Saloniki-Uskub railroad. This agreement, Venizelos insisted,
was binding on Greece, notwithstanding the equivocations
of the king. But when the French and British troops retired,
another situation was created altogether, because it was scarcely
likely that the Bulgarians would stop short at the frontier of
Greece, and more than likely that they would follow up their
advance and incidentally shell and destroy Greek property. Thus
Bulgaria would be doing what the Allies had very carefully
avoided doing: commit an act of war against Greece.
BULGARIAN ATTACKS 321
But fortunately for Greece, the Bulgarians did not continue
the pursuit, though the Greek Government waited anxiously to
see what turn events would immediately take. Sofia published
the most reassuring things about the friendliness of Bulgaria
for Greece, though of course Athens, being herself the seat of
a Balkan nation, knew what value such protestations of affection
had. Greece had only to recall the expressions of friendliness
Bulgaria had uttered to Serbia less than a week before attack-
ing her.
Meanwhile the French and British had fallen back on an
intrenched line two or three miles to the south of the Greek
frontier. This front stretched from Karasuli, on the Vardar
River, to Kilindir, on the Doiran-Saloniki railroad, and was
about fifteen miles in length. The French were still on the left
and the British on the right. The British flank, in the east, was
about thirty miles from Saloniki. These lines were strongly
intrenched and otherwise strengthened, for it was not yet cer-
tain that the enemy did not mean to invade Greece.
In the early days of October, when the Allies had first begun
landing their troops, it had not yet been definitely decided that
Saloniki was to be held permanently, or at least as long as the
war lasted, but by this time the value of the port had been
realized. So long as it was held in strong force it constituted a
constant threat against any attempt on the part of the Austro-
Germans to push their invasion down into Egypt. Further,
it was suggested by naval experts that if ever it passed into
the hands of the Germans, it might easily become the base for an
effective submarine warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, which
would be extremely dangerous to the allied fleets in those waters,
already the scene of considerable submarine activity, as was
demonstrated by the sinking of not a few transports, war vessels,
and other ships by the enemy. These waters could not be dragged
with steel nets, as had been done in the British Channel. As
the terminus of the railroad running through Macedonia from
Belgrade, Saloniki was potentially an important city. Austria
had long been aware of the high significance of this port and it
was, in fact, the final objective of her "Drang nach Osten" policy.
822 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
When it fell to Greece after the Second Balkan War she had been
bitterly disappointed, which was one reason why she had done
her best to spur Bulgaria on to precipitate that unfortunate
campaign. And this was another little matter which probably
helped to swing the balance of Greek sympathy toward the
Allies. What prosperity Saloniki had enjoyed during Turkish
rule had been entirely due to its big Jewish population, which had
been the mainstay of its commercial activities.
When Greece acquired possession little change followed, and
when the troops of the Allies began to disembark in the begin-
ning of October they were at once confronted by a serious dif-
ficulty in the absence of docking and local transportation facili-
ties. There was, further, the serious difficulty of obtaining
space ashore for camp ground for the troops, as well as suitable
level stretches for aeroplanes, Greek troops being in occupation
of all such spots. Moreover, the railroad facilities, even when
given over entirely to their use, were inadequate.
So long as the outcome of the effort to join up with the Ser-
bians remained in doubt the Allies had not given much energy to
fortifying Saloniki in great strength, but immediately the re-
tirement was decided upon this task was undertaken with some
dispatch. On and after December 12, 1915, the Allies, having
at last succeeded in compelling Greece to agree to their plans
for a permanent occupation, began preparations to meet all
possible events in the future. As the Greek troops withdrew,
French and British forces took their places, some being fresh
arrivals, for reenf orcements were landing daily at the rate of
between 4,000 and 5,000. As there were many rumors of the
enemy's intention to advance and attack before the city should
be made more defensible, the work of making it as formidable
as possible was pushed with fever heat.
Steps were at once taken to establish strong lines of intrench-
ments. In the course of a week or ten days this task was
sufficiently under way to settle the alarms of an immediate at-
tack from the enemy; the lines of the defensive works followed
a half circle of hills and lakes, some fifty miles in extent, reaching
on the west from the Vardar River to the Gulf of Orfano on
BULGARIAN ATTACKS 323
the east and inclosing a very considerable area, giving the Allies
sufficient freedom of movement.
Yet it was fortunate for the Allies that political considerations
deterred the enemy from making the attack* Had the Bulgarians
advanced in full force, the Allies would have been heavily out-
numbered, not only in men, but in heavy artillery and ordinary
field guns as well. It is doubtful whether they could success-
fully have resisted a determined effort to turn their flanks.
The conformation of the coast line around Saloniki is a handi-
cap to a continuous defensive line. It would demand more men
than other conformations would. Saloniki stands on a gulf, or
bay, and this would necessitate spreading the defending lines
around it in almost a complete circle, so that the adjacent shores
would be protected as well.
There does exist a natural horseshoe of positions from which
Saloniki could be held and which would cover the port from sea
to sea, but their development extends from 120 to 130 miles of
country, an area which could not well be held with less than a
force of half a million men. At the eastern horn of the Gulf of
Saloniki runs the Kaloron Ridge, culminating in a peak some
3,000 feet above sea level. All the southern slopes of this ridge
are exposed to the fire of any fleet of warships that might lie
offshore. This ridge continues toward the north by two more
peaks, each connected with its neighbor by a saddle-shaped ridge.
The positions along this ridge would pass first over a point about
a thousand feet high, covering the village of Galatista, and next
by a chain to the Hortak Dagh Mountains, one of the nearest
points in the line to Saloniki.
To the north again the ground falls abruptly to the level of
Lake Langaza, thence turns eastward to the height of Dautbaba,
after which the lines could be stretched to the borders of the
swampy region at the mouth of the Vardar, ground which is as
impassable as the Pripet Marshes on the Russian front and
which were formerly occupied by the Bulgarian comatjis, in spite
of all the efforts of the Turks to eject or capture them.
On December 20, 1915, there arrived in Saloniki, General de
Castelnau, Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. He
324
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
%
BULGARIAN ATTACKS 325
came with the same purpose that had brought Lord Kitchener,
to make a tour of inspection of the Near Eastern situation. No
doubt a certain anxiety was felt in France and England regard-
ing the security of the Saloniki position, and General de Castel-
nau had been dispatched to investigate. With General Sarrail
he made a thorough survey of the French lines, and with General
Mahon he undertook an equally searching tour of the British
section. Apparently he was satisfied with the situation, for soon
after he stated in an interview to the press that the position
of the Allies in Saloniki was excellent. After having passed &
week with Generals Sarrail and Mahon, he paid a short visit
to King Constantine on the 26th. On the same day the French
Government issued an official communique, which announced that
General de Castelnau, together with Generals Sarrail and Mahon,
had settled upon the plan of action to be followed by the Allies
and that he had assured the French Government that the ar-
rangements which had already been made rendered the safely
of the whole expedition absolutely certain.
This statement came as rather a strong contrast to an official
declaration made by the German Government to the effect that
Germany would be established in Saloniki by January 15, 1916.
Possibly the Teutonic allies may have planned at that time to
initiate a campaign against Saloniki, but apparently pressure
on their lines on the other fronts became so strong as to divert
them from this object.
However, the year was not to close without some disturbance
of the monotony of the situation that now set in at Saloniki.
In the middle of the forenoon of December 30, 1915, an attack
was made on the city by a fleet of the enemy's aeroplanes, which
sailed overhead at a great height and dropped bombs, doing
considerable damage. One bomb fell on a detachment of Greek
troops, which was carrying on drill maneuvers outside the city
in the presence of Prince Andrew of Greece. Attempts were
made from the warships in the harbor to reach the aircraft with
their antiaircraft guns, but as the aeroplanes were over ten thou-
sand feet high they were not hit. French aeroplanes were sent
up to engage them, but by the time they had circled up to the
326 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
same high altitude, the enemy had disappeared over the mountain
tops toward Monastir.
Less than six hours later the soldiers of the Allies suddenly
descended on the German, Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish
consulates and arrested the enemy consuls and vice-consuls,
taking them prisoners together with their families and entire
staffs. They were immediately marched down to the quays and
sent aboard one of the battleships. The four consular buildings
were then taken over by the Allies as barracks. On the following
day the consuls and their belongings were on their way across
the Mediterranean to some unknown destination, though, as
developed later, they were landed at Marseilles in France, thence
sent to, and liberated in, Switzerland. Later the Norwegian con-
sul was also arrested on a charge of espionage.
One of the disadvantages under which the Allies labored
in Saloniki was the comparative ease with which the enemy
could spy on their movements. This had especially been the
case when their lines had been advanced beyond the Greek
frontier.
The Greek Government protested at this breach of neutrality,
declaring that such high-handed proceedings undermined its
sovereignty and the enemy Powers also protested and threatened
reprisals.
Further proof of the decision that the Allies had made to re-
main in Saloniki was given by their occupation of Castellorizo,
an island lying off the mainland of Asia Minor near Rhodes,
commanding the Gulf of Adalia. Five hundred French soldiers
had been landed, with a view to using the place as a base for
operations in that part of Turkey, should that later become
feasible. The Greek Government again protested, as it also
did when, in the first week of January, the Allies arrested the
German, Austrian, and Turkish consuls at Mitylene for the same
reasons that had led to the arrests in Saloniki, and shipped
these men away on a man-of-war. Greece was indeed kept
quite busy framing protests during this period, for on January
11, 1916! a detachment of French soldiers took possession and
military control of the island of Corfu, but the Greek garrison
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA 327
there offered no opposition. The place had some strategic value,
but the main purpose for which it was to be used was as a
sanitarium for the Serbian refugees, who were beginning to
arrive from Albania, and many of whom were in miserable
physical condition.
CHAPTER XXXIX
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA —
CONQUEST OF MONTENEGRO
WHILE the French and British were strengthening their
position in Saloniki in every possible way, the Italians were
beginning a movement which .was to have some influence in the
Balkans.
Already, a year before, Italy had landed a small containing
force in Avlona, Albania, on the Adriatic coast, because Greece
had previously occupied a section of southern Albania, contiguous
to her frontier. Albania, it will be remembered, had been de-
clared an independent nation after the Balkan wars and William
of Wied had been appointed its sovereign, by the consent of the
Powers. But so turbulent had his subjects been that finally,
when an uprising threatened his life, he fled on a foreign war-
ship. The leader of the Albanians, in so far as they could
be brought to respect any one general leader, was Essad Pasha,
the Albanian commander at Scutari, who had defended that place
so long and so valiantly against the attacks of the Montenegrins
during the First Balkan War.
Already in the latter days of November there had been rumors
that Italy was landing an army of considerable size in Avlona,
to assist the Serbians. This could easily be done without at-
tracting much attention, as this town, often described as the
"Gibraltar of the Adriatic,9' is not more than fifty or sixty miles
from the Italian coast and can be reached by steamer in a few
hours. Its occupation by an enemy would be highly undesirable,
from the point of view of Italian interests.
328 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Baron Sonnino, the Italian prime minister, made a speech in
which he declared that Italy was determined to do everything to
assist the Serbian army, and that the Italian flag on the other
side of the Adriatic would also constitute a reaffirmation of Italy's
traditional policy, which included the maintenance of Albanian
independence.
By the end of the first week of December, 1915, an army of
50,000 had been landed. With part of this force Italy occupied
Durazzo on December 21, 1915, joining up there with Essad
Pasha, who had declared himself against Austria. A few days
later this chief, in the name of the Albanian nation, declared
war on Austria.
Meanwhile, the Austrian warships had become very active
along the coast; in December their activities culminated in an
attempt to bombard Durazzo, whereupon they were engaged by
some Italian, French, and British ships and compelled to retire,
with the loss of two destroyers.
Thus, at the beginning of the year 1916, a period of compara-
tive quiet seemed to be settling down over the Balkans, with one
exception. And that exception was Montenegro. Austria was
now prepared to turn her full attention to this little state, whose
soldiers had invaded her territory several times, during the
Serbian campaign at the very beginning of the war, and now
again, when the final invasion had been undertaken.
Little was heard of Montenegro in the press dispatches, but
she had thrown the full strength of her little army into the
field against the Austro-German invaders. Before the Balkan
wars her fighting men had numbered some forty thousand, but
by this time they were reduced to something less than twenty
thousand. They were short of artillery and munitions, short of
all kinds of supplies, even food, but it was a difficult task for
the Allies to offer them any material relief. Montenegro is
unserved by any seaport and even the Italians who had landed
at Avloha did not hope to establish any communication with
them through the mountainous country intervening.
The one topographical feature of Montenegro that must be
especially noted is a mountain which rises abruptly, dominating
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA 329
the surrounding Austrian territory along the coast, more es-
pecially the seaport and naval station, Cattaro. The importance
of this eminence, Mount Lovcen, would have been paramount,
had it been properly equipped for offensive action.
For Cattaro is a natural harbor of the first order, capable
of accommodating the whole Austrian fleet. The barracks at
Cattaro are plainly visible from the top of Mount Lovcen, but to
bring guns of a large enough caliber up there to reach those
barracks was practically impossible, on account of the rugged
nature of the surrounding country.
During the ten weeks the fourth and final invasion of Serbia
was running its course, the warriors of the Black Mountains
were engaged in giving their kinsmen, the Serbians, their full
support. Indeed, the Montenegrin army, though it amounted
only to a few regiments, had held a slice of Bosnia for some time,
formed the left flank of the whole Serbian position and did good
service during the earlier stages of the conflict, being opposed to
the Austrian lines around Fotcha and on the Lim, a branch of
the Drina.
But the Austrians along this part of the front were satisfied
merely to hold the Montenegrins back, not a very difficult task,
considering their numbers. On the other hand, any attempt to
advance into their mountainous country would have been an
extremely arduous undertaking, entirely out of proportion to the
importance of the Montenegrin forces, from a military point of
view.
When Serbia had finally been overrun, Mackensen withdrew
his Germans and also some of the Austrians, these being sent
north up to the Russian front, where there seemed danger of
renewed activities on the part of the czar's forces. Especially
threatening were the rumors that the Russians were about to
make a descent on Bulgaria through Rumania, or across the
Black Sea.
The Austrians along the Montenegrin front, however, re-
mained where they were and presently they were strongly
reenforced, for Austria was determined on the permanent elimi-
nation of Montenegro, as she had been determined on putting
330 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
an end to the Serbian nation. Nor was this impossible, in
spite of the mountainous nature of the country, if only the
invaders were provided with heavy enough guns. What could
be done in Serbia could also be done in Montenegro.
As far back as the middle of November, 1915, it was
announced in the dispatches from Rome that Austria was as-
sembling a force of three army corps in Herzegovina to attack
Montenegro from that side. There was also available the
Austrian troops already in Serbia on the eastern frontier of
Montenegro, to say nothing of the Bulgarians, who so far as-
sisted the Austrians as to take Djakova, on December 3, 1915.
The whole expedition was put under the command of Von
Kovess, shortly after the fall of Mitrovitza.
King Nicholas was not ignorant of what was coming. At the
end of November, 1915, after Serbia's last resistance had been
overcome, he issued a proclamation to his people in which he
said that Montenegro would continue the fight to the bitter end,
even though it was probable that she would share the fate of
Serbia. The Allies, he went on to state, would make every effort
to keep, not only the army, but the people as well, supplied with
all that was needed to live and to resist the enemy. Supplies had
always been a hard problem in that poverty-stricken little land
and when the Serbian refugees began flocking in, it became
an insoluble problem, unless with help from outside, which was
not always forthcoming.
It was obvious that, in spite of the fact that they had assisted
in a successful invasion of Serbia, the Austrians, now that they
were by themselves again, were not so confident of overcoming
even the Montenegrins that they could afford to undertake the
campaign impulsively, for during the whole month of December,
1915, they did not press the campaign on the Montenegrin front.
During this period and the first week of January, 1916, they were
satisfied with more or less holding their lines, though they did
advance some distance on the eastern, or Sanjak, front, cap-
turing Plevlie, Ipek, and Bielopolie. But, as an offset to this
success, the Montenegrins scored at least one victory of con-
siderable magnitude. On December 1, 1915, the Montenegrin
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA 331
forces operating in southeastern Bosnia defeated the Austrians
near Foca, on the Drina, seven miles across the Drina, forcing
the enemy to retreat along the river toward Gorazda. A few
days later the Austrians retaliated by sending an aeroplane
flying over Cettinje, which dropped a number of bombs on that
small city. Other aeroplanes, flying over the Montenegrin
encampments, dropped circulars stating that all Serbia had been
conquered, and if Montenegro made any further resistance, she
would suffer the same fate. Toward the end of the month the
Austrians began a heavy bombardment of Mount Lovcen and
launched a strong infantry attack against it, but were repelled
with considerable losses.
On December 23, 1915, the Montenegrin Government reported
having inflicted a reverse on the Austrians advancing from the
east. The Austrians bombarded violently in the Mojkovac sector,
then attacked Touriak, in the direction of Rozai-Berane, but
were thrown back. At Berane the Montenegrins assumed the
offensive for a brief space, and at Bielo they drove the enemy
troops back as far as Ivania.
However, these were all minor operations and the successes
of the Montenegrins were not of a permanent nature. Apparently
the Austrians were all this time strengthening their lines and
arranging their forces for the general offensive, which they were
ready to begin early in January, 1916.
On January 6, 1916, Kdvess began decisive operations with a
series of violent attacks on the eastern front, on the Rivers
Tara, Urn, and Ibar, while at the same time the warships in the
Gulf of Cattaro opened a terrific fire on Mount Lovcen.
For four days the Montenegrin troops offered a determined
resistance. Berane, on the Lim, was captured by the Austrians
on the 10th. On the same day the warships suddenly ceased
their bombardment of Mount Lovcen and Austrian infantry
swept up the mountain sides and delivered a strong attack. The
handful of Montenegrins at the top were completely overwhelmed
and Lovcen was captured. Some surprise was expressed among
the Allies at the time that this supposedly powerful stronghold
should so easily succumb, but it soon developed that the defenders
.-*•
332 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
were not only short of food, but they had run out of ammunition
and had practically fired their last cartridges.
With Lovcen in the hands of the enemy Cettinje could no
longer be held by the Montenegrins, and on January 13, 1916, it
was occupied by the Austrians. The back of the Montenegrin
resistance had now been broken.
On January 17, 1916, it was announced in the Austrian Par-
liament by Count Tisza that the Montenegrin Government had
sued for terms of peace. Montenegro's official version of this
sudden surrender was given in a note by the Montenegrin Consul
General in Paris:
"The newspapers announce that unhappy Montenegro has
had to submit to the inevitable after having struggled heroically
under particularly disadvantageous conditions against an enemy
much superior in number and formidably armed. It may be
considered as certain that if the king and the Government have
yielded it is because the army had expended the last of its
munitions.
"Even flight was impossible. The enemy was on the frontiers ;
there was no escape by the sea; inveterate hostility was to be
encountered in Albania. If the Serbian army was able to escape
from Serbia, the weak contingents of Montenegro, exhausted by
the superhuman efforts of their long and desperate, but effective
resistance, and by privations of all kinds, were not able to seek
refuge on friendly territory. It is possible to discuss ad in*
finitum the conditions of the suspension of hostilities, the details
of which, it is to be observed, come from enemy sources; it is
even possible to heap insults on the unfortunate conquered. . . ."
The question immediately raised in the British and French
newspapers was : who opened negotiations with the enemy — the
king or his minister? Mi'uskovitch, who was frankly in favor
of the Austrians, had become premier at a critical moment in
Montenegro's fate and negotiations were undoubtedly proceed-
ing while the fighting on Mount Lovcen was still in progress.
It was said that this was well known to the troops in the field,
and in consequence they had not made so determined a resist*
ance as they might otherwise have done,
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA 333
Meanwhile throughout Germany and Austria celebrations of
the great victory were going on and a Vienna paper published
what purported to be the terms that were to be granted the
conquered Montenegrins, harsh in the extreme. It was even in-
dicated that the Montenegrin soldiers must all serve with the
Austrians on the Italian front. And next there was a strange
silence, a period during which no mention at all was made of
Montenegrins, as to whether they had accepted the terms or
not.
Meanwhile among the Allies, who had not expected that Monte-
negro would give in so quickly, there was much criticism of
the little state's surrender. It was suggested that it had been
inspired for dynastic reasons, by a pro-Austrian section of the
court. It was even asserted that King Nicholas had secretly
come to terms with Austria before the fall of Mount Lovcen
and that the resistance put up by the Montenegrins was unreal
and of a purely theatrical character. It was recalled that the
wife of the Montenegrin Crown Prince was a German princess.
It was said that a compact was in existence, and had been in
existence for several months, by which Montenegro agreed to
hand Mount Lovcen over to the Austrians in return for Scutari.
These speculations were finally terminated by an official state-
ment issued by Sir J. Roper Parkington, the Consul General
for Montenegro in London, in which he said that the king and the
Government of Montenegro had peremptorily refused the con-
ditions of peace offered them by Austria and that Montenegro
would continue the struggle to the bitter end. The announcement
made by the Austrian Government that the Montenegrins had
already laid down their arms seemed, therefore, to have been
without foundation. This communique also stated that all the
reports issued by the Austrians had been in large part untrue.
"King Nicholas/9 continued this official announcement, "re-
mains with his two sons at the head of his troops, to organize a
final defense, and to take part, in case of necessity, in the retreat
of his brave army. His majesty expresses the hope that the
Allies will eventually afford him effectual assistance for the re-
treat, as they have already done for the Serbian army."
834 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
In the fourth week in January, 1916, the Montenegrin premier,
M. Miuskovitch, issued a note admitting there had been negotia-
tions with Austria, but asserted that they had been merely a pre-
text to gain time, to insure the safe retreat of the army toward
Podgoritza and Scutari, as well as to give opportunity to the
Serbian troops to leave Podgoritza and Scutari for Alessio and
Durazzo in Albania.
On January 23, 1916, old King Nicholas appeared in Rome,
where he was met by his son-in-law, the King of Italy, and
from thence he went on to Lyons, in France, where his queen
had preceded him and where, by the courtesy of the French
Government, the capital of Montenegro was temporarily es-
tablished.
At this time the Austrian Government had continued issuing
reports to the effect that the Montenegrin soldiers were laying
down their arms, but this seems to have been only partly true.
Though many of them were captured, a much greater number
joined the Serbians in Albania, where they made a juncture
with the forces under Essad Pasha.
The Austrians, however, continued their advance, occupying
Scutari on the 23d and San Giovanni di Medua on the 25th.
Thus Montenegro itself was finally overrun.
But this little country, the poorest in Europe, offered the
Austrians very little reward for their enterprise.
An Austrian journalist, accompanying the invading forces
when they took possession of the king's palace in Cettinje,
described the interior decorations as follows:
"In the reception room two great oil paintings occupied the
positions of honor. One was that of the Emperor of Austria
and the other was that of the Queen of Hungary. In the king's
study, on one of the writing tables, there was a portrait of
Francis Joseph and in other rooms we also came across his
picture."
On the whole, Montenegro had not made the desperate resist-
ance which its reputation for hard fighting had led people to
believe it would put up. This partial failure was explained by
M. Miuskovitch, who declared that when Montenegro entered
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA
335
V— War St 4
THE AUSTRIAN CAMPAIGN JN MONTENEGRO
336 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the war on the side of the Allies she had been promised every-
thing necessary for the army and also for the civil population,
because even in normal times they import wheat. Russia and
France were to have sent supplies, but this promise could not be
carried out. They had done the best they could with the
materials on hand, but without ammunition they could not be
expected to fight.
The Montenegrins, said the premier, had been given the task
of protecting the rear of the Serbian army and they had de-
fended the Sandjak frontier so successfully that on this side the
Serbians had had time to retire. But when the Serbians were
obliged to fall back on Montenegrin territory, their arrival pre-
cipitated events. The Montenegrins had still some supplies, but
with 120,000 to 130,000 additional mouths to feed, these were
soon exhausted. On many occasions the Montenegrin soldiers
did not receive rations for a whole week and when they did,
each ration only amounted to half a pound of corn flour a day.
After escaping, King Nicholas sent the following letter to Gen-
eral Vukovitch:
"I order you anew to resist the enemy in the most energetic
way possible. In the event of a retreat, follow the direction of
the Serbian army toward Durazzo. The Serbian commanders
have been informed of this. You will receive food supplies at
Medua and farther on.
"Prince Mirko and all the other ministers who have re-
mained cannot in any case open negotiations with anyone what-
ever. The French Government has promised our retreating
army all possible facilities, such as it gave to the Serbian army.
Prince Mirko and the other ministers must in no case remain,
but make every possible effort to escape."
Having completed their invasion of Montenegro, the Austrians
now began to continue their advance over into Albania. On
January 26, 1916, they reached San Giovanni di Medua, a seaport
in northern Albania. At the same time Essad Pasha at Durazzo
reported that he was being threatened by an Austrian and Bul-
garian column marching northwest from Berat, while still an-
other column was heading toward the Italian forces in Avlona.
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA 337
Meanwhile all haste was being made in getting the Serbians
safely out of Albania and transporting them to Corfu, the Greek
island lying south of Avlona, in the Adriatic, which the Allies
had occupied under the protest of the Greek Government This
undertaking was much facilitated by an improvement in the
weather, which until then had been very severe, and by the con-
struction of bridges across the rivers by a force of British
engineers. Depots of provisions were also established along all
the roads by which the refugees were straggling in toward the
coast. The few guns, limbers, and munitions which these
fragments of the Serbian army had brought with them were
transported to Brindisi. At about the same time that the
Austrians occupied San Giovanni di Medua, a Bulgarian detach-
ment had occupied Dibra, in southern Albania, just above
the Greek frontier and not far from Lake Ochrida and
Monastir.
On February 10, 1916, the last of the Serbian soldiers had
been taken out of Albania. In spite of the attempt made by
Austrian ships and submarines, involving several minor naval
engagements with the ships of the Allies, the embarkations
had been going on at the rate of from eight to ten thousand
men a day. In Corfu alone, 75,000 had been landed ; others were
taken to Bizerta, the French naval port in Tunis, and some had
been sent to Italy. On this date Dr. Vesnitch, the Serbian minis-
ter in Paris, made the following statement:
"One hope still illumines the night of invaded Serbia; her
avenging army. At present that army numbers more than
100,000 men. It can be confidently stated that it will be increased
to 160,000."
On February 11, 1916, the Austrians had advanced within a
few miles of Durazzo and on the following day occupied the
Tirana heights, between Breza and Bazar Siak, Breza being
about twelve miles northeast of Durazzo and Bazar Siak about
halfway between these two towns. Two days later the Italian
forces advanced against this Austrian column and delivered a
strong attack, which was repulsed by the Austrians, according
to Vienna dispatches. Meanwhile the Bulgarians were occupying
838 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Fieri, about sixteen miles from Avlona, and claimed that they
had taken possession of a third of southern Albania. A day
or two later the Austrian and Bulgarian columns operating in
central Albania made a junction and occupied Elbassan, thirty-
eight miles southeast of Durazzo.
The enemy was, in fact, closing in on Durazzo. On February
25, 1916, the Austro-Bulgarian forces had driven the Italians
to the isthmus west of the Durs lakes and the Austrian artillery
began to open fire on Durazzo itself. At daybreak the next
morning the Austrians closed in and the Italians and Albanians
under Essad Pasha were finally, after a spirited resistance,
driven back from their positions at Bazar Siak. Soon afterward
the Italians on the southern bank of the lower Arzen were
forced to abandon their positions. The Austrians crossed the
river and proceeded southward.
At noon a decisive action east of Bazar Siak drove the Italians
from their positions. The same fate was suffered by the de-
fenders of Sasso Blanco, six miles east of Durazzo. By evening
the entire outer circle of defenses had been taken. The Aus-
trians, advancing to the inner line positions, observed that the
Italians were embarking on their ships.
They were now able to reach the docks with their artillery,
and attempted to hinder the retirement of the Italians with a
heavy shell fire and succeeded in inflicting some damage to some
of the ships. But by the following morning the Italians had
made good their escape, and with them went Essad Pasha and
his Albanian troops.
On February 28, 1916, the Austrian Government issued a full
report on the campaign in Albania which had culminated in that
section in the capture of Durazzo:
'The Austrian troops have captured Durazzo. During the
forenoon one column, under the fire of the Italians, advanced
across the northern isthmus to Portos, four miles north of
Durazzo. Our troops advancing across the southern isthmus were
hindered at the beginning by the fire of the Italian artillery, but
toward night numerous detachments, by wading, swimming, and
floating, reached the bridge east of Durazzo, driving back the
SERBIA, GREECE, AND RUMANIA 339
Italian rear guard. At dawn an Austrian battalion entered the
burning town."
The spoils were, according to tiie report, twenty-three cannon,
including six big coast defense guns, 10,000 rifles, and a large
amount of artillery ammunition and provisions.
The Italian version was:
"After our ships had silenced the enemy batteries and swept
the coast and near-by roads of their fire, all the Italian troops
which were sent temporarily to Durazzo to cover the evacuation
of the Serbians, Montenegrins, and Albanians, reembarked with-
out incident and were transported to Avlona, notwithstanding
the bad weather which still prevails in the lower Adriatic. War
material which was still serviceable was also taken aboard the
ships and the damaged supplies were either rendered useless
or destroyed."
Thus, by the first of March the Austro-Bulgarian forces had
almost completed their conquest of Albania, the only important
point still in the hands of the Italians being Avlona. At this
point, however, the Italians had made longer and bigger prep-
arations for defense, besides which they were here in far greater
numbers, estimated at from 50,000 to 120,000.
CHAPTER XL
CONDITIONS IN SERBIA, GREECE,
AND RUMANIA
DURING this time the Bulgarians and Germans were es-
tablishing a semicivil government in Serbia. Many conflict-
ing reports were circulated, some of them to the effect that
there was much friction between the German and Bulgarian
officers. Whether Germany and Bulgaria really intended to
make an attack on Saloniki has until now been a question, but
in those districts near the Greek frontier considerable forces of
Germans remained, garrisoning the large towns, notably Mo*
340 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
nastir. The forces along the frontier itself were Bulgarians at
first, but toward the end of February, 1916, detachments of
Germans began taking their places along the front. The Allies
in Saloniki reported that up to this time there were heavy
desertions from the Bulgarian forces, the deserters coming in
to Saloniki, complaining that they were starved and did not wish
to fight the French and British. When the Germans appeared
on the front, these desertions suddenly ceased.
In the middle of January Emperor William of Germany paid
Serbia a visit and inspected the captured towns and cities of
most prominence. On the 18th he arrived in Nish, where he
was met by King Ferdinand and Prince Boris of Bulgaria. The
two sovereigns then attended Mass in the cathedral together,
after which they reviewed the troops.
At a dinner which followed the emperor announced to King
Ferdinand his nomination to the rank of a Prussian field marshal
and presented him with the baton. King Ferdinand in turn
bestowed the order for bravery on the emperor and General
von Mackensen. In a speech which he made, King Ferdinand
addressed the emperor with "Ave Imperator, Cesar et Rex/'
("Hail Emperor, Caesar and King.")
During the first two months of the year the Allies had con-
tinued to reenf orce their forces in Saloniki, and toward the end
of February there were reports to the effect that General Sarrail
would assume an offensive up into Macedonia and Bulgaria. On
January 20, 1916, the ships of the Allies again bombarded Dedea-
gatch vigorously, then proceeded to Port Lagos and swept that
seaport with a heavy shell fire. A few days later a feat, which
in some respects established a new record in the annals of French
aviation, was performed by an attacking squadron of forty
French aeroplanes.
The French squadron left Saloniki at seven in the morning and
divided into two parts, one of which proceeded to Monastir,
about sixty miles distant, and the other going to Ghevgli. Some
of the aeroplanes were armed with guns.
Altogether over two hundred projectiles were discharged at
the enemy's camp, on the building occupied by the Bulgarian
SERBIA, GREECE, AND RUMANIA 341
headquarters in Monastir, and on other military establishments.
The airmen were vigorously bombarded in return, but sus-
tained no casualties. One notable feature of the raid was that
the squadron had to contend with a forty-mile gale from abeam
during the whole trip and they had also to fly over mountains
6,000 feet in height. By noon both sections of the squadron had
returned to Saloniki.
On the part of Greece there was no change; she still continued
her attitude of sullen acquiescence to the presence of the Allies'
troops in Saloniki. In the last week of January General Sarrail
sent a detachment to occupy Cape and Fort Kara Burun, about
twelve miles from Saloniki and commanding the harbor. This
action, it was stated, was due to the fact that a British transport
had been torpedoed by a German submarine under the very guns
of the fort. As usual, Greece protested, and, again as usual,
no notice was taken of her protest.
At about this same time King Constantine sent for the Ameri-
can correspondent of the Associated Press in Athens and asked
him to make public certain statements he wished to make, where-
upon he gave the journalist an interview so remarkable that when
it was published it attracted world-wide attention.
"It is the merest cant/' he said, "for Great Britain and France
to talk about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium after
what they themselves have done and are doing. . . . The
only forum of public opinion open to me is the United States.
The situation is far too vital for me to care a snap about royal
dignity in the matter of interviews when the very life of Greece
as an independent country is at stake. I shall appeal to America
again and again, if necessary, for that fair hearing which has
been denied me by the press of the Allies.
"Just look at the list of Greek territories already occupied by
the allied troops — Lemnos, Imbros, Mytilene, Castelloriza, Corfu,
Saloniki, including the Chalcidice Peninsula, and a large part of
Macedonia. In proportion to all Greece it is as if that part of
the United States which was won from Mexico after the Mexican
War were occupied by foreign troops, and not so much as by
your leave. . . . Where is the necessity for the occupation
842 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
of Corfu? If Greece is an ally of Serbia, so also is Italy, and
transportation of the Serbs to Italy would be simpler than to
Corfu. Is it because the Italians are refusing to accept the Serbs,
fearing the spread of cholera, and the Allies are thinking that
the Greeks want to be endangered by cholera any more than
the Italians? . . . The history of the Balkan politics of
the Allies is the record of one crass mistake after another, and
now, through pique over the failure of their every Balkan cal-
culation, they try to unload on Greece the results of their own
stupidity. We warned them that the Gallipoli expedition would
be fruitless and that the Austro-Germans would surely crush
Serbia. ... At the beginning of the war eighty per cent of
the Greeks were favorable to the Allies; to-day not forty, no,
not twenty per cent would turn their hands to aid the Allies/9
As for Venizelos, his voice was no longer heard. So disliked
was he by the Government that when certain soldiers joined in
a celebration of his name-day, fifty of them were sentenced to a
month's confinement as a punishment for so expressing their
sympathy. In the middle of February, 1916, this enmity was
especially acute. Venizelos himself told a journalist that he was
holding himself so aloof from politics that he did not even read
the reports of the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies.
But on March 1, 1916, there was a report from Athens that
King Constantine had suddenly summoned Venizelos. Several
interviews followed, and it was then announced that the king
and Venizelos were reconciled. Whether that meant any change
in Greece's policy was not mentioned. The general impression
prevailed at this time, however, that the great success of the
Russians in Asiatic Turkey was having its effect on the King of
Greece and his Government.
Of Rumania little was heard during the entire winter, no
startling changes having taken place in her attitude. In January
the British Government contracted with Rumania for the pur-
chase of 800,000 tons of wheat, to the value of about fifty million
dollars, to be delivered by the middle of April.
On February 14, 1916, the Rumanian Government announced
that its mobilization had been completed by the calling up of a
SERBIA, GREECE, AND RUMANIA 843
fresh class and that the General Staff was completing the de-
fenses of the Carpathians and the fortifications along the banks
of the Danube in the new Dobrudja territory, which had been
taken from Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars. Take Jonescu,
the well-known Rumanian statesman, in an interview with a
French journalist on the same date said :
"As regards Rumanian policy ; we made a great mistake in not
intervening when Bulgaria entered the war. I hope that we shall
not make the same mistake again and that we shall not quail
before Germany's threats, if she makes them. . . . The
country is unanimous on this point"
PART VII— THE DARDANELLES AND RIjSSO-
TURKISH CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER XLI
CONDITIONS IN GALLIPOLI — ATTACK
AT SUVLA BAY
WE left the allied troops at the end of July, 1915, firmly
established at two points on the Gallipoli Peninsula. But
though they had won these secure bases by terrible losses and
much heroism, yet they had progressed but slightly toward their
ultimate objects — the capture of the three key points to the
peninsula defenses and the opening of the Dardanelles to the
fleets of England, France, and Russia.
Indeed, it had become apparent, not only to those in com-
mand on the spot, but to the authorities in London and in Paris,
that the allied forces had reached a condition of stalemate on
the two fronts. In other words, the Turks by their stubborn,
intelligent, and brave defense had eliminated the possibility
of the element of surprise, without which it was almost hope-
less to expect success under the modern conditions of trench
warfare.
Much as the world appreciated the virtues of the Turk as a
fighting man, it must be confessed that he furnished the allied
troops with an unpleasant surprise. He displayed, first of all,
a quite remarkable degree of bravery, hurling himself against
the intrenched troops of France aand England with an abandon
and a disregard of personal safely that excited the admiration
of his enemies. The whole Gallipoli campaign is replete with
examples of Turkish valor.
844
CONDITIONS IN GALLIPOU 345
Furthermore, the Turks were well led, not only by their Ger-
man officers, but by the Turkish commanders as well. Frequently
they surprised and confounded the allied command in this
respect, successfully foiling vital movements by daring and
original maneuvers. This was all the more remarkable because
it demanded cool thinking at critical moments, not the excited
religious fanaticism for which the Turk had been noted. The
Turk is an adept in the construction of trenches and their use.
Thus it became apparent to all that if any real success was
to be obtained in the Dardanelles campaign the element of sur-
prise must be reintroduced. Sir Ian Hamilton refused to throw
away his troops in hopeless frontal attacks against practically
impregnable defenses. He called upon Lord Kitchener for re-
enforcements, at the same time issuing an encouraging bulletin
to his troops, telling them that help was coming.
These new troops, which began to arrive at Mudros about the
first week of August, 1915, were not to be used for strengthen-
ing the two fronts, but were to be employed in an entirely fresh
attempt to surprise the Turks at a new point, push inland before
the defenders had time to bring up troops, and seize commanding
positions in the first great rush. In fact it was a repetition of
the attempts made at Achi Baba and Krithia at the original
landings, applying the lessons learned at such tremendous cost
on those occasions.
Besides the military considerations which made such an at-
tempt desirable, the political situation in the Balkans made an
allied success in the Dardanelles highly imperative. The success
of the great German drive against the Russians in Poland and
Galicia had had a disturbing effect upon at least one of the Bal-
kan neutrals. Bulgaria, it soon became apparent, was preparing
to enter the struggle on the side of the Central Powers and
Entente diplomats reported to their Governments that nothing
short of a smashing victory at the Strait would change the pur-
pose of King Ferdinand. Furthermore, the Entente Powers were
disturbed over the attitude of Greece and Rumania. It had been
confidently expected that the latter country would enter the
struggle on the side of the Entente Powers at the same time
346 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
that Italy actively entered the struggle. Indeed, the Bank of
England had made an advance to Rumania of $25,000,000,
although it was expressly understood that the loan was purely
a business transaction and had no political import. It was
believed that Rumanian sympathy, as a whole, was with the
Entente Powers, but it was known that financial, commercial,
and dynastic ties with Germany and Austria were important and
might at any moment, in favorable circumstances, turn the
scales in favor of the Central Powers.
It had become apparent, too, that even Greece had been im-
pressed by the success of the Germans. It was known that
King Constantine, with his strong German sympathies, and es-
pecially his oft-expressed admiration for the power of the Ger-
man military machine, was determined at all costs to keep
his little kingdom out of the great struggle. Inasmuch as
these two countries, Greece and Rumania, had been confidently
regarded as belligerents on the side of the Entente Powers, even
their neutrality was regarded as a blow to the Allies.
This, then, was the situation that made a dashing stroke in
Gallipoli necessary. Sir Ian Hamilton prepared for it with
great skill. A point called Suvla Bay, north of the base es-
tablished by the Australian and New Zealand troops at Anzac
Cove, was selected for the point of landing, aiming to cooperate
with the force already ashore and assisted by a strong diversion
aimed against the Bulair lines.
For this supreme attack, upon which so much was dependent,
fresh troops were brought from England — men who had seen
nothing of the fighting on any front. Indeed, it is a question for
future experts and historians to argue pro and con whether or
not the outcome of the attack was not due almost entirely to
this use of green troops. How they were depended upon in a
crucial operation, how they wavered, and the consequences to
the allied operations will be told in the narrative.
Suvla Bay lies between five and six miles from Anzac Cove. It
is a wide, shallow indentation forming an almost perfect half
circle. Although the landing facilities were not as good as at
some other points on the coast of the peninsula, it had the ad-
CONDITIONS IN GALLIPOLI 347
vantage of providing plenty of more or less open country for
maneuvering, once the troops were well ashore. This was an
element lacking in the case of all the other landings, and one
that Sir Ian Hamilton found of vital importance. The nature
of the Gallipoli country as a whole made flank attacks almost
impossible, but he hoped in the case of the fresh landing to be
able to avoid a direct frontal assault.
The new troops, once ashore at Suvla Bay, were to push rapidly
across country, skirt Salt Lake, and carry the crest of the Ana-
farta Hills, a range running to something like 600 feet in
height and dominating two important roads and the adjacent
country, excepting the all-important peak of Sari Bair.
At the same time the Australian and New Zealand troops
were to make a sudden and supreme attack upon Sari Bair itself,
It speaks volumes for the confidence which Sir Ian Hamilton
had in the fighting qualities of these colonial troops that he set
them such a tremendous task. Since the landing at Anzac Cove,
the Turks, under the supervision of their German mentors, had
fortified every yard of the thousand feet of heights known as
Sari Bair. An unprecedented number of machine guns had been
brought up and placed in concealed positions from which it was
possible to sweep every line of advance, thus powerfully in-
creasing the volume of the infantry and artillery fire. It did not
seem possible that an attack, however resolutely and bravely
made, could succeed in the face of such a fierce defense.
The third element in this new attack was to be a demonstra-
tion against Earachali, on the European mainland of Turkey,
menacing the Bulair lines as well as the railway running to
Sofia, Bulgaria. For this purpose a number of troopships and
warships carrying what was known as the Greek Legion and
made up of Cretan volunteers, were to be used. It was hoped
that this diversion would attract most of the available reserves
in and about the Gallipoli Peninsula and make impossible the re-
enforcement of the troops stationed near Anaf arta Hills and Sari
Bair.
The fourth and last element was to consist of a determined
attack upon the Turkish defenses about Krithia, pinning to that
348 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
spot all the troops possible. Curiously enough the plans of the
Turkish command, dominated by Enver Pasha, favored the allied
troops in that the Turks had planned an attack upon the enemy
on the Krithia lines about this time and had concentrated most
of their available reserves near the tip of the peninsula.
This intention on the part of the Turks was undoubtedly due
to the information they had received of the arrival of fresh
British troops. But quickly as they pushed forward their prep-
arations, the Allies were too lively for them. On August 6,
1915, the French and British troops advanced against the Turks
and there followed some of the most determined and desperate
fighting of the whole Dardanelles campaign. In the fighting
the East Lancashire Division, a territorial force, did heroic
work and bore the brunt of the fighting. There were many in-
dividual feats of daring and bravery, yet one stands out con-
spicuously. A youthful Manchester schoolmaster, Lieutenant
W. T. Forshaw, held his trench against attacks for forty-five
hours. For forty-one of those hours he was continuously throw-
ing bombs and only desisted when his arm became temporarily
paralyzed. When, finally, the Turks swarmed into his trench,
revolver in hand he led his wearied troops and drove them
out. He richly deserved the coveted Victoria Cross which was
conferred upon him.
At dawn on the following day, the Australians began the
attack at Sari Bair. The force at Anzac Cove had been re-
enforced with Indian troops and two divisions of the new troops
from England. As planned, the operations at Sari Bair were to
consist of an attack, first on the right, to serve as a feint,
and then a main attack on the left which was to link up and
support the attack from Suvla Bay, moving around in back of
Salt Lake.
The attack on the right, upon what was called Lone Pine
Plateau, was a dispiriting failure on the opening day. The
dismounted troops of the Third Australian Light Horse, a mag-
nificent body of men, were sent forward to storm the elaborate
trenches of the enemy. The attack was made in three lines. The
first was mowed down to a man; of the second only a few sur-
CONDITIONS IN GALLIPOLI 349
vivars reached the Turkish trenches to be either captured or
killed; the third was stopped by a change of orders just as
it was about to follow the other two into the valley of sure
death.
On the following day, the 8th, the main Australian inf antry
forces were sent forward against the same trenches and,
after some bloody fighting, succeeded in capturing and holding
them against repeated counterattacks.
While this holding operation was in progress the main attack
was being made on the left. New Zealand and Australian
troops, supported by a picked force of Indian hillmen, used to
night warfare and campaigning in difficult mountain country,
starting in the evening of August 6, 1915, made a rapid march
along the coast as far as Fisherman's Hut. There large
quantities of stores had been gradually accumulated in prepara-
tion for this very movement.
At Fisherman's Hut the force, numbering 6,000 men, under
the command of Major General Sir A. J. Godley, turned sharply
inland and just before dawn, almost without the knowledge of
the Turkish defenders, had arrived within half a mile of one of
the dominating hills on the right flank of the vitally important
Sari Bair.
At this point Godley's force was split into three columns.
One composed of Australian troops, was based on Asma Dere,
almost within touch of Suvla Bay. The Indian troops were
within striking distance of Chunuk Bair, close to the towering
peak of Koja Chemen, rising sharply to almost 1,000 feet, while
the New Zealanders were within striking distance of Rho-
dodendron Ridge.
With the dawn of August 7, 1915, the Turks awoke to the
seriousness of the new menace. So difficult was the country
in which the British troops were operating that the Ottoman
commander had dismissed all idea of a serious attack from that
point and had merely posted patrols in the hills guarding the
flank of Sari Bair. Now, however, reserves were hurried to
the scene, and so rapidly and in such large numbers did they
arrive that the troops from Anzac were soon compelled to dig
350 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
themselves in in an attempt to hold what they had won by their
surprise march.
Early on the morning of August 8, 1915, the Australians
moved out from Asma Dere. They had as an objective a near-
by hill from which it was proposed to storm the height known
as Koja Chemen. Unfortunately for their plan, the Turks by
this time had brought up such forces that the Australians were
outnumbered. They had not proceeded far before they dis-
covered that they were being rapidly encircled. A retreat was
immediately decided upon and so closely were they followed by
the Turks that the British troops had difficulty even in holding
their original position at Asma Dere.
Meanwhile the New Zealanders were having more success.
Carrying full kit, food, and water, these splendid colonials clam-
bered up the steep sides of Rhododendron Ridge, swept the Turks
from the crest and charged up the southwestern slope of the
main peak of Sari Bair. There they dug in and fought des-
perately to hold their advantage against successive waves of
Turkish infantry that came charging down upon them.
At the same time the Indian troops gained some fresh ground
in the neighborhood of Hill Q.
During the night of August 8, 1915, and the early morning
of the following day, the officers of the British forces who had
survived the fighting reorganized the scattered remnants and
prepared for a fresh advance. About midnight reenforce-
ments arrived at all three bases and were hurried forward
to relieve as much as possible the exhausted men in the firing
line.
Just as dawn was breaking on August 9, 1915, word was
passed along the lines that a supreme effort was to be made to
carry the heights that barred the allied troops from a great
victory. British and French warships posted close inshore and
in wireless touch with the troops opened an intense bombard-
ment of the Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Koja Chemen. Then the
whistles blew, the infantry leaped out of its shallow trenches
and, with a yell that echoed and reechoed through the Gallipoli
hills, charged up the precipitous slopes.
CONDITIONS IN GALLIPOLI 351
Of the three columns, the greatest success was gained by the
Indians. Led by the hardy Gurkhas, they actually reached the
crest of Hill Q and looked down on the much-to-be-desired Strait,
bathed in the hot August sunshine.
The Turkish command full well realized the importance of this
position, and immediately guns from every angle were turned on
the Indian troops and the New Zealanders who were supporting
them on the left. A hurricane of shells was poured on the troops
before they had time to dig themselves in. A few seconds later
a counterattack was launched in such force against the New
Zealanders that they and the Indians were swept down the slopes
of Sari Bair.
By nightfall of August 8, 1915, the few Turkish patrols in
the district had been driven off and considerable forces of the
British troops had made their way inland. Splitting into two
columns, one moved north and seized Karakol Bagh; the other
and larger force marched across the low country until it had
arrived in position facing the Anafarta Ridge, its objective.
Lying between the line of advance from Suvla Bay to the
Anafarta Ridge and Asma Dere, the base of the Australian
troops operating against Sari Bair, were a number of hills, two
of which played supremely important parts in the fighting of
the next few days. They have been called Chocolate Hill and
Burnt Hill.
It was in an action against Chocolate Hill that the battle
opened. Moving in a night attack on August 8, 1915, Irish troops
stormed Chocolate Hill and came within measurable distance of
connecting up with the Australian division. Then preparations
were made for an attack upon the Anafarta Ridge.
On August 11, 1915, the right wing of the forces landed at
Suvla Bay succeeded in working along the coast and linking
up with the Australians at Asma Dere. They brought with them
to the hard-hitting Colonials the first word of the progress of the
Anafarta operation, and it was a bitter disappointment to the
latter to learn that their heroic efforts against Sari Bair had been
largely made in vain because of the failure of the Suvla Bay
force to accomplish its task*
W— War St 4
352 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Both sides then busied themselves preparing for the new war-
fare in this region. The British consolidated their positions,
and on August 15, 1915, sent forward the same Irish division
that had captured Chocolate Hill in an attempt to rush Dublin
Hill. After a hand-to-hand fight with the Turkish troops, who
swarmed out of their trenches to meet the charging Irishmen,
the hill was won.
The Turks, meanwhile, were strongly fortifying not only the
Anafarta Ridge proper but some of the hills commanding its
left flank. Here Hill 70 and Hill 112 were the major positions,
and on August 21, 1915, the British troops moved out in an
effort to capture them.
A portion of the British troops succeeded in reaching the top
of Hill 70. There, however, they were greeted by a terrible fire
from a battery concealed on Hill 112 and forced to fall back, first
to the lower slopes of the hill and then, when the fire slackened,
to their original intrenched positions.
Even less success was enjoyed by the troops making the as-
sault upon Hill 112. The Turkish artillery poured a curtain of
fire among the shrubs at the foot of the hill which effectively
prevented the proposed advance. Farther to the south at the
same time the Australians were attacking Hill 60 of the Sari
Bair group and succeeded in driving the Turkish defenders from
its crest.
PART VIII— AGGRESSIVE TURKISH CAMPAIGN
AT DARDANELLES
CHAPTER XLII
SABI BAIB — PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL
OF ALLIES
THUS practically ended the Suvla Bay operation and its
supporting movements. Much had been expected of it and,
by the barest margin, in the opinion of many competent mili-
tary men, great results had been missed. Just what ultimate
effect its success in this operation would have had on the Galli-
poli campaign, on the position of Turkey in the war and, finally,
upon the course of the war as a whole, it is obviously impossible
to say. There are those who claim that the capture of Constan-
tinople would have brought the struggle to a quick and dis-
astrous end from the viewpoint of the Central Powers. There
are others, equally entitled by experience and knowledge to speak,
who claim that it would have had no appreciable influence on the
final result. And there is a third body of critics of opinion that
the capture of Constantinople would have been a disaster for the
Allies, inasmuch as it would have opened up vast questions of
age-long standing that would have led to wide dissension between
England, Russia, and France.
There is another and no less interesting phase of the Suvla
Bay operation that will one day be studied with care. In this
crucial attack a reliance was placed upon raw troops who had
seen little or no actual fighting. It was, in a way, an attempt to
prove that patriotic youths, rallying to the colors at their coun-
try's need, although without previous training, could in a few
353
354 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
months be made more than a match for the obligatory military
service troops of the Continental system.
Some extremely interesting details of the preparation for the
landing at Suvla Bay have been given by a correspondent who was
permitted to be present, but who, like all except a few officers of
General Ian Hamilton's immediate staff, was kept in absolute
ignorance of the exact location of the spot selected.
"It has long been obvious that some new landing on a vast
scale was about to be attempted," he wrote, "and surmise has
therefore been rife as to the exact point on which the blow would
fall. It was hoped to take the Turk completely by surprise, and
to obtain a firm foothold on the shore before he could bring up
his reenf orcements. In this it would seem as if we have been
successful, for two divisions were yesterday (August 7, 1915)
put ashore almost without opposition. The enemy probably had
accurate knowledge of the arrival of large reenf orcements, for it
is almost impossible to keep movements of troops unknown in
the Near East, and his airmen have frequently flown over our
camps. He knew, therefore, we were preparing to strike, but on
the vital point as to where the blow would fall he seems to have
been entirely ignorant
"No one who has not seen a landing of a large army on a
hostile shore can have any idea of the enormous amount of prep-
aration work and rehearsal which must precede any such move-
ment. For three weeks this has been going on incessantly.
'Tor many days past a division has been practicing embark-
ing and disembarking until every officer and every man knew
the exact rdle he had to play.
"On the morning of August 6, 1915, 1 was told to hold myself
in readiness to embark that evening for an unknown destina-
tion, which would not be disclosed to me until after I got on
board the transport There was general rejoicing among the
troops when it became known that the period of preparation
was at length passed and that the hour for action had at last
arrived.
"Throughout the whole of August 6, 1915, the work of em-
barking proceeded without a stop. Dense masses of fully
SARI BAIR 355
equipped infantry, each carrying two days' rations, and tin
dishes strapped on their knapsacks, moved down to the quay
and were there embarked. The troops seemed in excellent spirits
and full of fight. They were cracking jokes and singing many
familiar songs, the favorite of which seemed to be a blending of
Tipperary* with 'Are We Downhearted?' Which query was
answered by a deafening roar of 'No!' "
In writing of the country around Suvla Bay the same cor-
respondent said:
'The country is in fact terrible; the hills are an awful jumble,
with no regular formation, but broken up into valleys, dongas,
ravines, and partly bare sandstone, and partly covered with
dense shrub. In places there are sheer precipices over which it
is impossible to climb and down which a false step may send
you sliding several hundreds of feet."
Finally, deeply illuminating is the official communique
published in England on August 26, 1915, regarding the
operations in early August. The most striking paragraphs
follow:
''Very severe and continuous fighting, with heavy losses to
both sides, has resulted. Our forces have not yet gained the
objectives at which they were aiming in sphere eight, though
they have made a decided advance toward them and have greatly
increased the area in our possession.
"The attack from Anzac after a series of desperately con-
tested actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and
Chunuk Bair Ridge, which are the dominating positions on this
area, but, owing to the fact that the attack from Suvla Bay did
not make the progress which was counted upon, the troops from
Anzac were not able to maintain their position in the actual
crest, and after repeating counterattacks, were compelled to with-
draw to positions close below it."
And the communique ends up with the significant sentence:
"But these facts must not lead the public to suppose that
the true objective has been gained or that further serious and
costly efforts will not be required before a decisive victory is
won."
856 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Picturesque accounts of the fighting by the Australian troops
for Sari Bair on August 6, 7, and 8, 1915, have been written
by an eyewitness of the fighting. Speaking of the few mo
ments before the fighting, he said:
"Meanwhile the combined Australians and New Zealanders
braced for the desperate night attack that had been decided upon.
The men had long been waiting for this hour to arrive.
"Strict orders were given that not a shot was to be fired;
the bayonet alone was to be used. Exactly at ten o'clock on
Friday night a brigade clambered over their trenches and furi-
ously charged the Turkish line amid loud cheers, bayoneting all
the enemy found therein. The Turks, taken apparently quite
unawares, fired wildly and were unable to check the advance.
"Thus in a few minutes all the enemy nearest the sea were in
our hands and the way was thus cleared for the main advance.
The New Zealanders stopped only to take breath and then pur-
sued their victorious career, rushing in succession the old No. 3
outpost, 'Bauchop's Hill/ and other Turkish positions. The na-
tive Maoris entered into the charge with great dash, making the
darkness of the night hideous with their wild war cries, and
striking terror into the hearts of the Turks with the awful
vigor with which they used their bayonets and the butt end of
their rifles.
'The darkness of the night, the broken nature of the ground,
and the shell fire with which the enemy had smothered every
available bit of ground, with his deadly snipers, delayed the main
advance somewhat after these preliminary positions had been
successfully rushed, for every hill and spur had to be picketed
to keep down the fire from lurking marksmen left in the rear of
pur advancing columns. The fighting throughout the night
was continuous, for amid these gloomy ravines the Turks offered
courageous and despairing resistance to the Australians, the
New Zealanders and Maoris, and many bloody encounters, the
details of which will never be known, were fought in the dark
hours which preceded a still more eventful dawn/9
AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS 357
CHAPTER XLIII
AGGRESSIVE TURKISH M O V E M E N T S— 0 P I N I 0 N
IN ENGLAND — CHANGE IN
COMMAND
WITH the withdrawal of the allied troops from Anzac Cove
and Suvla Bay, the Turks were free to concentrate all their
forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula in the south against the British
and French forces that were still intrenched on a line running
roughly from Y Beach on the JEge&n Sea to Kereves Dere on the
Dardanelles, skirting the slopes that led up to the town of Krithia
and the heights of Achi Baba.
Immediately the Turks began to transfer the guns and men
that had been used against the northern position. Obviously
such a transfer in difficult country with few roads and a re-
stricted front took considerable time. In the meantime the
British and French in front of Krithia were not inactive. They
countered constantly against the ever-increasing pressure of the
enemy. Although few infantry attacks were engaged in, bomb
and mine warfare for the improvement of the allied positions
and the prevention of fresh inroads by the Turks was an al-
most constant affair.
Fortunately for the safety and subsequent plans of the Allies,
the Gallipoli Peninsula at that time of the year was rendered
most difficult for offensive fighting. Heavy rains and conse-
quent floods make the country almost impassable for the move-
ment of big guns or large bodies of troops in the face of a
determined defense.
But while the position of the allied troops in the hills away
from the fringe of coast was becoming desperate, at or near
the beaches they could enjoy practical immunity except from
a few long-range Turkish batteries. The powerful guns of the
allied warships so far outranged and outweighed anything the
Turks could bring into the field about Krithia and Achi Baba that
the allied troops could lie sheltered under their protection.
358 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
This fact undoubtedly contributed largely to the astonishing
success of the reembarkation operations here, as it had at the
two northern bases. The chief danger to the allied troops about
Erithia was in the retreat over the few miles that separated
them from the embarkation beaches.
Finally, however, the pressure of the Turks became so heavy
that there was very real apprehension for the safety of the
allied troops still left on the peninsula. Whether or not it
was ever intended to maintain the positions won in the south it is
impossible to say at this time. Some observers were of the
opinion that it was England's desire to construct on the terri-
tory in her possession at the entrance to the Dardanelles a
second Gibraltar, commanding at least one end of the important
waterway. German opinion held that it had been agreed between
the Entente Powers in the event of the forcing of the Dardanelles
that the land commanding the waterway was to be divided among
the three countries, each dominating a stretch — probably Russia
in Constantinople, England at the Narrows, and France in
between.
However that may be, any intention of hanging on to the
territory captured in the south was soon to be impracticable.
By the first of the year, 1916, the Turks were hotly pressing
the allied troops to the left of Erithia and it became imperative
to shorten the line.
Favored by the floods and the fact that, despite the knowledge
of the Turks that a reembarkation had been decided upon, they
did not know exactly when it was to be carried out, the retire-
ment was effected with small loss. On the nights of January
8-9, 1916, the men were embarked from the beaches at the north
of Sedd-el-Bahr under the guns of the British and French
fleet.
At the last moment it was found impossible to get eleven
British guns away. Reluctantly it was decided to destroy them
and they were rendered useless by the last troops leaving the
peninsula. Similarly the French were compelled to abandon
six heavy pieces. Immense stores were burned and all the build-
ings, piers, etc., erected by the allied troops blown up.
AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS 359
While the Allies9 offensive was beginning to wane at Gallipoli,
an interesting incident developed at Constantinople which gives
some idea of the high tension existing there at the time. The
story is best told in the original words of Mr. Henry Wood, an
American newspaper correspondent, who in a dispatch dated
August 17, 1915, first gave the news to the New York "World."
He wrote:
"The following is the story of the manner in which Mr. Mor-
genthau, the American Ambassador, intervened in favor of 2,000
English and French civilians whom Enver Pasha had decided
to expose to the bombardment of the allied fleet at Gallipoli :
'The decision had not only been taken, but every detail had
been covertly prepared for its carrying out on a Monday morn-
ing, when on the previous evening Mr. Morgenthau learned
of it. He at once telephoned to Enver Pasha and secured from
him a promise that women and children should be spared. A
second request, that the execution of the order be delayed until
the following Thursday, was only granted after the ambassador
had assured Enver that it would be the greatest mistake Tur-
key had ever made to carry it out without first advising the
powers interested.
"Mr. Morgenthau at once telegraphed to France and England
by way of Washington, and no reply having arrived by Wed-
nesday morning, again telephoned to the War Minister, in-
sisting on being received in personal audience.
" 'I have not a single moment left vacant until four o'clock,
at which time I must attend a Council of the Ministers/ was
the reply.
"'But unless you have received me by four o'clock/ Mr,
Moigenthau replied, 4I will come out and enter the Council of
Ministers myself, when I shall insist upon talking to you/
"An appointment was therefore granted for three o'clock, and
after a long argument Enver Pasha was persuaded to agree to
send only twenty-five French and twenty-five English to Galli-
poli 'as a demonstration/ the War Minister arguing that any
farther retraction would weaken discipline. It was also agreed
to send only the youngest men, and Bedri Bey, the Constants
860! THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
nople chief of police, was at once sent for in order that he might
be acquainted with the new limitation of the decision. But he
at once protested. 'I don't want to send a lot of boys down
there. I want to send down notables. You have tricked me/
he declared, turning to the ambassador.
"Next morning the ambassador attended personally to the go-
ing aboard of the twenty-five French and twenty-five English
who had been finally selected. For all that, they knew the
original orders to expose them to the fire of the fleet were to
be carried out to the letter, and the farewell to their friends
and relatives at the Golden Horn pier was one of the most af-
fecting ever enacted at Constantinople. At the last minute
one of the British ministers, who still remained at Constanti-
nople, volunteered to go along in order that he might offer spirit-
ual consolation should they eventually face death, and a young
Englishman was released in his place. Mr. Morgenthau insisted
that the party be accompanied by Mr. Hoffman Phillip, First
Secretary of the American Embassy.
"On their arrival at Gallipoli they were imprisoned in two
empty houses and informed that the allied fleet was expected any
moment to resume its bombardment. The city had been under
fire for several days, and was almost completely deserted. No
provision had been made for their subsistence. During the days
which followed the fifty men suffered considerable hardships,
but at last orders came from Constantinople for all fifty to be
returned and released/'
Meanwhile a curious hardening of public opinion regard-
ing the Dardanelles was taking place in England, which in
the course of time was destined to have an all-important in-
fluence on the operations in that part of the. world. Before
the Suvla Bay landing there had been considerable but mild
criticism of the manner in which the whole affair had been un-
dertaken and carried out. Close upon the early successes of the
naval bombardment there had been an unjustified public op-
timism. Then came weeks of pessimism following that black day
when three battleships were sent to the bottom almost at one
blow.
AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS 361
Subsequent events and the false color given to them by the
official, but especially the unofficial, accounts served to hearten
the British public for a time. Then came Winston Churchill's
famous speech in which he spoke of Sir Ian Hamilton's forces
being "only a few miles from a great victory/' such as would have
a determining effect upon the outcome of the war. This was
followed by many absurd but circumstantial reports that the
Dardanelles had actually been forced but, for some unexplained
reasons, the news was being withheld by the Government.
A little later there came news of the arrival of German sub-
marines off Gallipoli and of the sinking of two more battleships.
This was followed by unofficial intimation that the major fleet
had had to be withdrawn from the waters about the peninsula
and that the forces on land were in a measure cut off and depend-
ent upon smaller vessels for naval support and supply.
At this point criticism of the Dardanelles campaign became
more pronounced and daring in many quarters in England. The
public was ripe for it and many openly expressed their regret
that it had ever been entered upon. Then came the Suvla Bay
landing, and affairs rapidly moved to a climax.
The Suvla Bay attempt, like all of the other operations at
Gallipoli, was conceived in a spirit of excessive optimism, It
was intended to be a surprise and the public in England were
kept absolutely ignorant of the preparations, so far as it was
possible to prevent a leakage with thousands of troops being
sent out of the country. Even after the landing and the fighting
were well over, little or no news was allowed to get into the
papers. Finally there came a long dispatch from the United
States, which, curiously enough, the British censor passed, tell-
ing of the utter defeat of the Turk, the complete success of the
Suvla Bay maneuver, and intimating that the forcing of the
Dardanelles was now but a question of a few days.
This amazing dispatch, in which there was of course no truth,
was printed in the leading English papers, and a large part of
the unthinking public and even a portion of the more intelligent
classes swallowed it whole. The news came just at the time of
the blackest week of the war up to that time, from the British
362 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
point of view, when the Germans were racing to the end of their
remarkable drive against the Russians and the czar's great for-
tresses were falling like packs of cards before the furious on-
slaughts of the Teuton forces.
But with the arrival and publication in England of Sir Ian
Hamilton's account, and the declaration by him that the ends
aimed at had not been achieved, it soon was realized that even
this great attempt, upon which so much had been builded, had
failed. Depression became universal, and there were for the
first time responsible demands that the whole expedition be
abandoned.
This question of the total abandonment of the attempt to force
the Dardanelles was a tremendous problem for England. In-
volved in it was the great question of her prestige, not only
among her millions of Mohammedan subjects, but also in the
Balkans, then rapidly moving to a decision. Turkey was the
only Mohammedan power still boasting independence, and for
Great Britain to acknowledge herself bested in an attempt to
defeat her was likely to have far-reaching and serious results
throughout India and Egypt, where Great Britain's ability to
hold what she had won was dependent in a large measure upon
the very prestige now in danger.
One of the reasons for urging the abandonment of the Dar-
danelles campaign was the urgent need for troops elsewhere. It
was declared that it was absurd folly to be wasting troops at
Gallipoli when the western front was being starved for men.
Furthermore there were rapidly accumulating evidences that the
Entente Powers were soon to be compelled to fight on a new and
important front.
About this time Germany began her preparations for a final
attack upon Serbia. Try as the Allies might, they had not been
able to force an agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria on the
question of the ownership of those parts of Macedonia won from
the Turk in the First Balkan War, and taken from the Bulgar by
the Serbians in the second. Germany, taking advantage of these
irreconcilable differences, was about to launch a heavy attack
from the north upon the kingdom of aged Peter.
AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS 363
In these circumstances there came before the British Govern-
ment, in common with the French Government, the question of
Just how great an obligation rested on the shoulders of the two
great powers. Serbia certainly looked to them to assist her with
all their strength, and at the height of the agitation Sir Edward
Grey made a public declaration that in every circumstance Serbia
could look to England for unlimited support.
It was when those who knew began to discuss the question of
where Great Britain was to find the military force to make good
Grey's pledge to Serbia that the Dardanelles campaign came in
for hot criticism. It was known that few, if any, fully trained
troops were available in England for a fresh campaign. Indeed,
as matters ultimately worked out, it was France who found the
bulk of the force that was hurried to Saloniki when Bulgaria
declared war on Serbia and joined in the Austro-German attack
upon the Balkan kingdom. Later, under French pressure, Eng-
land withdrew 40,000 of her troops from the western front and
rushed them off to Saloniki, but much too late to succor Serbia.
Finally, so powerful became the influences calling upon the
Government to retire from the Dardanelles with as much grace
as possible that the opinion of Sir Ian Hamilton was asked.
Probably the inside truth of the affair will not be known for
some years, but it later developed that there was considerable
friction between Sir Ian Hamilton and the British War Office at
the time. Sir Ian, it is known, laid a large part of blame for
the failure at the Strait to the fact that Earl Kitchener did not
send him large reenforcements that were expressly promised.
At any rate he was against a withdrawal from Gallipoli in the
circumstances and in favor of a swift and overwhelming assault
with all the troops and forces that could be gathered. He was
still firmly convinced that the forcing of the Dardanelles was
possible and probable.
Just what were the relations between France and England,
and especially how they each regarded the Dardanelles cam-
paign in the winter of 1915, it is impossible to say with any
degree of assurance. It is known, however, that there were
serious differences of opinion! not only among the more influ-
364 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ential men in both Paris and London, but between the two
Governments.
Obviously, the British were the more reluctant to abandon the
project, which had been entered upon with so much confidence
and enthusiasm. It was distinctly a British operation, although
the French Government had given its unqualified approval at
the start and had loyally contributed all the troops it could
spare. But the plans had been drawn up in London and had been
worked out by British commanders ; and the acknowledgment of
failure was a confession of British, not French, incompetency*
It was a blow at British prestige such as had not been dealt since
the early disasters of the Boer War.
While the whole question of the Gallipoli campaign was being
reconsidered there occurred something that had a profound effect
upon subsequent events in that part of the war area and else-
where. The defeat of the Russians while the French and British
troops were unable, through lack of preparation and foresight,
to carry on an energetic offensive that might have drawn the
Germans from their Slav prey, convinced all the allied Govern-
ments that the time had arrived for a thorough revision of their
system of cooperation. In short, if the war was to be won and
each of the Entente Powers was to escape a separate defeat
while the others were doomed to a forced inactivity, it was neces-
sary that their military, economic, and financial affairs should be
so coordinated and administered that they should be directed
with one object only in view — the winning of the war.
For this purpose representatives of the allied powers met in
Paris and discussed plans. One of the first results of these dis-
cussions was to be seen in the military field. The armies of
France and England in the field became, for all practical pur-
poses, one. The supreme command of the allied forces in France
was placed in the hands of the commander in chief of the French
army.
General French, who had been only nominally under the orders
of the French commander in chief, retired from command of the
British army in France and one of his subordinates, Sir Douglas
Haig, took his place. Similarly, in the southwestern theatre of
AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS 365
the war, where Sir Ian Hamilton was in supreme command, the
leadership passed to France, Hamilton resigning and his plac<
being taken by Sir Charles Monro. When the British and French
troops from Gallipoli were ultimately landed at Saloniki the
supreme command of the allied forces in that theatre of war was
given to General Sarrail of the French army.
Undoubtedly, too, the influence of France, and of Joffre indi-
vidually, was thrown into the scales at these Paris meetings
against a continuance of the Dardanelles operations. French
public opinion was strongly in favor of sending immediate succor
to the Serbians. So strong, in fact, was this public opinion that,
when the expected help failed to arrive, it forced the immediate
downfall of Delcass6 and the ultimate resignation of the French
Cabinet.
Soon after Kitchener returned to London from these Paris
conferences a sensation was caused by the announcement that
he was leaving the War Office temporarily and would undertake
an important mission in the Near East. Ultimately it developed
that this important mission was nothing more nor less than a
first-hand examination of the problems confronting the British
commander in withdrawing his force from Gallipoli and a study
of the field into which it was proposed to transfer, not only these
troops, but hundreds of thousands of others.
Probably no high officer of the British army was more fitted
for the mission. Whatever one may think of Kitchener's ad-
ministration of the British War Office during a period of unprece-
dented difficulty, no one can deny his success in India and Egypt.
With those commands had necessarily gone an exhaustive study
of military operations that might conceivably have to be under-
taken for the protection of British prestige and power in the
Mohammedan world.
Thus he was thoroughly at home in the Near East and he
brought back to London an encouraging report. Even high
military opinion in England had been of the opinion that the
withdrawal of the allied troops from Gallipoli could not be
effected without terrible losses. Some even held that it would
be better and less costly in human lives to leave the troops there
366 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
on the defensive until the end of the war than to attempt to get
them out of the death hole into which they had been dumped.
This, however, was not Lord Kitchener's idea. He reported
that they could be withdrawn, not, it was true, without heavy
losses, but at a cost much smaller than the general estimate.
This conclusion he came to after an examination on the spot, and
subsequent events, as we shall see, more than justified his judg-
ment in the matter.
Once having made up its mind to risk the loss of prestige in-
volved and withdraw the army from the Gallipoli Peninsula, the
British Government acted with speed and intelligence. It turned
the difficult task over to General Sir Charles Monro, whose subse-
quent accomplishment of the operations earned him the admira-
tion of every military man throughout the world.
General Sir Charles Monro's job was difficult and dangerous
enough for any man. In the face of an enemy numbering, some-
thing like 80,000 men, along a line of 20,000 yards, he had to
withdraw an almost equal number of men with their stores,
trucks, ammunition, guns, etc. Only by the greatest of good
fortune could he have the inestimable advantage of surprise.
Moreover, the enemy had been tremendously encouraged and
emboldened by the successful defense which they had offered to
all the allied assaults of the previous year. Their Mohammedan
fanaticism had been stirred by the Turkish, Austrian, and Ger-
man press, and their pride quickened by the thick crop of rumors
that the Allies were finally about to acknowledge defeat.
In many places the French and British trenches were separated
by less than fifty yards from the Turkish defenders. In few
cases were they more than 500 yards distant. Furthermore, the
Turkish positions overlooked the allied troops, being in almost
every case on higher ground. And finally the Suvla Bay and
Anzac regions, the points from which the troops would have to
be embarked, were all within artillery range and often within
rifle range of the enemy.
Every effort was made by General Monro and his subordinate
officers to conduct the preparations for the embarkation of the
troops in secret. That is to say the exact day decided unon was
AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS 367
kept a secret from all except the highest officers. For it was not
possible to keep from the Turks entirely the knowledge of a com-
plete withdrawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula of the allied
troops. Too much publicity had been given to the whole discus-
sion in France and England for that.
Eventually, Monday, December 19, 1915, was decided upon for
the critical operation. With all possible secrecy a great fleet of
transports was gathered at Mudros Bay and, under the protec-
tion of this fleet of warships — the strongest that had approached
the Gallipoli Peninsula since the arrival of the German sub-
marines in the neighborhood — sailed for Suvla Bay and Anzac
Cove.
It had been decided to remove the allied troops from these two
bases before attempting the perhaps more difficult task of getting
the force away from the Krithia region. Indeed, after the
troops had been safely extricated from the northern bases it was
officially announced in London that the Allies would continue to
hold the base won in the south. This proved, however, to be
merely in the nature of a literary demonstration to divert the
attention of the none too credulous Turk from the real purpose
of the allied command.
While the fleet of transports and warships was approaching
the two bases under cover of the night, the Australian and New
Zealand troops at Anzac and the British troops at Suvla were
hastily preparing for leaving. Among the colonial troops there
was the keenest regret in thus relinquishing what had been so
hardly won at the price of so many precious lives. To the
Australians the operations at Anzac will always remain one of
the greatest, if not the very greatest military feat in their his-
tory. To be sure they fought in numbers and with conspicuous
bravery throughout the Boer War; but Anzac was an operation
all their own, on a scale never before attempted by them as a
distinct military organization. They had won undying fame and
unstinted praise from the highest military authorities, and the
success of the operation in that part of the Gallipoli Peninsula
had become a matter affecting their pride.
X— War St 4
368
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
*&* KARNABtKEUl"
SfCfMJK OP Mlt.E<>
"> HIGHWAY*
PORT*
HClOHTftlNFeCT
OPERATIONS AT THE DARDANELLES
ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES 369
CHAPTER XLIV
ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES-
ARMENIAN ATROCITIES
FINALLY, by midnight of Sunday, all was ready. Just after
that hour the allied troops on shore at Anzac and Suvla Bay
could see the dark forms of the warships and the transports as
they dropped anchor close inshore. If they had listened atten-
tively they might have heard the soft splash of the hundreds
of muffled oars as they slowly propelled the ships' boats toward
the beaches.
On shore preparations were being made to repel a hurricane
attack by the Turks. For it was felt that as soon as the enemy
got knowledge of the contemplated withdrawal they would attack
with unprecedented fury.
But, though the British troops waited, the expected attack
never came. Finally, just after three o'clock in the morning, the
Australians exploded a large mine at Russell's Top, between the
two systems of trenches, and made a strong demonstration as if
about to initiate a big offensive. About eight o'clock the last of
them were taken off. Before these last men left they set fire to
the stores that it had been impossible to carry away.
It was only then, apparently, that the Turks awoke to the real
progress of events. Immediately from every Turkish battery a
hurricane of shells was poured into the deserted Allies' base.
Those within range turned their fire upon the allied fleet, now
swiftly disappearing from sight in the thin haze.
Highly significant, as showing the serious state of public opin-
ion in England during the closing days of the Dardanelles cam-
paign, were the published statements of E. Ashmead-Bartlett.
Ashmead-Bartlett was in the nature of an official eyewitness of
the major part of the operations at the Strait, although the
British War Office took no responsibility for his opinions or
statements. It was at first intended by the British authorities
that there should be no newspaper correspondents on the spot,
370 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
but finally, as a concession to the demands of the united press
of Great Britain, it was agreed that one man should be allowed
on the scene and that his dispatches should be syndicated among
the papers sharing the expense of his work. Ashmead-Bartlett
was the man selected for the unique task.
His dispatches from the Dardanelles were censored on the spot
and again in London, so they did not possess much information
of direct value. It was when he returned to London and was in a
degree free from restraint that he wrote frankly. His remarks
are quoted in part because they are the best, perhaps the only,
unprejudiced opinion on the operations from a British point
of view.
Writing in the middle of October, 1915, he strongly advised
the abandonment of the campaign, "which," he says, "if it ever
had any hope of success, now is completely robbed of it." In
his opinion, giving up the campaign would not hurt the Allies9
prestige in the Balkans, for the simple reason that their prestige
had "been reduced to nil" by the Foreign Office, loquacious poli-
ticians, and faulty diplomacy.
Speaking of the military operations at the Dardanelles, after
paying the highest tribute to the ability and the courage of the
Turks, and berating the British politicians who interfered with
the General Staff, he said:
" Apart from the question that the conception is of doubtful
paternity, we committed every conceivable blunder in our meth-
ods of carrying out the plan. Few minds were engaged that
had any knowledge of the character of the Turks9 fighting quali-
ties and the geography of the country. Never before in this war
has the situation been more serious.
"Our boasted financial stamina in outlasting our opponents
is going fast to ruin in excessive expenditures in enterprises
which, if they ever had any hope of success, now have been finally
robbed of all such hope.
"A good gambler, when he loses much, can afford to stop. He
waits for a turn in his luck and a fresh pack of cards, and clears
off for another table. The mad and headstrong gambler loses
everything trying to recoup, and has nothing left to make a fresh
ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES 371
start elsewhere. Which is England to be, the former or the
latter?"
It is natural that the Turkish people should have been jubi-
lant over the turn of events in Gallipoli and elsewhere. After
the series of defeats during the Balkan War the successes of
the Great War against such redoubtable opponents as France
and England were all the more inspiring. The final success in
the Dardanelles had been predicted some weeks before in the
Turkish Parliament, and therefore was not unexpected. In the
last week in October, Halil Bey, president of the Turkish Cham-
ber of Deputies, declared :
"At the time when the most serious engagements were taking
place in the Dardanelles and in Gallipoli, I was in Berlin. I was
there able to realize personally the feelings of high and sin-
cere admiration entertained by our allies for the extraordinary
bravery with which terrible attacks were repulsed by our armies.
The German nation publicly congratulated their Government,
which, at a time when we were despised by the smallest nations,
was proud to sign an alliance with us. That alliance carries with
it obligations for the distant future, and unites in a sincere and
unshakable friendship three great armies and three great nations.
"The cannon which thundered on the Danube will soon be
heard again in greater force and will create in the Balkans an
important sector in connection with the war. After the reestab-
lishment of communications, which will take place within a brief
space of time, our army will be in a better position to fulfill its
mission on all the fronts, and in irresistible fashion. The hopes
of the enemy are forever destroyed as regards Constantinople
and its straits, and can never be renewed/'
Extremely significant is one of the concluding paragraphs of
his speech in which he foreshadows economic developments after
the war. In view of the Allies9 expressed intention of making
an effort to boycott German trade even after the signing of peace
terms, the following words of Halil Bey are illuminating and
important :
"The most important result of this war is that from the North
Sea to the Indian Ocean a powerful group will have been created
372 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
that will be ever in opposition to English egotism, which has
been the cause of the loss of millions of human lives and of thou-
sands of millions in money, and will act as a check on Russian
pride, French revanche, and Italian treachery. In order to se-
cure this happy result the Turkish nation will be proud to sub-
mit to every sort of sacrifice." The president concluded his
speech by eulogizing the memory of those who had fallen in
the war.
Halil Bey's prediction of the reestablishment of communica-
tions with the Central Powers was not long in being fulfilled.
Within two weeks the Germano- Austrian drive from the Danube
had penetrated to Bulgarian territory opposite the Rumanian
frontier, and within another fortnight it had linked up with
the Bulgarian columns in the south operating against Nish. For
all practical purposes Serbia was in their hands, and the power-
ful economic group heralded by Halil Bey was in the process
of completion.
There is no doubt that the forging of this strong link with
Berlin was one of the main considerations in inducing the Allies
to abandon the Dardanelles campaign. There were two im-
mensely important reasons why this should have radically
changed conditions in the Gallipoli Peninsula.
In the first place, there was the question of supplies. There
are three ways in which modern wars on a big scale can be
won: by direct military pressure, by financial pressure, or by
economic stress. In the case of the Allies9 offensive against
Turkey, after the first disappointment of the naval military
operations, it was confidently predicted that economic stress
would accomplish what military pressure had failed to do. It
was known that Turkey had but meager means of making
good the enormous expenditure of heavy-gun ammunition
necessary in modern battles. Indeed, as early as the big naval
attempt to force the Dardanelles, rumors were heard of a
shortage of ammunition in the Turkish forts, and in this
connection it is interesting to print a report that gained cur-
rency at the tim* of *he abandonment of the Anzac and Suvla
Bay baseo
ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES 373
Had the allied fleet returned to its attack upon the Dardanelles
batteries on the day following the great bombardment of March
19, 1915, the waterway to Constantinople would surely have been
forced, in the opinion of several artillery officers of the defense
works near Tchanak-Kalessi expressed to the Associated Press
correspondent, who had just reached Vienna.
One of the principal batteries, it appeared, had for three of
its large caliber guns just four armor-piercing shells each when
night ended the tremendous efforts of the British and French
fleet.
For the fourth gun five shells were left, making for the
entire battery a total of seventeen projectiles of the sort which
the aggressors had to fear. What this meant is best understood
when it is considered that the battery in question was the one
which had to be given the widest berth by the allied fleet.
During the evening of March 18, 1915, the correspondent talked
with several artillery officers from this battery.
"Better pack up and be ready to quit at daybreak/' said one
of them.
"Why?" he asked.
"Oh, they are sure to get in to-morrow !"
Then the officer stated his reasons. He was so certain that
the British and French would return in the morning to finish
their task that there was no question in his mind as to the pro-
priety of discussing the ammunition matter.
"We'll hold out well enough to make them think that there
is no end to our supply of ammunition," he said, "but it can't
be done if they go about their work in real earnest. With our
heavy pieces useless they can reduce the batteries on the other
shore without trouble. The case looks hopeless. You had better
take my advice."
Following the advice thus given, the correspondent rose early
next morning and packed his few belongings, keeping, mean-
while, a watchful eye on the tower of Eale-Sultanie, where the
flag, showing that the allied fleet was near, was usually hoisted.
But the morning passed and still the danger signal did not
appear. Evidently the allied fleet was not inclined to risk more
374 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
such losses as those of the previous day, when the Bouvet, Irre-
sistible, and Ocean went down and five other ships were badly
damaged. Yet even with the eleven remaining ships, it appears
from the Turkish admissions, the Dardanelles could have been
forced on March 19, 1915.
The correspondent visited several of the batteries during the
day. The damage done the day before was slight indeed, con-
sisting mostly of large earth displacements from the parapets
and traverses. Four guns were temporarily out of commission,
but the general shortage of ammunition made these pieces negli-
gible quantities anyway.
Although the British information system in this field of opera-
tions was efficient, it must have failed in this instance, for it
seems certain that with seventeen shells the battery in question
would have been easily disposed of, a channel could have been
made through the mine field, and the way to Constantinople
would have been open.
All this was realized in the Turkish capital. The court made
arrangements to transfer to Akhissar Anatolia, and the Ger-
man and Austro-Hungarian Embassies were ready to leave for
this ancient seat of the Ottoman Government. The families of
many German officers in the Turkish service left Constantinople.
In short, everybody understood that a calamity was pending.
What its exact nature was but a few knew.
Whatever truth there may have been in this particular story,
there seems to be little doubt that the Turks were woefully short
of ammunition. During the Balkan War it was reported on good
authority that much of their ammunition was defective. When
countries like France, England, and Russia hopelessly miscalcu-
lated the need of ammunition for modern warfare, it is not ask-
ing too much of us to believe that the Turks suffered in a worse
degree.
Without direct or indirect communication with Germany, it is
easy to imagine this condition of affairs getting steadily worse.
At the beginning of the war, there seems to be good evidence,
large quantities of all kinds of munitions and war supplies were
rushed from Germany to Constantinople by way of Rumania
ABANDONMENT OF DARDANELLES 375
and Bulgaria, but it was not long before the Rumanian Govern-
ment, either of its own volition or in the face of threats by the
allied powers, refused to permit these supplies to pass through
her territory.
It became evident to the Allies that sooner or later the Ger-
mans would have to make an attempt to link up with the Turks.
Thus, from one point of view, the operations at the Dardanelles
became a race against Germany, with a common objective, Con-
stantinople. Those who laid their money on the allied horse
were confident of winning, figuring that long before the Germans
were free of the French menace on the west and south and the
Russian menace on the east, arid so in a position to undertake
an offensive against Serbia, the allied troops would have forced
the Dardanelles, vanquished the Ottoman troops before the gates
of Constantinople, and opened the Strait of the Dardanelles and
the Bosporus.
So it was that when events did not transpire as expected,
and the allied troops were still hanging desperately to their
bases on Gallipoli Peninsula, when the Germans had subdued
Serbia, and arrived in triumph in the capital of the Ottoman
Empire via the Berlin to Constantinople Express, there was no
longer any hope of starving the Turkish guns nor, having even
forced the Dardanelles, any certainty of the capture of Constan-
tinople. In other words, conditions had radically changed, and,
even with better chances of success than were believed to exist,
the game was no longer worth the candle.
The second reason was that, with a neutral Bulgaria, the bene-
fits to the Allies of a successful offensive in the Dardanelles were
obvious. The forcing of the Strait, a combined naval and land
attack upon Constantinople, the driving of the Turk from Europe,
and the insertion of a firm defensive wedge between the empire
of the Sultan and any possible German offensive from the
north, were objectives important enough to justify almost any
expenditure of money, men, and effort the Allies might have
made.
But with the Turkish army linked up with a friendly Bul-
garia, and backed by a strong Austro-German force led by
876 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
General Mackensen, the conditions were changed to a state of
hopelessness. An allied army operating on the European side
against Constantinople would be dangerously flanked by the
Bulgarian and Austro-Germans and hopelessly outnumbered if
limited to the force the Allies had been able to send to the
southeastern war area.
Just how many men it was possible for Bulgaria and Turkey
to put in the field it is not possible to state definitely. It would
be reasonable to figure that they could by a great effort, after
many months of war, put at least twice their reputed war
strength into the ranks. The larger countries far exceeded such
figures. Enver Pasha, at the end of October, 1915, stated that
Turkey had raised a total of 2,000,000 soldiers. Bulgaria, in
a case of necessity, might possibly have added another million,
while Germany and Austria, at the time of the operations against
Serbia, demonstrated their ability to supply, in action and in re-
serve, another 500,000 for this front.
These are huge figures. There were many reasons why all
these troops could not be used against an allied offensive. It is
not meant to imply, for instance, that an allied offensive on a
large scale, based on Saloniki, is doomed to failure. The figures
are quoted simply to show the military conditions that made an
offensive from the Dardanelles hopeless in the circumstances
that obtained at the end of 1915 and that weighed with the mili-
tary authorities in London and Paris in deciding upon a with-
drawal from the Gallipoli Peninsula.
Probably it will be a long time before the world has any accu-
rate, adequate idea of the terrible disaster that overtook British
prestige and allied troops in their year's attempt to force the
Strait. Official figures announced by Premier Asquith speak
of more than 100,000 troops killed, wounded, or missing, but
these total figures took account of the sick, who reached an ex-
traordinary high total. Lack of drinking water, the difficulty
of keeping the troops supplied with food, the intense heat, and
the fact that the men engaged were unused to the climatic con-
ditions, combined to lay low thousands upon thousands of men
not mentioned in the restricted casualty lists. An estimate of
ABANDONMENT OP DARDANELLES 377
another hundred thousand put out of action, temporarily or per-
manently, by sickness is not unreasonable.
Thus 200,000 men, six battleships and smaller war vessels,
enormous stores and millions of dollars' worth of ammunitions
were the price Britain paid to discover that the Dardanelles
were impregnable even to British battleships and British endur-
ance. And who shall estimate the loss of vital prestige, the
waste of fine efforts at a time when it was so much needed else-
where? Some future historian, with all the facts in his posses*
sion, with the saving perspective that only time can give, will
have a fascinating subject for discussion in this Dardanelles
campaign, destined to go down into history as one of the most
spectacular and daring in the annals of warfare.
It was not until some weeks later that the outside world
began to hear rumors of the dire predicament of the Armenians
under Turkish rule. In their case, as in that of the French and
British who were to be sent to the Dardanelles, Mr. Morgenthau
finally intervened with effect.
It had always been recognized that the elements of serious
trouble existed in the districts of Asiatic Turkey populated by
the Armenians. In the days of Sultan Abdul Hamid there had
been frequent massacres by the Turks, following outbreaks of
racial and religious strife. The Armenians had not been easy
people to govern, and a constant and deep hatred existed between
them and their rulers.
With the coming of the Young Turks the lot of the unhappy
Armenians had apparently bettered. Indeed, at the time of the
outbreak of war, one of two special European inspectors, spe-
cially appointed to watch over the administration of the six
provinces of Asiatic Turkey in which the Armenians lived, was
actually on his way to his post.
Of course the war changed the entire situation and made the
position of the Armenian population a precarious one. All hope
of reform for the moment was banished and the old hatred, of
which it was hoped the world had heard the last, was revived
and intensified by the passions aroused by the entrance of Turkey
into the struggle.
378 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Nor were the Armenians content to await their fate. In sev-
eral important instances they took matters into their own hands.
It was, perhaps quite natural that many of them, especially those
who lived near the Russian frontier, should sympathize with
Russia.
Early in April of 1915, a considerable force of Armenians in
the city of Van collected and resisted the attempts of Turkish
gendarmes to apply the terms of an order banishing certain of
their number suspected of Russian or anti-Turk sympathies. In
such force were they that they actually, with the help of Russian
troops, captured the city.
With the Van revolt Talaat Bey, the powerful Turkish Minis-
ter of the Interior, determined upon a ruthless policy of repres-
sion, and it was largely due to efforts to put that policy in force
that there resulted the subsequent massacre of Armenians
that shocked the world. It is difficult for anyone not in posses-
sions of the actual facts to apportion an exact measure of blame
for these bloody reprisals; and in the following account, it must
be remembered, we are compelled at this juncture to rely almost
entirely upon English and Russian official and military in-
formation.
The district covered by the massacre, in which it has been
said 1,000,000 Armenians (probably not an exaggeration) were
killed, were Eastern Anatolia, Cilicia, and the Anti-Taurus
regions. It is said that at Marsovan, where there is an Ameri-
can college, the Armenians early in June were ordered to meet
outside the town. They were surrounded and 1,200 of their
number killed by an infuriated mob. Thousands of the rest
were hurled into northern Mesopotamia.
At Bitlis and Mush, in the Lake Van district, it is reported that
12,000 were killed and several Armenian villages entirely wiped
out.
As has been pointed out, the Armenians of some districts did
not sit still and wait to be massacred. At Shaben Karahissar
in northeastern Anatolia, within a hundred miles of Trebizond,
the Armenian population held the town for a short time against
Turkish troops. Finally they were overcome and 4,000 are said
ABANDONMENT OP DARDANELLES 379
to have been killed. At Kharput, a hundred and twenty-five
miles southwest of Erzerum, the Armenians held the town for
a whole week, but were finally overcome by troops and artillery.
In many of the districts the able-bodied men of the Armenian
population have been drafted into the labor battalions for mili-
tary work at the front and at the bases. The men too old for
this class of work, and yet suspected of agitating against
Turkish rule, were exiled into districts where their powers for
harm would be nil.
It must not be assumed because of these accounts that the
Turkish Government gave its unqualified approval of these
massacres. Undoubtedly Talaat Bey adopted a deliberately ruth-
less policy in dealing with all cases of actual or suspected revolt.
But it is a far cry from a systematic, intelligent policy of fright-
fulness to an indiscriminate massacre.
Protests against these massacres were not confined to the
outside world. Many influential personages in Turkey openly
protested, and in some notable cases conscientious and brave of-
ficials actually refused to obey the demands of the Constanti-
nople authorities and hand over Armenian subjects or assist in
their exile.
Again in this case, as in that of the proposal of Enver Pasha
to send a large number of allied citizens to the bombardment
area of Gallipoli as a reprisal, it was Mr. Morgenthau, the
American Ambassador at Constantinople, who followed up his
protest by real action. He threw himself heart and soul into
the work of softening the lot of the unfortunate Armenians.
Of course he had to move warily in order not to offend the
pride of the Turkish authorities, but working through the
American Consular officials stationed throughout Turkey and
through the American missionaries and teachers working among
the Armenian and Turkish people he undoubtedly saved the lives
of thousands of men, women, and children, while oilier thou-
sands undoubtedly owe to his zeal their escape from exile or
starvation.
It was due largely to the publicity given to these deplorable
happenings in the American press that the attention of the
380 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
world was drawn to Asiatic Turkey and the conditions there, re
suiting in action by the Turkish Government that effectively put
a stop, for the moment at least, to the persecution of an un-
happy people.
CHAPTER XLV
CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS — PALL OP
ERZERUM
THE fall of 1915 and the early winter of 1915 were periods of
feverish activity behind the lines in the Caucasus. A severe
winter held up any active operations of consequence on the part
of either belligerents, but both knew that with the coming of
better conditions their defensive and offensive organizations
would be put to severe tests.
On the part of the Russians the Caucasus front became at the
time one of prime importance. Not excepting even the Balkan
frontier, to Russia the Turkish line was of more importance
than any other on which her army was aligned. In the first
place, of all her frontier that running through the Caucasus
promised the best return for the least expenditure of effort, time,
money, and men. Against both Germany, in the north, and Ger-
many-stiffened Austria in Galicia and the Carpathians, Russia
had had severe reverses. The czar's staff, through grim experi-
ence, realized the tremendous difficulties that confronted them
on these two fronts. Turkey, ill prepared, lacking superlative
military leaders, without organization, and barely recovered
from the terrible effects of the Balkan wars, appeared to be an
easy opponent, comparatively speaking, despite the frightful
difficulties of large military operations in the roadless and railless
mountain passes of the Trans-caucasus.
Furthermore, the military pressure was becoming steadily
easier on Russia. The great German drive was drawing to its
close. With its front established in a straight line from just south
of Riga on the north, to the Rumanian frontier on the south, the
CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS
381
.•CftU'ar HUM,
I J S M ]L
THE TURKISH EMPIRE
382 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Austro-German army decided to abandon the offensive for the
time being and be content with holding that front; and devote
its energies to the Serbian and French theatres of war. This
promised to provide a very welcome breathing spell for Russia,
permitting her to reorganize her military forces, remedy her
deplorable shortage of munitions and incidentally to turn her
attentions to the Turks.
Finally, once in the war, the whole of Russian official opinion
tended toward a settlement, once and for all, of her age-long
dream of Constantinople. The consolidation of the Balkans on a
Slav, pro-Russian basis, important as it appeared to be and fur-
nishing the ostensible causes of the war, was but incidental to the
Russian dominion over and control of Constantinople, the gate
to the warm waters of the Mediterranean.
From the viewpoint of the Entente Powers as a whole there
were cogent reasons why a Russian offensive against the Turkish
Caucasus front would be highly desirable. It would, for instance,
relieve the pressure, not only on the Gallipoli front, but as well
on the British forces in Mesopotamia. In the latter field, of
course, Great Britain, with a miniature army of not more than
40,000, was attempting to reach Bagdad, but was being hard
pressed by the Ottoman forces. Furthermore, an eventual junc-
. tion of the Russian columns from the Caucasus and the British
troops from the Persian Gulf, and the establishment of an im-
pregnable line, would provide against any future drive of a
German-Austro-Turkish army toward India.
These, then, were the considerations that influenced the prep-
arations for a resumption of the Russian offensive against
Erzerum and beyond, which had been more- or less quiescent since
the smashing defeat of the Turkish army on the frontier in
December, 1914.
Undoubtedly this state of affairs had much to do with the
transfer of the Grand Duke Nicholas to the Caucasus command
when it became apparent that the German offensive in the north
was nearing its finish. With masterly skill the Russian com-
mander in chief had withdrawn his huge army in the face of a
victorious and highly efficient enemy, not, to be sure, without
CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS 383
serious losses, but certainly without permitting his long front to
be really broken or his forces utterly defeated. It was felt in
Russia that he, of all men developed by the war, was the one to
organize and initiate the proposed operations in the Caucasus.
It was early in the month of September, 1915, September 5 to be
precise, that the czar issued his famous order relieving the Grand
Duke Nicholas of his command in the north and transferring
him to the Caucasus. Taking with him a number of the higher
officers who had been with him through the trying months on
the Warsaw front, the Grand Duke Nicholas immediately
journeyed south and took over the command of the Russian forces
in that theatre of war.
It was not long before there were to be seen many evidences
of the arrival of a commander with energy and determination.
1 Despite the lamentable shortage of munitions known to exist in
Russia, guns, shells, rifles, provisions, and stores of all kinds were
rapidly accumulated at the main Caucasus base and from there
distributed to the points along the line of advance into Turkey.
Many of these supplies of all kinds, provisions as well as muni-
tions of war, came from the United States by way of the Siberian
port of Vladivostok and even by way of Archangel, although that
port was, in most cases, reserved for British shipments. From
Vladivostok the American shipments were carried over the 6,000
miles of the great Trans-Siberian railway to Petrograd and from
there continued on their long and slow journey to the Caucasus
front
Among the endless stream of supplies were many special and
ingenious conveyances for transporting guns, provisions, and
soldiers over the otherwise impassable snows of this terrible
region. It was necessary, to insure success, that by some means
hitherto unknown to military transportation guns weighing tons
should be moved about the trackless, roadless country almost like
playthings. Only thus could a commander hope to secure that
preponderance of heavy gunfire without which the modern offen-
sive is doomed to defeat or stalemate.
By the beginning of February, 1916, all was ready for the
Russian advance upon Erzerum. To begin with, the Turks were
Y— War St d
584 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
known to be busily occupied in other fields. The British forces in
Mesopotamia, although held up at Kut-el-Amara, and known to
be in sore straits, were in daily expectation of strong reenforce-
ments. The campaign against Bagdad, which had been originally
undertaken by the Indian army, had proved too big a task for that
relatively small organization, and the conduct of that campaign
was taken over by the imperial military authorities in Great
Britain, who have larger militant forces at their disposal than
those possessed by the Indian Government.
Aside from this fear of strong reenforcements, the Turkish
commanders were straining every effort to capture the British
force shut up in Kut-el-Amara, and thus secure a great victory
that could not fail to have far-reaching military and political
effects both in Turkey and throughout the whole warring world.
For this reason every unit of troops that could be possibly spared
from other fields was rushed to Bagdad and thrown into the
field against General Townshend's sorely pressed command
awaiting relief at Kut-el-Amara.
Furthermore, although the pressure on the Gallipoli front had
been relaxed through the practical abandonment by the allied
troops of the attempt to force the Dardanelles, with the entrance
of the Bulgarians into the war and the prosecution of the offen-
sive against Serbia a new need had been found for Turkish
troops. For the Bulgarian and Serbian development had brought
the Allies in ever-increasing strength to Salonika The Allies at
the Greek port were a constant potential menace to Turkey, as
well as to Bulgaria, and through the Entente press were running
constant rumors of a coming offensive directed at Constantinople
''through the back door," as it was called.
To be sure the allied forces at Saloniki, beyond a half-hearted
effort, with but a fraction of their numbers to assist the escape
of the Serbian army from the menace of the Austro-German-
Bulgarian pincers that threatened it on three sides, had made no
move to carry the war to the Bulgarian or Turkish enemy. Yet
Turkey found it necessary to keep constantly at Constantinople,
or in the country immediately to the north and in close touch with
the Bulgarian forces, an army estimated at at least 200,000 men.
CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS 385.
In other words, the Turkish General Staff could withdraw few
if any of the men concentrated about Constantinople at the begin-
ning of the war to fill the enormous gaps made in her line on other
fronts. Indeed, she had need to add to them to offset the extraor-
dinary number of men who were constantly being poured into
Saloniki by France and England until, in the early spring, their
total was variously estimated at from 250,000 to 350,000 men of
all services.
It was in these circumstances, then, that the Grand Duke
Nicholas ordered the advance upon Erzerum. They go far to
explain the events of the subsequent few weeks in and about the
great Turkish Caucasian fortress town.
Russian forces had, during the three months immediately pre-
ceding the big offensive, prepared the way by the capture of
points from which the grand attack was to be launched. In com-
mand of the czar's troops was General Judenich, although the
Grand Duke Nicholas was officially responsible for operations on
this front. General Judenich had devoted years of his life to a
study of the special problems attending an offensive in the Kars-
Erzerum regions and carried through his task with a skill and an
expedition that have hardly their equal in the history of the war.
The advance of the Russian forces upon Erzerum was made
from three points. It is well for the reader to keep this con-
stantly in mind. It was an application of the principle of the
pincers, combined with a great frontal attack, used so often and so
successfully by the Germans in their Russian drive. It adds
tremendously to the difficulties of a commander battling to de-
fend a big position. Nowadays, under the new conditions of
warfare, fortresses or other positions are not defended to the end.
They are held just as long as it is safe for the army within to
hold out. But a commander must on no account endanger his
force. Discretion is more than ever the better part of valor, and
"he who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day," is the
guiding principle of the general of modern times.
Now this triple menace, striking not only on the front but on
both sides and menacing the roads by which a defeated army must
retreat, seriously weakens the defense which an army within a
386 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
fortress can make. It was just such an operation or series of
operations that carried the tremendously strong fortress of
Antwerp in record time, that accounted for the surprising fall
of Namur in two days, and that explains the rapidity with which
a score of almost impregnable Russian fortresses in Poland fell
before the rush of the German avalanche.
The triple Russian thrust at Erzerum was made from Olty,
which had been captured as far back as August 3, 1915, along the
Kars-Erzerum road by way of Sarikamish, the scene of the great
Turkish defeat of the early days of the war, and from Melazghert
and Khynysskala.
Erzerum was undoubtedly one of the strongest positions in the
Turkish Empire, although the experience of the war had tended
to detract from previous confidence in the strength of old-style
concrete forts when attacked by concentrated big-gun bombard-
ment. Opinions differ on the question of whether or not the
Erzerum armament had been maintained up to a modern stand-
ard. But as regards the number of its guns, and the size and
number of its individual forts, there are no two opinions.
Its eighteen separate positions encircling the city in two rings,
defended by concrete forts, would, under ordinary conditions,
have made it virtually impregnable. One count mentions as
many as 467 big guns in the outer forts, 374 in the inner forts,
and 200 more or less mobile fieldpieces scattered about the coun-
try intervening. Although this was an early Russian report,
issued in the delirium of national joy that followed the capture
of the fortress, and should be considerably discounted, neverthe-
less, Erzerum boasted a plentiful supply of big guns, few if any
of which were taken away by the fleeing Turkish army, although
the majority of them were probably rendered useless at the last
moment. According to Entente information, among these guns
were 300 of the very latest pattern Krupp pieces, but on the other
hand, according to German information, the fortress boasted no
guns less than twenty years old. Arguing from the known
shortage of big guns in Turkey and the fact that of late years
other fronts have been of prime importance and have undoubtedly
received what fresh ordnance the army was able to purchase and
CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS 387
Secure, it does not seem likely that much modern equipment was
found in the Caucasus fortress by the Russian victors.
Quickly the three Russian forces converged upon Erzerum.
Finally, driving outlying Turkish forces before them, in the
second week of February, 1916, they were in touch with the outer
defenses of the great fortress. It was rumored at this time that
both Von der Goltz and Liman von Sanders, the two high Ger-
man commanders, lent by the kaiser to Turkey, were in Erzerum
superintending the defense and, furthermore, that huge Turkish
reenforcements were covering the 200 miles from the nearest
railway head by forced marches in an effort to arrive at the
fortress and prevent its encircling and isolation by the Russians.
Both of these reports, however, ultimately were proved to be
figments of the active imaginations of local correspondents.
The Turkish plan of campaign for the defense of Erzerum,
according to official Russian sources, was as follows : The Third
Army Corps, which had been ordered up to replace the losses in
the Caucasus front of the previous nine months, was moved out of
Erzerum and took up a position between that town and the Rus-
sian front. The Ninth and Tenth Corps moved out toward Olty
to form an offensive ring, while the Eleventh Corps was to hold
the Russian offensive on the Kars-Erzerum road. In case the
Russians in the last named region were too strong for the
Eleventh Corps to hold, it was to fall back slowly on the fortress
of Erzerum, drawing the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas with
it. When this movement had progressed sufficiently, the Ninth
and Tenth Corps were to attack energetically on the flank.
Unfortunately for the success of this plan, although the
Eleventh Corps performed its function and drew the Russian
army with it in its retreat toward Erzerum, the Ninth and Tenth
Corps suffered a reverse and were compelled to fall back also.
Similarly, the Third Corps was compelled to yield before superior
numbers and barely escaped envelopment
Naturally, there is considerable difference of opinion as to the
question of numbers involved in these operations. It seems to be
fairly well established, however, that the Russians used, roughly,
eight army corps, or slightly more than 300,000 men. Eight
388 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
corps are known to have been at the disposal of the grand duke,
but a small portion of his force was at the same time engaged in
an expedition into northern Persia, so that the round figures
given would seem to be conservative.
Although but four Turkish corps are mentioned, it is known
that the Ottoman command had at its disposal considerable num-
bers of Kurds, Persians, Arabs, and other irregular troops, as
well as several units not specifically mentioned in the official
accounts. Thus the estimate of 180,000 to 200,000 men would
not seem to be out of the way.
While the thrusts from the northeast and southeast were fight-
ing their way toward the flanks of Erzerum, the Russian troops
advancing along the Kars-Erzerum road, driving the Eleventh
Corps before them, made a fierce frontal assault upon the outer
forts of the town.
In this connection it would be well to examine more minutely
the conditions that confronted the Russian commander. Erzerum
is situated on a plateau some 6,000 feet above sea level, and the
key forts had been placed on high ground commanding the sur-
rounding country. However well the Russian transport depart-
ment had done its work, the Russian supply of heavy artillery
could not have been overwhelming in the sense that heavy guns
were overwhelming on other fronts. There could, therefore, have
been no condition of affairs where the infantry was called upon
simply to occupy positions previously shattered by gunfire. In-
deed, the best opinions agree that little or no real damage was
done by the artillery to the Erzerum forts and that the infantry
had to advance against practically intact defenses. Yet, after
five days of fierce assault, the hardy Siberian troops of General
Judenich's army carried nine of the outlying forts and forced the
evacuation of the entire fortress.
There can be but one explanation of this astonishing result. It
is hardly possible for any troops to take a position like Erzerum
by direct assault. The fortress successfully resisted all Russian
attempts to capture it in the Russo-Turkish War, although then
far less strong than in 1916. Some foreign military critics have
tried to explain the puzzling facts by claiming that the well-
CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS 389
known bravery and tenacity of the Turk on defense, shown all
through his history and never more evident than in the Gallipoli
campaign, was, for some unknown reason, totally lacking at
Erzerum. Such claims, however, do not hold water.
Erzerum was evacuated simply because of a menace to the
Turkish lines of communication and the danger of isolation.
However well provisioned the fortress might have been — and its
stores were vast, for it was the chief supply and provisioning
center for the whole Turkish miliary organization in Asia^
Minor — it could not hope to withstand an indefinite siege. The
Turkish high command would not view with equanimity the
bottling up of close upon 200,000 of its first-line troops. With
the example of Przemysl, and Metz in 1870 in its mind, it decided
upon a, perhaps, temporary abandonment of the position immedi-
ately it became apparent that the Russian advance from the
northeast and southeast could not be successfully opposed by the
troops available.
Furthermore, the defense of the fortress was weakened by the
condition of the country over which the Turkish army had to
retreat in any retirement from Erzerum. It is no simple matter
to transport a defeated army, with its supplies, enormous guns,
ammunition, and other impedimenta, even with an efficient rail-
way organization at its back. It is comparatively easy, then, to
imagine some of the difficulties that confronted the Turkish com-
mand. From Erzerum to the nearest railhead is something like
200 miles. A blinding snowstorm was raging and the tem-
perature was hovering around 25 degrees below zero. Few roads,
and those almost impassable at that season of the year, must
supply all the needs of scores of thousands of men and thousands
of animals, carts, trucks, guns, carriages, etc.
The retreat of the Turkish forces from Erzerum, resembling a
rout in its inevitable haste and confusion, had to be made in the
face of a victorious enemy and, menaced by superior forces on
both flanks, under terrific weather conditions and through road-
less and highly broken country. After a preliminary artillery
bombardment of the Turkish forts on the southeast front of the
city, the Russian infantry began to assault Fort Kara Gubek.
390
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
§
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D
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CAMPAIGN IN CAUCASUS 391
Finally this was carried and then fell in quick succession Forts
Tafta and Chobandede, six miles south on the commanding and
important Deyer Boyum Heights. By February 15, 1916, the
Russians were masters of the city and fortress.
At first it was supposed in the allied countries that the Turkish
army had been trapped in the fortress and more or less author-
itative accounts spoke of the surrender of 180,000 Turkish
troops. These accounts were circumstantial enough. Several
days before the news of the fall of Erzerum came through there
appeared stories of the envelopment of the city. It soon became
known, however, that less than 17,000 troops had been taken with
the abandoned forts — merely a rear guard left behind to delay
the onward sweep of the Russians and give the retreating Turk-
ish army a chance to put a few miles between it and its pursuers.
If the country to the west of Erzerum was rugged and difficult
for the retiring Turk, it also followed that it was not only difficult
for the pursuing Russians, but also offered many opportunities
for a stern resistance. Thus it was not astonishing to learn that
the Russians had little chance of following up their success at
Erzerum. The Turkish army, largely intact, made good its
escape across Armenia, followed by the troops of the Grand Duke
Nicholas, much to the chagrin of allied public opinion, which had
hoped for a smashing victory such as the fall of Przemysl, or Metz
in 1870, or Plevna in 1877.
The grand duke decided to advance with the right of his army
on Trebizond, the Turkish supply base on the Black Sea. Turkey
was known to be hurrying reenf orcements to this town in the hope
of preventing its capture by the Russians. It became a race
across difficult country and, although Petrograd and London re-
ports confidently predicted the success of the Russians, in the
end the Turks were able to bring up strong enough forces to
prevent its capture, for the time being at least.
It is difficult to measure with any accuracy the political results
of the success of the Russians at Erzerum, for the political re-
sults far outweighed the military. In a general way it can be
said that it had little or no effect upon the Balkans, and upon
Mohammedan opinion throughout the East, merely serving to
392 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
offset in a small measure the effects of the allied withdrawal
from the Dardanelles. On the other hand, it had a tremendously
important effect upon the situation in Persia. In that kingdom,
just prior to the Russian offensive, there were many evidences
that affairs were ripe for a rising of the local tribes against the
Russians in occupation of the northern zone of influence. In-
deed, at the very time the grand duke gave his orders for the
advance upon Erzerum he was compelled to detach troops for
operations in Persia. This force advanced against a body num-
bering about 2,000, made up of Turks, Persians, and some Ger-
mans, and finally, after some small fighting, occupied the Persian
towns of Hamadan, Kurn, and Kermanshah.
Even with these successes there was great difficulty in control-
ling the Persians, who had gained courage through the defeat of
the British in Mesopotamia and in Gallipoli. However, the cap-
ture of Erzerum and the rout of the Turks had a quieting effect,
for the time being at least.
PART IX— ITALY IN THE WAR
CHAPTER XLVI
REVIEW OF PRECEDING OPERATIONS-
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS
A RETROSPECT of the Austro-Italian struggle, taken from
the vantage point afforded by nine months of fighting, re-
vealed what was intended to be a campaign of invasion as de-
veloping all the characteristics of trench warfare. Following
shortly on the declaration of war by Italy, General Cadorna de-
ployed the whole of the Italian Third Army on the right bank of
the Isonzo between Tolmino and Monfalcone, and carried out a
vigorous offensive in order to gain a secure footing on the left
bank — an antecedent condition to further operations eastward.
Italian troops crossed the river at five different points, Caporetto,
Plava, Castelnuovo, Gradisca, and Monfalcone. Considering the
immense strength of the Austrian defenses this was considered
a good start Along the thirty-mile front from Tolmino to the sea
there is a continuous wall of defensive works, flanked on the
north by the fortified position of Tolmino, and on the south by the
formidable Carso Plateau, while Gorizia constitutes the central
Austrian paint d'appui, having been converted into a modern
fortress with a girdle of exterior forts supplemented by advanced
batteries provided by armored cars on which the latest types of
howitzers are mounted. All that military science could do to
render this iron barrier impregnable had been done, and the
Italians from the first had a hard struggle in their attacks on it.
While regular siege operations were being carried on against
Tolmino and Gorizia, the Italians were putting forth great efforts
393
394 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
to secure possession of the Carso Plateau, which dominates the
rail and carriage road between Monf alcone and Trieste, as well
as the Isonzo Valley up to Gorizia. The plateau had to be com-
pletely occupied before any advance could be made along the
coast road into Istria and before Gorizia could be attacked from
the south. Two months after the declaration of war the Italians,
who by that time were in possession of the bridgehead at Sagrada,
stormed with great gallantry several lines of trenches on the
summit of the western face of the plateau, and captured two
thousand prisoners with a large quantity of war material. They
followed up this success by an infantry attack, supported by a
large number of heavy and field guns. Farther north another
army operated against Tarvis along two routes, one of which goes
over the Pontafel Pass and is traversed by the railroad running
between Vienna and Venice, while the other is a coach road lead-
ing from Plezzo over the Predil Pass to the Save Valley. The
progress of the Italian columns was checked at Malborgeth, where
the Austrians had constructed a chain of permanent forts, while
along the coach road an equally strong group of forts covering
the Predil Pass blocked the way. A further offensive was di-
rected across the Carnic Alps by way of the Ereuzberg Pass down
the Seoten Valley to Innichen and Toblach on the Pusterthal rail-
way. Formidable works had been constructed at Seoten and
Lambeo, covering the approaches to the railroad, and on these the
Italians opened a furious bombardment for the purpose of clear-
ing a way into the Drave Valley. The object aimed at here was
very clear to the Austrians, for when the railroad was reached
communication along the Pusterthal between the Adige and
Isonzo would be cut, and the Austrian position on the Trentino
turned. This was the position in August, 1915, when the Italians
were exerting pressure on the Austrians for the further purpose
of diverting troops from the Russian frontier, where was being
carried on the greatest offensive known to history.
During August, 1915, a continuous night and day battle was
waged on the Isonzo frontier for the possession of the Carso
Plateau. Gorizia, with its circle of outlying forts, proved itself
practically unavailable from either the north or west, for two
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS 395
fortified heights, Monte Sabatino, on the right bank, and Monte
Gabrielle on the left bank, of the Isonzo River, stood sentry over
the town on the north, while the plateau of Podgora, which is a
perfect labyrinth of deep, intercommunicating trenches, barred
the approach to the town from the west. A determined and care-
fully prepared attack was made by a large Italian force on
Podgora, but though ten regiments were sent against the position
they failed to get through. In another movement the troops of
General Cadorna were successful in obtaining a firm footing on
the western face of the Carso Plateau, occupying Sdraissima, Po-
lazzo, Vermegbano, and Monte Sei Bussi, which overlooks Mon-
f alcone. Finding, however, that the Austrians had been strongly
reenforced, General Cadorna abandoned his storming tactics,
and began advancing along the plateau by the slower methods of
siege operations. From the beginning, both Italians and Austri-
ans recognized the Carso Plateau as the key to Gorizia, and
around it have been waged some of the bitterest conflicts of the
war.
During September, 1915, General Cadorna was able to report
progress all along the front occupied, and especially on the Tren-
tino frontier, where Italian troops moved along the three main
routes which converge on the Adige Valley from the Italian
plain. The route taken was through the Val Giudicaria on the
western face of the Trentino salient, up the Adige on the south
side, and along the Val Sugano on the eastern front The Val
Giudicaria is the highway into the Tyrol from Brescia, and on
either side of it are fortified positions nearly the whole way to
Trent. During the first week of the war the Italians, taking the
Austrians by surprise, seized Condino by a coup de main, and
compelled the Austrian garrison to fall back on the -second line
of defense higher up the valley. Then the Italian troops began to
secure the position gained by constructing defensive works cov-
ering the road approaches to Brescia, and linking these up with
other defensive positions extending along the entire front from
the Stelvio pass to Lake Garda. Simultaneously with the occu-
pation of Condino, an Italian force, based on Verona, moved up
both banks of the Adige, crossed the Austrian frontier near
396 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Borghetto, and seized Ala with hardly any opposition. Continuing
their offensive the Italians then seized Monte Altissimo and its
northern spurs, which command the railroad between Riva and
Rovereto, and at the same time occupied the important position
of Gori Zugra, which is four miles north of Ala, and flanks the
Rovereto road. From there on advance was subsequently made
to Pozzachio, an unfinished fort eight miles from Rovereto, which
was abandoned by the Austrians as soon as the Italian offensive
began to develop. Another force then moved up the Val Astico
from Asiefo, and succeeded in storming the Austrian positions on
Monte Maronia, whence the Italians threatened the main de-
fenses of Rovereto on the Lavaone-Folgaria Plateau. Rovereto
is at the junction of three mountain roads leading into Italy in
this locality, and has a strategical importance second only to that
of Trent. Its occupation was recognized from the start as a
necessary preliminary to advanced operations up the Adige. The
third Italian column, directed against Trent, moved up the Brenta
along the Val Sugana, and in September, 1915, its advanced
guards, operating right and left of the valley, reached Monte
Salubion on the north and Monte Armenderia on the south of
Borgo. These heights command the town of Borgo, but as the
inhabitants are all Italians, the place was not occupied lest this
should lead to its bombardment by the Austrian artillery. The
Austrian commander, however, did not spare the town, which
had been repeatedly bombarded by the guns north of Ronegno.
Borgo is only eighteen miles from Trent and its investment by
Italian troops brought them almost within striking distance of
the great Tyrol fortress.
During November and December, 1915, a series of most des-
perate attempts were made by the troops under General Cadorna
to storm the bridgehead of Gorizia and establish a firm footing on
the Doberdo Plateau. This plateau, which acts as the citadel for
the more extended position of the Carso, rises from 850 to 650
feet above the level of the valley, and dominates all the approaches
to Gorizia. Monte San Michele, which is a ridge on the north side
of the plateau, and rises in one place to 900 feet above sea level,
is the key to the whole position; and round it there was a con-
ITALIAN MOVEMENTS 397
tinuous sanguinary hand-to-hand fight, the Italians sometimes
gaining the advantage, and at other times the Austrians. Against
this position General Cadorna concentrated 1,500 guns, some of
them 14- and 15-inch howitzers, and naval guns. A tremendous
artillery duel, interspersed with infantry attacks, thus set in, and
for a long time the fate of Gorizia trembled in the balance. But
the advantage of position and the systematic preparation of long
years told heavily on the side of the Austrians, who had de-
fended the town with a determination and courage equal to that
of their adversaries. General Boroevich had all along had gen-
eral charge of the Isonzo defenses, while the Archduke Joseph,
who held the Dukla Pass for so many weeks against the Russian
attacks, succeeded to the command of the corps holding the
Doberdo Plateau. Meanwhile the Italian troops were achieving
successes elsewhere. They occupied during the month of Novem-
ber, 1915, Bezzecea in the Ledro Valley, and took possession of
Col di Lava (8,085 feet) in the Dolomite district.
This was roughly the position from the military point of view
on the various Austro-Italian fronts toward the close of the year,
when the obstacles facing the Italian forces began to be appreci-
ated by the outside world. It was by that time generally rec-
ognized that, though the Italians outnumbered the Austro-Hun-
garian troops, and but few reserves were available to reenf orce
General Boroevich, the Austrian defenses were enormously
strong, and could only be captured after a heavy sacrifice of life
and an unlimited expenditure of artillery ammunition. No mere
study of the map can convey any true idea of the difficulties to be
overcome before the Austrian positions in the Dolomites and
Carnic Alps could be captured. For such a survey could give no
indication of the huge guns mounted on the very summit of snow-
clad peaks, or the lines of armored trenches stretching uninter-
ruptedly from the Stelvio to the Isonzo. In the mountain warfare
that had to be undertaken amidst the terrific heights, progress
by either side could all but be reckoned by yards. The con-
voys had to plod up and down precipitous mountain sides. In-
stead of the fighting taking place in valleys and passes, as many
thought, the positions and even the trenches were revealed as
398 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
frequently on the very summits of almost inaccessible peaks and
crags, often above the snow line. At high altitudes the few ob-
servers admitted on either side saw artillery of a caliber usually
associated with defensive works at sea level. The intrepidity re-
quired in operations over such a terrain is illustrated by the
Italian capture of Monte Vero, when a battalion of Alpini as-
cended barefooted the precipitous face of the mountain in the
middle of the night and stormed the Austrian position on the
summit. In such enterprises youth and enthusiasm were found
the best assets. The Alpine troops of Italy are recruited from
mountain populations, whose hearts and lungs, accustomed to
high altitudes, can well bear the strain of mountain fighting.
On the lower Isonzo front the character of the operations has
somewhat recalled the aspect of the fighting area and the troop
movements in France. Here low foothills and undulating plains
predominate. There was on the Isonzo front, however, an ab-
sence of the horrors of war in the shape of devastated towns, vil-
lages, and countryside, with which the world has become familiar
in illustrations from Belgium and northern France.
Over no field of operations was the veil of official secrecy more
securely held than over the events proceeding on the Austro-
Italian front. Newspaper men were rigorously excluded from
the area over which martial law prevailed and the official com-
muniques seldom erred on the side of perspicuity. This pro-
cedure gave rise to a widespread impression that the Italian
forces had been largely marking time. The brilliant dash into
the Isonzo Valley and the capture of Austrian positions in the
Trentino which were chronicled during the months of June and
July, 1915, marked an advance which was not equaled by any
achievements in the months that followed. Nevertheless, a de-
tailed study of the changes in position during that time show that
the Italians were drilling their path forward with unflagging
determination.
ITALY'S RELATIONS TO WARRING NATIONS 399
CHAPTER XLVII
ITALY'S RELATIONS TO THE OTHER
WARRING NATIONS
MEANWHILE, events of a most startling character were tak-
ing place close to the Italian frontier, every one of them big
with consequence to Italy's vital interests. The conquest of Serbia
by the forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary under General
von Mackensen was begun and completed in two months. On
October 14, 1915, Bulgaria declared war against the Allies and
immediately attacked Serbia from the south, cooperating with
the Austro-German forces with whom direct communication was
established toward the end of November, 1915. A belated
French-British expedition landed at Saloniki for the purpose of
lending aid to harassed Serbia, but the forces, which were united
under the command of the French General, Sarrail, were capable
of achieving little. After coming into contact with the Bulgarians
they began on November 27, 1915, to retire to their base at
Saloniki, with Irish troops covering their retreat. The conquest
of Montenegro followed that of Serbia. The much-coveted stra-
tegic position of Mount Lovcen, commanding the Bocca di Cat-
taro, was captured by the Austrians on January 10, 1916, while
the capital, Cettinje, was likewise occupied three days later.
Farther east, the ill-starred Dardanelles venture was coming to a
disastrous end. Evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula by the
forces of Britain and France began in December, 1915, the last
soldiers of these two powers leaving Sedd-el-Bahr on January
7, 1916.
It was expected that Italy would take a prominent part in the
series of events which had taken place on these various fields.
More than once the message was sent round the world that a
well-equipped Italian expedition had left for the Dardanelles. It
was considered certain that Italy would lend her assistance to
the forces landed at Saloniki, and thus aid in preventing the over-
running of Montenegro, which could not but constitute a direct
Z— War St. 4
400 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
menace to herself . Apart from the landing of a number of troops
at Avlona in Albania, Italy kept aloof. This rigid abstinence,
eoupled with the appearance of deadlock on Italy's two main
frontiers, set in motion an undercurrent of criticism among the
friends of the Allies. A further source of uncertainty was found
in the relations still maintained between Italy and Germany.
"Why did not Italy declare war against Germany as well as
against Austria?9' was a query that was continually put. In the
face of this attitude of doubt the Italian Government still con-
tinued what it considered its sound and well-matured policy of
concentrating its forces for the protection of its own fron-
tiers against Austria, and looking on every other enemy as
secondary.
As regards the Balkans, it has to be recalled that it was Italy
who first suggested that Serbia receive the assistance of the Allies
against the superior Austrian forces. This suggestion was at
that early time taken into but slight consideration by France and
Great Britain. A battery or two was lent to Serbia by Great
Britain, but little more was done until the spectacle of invasion
became imminent. While Italy recognized that her interests were
of a paramount character in the Balkans, she was convinced that
the war would be decided in the main theatre, and not on any of
the side theatres that Germany might decide to choose. Nor was
Italy under any misapprehension as to what would be her fate
were the Austrians to succeed in breaking through the lines of
defense on her northern frontier. These considerations decided
her against participating in any over-sea adventure unless she
was absolutely compelled to do so.
Italy's interest in the problem as to who was to dominate
Constantinople and the Dardanelles was less than that of either
England or Russia. The apologists of her policy of abstention
maintained, indeed, that jealousy of Russia was Great Britain's
main motive in deciding on the expedition to Gallipoli. Italy had
a more important work to do than to lend her aid in playing off
one ally against another. Any aid given to that expedition had,
necessarily, to be of a comprehensive character if success was to
be achieved. This would have meant a serious depletion of the
ITALY'S RELATIONS TO WARRING NATIONS 401
Italian forces and might have opened up a way that would have
enabled the enemy to strike at the very heart of Italy.
When the possibility of Bulgaria taking the side of the Central
Powers loomed into the domain of actuality, Italy with her nearer
intuition in Balkan affairs called attention to the impending
denouement. In this she was seconded by Serbia, who asked the
aid of the Allies in striking a blow which would have prevented
what proved from the allied point of view to be a calamity.
Italy's suggestion was that Sofia be at once occupied before Bul-
garian mobilization could be got under way. The policy of hop-
ing against hope took the place of energetic action. Then action
on the part of the Allies followed when the blow had fallen. Yet
Italy knew that Serbia was doomed the moment Bulgaria de-
clared war.
Bitter as the admission might be to Italy, it was convinced that
Montenegro was in the like case with Serbia. Montenegro had
as little hope of coping with the combined forces of Germany,
Austria, and Bulgaria as Serbia. A mere consideration of the
alternative plans of rendering aid to her small neighbors revealed
the most promising of them as entailing a useless sacrifice. It
would have meant the taking over-sea of some hundreds of thou-
sands of men and large guns during the worst period of the year.
The passage to the Montenegrin port of Antivari would have re-
quired the protection of the entire Italian navy, thus leaving the
coasts of Italy exposed to the attacks of the enemy. And what
would have been the main purpose of the expedition? To save
the celebrated Mount Lovcen, which indeed dominates the Bocca
di Cattaro, but does not dominate the Bocca di Teodo, where at
the time of the combined attacks of Montenegrins and French
from Mount Lovcen months before, and of the French and Eng-
lish from the sea, the Austrian navy was safely sheltered. What
Italy could wisely do she did so. She succored the retreating
Serbian and Montenegrin soldiers, gave them food, clothing, and
shelter, and brought them in safety to the different places to
which they had been assigned.
Even before hostilities commenced between Italy and Austria
the Italian Government accomplished a tour de force. Against
402 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the tacit opposition of Austria she transported a considerable
body of troops to the port of Avlona, which, with Brindisi, com-
mands the entrance to the Adriatic. A glance at the map will
immediately reveal the vital importance of this strategic position
as a base for expeditionary forces in Albania and the Balkans,
while its naval possibilities make it inferior to no port on the
Adriatic. The fly in the ointment was in the Austrian hold on
the Bocca di Cattaro. Thence Austrian submarines could menace
Italian shipping, even though no Austrian surface craft dare
approach the Strait of Otranto. To this has to be added the
further peril arising from the strong current that is supposed to
descend from the head of the Adriatic. While transporting
troops from Brindisi to Avlona, more than one Italian vessel fell
victim to floating mines borne down by this current.
Such in general outline was Italy's position at the end of the
year 1915, and such the tenor of those who sought to vindicate
her policy in the Balkans and elsewhere. It was maintained by
Italian publicists that the Italian fleet had fought with the fleets
of France and England on several occasions against the Turks.
It was pointed out that that fleet was on continual patrol duty in
the Mediterranean with those of the Allies. Italian troops had
also been landed with French troops on the island of Corfu, and,
according to report, had cooperated to some extent with British
troops in Egypt and North Africa. Nevertheless, political and
military reasons all combined to make the Austro-Italian frontier
the one battle ground where Italy could hope for an enduring
victory and fight for it with all her strength.
In regard to the absence of a declaration of war between Ger-
many and Italy, the attitude of the Government of King Victor
Emmanuel was thus explained: First of all, the treaty of the
Triple Alliance did not consist of a single document, but of three
separate agreements: one between Germany and Austria, an-
other between Germany and Italy, and another between Austria
and Italy. When Austria declared war on Serbia, Italy registered
her protest against the policy of Austria in which she claimed to
recognize a violation of that country's treaty with herself. The
pourparlers thus graduallv turned for subject matter to the time-
ITALY'S RELATIONS TO WARRING NATIONS 403
honored grievances which Italy cherished against her present ally,
but old oppressor. In these negotiations Germany rendered con-
tinued aid to Italy, who sought by peaceful means to secure the
return of the provinces to which she had an immemorial claim.
These negotiations failed, and Italy, denouncing her treaty with
Austria-Hungary, declared war against her. But except in so
far as she was the ally of Austria-Hungary, Italy had no griev-
ance against Germany. She broke off diplomatic relations with
both empires, and she expected that Germany would declare war
against her. Germany did not do so, and there the matter
remained.
Italy had undoubted historic grounds for this procedure, which
was likewise in full agreement with the national feeling. For
well over a century feeling in Italy against Austria has been deep
and widespread. Toward Germany, on the other hand, the feel-
ing is largely neutral, tinged with a certain awe of German
efficiency. German investments in Italy are also said to total
something like $3,000,000,000, and the economic domination
which that vast sum denotes was bound to be felt through every
channel of the national life. But neither the respect felt for Ger-
man ability nor the secret influence of German finance has
hampered Italy in the conduct of the war. Besides breaking off
diplomatic relations with the kaiser, she treated the Germans
within her gates exactly as she treated the citizens and subjects
of other enemy countries. She formed a commercial alliance with
France, Great Britain, and Russia, an alliance the chief aim of
which was the removal of German economic domination in Italy.
She, moreover, requisitioned German merchant ships that had
taken shelter in Italian ports; and finally she broke off com-
mercial relations with Germany, and took measures to prevent
Germany from obtaining through Switzerland any goods neces-
sary for the welfare of the population or the prosecution of the
war. Germany allowed the serious measures taken by Italy to
pass unchallenged, and so Italy was content to let the relations
between the two countries continue on that basis.
But beneath all these surface movements ran a deeper current
of influence that was partly hidden from all except those who
404 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
were active participants in affairs of southeastern Europe.
There was, for example, the rivalry between Italy and Greece,
a factor that may yet be discovered to have had a deciding in-
fluence in the war. For it was the entrance of Italy into the
war, with the assumed pledge of territorial profits in the Balkans
and in Asia Minor, that forced Greece into maintaining her neu-
trality at a time when the alignment of forces in the Balkans
was still in complete doubt. A well-informed and well-conducted
diplomacy, steering skillfully amid the eddies of Balkan affairs,
might have brought the combined strength of Italy, Bulgaria, and
Greece to the side of the Allies. But Greek jealousy of Italy was
allowed to smolder and even to be fanned into flame by the
awakened pretensions of the Italian press, whose ambitions in
the East became inflated at the prospect of a victorious war, out
of which Italy was mirrored as issuing as an imperial state
holding a hegemony over the lesser lands on her extended bor-
der. While hesitation and doubt held sway in the councils of
the Allies, Bulgaria struck, and at one stroke brought disaster
on Serbia and Montenegro, and stiffened Greece into an attitude
ef unshakable neutrality.
CHAPTER XLVIII
PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY
MEANWHILE, with more than half a year's fighting behind
them, the Italian commanders had come to certain well-
defined military conclusions. The plans of General Cadorna had
involved three separate campaigns — one in the Trentino, the
other in the Carso, and a subsidiary campaign in the Carnic
Alps to the north, along the main watershed of the mountains.
A general offensive in the Trentino had been tested and found
well-nigh impossible. Trentino is indeed a military paradox — a
sharp salient jutting into Italy, which is strong by reason of its
being a salient. This is because it is inclosed on eight sides by
PROBLEMS OP STRATEGY 405
great walls, the batteries of the main Alpine chain. A salient
is weak as a strategical situation in proportion to the possibility
of crushing in its sides and threatening the lines of retreat of
the forces occupying the point. Where the sides cannot be suc-
cessfully attacked, it becomes a position of strength and remains
a constant threat. This was the situation in the Trentino. The
main Alpine chain is not impassable. It is indeed conceivable,
under exceedingly favorable circumstances, that one or more of
the passes on the east or west side might be taken and an advance
down the valleys to the Adige turn the positions of the defenders.
But ordinary foresight on the part of the defense would make this
impossible. The valley of the Adige is the only avenue through the
Trentino, and this avenue, which is at best only a narrow road,
was heavily guarded by the strong fortress of Trent. Moreover,
there could be but little result accruing to Italy if the Trentino
were forced. The Adige leads only to the main chain of the Alps,
and farther on, across the mountains by the easiest of Alpine
highways, is the Brenner Pass. Modern defensive power is so
great that its development to the point where this highway
would be impregnable, except against overwhelmingly superior
numbers, would be a matter of great simplicity. Along the
northern frontier, in the Carnic Alps, the situation is similar.
There is only one pass across these mountains, and this the
Austrians could block with the same facility and certainty with
which they could block the Brenner Pass.
On the other hand the presumption that the Isonzo sector
had a degree of vulnerability was found correct, and along the
Isonzo line the real Italian offensive from the beginning con-
tinued to be directed. The Isonzo is roughly about three miles
into Austria, beyond the political boundary. But it is the true
military boundary between Italy and Austria, and it was always
regarded by the Austrians as their first line of defense. For
almost its entire length, as far south as Salcaro, about four miles
north of Gorizia, the Isonzo River runs through a deep gorge
and is easily defended. From Salcaro to the sea it issues from
the gorge into a more level country — the plateaus of Gorizia and
of Carso — although even the southern part of the line is domi-
406 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
nated by a series of elevations in supporting distance of each
other. Until the line of the Isonzo was forced, Trieste and the
entire Istrian Peninsula might be regarded as safe.
Although the line of the Isonzo was, as has been shown, the
only feasible line on which Italy could advance, no serious offen-
sive could be attempted until the outlets from the Trentino were
thoroughly and effectively stopped up. For Italy to have ad-
vanced in the Carso, with her rear open to attack by the Aus-
trians coming through the Tyrolean passes, would have been
foolhardy. Italy's first step, therefore, was to start a simultane-
ous forward movement through every pass from Stelvio on the
west to the pass near Pontebba on the north. These movements
naturally were of an offensive nature, although they were really
for a defensive purpose. No attempt was made to advance any
distance through the western passes. The Italians were con-
tent to take the fortifications guarding the entrance and to seize
heights commanding the approaches.
On the south and east of the Trentino, however, the opera-
tions took on a more extended and, for the Austrians, a more
serious aspect. On the south the principal efforts were directed
against Riva and Rovereto. The operations against Riva, which
is situated at the head of Lake Garda, were directed along the
valley of the Ledro and thence along the Tonale River, a small
stream connecting Lake Ledro and Lake Garda. At the same
time the Italians pushed with energy down the Val Sugana,
which leads directly to Trent. The advance was pushed to a
point where there was no possibility of the Austrians coming
through, and there the Italian forces rested.
Well up, toward the north, in the Dolomites there followed
considerable fighting, in the Cordevole Valley particularly, for
the Col di Lona, the loftiest of the mountain tops in that region.
The Cordevole unites with the Val Forsa some twenty miles east
of the Adige Valley, the Val Forsa connecting with the Adige
at the town of Lavio, six miles north of Trent. To cut in behind
the Austrians south of Trent would, of course, have created
havoc with the entire Austrian forces in the Trentino, but, as
stated, the defensive possibilities of the situation are so formid-
PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY 407
able that success would appear almost beyond the realms of
actuality.
On the Isonzo front the fighting all along continued on a large
scale. An idea of the immensity of the struggle is suggested by
the Austrian estimate in January, 1916, that Italian casualties
had passed the million mark. Exaggerated as this number was
regarded in allied circles, it showed Austria-Hungary's opinion
of the severity of the fighting in what was considered a sub-
sidiary theatre of the Great War.
The railroad situation on the Isonzo front is, as in practically
all modern military situations, of primary strategic importance.
The Istrian Peninsula is served by three lines, each of which
runs to Austrian bases of supply. One runs up the valley of the
Isonzo, through Gorizia and Tolmino and through the Hochein
Tunnel to Vienna. At Gorizia a branch leaves this line, running
southeast, and connects Gorizia with Trieste across the Carso
Plateau. The second line comes from the east from Laibach
through San Pietro, where a branch runs south to Fiume, and
the third comes north from the Austrian naval base at Pola.
Gorizia is served by the northern road from Vienna, from Trieste
by the main line, and by the branch just described. Supplies
from Vienna would be stopped by cutting the road anywhere
north of Gorizia. But to shut off Trieste as a source, both of
the southern rail communications must be cut. Early in June,
1915, the Italians forced a passage of the Isonzo at Plava and
at Monf alcone, and cut the railroad at these two points. Gorizia
then continued to be supplied only by the Trieste branch. Nor
was Trieste itself cut off, as the road from Laibach through
San Pietro continued open. The only way to isolate Istria was
to take the San Pietro junction, and this was the ultimate aim
of the operations at that region.
The Italian objective in Istria was, of course, Trieste. In
order to advance on Trieste the Italians must be secured from
a flank attack, and Gorizia, which is a strongly fortified bridge-
head, would be directly on their flank. Therefore, it must be
either captured or masked before an advance to the south could
be started. Gorizia, too, was important for another reason. It
408 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
was the point which the Austrians had chosen to be the center
of their first main line of defense. If it fell, not only was the
way open for an advance on Trieste, but the entire Austrian
line to the north and south was jeopardized through the fact
that, with the center pierced, both wings were exposed to flank
attacks, and would have to retreat or be rolled up and defeated
in detail. In other words, the fall of Gorizia would uncover
Austria's entire Isonzo line, and, although there might be some
subsequent resistance in the mountains to the north, the giving
way of the line would be inevitable.
Gorizia, however, as has been shown, stands in the front rank
of strong natural defensive positions. The foothills of the Julian
Alps descend sharply to a plain near where the Isonzo issued
from the gorge which it has cut through the mountains. The
line between the plain and the mountains is sharp and clearly
marked. There is no gentle tapering off of one into the other.
This line between the hills and plain is somewhat irregular in
shape and incloses a pocket in which Gorizia is situated. It is
not unlike a huge elliptical stadium. At the north end, level with
the ground, is Gorizia, with the Julian Alps mounting on all sides.
The southern bank is constituted by the plateau of the Carso,
in which is situated the town of Doberdo. Thus the plain of
Gorizia is surrounded on three sides by elevations which serve
as admirable watchmen for the city beneath. Just across the
Isonzo from Gorizia are the town and spur of Podgora, which
absolutely command the city and prevent an Italian attack from
that side. With Podgora completely in Italian hands, it is diffi-
cult to see how Gorizia could hold out. From Podgora the depots,
barracks, and supply houses of Gorizia are within artillery range
of guns of all calibers, and the environs of Podgora have changed
hands several times.
To the north of Podgora, at a distance of between two and
three miles, is a second series of heights — the heights of Oslavia,
which also dominate the bridgehead. These the Italians rushed
in December, 1915, so the heights northwest of Gorizia continued
in Italian hands. To the south, on the Carso Plateau, the Italians
also pushed forward. The heights on the edge of the plateau —
PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY 409
San Michele and San Martine di Carso— came into Italian hands.
The fortifications of Gorizia — temporary field fortifications — are
not at all like the more modern fortifications of Europe, which,
previous to the shelling of Liege and Namur, were considered
almost impregnable. They are more nearly like the little town
of Ossowetz on the Bobr River, which held out against the Ger-
man 42-centimeter guns for over six months, and was then
evacuated only because its defenders were flanked out. There
was very little concrete in the Gorizia defenses, which were
mostly earthworks formed into terraces on which the guns were
mounted. Many of these gun positions have been destroyed, but
Gorizia has continued to hold out despite the desperate attacks
of the besiegers.
Because of the natural defensive strength of the line less men
have been used by Austria on this front than in any other theatre
of the war. When war between Italy and Austria broke out
the Austrians had already commenced the vast operations which
flung Russia from the Carpathians and behind Lemberg. The
men were therefore not available in sufficient numbers to defend
the line of the Isonzo, otherwise it is likely it would have re-
mained intact from the outset, and the Italian forces would never
have been able to force their way through Flava and Monfalcone.
That Austria harbored little anxiety regarding her Italian fron-
tier likewise appears from her relinquishment of the Russian
offensive to begin operations in the Balkans. Whether a real
Italian offensive at any time was among her military plans will
remain doubtful till events make the situation clear. Austria
would appear to have little to gain from a conquest of Italian
provinces in which her former rule brought her the deep and
ordained resentment of the Italian people.
During the month of January, 1916, the southern theatre of
war was comparatively quiet. The forces under General Cadorna
maintained their offensive on the Isonzo without any decisive
revolt taking place. There was considerable bombardment of
the bridgeheads at Tolmino and Gorizia. In the Gorizia sector
the Austrians attacked tha Italian positions at Oslavia, captur-
ing 900 men and inflicting severe losses in killed and wounded.
410 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Determined attacks by the Italian troops followed, and the posi-
tions were again transferred to Italian hands. At the end of
this month an official r£sum£ covering Italy's entrance into the
war and the operations of the Italian army in the intervening
months was issued at Rome. In this official communique it was
estimated that 30,000 Austrian prisoners, 5 guns, 65 machine
guns, and a large quantity of war material had so far been cap-
tured by the Italians from the Austrian forces. Twenty-five
Austrian divisions, totaling about 425,000 men, were said to
have been massed along the Italian frontier at the beginning
of the war.
CHAPTER XLIX
MOVE AGAINST GERMANY
A ROYAL decree was issued at Rome on February 11, 1916,
prohibiting the importation into Italy or transit through
Italy of all German and Austrian merchandise, as well as the
exportation of all merchandise of German or Austrian origin
through Italian ports. This was the formal recognition of a
policy that had been followed out with increasing strictness since
hostilities commenced, but which had never been officially de-
clared. The declaration of war by Italy against Austria carried
with it the prohibition of trading with Austro-Hungarian sub-
jects, and announcement had been made in the Italian press of
prosecution of persons on the charge of trading with the nation's
enemy. The coupling of the German Empire with Austria-
Hungary in this royal decree was the first formal act on the
part of Italy in the way of making it clear that all commercial
relations with Germany were suspended. This was in accord-
ance with the general policy of cooperation among the Allies,
whose disjointed action had hitherto seriously hampered the con-
duct of the war.
It was also decided by the Italian Government on February 16,
1916, that warmer commercial relations with the allied nations
MOVE AGAINST GERMANY 411
should be cultivated. In pursuance of this policy a program wag
mapped out covering the following five years, during which
period machinery, raw materials, and manufactured articles des-
tined for the development of existing industries or the creation
of new ones could be imported free of any duty if their origin
was in allied or friendly countries. In this way it was aimed
to disintegrate the commercial domination of Germany which
had been built up by the efforts of a generation. It was felt that
by this method efforts on the part of Germany and Austria-
Hungary to recapture lost Italian import trade would be ren-
dered futile. During this same month announcement was made
regarding the third Italian war loan. This was declared to have
reached on February 6, 1916, 3,000,000,000 lire, which, together
with former loans, showed that altogether 5,000,000,000 lire had
been contributed. Considerable satisfaction was expressed at
this result. It was conceded that in the realm of finance, in
which Italy had been considered weakest, the country had done
remarkably well. Considering that Italy not long ago was con-
sidered one of the poorest nations of Europe, bearing taxes out
of all proportion to her wealth, and that even now she had been
enjoying but half a century of national independence, the show-
ing was full of promise for the future. In general, it was held
that Italy had revealed herself in a character different from
that which had been made traditional by the criticisms of
foreigners.
Not only on the declaration of war had the traditional "Latin
temperament" shown itself to be surprisingly calm and self-pos-
sessed, but various other traits were revealed that militated
against the conventional view. When hostilities began on the
Austro- Italian frontier the stroke of the fateful hour found Italy
prepared to the last button and the last man. An organization
that was the fruit of years of toil had been built up, ready for
action on any frontier. That such action would be first needed on
the frontier of a former ally could not have been foreseen. But
within a very short time Italy was mobilized, and her prompt
efficiency made it possible at once to carry the war on to Austrian
territory, where it has since been waged.
412 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On the last day of the month of February, 1916, Italy took
still another step which showed her prepared to burn all her
boats as far as Germany was concerned. On that date the Italian
Government requisitioned thirty-four large German steamers in-
terned in Italian harbors. A total of fifty-seven German and
Austrian vessels were in Italian ports at the beginning of the
war. The Austrian ships were seized by Italy when war was
declared on the Dual Monarchy. No action had, however, been
taken in regard to German vessels. Their status in the ports of
Italy had been regarded as parallel to that of German vessels
which remained in American ports after war began. This led
to a certain amount of heartburning among the friends of the
Allies, who pointed out that it was in line with the Italian policy
of maintaining commercial relations with Germany as far as
they could be maintained. Rumors had also been rife regarding
alleged secret agreements that had been made with the German
Government.
These rumors were gradually dissipated by the successive
measures taken by the Italian Government and the requisition-
ing of the German interned vessels revealed her as in full co-
operation with the Allies. There were also other considerations
that weighed with Italy. The submarine had revealed itself as
a powerful destructive weapon, and the toll taken by it of allied
ships was a heavy one. It was seen that the transfer of German
vessels to the flag of Italy and their use by the Allies would do
much toward relieving the congestion of goods at American docks
which were awaiting shipment to the allied countries. The loot
of German vessels then in Italian ports and their tonnage formed
a formidable total. They were as follows : At Ancona, Lemnos,
24,873 tons; at Bari, Waltraute, 3,818; at Cagliari, Spitzfels,
5,809; at Catania, LipaH, 1,539; at Genoa, Hermesburg, 2,824,
Konig Albert, 10,484, Moltke, 12,325, Prinz-Regent Luitpold,
6,595; at Girgenti, Imbros, 2,380; at Leghorn, Amalfi, 1,756,
Termini, 1,523; at Licata, Portfino, 1,745; at Naples, Bayem,
8,000, Marsala, 1,753, Herania, 6,455 ; at Palermo, Algier, 3,127,
Catania, 3,000, Tunis, 1,833; at Savona, Bastia, 1,527; at Syra-
cuse, Albany, 5,882. Ambria, 5,143, Barcelona, 5,465, Katter-
BENEWED ATTACKS 413
turm, 6,018, Mudros, 3,137, Sigmaringen, 5,710, Italia, 3,498;
at Venice, Samo, 1,922, Volos, 1,903; at Massowah, Aspemfell,
4,361, Borkum, 5,645, Choiring, 1,657, Christian X, 4,956, Ost-
warfc, 4,400, Persepolis, 5,446, Segovia, 4,945, and Sturmfels,
5,660. All these were at the end of February, 1916, put into
the service of the Allies, compensating in some degree for the
losses suffered by each of these nations from mines and the
deadly submarine.
CHAPTER L
RENEWED ATTACKS — ITALY'S SITUATION AT
THE BEGINNING OF MARCH, 1916
DURING the month of February, 1916, the war on the Italian
front continued with bitterness but without decisive result.
Early in the month the Austrians attacked the heights of Oslavia
northwest of Gorizia, capturing 1,200 men and several trenches.
Several days later the Italians achieved some results after weeks
of hammering in the Sugana Valley. They captured the moun-
tainous region of Collo and also occupied the towns of Roncegno
and Romchi. By this new acquisition of territory the Italians
came almost within striking distance of one of their chief ob-
jectives in the war — the city of Trent — which lies, protected on
the northeast and north by a line of forts, fifteen miles west of
the conquered terrain. Meanwhile several aerial attacks, which
had been fitfully chronicled since the beginning of the war,
brought anxiety to the coast towns of Italy. Venice with its
arsenal was visited more than once. In February, 1916, hostile
aeroplanes bombarded the town of Setio, fifteen miles from
Vicenza, killing six persons, wounding many others, and doing
considerable material damage. The aerial attack on Setio was
the third reported in one week on Italian cities, following raids
on the districts of Ravenna and Milan. Setio is in northeastern
Italy, fifteen miles south of the Austrian border, and fifty miles
northwest of Venice. On February 14, 1916, Austrian aeroplanes
414 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
dropped bombs on Rimini, but were chased to the east by the
fire of antiaircraft batteries.
In the last week of February, 1916, a report that Durazzo, an
Albanian port on the Adriatic Sea, had been evacuated by the
Italian troops was confirmed. The Italian brigade stationed
there had been withdrawn, it was officially declared. The Italian
troops were drawn back in company with Serbians, Monte-
negrins, and Albanians. Men and horses were gathered to-
gether, revictualed, and transported with light losses in the
midst of grave difficulties, by the combined action of Italian and
allied warships and Italian troops along the Albanian coast
When the evacuation was completed by the departure of the
Albanian Government from Durazzo, the Italian brigade as-
signed to the city began a retreat, which was accomplished ac-
cording to plan despite serious attacks from the Austrian forces,
which advanced as far as the isthmuses to the east and north of
Durazzo. The fall of the city of Durazzo resulted from the de-
feat of the Italian and the Albanian forces under Essad Pasha,
the provisional president. A strong line of outer defenses for the
city had been constructed and the indications were that a spirited
resistance would be offered. The Austrian and German forces
attacked at daybreak. The defenders were soon ejected from
their positions at Bazar Sjak. Soon afterward the Italians on the
southern bank of the lower Arzen were forced to abandon their
positions. The Austrians crossed the river and proceeded south-
ward. At noon a decisive action east of Bazar Sjak drove the
Italians from strong positions. The same fate was suffered by
the defenders of Sassa Bianeo, six miles east of Durazzo. By the
evening of February 23, 1916, the entire outer girdle of defenses
was taken. The attackers, advancing to the inner line positions,
established the fact that the Italians were embarking their
troops hurriedly. The final result was that the only position held
by Italian troops in the Balkans was Avlona in Albania. The
situation was viewed with much concern in Italy, where the am-
bition was to make the Adriatic an Italian sea. It was an un-
satisfactory result of a series of operations in which Italian
interests were vital, but in which Italians had taken but a
RENEWED ATTACKS 415
negligible part. The conquest of most of the territory north of
Greece had left the Austro-Germans with a large army released
for work elsewhere. French and British were intrenching
strongly at Saloniki, backed by a powerful fleet. The Italians
still held Avlona. Greece remained neutral, but was filled with
resentment against the Allies, who were repeatedly violating her
territory. Bulgaria, flushed with victory, now held her strong
army in leash. Serbia and Montenegro had gone down before
the invader. Rumania was resisting every effort whether by
threat or force or cajolement to lead her into war. The situation
called for the most serious consideration from Italy and her
allies.
During February, 1916, M. Briand, the French Premier, was
the guest of the Italian Government in Rome, where he had gone
with the object — the words are M. Briand's — "of establishing a
closer and more fruitful cooperation between the Italians and
their allies/' Political cooperation was complete, he declared,
but military cooperation on their part had been admittedly less so,
and that was the supreme want of the moment. Italy rightly
hesitated to embark on adventure, but in order to secure her
political aims her primary object was identical with that of her
allies, namely, to break down the military strength of the Central
Powers. For this purpose it was necessary to strike together,
and strike at the enemy's heart. The world knew what Italians
wanted, and meant to get — the Italian Trentino and Trieste; but
frontal attacks were costly, as General Cadorna had discovered,
and the Italian strategist had not yet said his last word.
The fate of Trieste might perhaps bemore quickly decided on the
Danube than on the Isonzo. There was a general agreement that
an error had been committed by the Allies in letting the Central
Powers cross the Danube into Serbia. Except along the 250-mile
gap between the Adriatic and the Serbo-Rumanian frontier, the
Central Powers were blockaded either by ships and soldiers or by
neutral territory. Opinions differed as to where the Allies should
strike to reach the heart of Germany, but there were many who
thought that the first offensive should be to close the gateway
into the Balkans by reconquering Serbia and cutting the com-
AA— War St. 4
416 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
mimications between the Central Powers and their allies. Time
would show what the allied Governments meant to do, but if this
intention was to get back to the Danube half a million men would
be required at Saloniki with an equal force in reserve.
It was generally admitted that the territorial ambitions oi
Italy had been seriously checked by the development of Austrian
strength. The war as originally planned on the Austro-Italian
frontier was to be one of swift movement in the direction oi
Trieste and Dalmatia; with the gradual cooperation of the
Balkan nations and a general invasion into the interior of Aus-
tria. Until, therefore, decided headway could be made on the
Isonzo front and Gorizia had fallen, a feeling-out movement
would appear the best to be followed. The Italian people were
learning to accept the delay with philosophic resignation. The
axiom of Napoleon was recalled that it was always the unsus-
pected that happened in war, and events in the other fighting
areas enabled them to grasp the difficulties of the situation on
their own border.
Already in February, 1916, the conquest of Montenegro and
the capture of Mount Lovchen, long the nightmare of Italian
statesmen, by the Austrians, began to be less a subject of anxiety.
Serious blow as it was to Italian prestige, it did not appear irre-
parable. Even before, Austria had already a magnificent series
of natural harbors in the Adriatic. But it was argued that
Austria had not a sufficiently strong fleet to take advantage of
the new wonderful natural harbor now entirely in her possession.
The chief perils lay in the formidable obstacle to naval activity
formed by Mount Lovchen, with 305-mm. guns mounted on its
summit and in the facile use of the Bocca di Cattaro as a sub-
marine base from which to harass the Italian fleet. Italy, it was
recognized, was contending with geographical disadvantages
everywhere, but in the Adriatic more than elsewhere, owing to
the peculiarly tame configuration of her coast line. As compared
with that on the eastern side of the Adriatic the contrast was
great.
Nature had, indeed, been lavish in her gifts to Austria in
this direction. Deep water inlets forming natural harbors, which
RENEWED ATTACKS 417
at the present time are invaluable as harbors for warships or as
submarine bases, are to be found all along the Dalmatian coast.
Tajer, Zara, Lesina, Lissa, Curzola, Maleda, Sabbioncello,
Grayosa, and Sebenico are almost in themselves sufficient to
counterbalance any numerical disparity between the Austrian
and Italian fleets. Several of these natural harbors have of late
years been transformed, at enormous expense, into naval ports
and strongly fortified. Millions have been spent on Sebenico,
and it has been so fortified as to be absolutely impregnable from
the sea, even the rocks facing the harbor having been cased in
ferroconcrete and turned into forts. The claim of Venice to be
mistress of the Adriatic belongs to a remote age; it has long
since been ousted by Pola, which has gradually been developed
into one of the strongest naval arsenals and ports in the world.
Similarly the whole coast line of Dalmatia is fronted by a chain
of islands, round which submarines can receive supplies and lurk
in absolute security. In the rear of these islands is a succession
of navigable channels through which a war fleet can pass under
cover from Pola to Cattaro. The Italian coast line is the very
antithesis of the Austrian. Between Venice and Brindisi, the
whole length of the Adriatic, there is not a single natural harbor.
But, said the Italians :
"What is the good of a fine stable without horses?" Italy had
the ships, Austria the harbors: it remained to be seen which
would win out.
The bearing of all this on the question of Italy's cooperation
with the Allies in the Balkans is apparent. It had been fre-
quently remarked that the Dalmatian coast line was likely one
day to bring on a European war, for its possession is of vital
interest to Italy. Austria, with twelve naval bases and all the
natural advantages of coast line in her favor, is in a far stronger
position than Italy. How can Italy hope to occupy the Dalmatian
coast? There was and is a considerable diversity of opinion in
Italy as to the wisdom of an over-sea expedition in addition to
the occupation of Avlona in Albania. At one moment it was
suggested that in view of the preponderating call on the military
resources of the country in the areas of operations on the Isonzo,
418 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
in Carnia, Cadore, and the Trentino, it would be wiser to with-
draw for the time being from Avlona. But it would seem as
though Italy is bound to see the thing through. The place has
been put into a state of comparative impregnability. Italy is
well aware that her line of communication must remain more or
less at the mercy of the Austrian fleet operating from Pola and
the naval bases along the coast She would need very material
assistance from the allied fleets, and her part in the Balkan
operations would appear therefore to depend on cohesive action
among the allied admirals. The loss of Avlona would inflict a
blow on the prestige of the Allies paralleling that of the Gallipoli
d6b&cle. Yet at the end of February, 1916, the Austrians, ad-
vancing along the coast in conjunction with Bulgarians coming
from Monastir, would appear to be making Avlona their objec-
tive. Austrian success would make the Adriatic a mere clausum
to the allied fleets and cripple Italy in one of her chief arms of
defense and offense.
PART X— CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
CHAPTER LI
OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD AND
AROUND THE TIGRIS
THE British campaign in Mesopotamia during the first year
of the war had been generally successful. After the capture
of Basra in November, 1914, the Delta country was cleared of the
enemy and the safety of the oil fields assured. A period of quiet
followed, broken only when the Turks took the offensive, which
failed, in April, 1915. Late in May the British won a decisive vic-
tory over the Turkish troops at Kurna. In July, 1915, the ill-
fated expedition against the enemy forces guarding Bagdad was
planned. Later, after the failure in the Dardanelles, it was neces-
sary to attempt something spectacular that would restore British
prestige in the Orient, and this could be accomplished by the
capture of Bagdad.
The British position in regard to Persia had become difficult.
It was known that the German Ambassador at Teheran, Prince
Henry XXXI of Reuss, was scheming with Persian tribes and
Persian statesmen and politicians, and also trying to win over
the armed police and their Swedish officers. Russia and Great
Britain had established this police system to protect the high-
ways from brigands, and Swedish officers had been chosen to com-
mand them because they might be counted on not to favor
Russian or British interests.
The mountain tribes on the Turko-Persian border were in a
state of unrest and seemed to be only waiting an opportunity to
show their hostility toward the foes of Germany and Turkey.
419
420
THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
S
OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD 421
The Swedish-led gendarmerie were also more than suspected by
the British of having been won over by German agents. The
Russian army in the Caucasus meanwhile was accomplishing lit-
tle or nothing, while the Turkish forces in part were extending
toward the Persian highlands, with the purpose, it was suspected,
of joining with the Swedish-led rebels and mountain tribes. The
Turks and intriguers in Persia evidently thought the time ripe for
a quick conquest of Persia, as the main Russian armies in
Poland were not in a position to interfere. It seemed to the Turks
and their German advisers that the hour was propitious to send
forward an army that would drive the British-Indian Expedi-
tionary Force out of Mesopotamia.
Sir John Nixon had no adequate forces at his command for
the proposed task of capturing Bagdad, having only at his dis-
posal one division of Indian and British troops, and a brigade
or so in reserve with which to attack the Turkish army that was
daily increasing in numbers.
The most implacable foe that the British troops had to contend
against was the climate. It was found impossible to march more
than eight miles a day and after sundown. The heat in the tents
at times varied between 128 and 130 degrees Fahrenheit. With
burning sand underfeet, and scorching rays of the sun from
above, blood dried up in the body, the brain became inflamed, fol-
lowed by delirium, coma, death. It was impossible for the white
soldiers to perspire unless they were near marshes where they
might quench their intolerable thirst in the brackish waters.
Owing to the lack of fresh vegetables and improper food, the
rations of bully beef and hard-tack, and the assaults of blood*
sucking insects, many deaths occurred. Even the Northwest
Indian troops, accustomed to the desert and life in a hot climate,
suffered intensely in Mesopotamia. It is necessary to consider
the climatic conditions the British forces had to contend with in
this country to understand why their progress was necessarily
slow, and why so many men fell by the way.
The attempt to capture Bagdad was much criticized when pro-
jected, and since, as being foolhardy, and likely to fail, and in any
case not worth the great loss of men it must entail. But the
422 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
British-Indian Expeditionary Force was in a position where it
must take a gambler's chance and stand to win or lose. To
capture the city of the Caliphs would in the first place greatly
impress the Mohammedan population and restore British pres-
tige, which had sadly suffered through the Dardanelles failure.
And it was necessary that the British troops should act promptly
and without counting the possible cost, for every hour's delay
permitted the Turks and their allies to grow in strength.
To the British, Bagdad was of importance. It was needed as a
base at the head of navigation. It would enable them to prevent
Turkish troops from traveling over Persian highways, and, most
important of all, it would afford the British opportunities to check
Mohammedan organization and subdue attempted risings.
General Townshend, who commanded the division that was sent
forward to attempt the capture of Bagdad, had all the odds
against him. His small force, consisting of two-thirds Indian and
one-third British troops, was hopelessly inadequate for the pro-
jected campaign. It was known that the Turks were well
equipped with guns of superior power, and that they were directed
by German officers, assisted by German engineers; that the very
able German officer Marshal von der Goltz was in charge of opera-
tions. When it is considered that the Turkish force was three
times as strong in numbers as General Townshend's, the British
general's advance on Bagdad seemed foredoomed to failure. His
only hope lay in delivering a swift defeat to the Turks before
their reenforcements could arrive from the Caucasian front, a
movement which began about the middle of September, 1915.
Before an advance could be made on Bagdad it was necessary
for the British to defeat a large Turkish force at Nasiriyeh and
at Kut-el-Amara, where the British captured fourteen guns and
about 1,000 prisoners, losing in killed and wounded 500 officers
and men. The Turkish trenches were destroyed and within a
small area about 900 Turkish dead were counted.
The British troops, having fought in an atmosphere of 130
degrees, were thoroughly exhausted when they encamped in Nasi-
riyeh. Like most Arab towns, the place was in such a filthy con-
dition that it required weeks to clean it up and make it habitable
OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD 423
for Europeans. Meanwhile the British troops lived in tents and
enjoyed a much needed rest. It was stated that fully 95 per cent
of the men were in such a state of exhaustion as to be quite unfit
for active service. If the Turkish commander in chief had
known of this, the reenforcements he had dispatched from his
base at Kut-el-Amara might easily have compelled the British
force to retire. Fortunately for the British, the Turkish reen-
forcements encountered on the way the routed Turkish army of
the Euphrates and evidently heard such tales of the fighting
powers of the British and Indian soldiers that they joined the
fugitives in their retreat.
At the close of August, 1915, Nasiriyeh had been made habita-
ble by the British engineers and a large part of the force departed
for Amara on steamers and barges, most of the soldiers wearing
only a waist-clout and still suffering from the intense heat, as
they crouched under the grass-mat shelters that had been pro-
vided. The garrison left in the town to keep the Arabs in order
suffered from swarms of flies, heat, fever, and dysentery, and
would have welcomed a Turkish attack if only that it might afford
some variety to their monotonous life.
During this time General Townshend, from his base at Amara
on the Tigris, was moving his heterogeneous collection of vessels
up the river and had begun friendly negotiations with the power-
ful tribes of the Beni Lam Arabs, who held most of the land be-
tween the Tigris and the northern mountains, and much territory
on the southern side of the river. Here stretched out a desert
waste between Amara and Eut-el-Amara, occupied by powerful
confederations of fighting Bedouins, the Abu Mohammed tribes,
known by their black tents, who moved about the British base on
the river ; the Makusis tribes, who fought as light cavalry on the
side of the Turks, and the Abu Dir Diraye Arabs, who were ready
to fight on any side that promised the most booty. For religious
reasons their priests urged the Arabs to fight against the infidels,
but the Britons had enjoyed considerable prestige in Mesopo-
tamia; thousands of Arabs calling themselves English subjects
and claiming the help of the British Consul in Bagdad when they
were in difficulties.
424 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
A fighting league with the great federation of Beni Lam was
greatly to be desired by the British, for it would enable them to
use freely a considerable stretch of the Tigris, and secure safety
from attack from both banks. The Beni Lam by siding with the
English, whose recent victories had not failed to impress them,
hoped to gain new grazing territory from their rivals who fought
with the Turks, so an alliance was formed and ratified by the
Sheiks of the confederation, and Sir John Nixon, Commander in
Chief; Sir Percy Cox, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and
General Townshend commanding the troops at Amara.
The British were under no illusions regarding the Arab char-
acter, having learned from some bitter experiences just how
much the wily nomads were to be trusted. As long as the British
were victorious they might count on the Arabs' allegiance, but in
case of defeat he was more than likely to turn about and fight
with the enemy. The alliance between the British and the Beni
Lam Arabs was of problematic value, but it was worth while
under the circumstances. It was better to secure their friend-
ship even temporarily, for the Arabs had been a constant source
of trouble from the time the British Expeditionary Force entered
Mesopotamia. Fighting to them was a pastime rather than a
serious business, and whenever the struggle became deadly they
Would very likely disappear. A veritable nuisance to the British
force were the Arabs who hung around the skirts of the expedi-
tionary force and amused themselves by reckless sniping.
Conflicts with mounted bands offered no difficulties, for having
no artillery they would disappear among the dunes to be located
later by British aeroplanes, and could then be hunted down by
columns of infantry. When aeroplanes were not available, it
was impossible to follow their movements. Having perfect
mounts they could afford to laugh at a cavalry charge.
"They would simply melt away into thin air," wrote an officer
at the front, who had led a charge against these sons of the
desert. "They are a quaint mixture," he adds : "some of them
being distinctly gallant fellows, but the greater part are curs
and jackals and will never take you on unless they are at least
three, or four, to your one. Incidentally, they have the pleasant
OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD 425
habit of turning on the Turks (for whom they are nominally
fighting) and looting and harassing them as soon as they (the
Turks) take the knock from us, and as a consequence the Turk
does not much care about having a real scrap with us/'
Sometimes the Arabs led the British into desert wastes where
they could get water from hidden springs known only to them-
selves, and where the British soldier, who literally traveled on his
water bottle, suffered tortures from thirst under a heat that dried
up the blood in his veins. In some of these attempts to round up
Bedouin marauders the British lost a number of men because the
water supply gave out. These conditions will explain why in so
many dispatches sent by General Townshend from the front, it
was stated that he had to fall back on the Tigris because his
troops lacked water. In such parts of the country where it was
possible to employ armed motor cars and even the best Arabian
steed could be run down, the Bedouins found their old tactics of
little account and were inspired with a wholesome fear of the
British soldier. Portable wireless apparatus used by airmen and
troops, and scouting aeroplanes, made difficulties for the elusive
Bedouins whose methods of desert warfare had not changed in
centuries. So it happened that in proportion as British fighting
methods and British resources became known and feared by the
Arab in Mesopotamia he grew more and more wary of running
into danger, unless the odds were altogether in his favor. What
the German and Turkish officers endured from their Arab allies
will probably never be known, but on more than one occasion
when the British won a victory and the Turks were in retreat,
the Arabs were active in despoiling the fugitives and then made
off with their loot, and with the new rifles and equipment they
had been supplied with by the Turks or Germans.
Being accomplished robbers, the Arabs were constantly making
raids on British stores under cover of the night and were gen-
erally successful. On one occasion a party of eight got by the
pickets and crawled into the regimental slaughterhouse. But
they had not counted on modern science. There were mines
planted outside the door and every Arab who was a robber was
killed.
426 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER LII
ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD — BATTLE OP
KUT-EL-AMARA
THE advance toward Bagdad was begun in the middle of Sep*
tember, 1915, but owing to the constantly changing conditions
in the bed of the Tigris, which hindered the progress of vessels, ]
and the necessity for constant reconnaissances of the river »
region, it was not until the last of the month that the British
force, consisting of only four brigades, reached the vicinity of
Kut-el-Amara.
Nuredin Pasha's troops occupied a strong position near the
£ut, with carefully constructed intrenchments protected by
large areas of barbed-wire entanglements and supported by con
siderable heavy artillery. The British camp was about ten miles
away from the Turkish position. They were weaker in men and
in guns than the enemy. The heat was overpowering. The
British lost some men on the way to this camp and others con-
tinued to drop out from heat exhaustion.
On September 23, 1915, two British brigades advanced to
within sight of the Turkish tents, while their principal camp was
pitched on the south bank of the Tigris. The British steamers
took up a position between the two armies in readiness to shat-
ter a surprise attack. It was discovered when the two brigades
made a demonstration against the enemy on September 25, 1915,
that the Turks had thoroughly mined all the southern bank of
the river, which caused the British commander to alter his plans
of attack.
On the night of September 27, 1915, the two brigades,
leaving their tents standing to deceive the Turks, crossed the
Tigris by a flying bridge. It is said that this dummy camp which
a Turkish division was facing was the direct cause that enabled
the British to win a victory. If the Turks had concentrated all
their forces on the north bank of the river the British attack
Would undoubtedly have failed. It was the absence of the divi-
BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA 427
sion facing the empty tents from the real battle field that caused
them to lose the day.
In order to understand the magnitude of the British victory
it is necessary to describe the seemingly impregnable char-
acter of the Turkish defenses. There were twelve miles of
defenses across the river at right angles to its general direction
at this point — six miles to the right and six miles to the
left. The works on the right bank had been strengthened by
the existence of an old water cut. The banks at this point
were from ten to twenty feet high and afforded excellent facil-
ities for viewing the deployment of troops advancing to attack.
A strong redoubt on the extreme right opposed any flank
movement that might be attempted in that direction. On the
left bank the line of defenses was separated by a heavy marsh
about two miles wide, so that from the left bank of the river
there were, first, two miles of trenches, then two miles of marsh,
and then two miles of defenses. It was evident that much labor
had been expended in preparing these defenses, showing the
skilled hand of German engineers. Each section of the succes-
sive lines of trenches was connected by an intricate network of
communication trenches. Along these complete lines of water
pipes had been laid.
It was known that the Turkish army holding this strong posi-
tion had been largely reenforced by the arrival of fresh troops
from Nasiriyeh, and the Turkish commander in chief, Nuredin
Pasha, may well have believed that victory would crown his arms
that day and that the British expeditionary force would be anni-
hilated. There was no lack of confidence in the British camp
either, though it was known that the Turks were vastly superior
in numbers to their own army. For, despite some hard lessons
learned from the enemy, the British soldier considers himself a
superior fighter to the Turk, and is always eager for an oppor-
tunity to prove it.
If the Turks had made their position almost impregnable on
land, they had neglected nothing to prevent the British from
gaining any advantage on the Tigris. The river was blocked at
different points by lines of sunken dhows, while across the water,
428 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
and a little above it, was stretched a great wire cable. Special
care had been taken to protect the Turkish guns from being
destroyed. Each one of them was placed in such position that
nothing less than a direct hit by a howitzer shell could damage it.
On September 26, 27, and 28, 1915, a column under General
Fry, by ceaseless effort day and night, had managed to work its
way up to within four hundred yards of the Turkish barbed-
wire entanglements, round what was known from its shape as
the Horseshoe Marsh. The troops went forward slowly under
continual shell fire and hail of rifle bullets, digging themselves
in as they advanced. The British guns in the open could not
check the Turkish artillery, which increased in intensity as the
British troops continued to advance. The nature of the ground
was decidedly to the advantage of the attackers, for at intervals
there were deep, firm-bottomed trenches that afforded excellent
cover. If the Turks had been provided with good ammunition
the British would have lost vastly more men than they did. It is
said that the Turkish shrapnel was of such poor quality that the
British troops passed unscathed through it, only being wounded
when they were hit by cases and fuses. All told, the British
suffered ninety casualties in this attack on the enemy round the
Horseshoe Marsh. The main object of this operation was to hold
the Turkish attention at a point where they hoped to be attacked
while more important work was going forward elsewhere.
A second column under General Delamain, which had crossed
the Tigris from the south side, marched all night of Septem-
ber 27, 1915, and reached their new attacking position on a neck
of dry land between two marshes where the Turks were in-
trenched at five o'clock in the morning of September 28, 1915.
Advancing cautiously for a mile between the two marshes, Dela-
main's column came in sight of the enemy's intrenchments.
Before the fight opened General Townshend directed General
Houghton to lead a detachment of Delamain's force around the
marsh to the north and make a flank attack on the Turkish in-
trenchments. That Nuredin Pasha should have left his northern
flank exposed to a turning movement appeared to some of the
British officers at the time as a piece of incredible stupidity;
BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA 429
but it developed afterward that the Turkish commander knew
perfectly well what he was about. The open road around the
marsh was a skillfully prepared trap. A carefully concealed
Turkish brigade that had escaped the observations of the British
airmen lay behind the ridges near the most northern marsh.
But the Turkish surprise did not come off as they expected, for
General Houghton's column moved forward so swiftly through
the dark around the marsh that, at 8.20 a. m., he was ready
to send a wireless message to his superior officer announcing that
he had reached the left rear of the Turkish lines. Everything
now being ready for a general attack, General Townshend pro-
ceeded to give battle. Since sunrise on September 27, 1915, the
fleet on the river, consisting of armed steamers, tugboats,
launches, etc., had been firing on the main Turkish position.
Attempts made by H. M. S. Comet, leading a flotilla to get in
near to the shore at the bend of the river and bombard the
Turks at close range, were a failure. For the enemy quickly
noted this movement and dropped shells so fast on the British
vessels that they were compelled to retire. Some boats had been
struck by Turkish shells, but the damages were not serious.
Later some armed launches were able to creep near to the Turk-
ish field batteries, and about noon their guns were silenced and
the gunners killed or dispersed. The British shore batteries did
some effective work, but the Turks succeeded in getting in one shot
that killed two gunners and wounded a number of others. It was
the only shot, and the last, that caused any British loss of life.
During most of the long hot day General Fry's brigade occu-
pied a position in front of the Horseshoe Marsh, subjected to
a constant shower of shells from quick-firing guns. It was evi-
dent that the enemy artillery was manned by Germans, for the
firing showed speed and accuracy. It was an advantage to the
British that the enemy had no airmen to scout and spot for them,
and consequently there were few casualties as the result of the al-
most continuous deluge of shells poured forth by the Turkish
guns. Early in the morning the Turks discovered that the British
camp was a dummy, and a division crossing the Tigris by means
of a flying bridge dashed into the fight A counterattack was
430 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
made against General Delamain by the greater part of this fresh
division.
The British column which was operating between what were
known as the Suwada Marsh and Circular Marsh started its
assault between eight and nine o'clock in the morning. The
British had concentrated all their available artillery between
the marshes, and under the protection of the guns and the sup-
porting fire of Maxims and musketry a double company of
the 117th Mahrattas made a headlong charge on the Turkish
trenches. The daring Indians suffered great losses, not more
than half the number who had set out reaching the Turkish
trenches, into which they dashed intrepidly and bayoneted their
way along them, causing heavy losses to the enemy. A double
company of Second Dorsets was now sent against the Turkish
trenches, and after meeting with desperate resistance they suc-
ceeded in entering the enemy's deeply dug line. The rest of the
battalion followed a little later, joining their comrades in the
captured position.
General Houghton's leading troops now came into action
around the rear of the Circular Marsh. The Turks' northern
flank had been stormed, but they still held desperately to their
southern flank, from which they poured a devastating stream of
shells against the British troops that caused many casualties.
General Houghton's troops had had little rest since the pre-
vious day, but they were cheered by the prospect of success,
and with the Oxfords leading they entered the fight, and after
four hours of continuous struggle surrounded and destroyed or
captured the enemy force. The Turkish troops, concealed in
deep ditches protected from the scorching rays of the sun by
grass matting, fought on with dogged determination and were
with difficulty dislodged. The British troops exposed to the piti-
less heat, and exhausted from lack of sleep and from having had
no water since the previous day, suffered terribly and could not
possibly have held out much longer if the Turkish resistance
had not collapsed.
General Delamain, commanding the victorious columns, had
made a night march from the dummy camp on the Tigris, and
BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA 431
his soldiers and horses also suffered from thirst, having been
forced into action before it was possible to renew the water
supply.
In the afternoon of the same day, September 28, 1915, General
Houghton's exhausted troops were furiously attacked by the
Turkish division that had crossed the Tigris at nine o'clock in
the morning, while a force of Turkish cavalry at the same time
attempted an outflanking charge.
The British troops beat off the Turkish horsemen and infantry
and endeavored to reach the river, which was over a mile to the
rear of the Turkish intrenched forces at Horseshoe Marsh. Ex-
hausted with weariness, consumed by a feverish thirst, the gallant
troops were swept by showers of shrapnel from heavy Turkish
batteries stationed near the Kut just when they were near-
ing the longed-for river that promised relief for their suffer-
ings. It was impossible for them to continue in that unprotected
position, and reluctantly the troops turned back from the inviting
waterway and struggled back to the Suwada Marsh, where Gen-
eral Delamain's force was concentrated. The filthy marsh water
was undrinkable, but it could be used to cool the superheated
jackets of the guns and thus keep them in a condition for action.
After nearly fourteen hours of continuous fighting and march-
ing the troops at last had an opportunity to take a short and
much-needed rest.
At 5 p. m. a wireless message was received from General
Townshend ordering a combined attack on the Turkish lines
around Horseshoe Marsh. General Delamain's column was
ordered to move forward to the rear of the enemy's position,
while General Fry's column, which had been moving toward the
Turkish center, was directed to hold back until Delamain had
reached the appointed place.
Behind Nuredin Pasha's main position the two brigades under
General Delamain and General Houghton, skirting the Suwada
Marsh, struggled once more to gain the river. Suddenly, out
of the dust clouds that obscured the view for any distance,
appeared a Turkish column about a mile to the west marching
almost parallel with the British force, but a little behind it. It
BB— War St 4
432 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
is related by one who was present that this sudden appearance
of the enemy so close at hand, and marching in the open, had
such a stimulating and heartening effect on the exhausted and
thirst-stricken British troops that they forgot for a time all about
the river toward which they were eagerly pressing, and, dash-
ing forward, charged the Turks with the bayonet and routed
them before they had time to recover from their surprise or
could fire more than a few wild shots. The British captured
all the enemy guns and pursued the enemy fleeing toward the
river, shooting them down as they scattered, and only ceasing
their destructive work when darkness fell and the few living
Turks had escaped over their bridge of boats on the river.
The combat here had not lasted more than an hour, and the
British brigades, now that the excitement was over, were too
exhausted to proceed any farther and bivouacked on the ground
near the scene of their victory.
It was hopeless now to attempt to continue the encircling
movement, which was started at five o'clock, owing to the dark-
ness and the condition of the men. Some time during the night
Nuredin Pasha, having evacuated his fortified position, moved
his troops across the Tigris tc the southern bank and, by forced
marches, reached Shat-el-Hai. From there he proceeded to
Azizie, where, for the defense of Bagdad, extensive fortifications
had been constructed. It was evident from the rapidity of his
movements that the Turkish commander was afraid of being
overtaken by the British forces, for in two days he had marched
his men sixty-five miles toward Bagdad.
The Turkish forces made good their retreat, and so General
Townshend, who had accomplished some remarkable successes
at the beginning of the battle, was deprived of a decisive victory.
He had evidently planned the battle on the impulse of the mr*
ment and when it was impossible to secure an adequate water
supply. His men fought with courage and determination, but
tormented by thirst and worn out from loss of sleep it was physi-
cally impossible for them to accomplish more than they did. It
was a bitter blow to General Townshend that the Turks had been
able to retreat in good order. The importance of such a vie-
BATTLE OP KUT-EL-AMARA 433
tory could not be overestimated. It meant the conquering of
entire Mesopotamia as far as Bagdad, and the moral effect of
such a success on the Arabs and tribesmen would have greatly
raised British prestige in that region.
An attempt was made to give chase to the fleeing Turks on
the river during the night, when Lieutenant Commander Cook*
son, the senior naval officer, with his ship, the destroyer Comet,
and several other smaller vessels set out after them. The Turks
fired on the boats from the shore, and the Comet, which had t
steamed in close to the bank, was assailed with hand grenades
by the enemy. A strong, thick wire had been stretched across
the river, attached to sunken dhows, and it became necessary to
remove these obstructions before an advance could be made. A
vivid description of the heroic death of Lieutenant Commander
Edgar Christopher Cookson, D. S. O., R. N., who won the Vic-
toria Cross for his bravery at this time, is given in a letter home
by one of his crew of the destroyer Comet: "Just as it was get-
ting dark our seaplane dropped on the water alongside of us
and told Lieutenant Commander Cookson that the Turks were
on the run, but that a little farther up the river they had placed
obstructions across, so that we could not pass without clearing
it away. This turned out to be the liveliest time that I have had
since we began fighting. It was very dark when we started off,
the Comet leading, and the Shaitan and Sumana following. When
we got around the head of land the Turks opened fire with rifles,
but we steamed up steadily to the obstruction. The Turks were
then close enough to us to throw hand bombs, but luckily none
reached the deck of our ship.
"During all this time we weren't asleep. We fired at them
with guns and rifles, and the Shaitan and Sumana were also
blazing away. Our troops ashore said it was a lively sight to
see all our guns working.
"We found that the obstruction was a big wire across the
river, with boats made fast to it. An attempt to sink the center
dhow of the obstruction by gunfire having failed, Lieutenant
Commander Cookson ordered the Comet to be placed alongside
and himself jumped on to the dhow with an ax and tried to cut
484 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the wire hawsers connecting it with two other craft forming
the obstruction. He was shot in seven places and when we
dragged him over his last words were : 'I am done ; it is a failure.
Return at full speed!' He never spoke afterward. We had six
wounded, but none seriously/9
The adventure which had cost the British the loss of a brave
officer was not a failure, as this writer concludes : "We must have
frightened the Turks, because on going up the river again about
daybreak (after we had buried our commander) we found the
Turks had cleared out and retired farther up the river. So we
steamed up after them and when we reached Kut-el-Amara we
found the army there." The friendly but keen rivalry that ex-
isted between the two services is amusingly shown in the sea-
man's final comment, 'This is the first place that the army has
got ahead of the navy/9
A little later the gunboats were ordered to pursue the fleeing
Turks. The Shaitan and the Sumana grounded on uncharted
mud banks and were unable to proceed, but the Comet continued
on its way and forced the Turks to leave several dhows behind
them laden with military stores, provisions, and ammunition.
Kut-el-Amara, the Arab town which General Townshend was
to make famous in history, was occupied by the British troops on
September 11, 1915. It is situated on a bend of the Tigris and is
120 miles from Bagdad by road, and 220 miles by water. The
retreating Turkish army made a stand a little to the west of
Azizi, which is forty miles to Bagdad by road and about four
times that distance by water. The object of the Turks in taking
up a position at this place, it was discovered later, was to enable
their engineers to prepare near Bagdad the most elaborate and
scientifically arranged system of fortifications that had so far
been constructed in Mesopotamia.
When the British Expeditionary Force began to threaten the
"City of the Caliphs," it was evident that the Turks had found it
possible to extend the Bagdad railway line, by means of which
Nuredin Pasha received fresh troops to reenforce his army,
brought hurriedly down out of Syria. For when the British force
reached Azizi on October 13, 1915, it was known that the Turkish
BATTLE OF KUT-EL-AMARA 435
commander had recently received some thousands of fresh troops.
Their presence in that part of Mesopotamia, at that time, could
only be explained on the ground that with the aid of German
engineers the Turks had been enabled to complete railway com-
munications, an important fact that seems to have been unsus-
pected by the British military authorities, and which might lead
to serious consequences for the already outnumbered British
force. Until the beginning of November General Townshend's
division remained here, part of the Turkish force being in-
trenched about four miles up the river. While it was expected
that at any hour the Turks would attack, they did not attempt
the offensive with any strong force, but skirmishes between the
opposing troops were of frequent and almost daily occurrenoe.
The British infantry were busy many days digging intrench-
ments, and every preparation was made by the British general
to make his position impregnable. With shore batteries and a
number of armed steamers and armored boats on the river, it
was hoped that the Turks would make a grand attack. Why they
did not when they had four times the number of men as the
British was inexplainable. Some such move was necessary if
they hoped to restore the confidence of their Arab allies, which
was said to be wavering. The recent British victory had, perhaps,
made the Turkish commander doubtful of his troops, for no
serious offensive against the British position was attempted.
About the middle of October, 1915, General Townshend re*
ceived some reenf orcements who had fought their way along the
river, constantly harassed by Bedouins and hostile tribesmen,
reaching the British position in a thoroughly exhausted condition.
Even with the arrival of the reenf orcements General Townshend's
force numbered little more than a complete division, and a small
reserve. During the stay at Azizi it was rumored that a large
contingent of troops was on its way from India to strengthen the
force at this place.
As time passed and nothing more was heard of these
promised reenforcements the small British army settled down
with grim determination to make the best of their situation,
but there was a general feeling among them that the Government
436 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
had not acted fairly by them in not sending help. It was evident
that the Indian and British Governments were imperfectly in-
formed as to the strength of the enemy's forces and of the means
whereby they could fill up the ranks when depleted by battle.
This is the only explanation or excuse that could be made. At no
time did General Townshend's force number more than four
brigades, which, under the circumstances, was wholly inadequate
to accomplish the conquest of Bagdad.
General Townshend being thrown on his own resources pro-
ceeded to act with extreme caution, for the whole fate of the
British Expeditionary Force hung in the balance. It was not a
time to take venturesome risks, for he could not spare a man.
The Turks, fortunately, showed no disposition to attack in force,
but they resorted to methods of guerrilla warfare.
The Turks had only left one brigade to hold their advanced
position, the remainder joining the forces established in the new
fortifications near Bagdad.
The rear guard remaining near Azizi did not allow the British
to forget their presence. They were well equipped with guns
and at frequent intervals sent shells into the British camp with-
out, however, doing much damage. Along the river ihey were
strong enough to hold back the British gunboats. For a time
General Townshend pursued the policy of watchful waiting, but
one dark night toward the close of October, 1915, the opportunity
arrived for an operation which promised success. Two brigades
were sent out to make a long detour, with the object of getting
behind the Turkish position. This, it was expected, would take
most of the night. At sunrise it was proposed that another
brigade should make a frontal attack on the enemy. The Turks,
however, were not to be caught napping. Their outposts, far
flung into the desert, soon gave warning of the attempted British
enveloping movement, and they were in full retreat with most of
their stores and guns before the British force could reach their
main position. The Turkish retreat in the face of superior num-
bers was the logical thing to do under the circumstances, and
from the manner in which the movement was conducted it was
evident that it had beev prepared for in advance. The brigades
BATTLE OF CTESIPHON 437
of British and Indian troops that had been sent forward to make
a frontal attack on the Turkish position now embarked on the
miscellaneous flotilla of boats on the river to pursue the retreat-
ing foe. The attempt was not successful, for, owing to the condi-
tion of the river which abounded in mud banks not down on the
chart, the British boats were constantly sticking fast in the
mud or grounding on shoals. Such slow progress was made that
the pursuit, if such it could be called, was abandoned.
British seaplanes and aeroplanes meanwhile had been scouting
around Bagdad and keeping a watchful eye on the Turkish lines
of communication that extended up the river toward the Caucasus
heights, and across the desert in the direction of Syria. The
difficult task set before the small British force was to break its
way through to Bagdad, where it was hoped it would be joined by
the advanced columns of the Russian army in the Caucasus.
Early in November, 1915, General Townshend knew that a Rus-
sian advanced column was rapidly forcing its way down the
border of Persia by Lake Urumiah. In a more southerly direction
a second column was on the march to the city of Hamadan, 250
miles from Bagdad. It was hoped that the small British force
would smash the Turks at Bagdad and the GermanoPersian
Gendarmes Corps be vanquished at Hamadan, after which it
would be no difficult task for the troops of Sir John Nixon to link
up with the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas. These far too
sanguine hopes were not destined to be fulfilled.
CHAPTER LIII
BATTLE OP CTESIPHON
GENERAL TOWNSHEND having captured the village of Jeur
on November 19, 1915, marched against Nuredin Pasha's
main defenses which had been constructed near the ruins of
Ctesiphon, eighteen miles from Bagdad. Ctesiphon at the pres-
ent time is a large village on the Tigris, once a suburb of ancient
438
THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE THROUGH PERSIA
BATTLE OF CTESIPHON 439
Seleucia, and the winter capital of the Parthian kings. The vicin-
ity is of great historic interest About thirteen centuries ago
Chosroes, the great Persian emperor, erected a vast and splendid
palace, said to be the greatest on earth in that period, and of
which the ruins are still standing near the marshy edge of the
river. Neither the ravages of time, nor' the devastations of the
destructive Mongols who swept the country in ages past could
obliterate this palatial memorial to the genius of Persian archi-
tects. The ruins of the palace at Ctesiphon contain the greatest
vaulted room in the world, and its battered walls, grand in decay,
stand to-day an anduring monument to the invincible power of
Islam in the days of Mohammed. For one of the first of the well-
known achievements of the army of the Arabian prophet was the
capture of Ctesiphon and the burning and despoiling of the
palace of the Persian kings.
Nuredin Pasha was well aware when he selected his defensive
position near the ruins of this memorial to the valor of Islam in
ancient days, that every Turk, Arab, and tribesman of his troops
was familiar with the story, and he doubtless hoped that its
memory might inspire the descendants of the Prophet's army to
fresh deeds of valor for the honor of Islam.
Around this ruin the Turks had constructed their position, on
the right bank of the river and on the left For miles around the
country was perfectly flat and devoid of cover of any description.
A network of deep and narrow trenches stretched back to within
a short distance of the River Dialah, six miles to the rear, which
flows into the Tigris at this point The earth from the trenches
had been carried to the rear, and there were no embankments
or parapets of any kind. Along the entire front a thick barbed-
wire fence had been set up.
The hard-fought action at Ctesiphon must rank as one of the
greatest battles in which the Indo-British army has ever been
engaged. The troops were in an emaciated condition through
constant fighting, first in excessively hot weather, and afterward
suffering intensely from the cold, which made the nights unen-
durable at this time of the year in Mesopotamia. In such a
physically weakened condition did the Indo-British troops engage
440 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
the vastly stronger forces of Nuredin Pasha at Ctesiphon. An
officer who participated in the battle describes in a letter home
some of the striking incidents of that important action.
"Morning of the 22d of November, 1915, found the troops in
readiness to attack, stretched out on the wide plain facing the
Ctesiphon position, the troops detailed for the frontal attack
nearest the river. As soon as dawn broke the advance com-
menced. The left of the columns marching against the enemy's
flank were faintly visible on the horizon. The gunboats opened
fire against the enemy's trenches close to the left bank. Th«
field artillery drew in and pounded the ground where they
imagined the trenches must be, but there was no reply, nor
any sound of movement at Ctesiphon until the lines of advancing
infantry got within 2,000 yards of the wire entanglements.
Then, as by signal, the whole of the Turkish line broke into a
roar of fire, and we knew that the struggle had commenced.
"Under the heavy artillery fire the attack pushed in toward
the enemy with a steadiness which could not have been beaten on
parade until effective rifle range was reached, where a pause was
made to build up the strength. The fight for the trenches from
now on until the British succeeded in reaching the first line of
trenches baffles description. The gallant advance across the open
ground, the building up of the firing line, the long pause under
murderous rifle fire, while devoted bodies of men went forward
to cut the wire, the final rush and the hand-to-hand fighting in
the trenches, are stories which have been told before. No de-
scription could do justice to the gallantry of the men who car-
ried it out.
"Meanwhile, the flank attack had crushed the enemy's left and
driven it back on its second line a mile or so to the rear. Courage
and determination carried the day, and by the afternoon the whole
of the front Turkish position, and part of the second line was in
the hands of the British. The intensity of the fighting, however,
did not abate. The Turks pressed in counterattacks at several
points from their second position on which they had fallen back.
Twelve Turkish guns were captured, taken again by the enemy,
recaptured by the British, and retaken finally by the Turks, and
BATTLE OF CTESIPHON 441
so the fighting went on until a merciful darkness fell, and, as if
by mutual agreement, the fire of both sides, too weary for more,
died away."
Nuredin Pasha's forces were numerically far superior to the
British. General Townshend had only four brigades, while the
Turkish commander had four divisions, and was much stronger
in artillery.
The Turkish commander, who was well informed as to the
strength or weakness of the British force, may well have looked
forward to an easy victory. But the many successes gained by
British arms during the campaign in Mesopotamia had not failed
to impress the Turkish troops and the tribesmen, their allies,
with a wholesome respect for British valor. If General Towns-
hend had been reenforced by another division that might easily
have been spared to him from the army that had been in training
in India for ten months previous, he could have smashed the
Turks at Ctesiphon and conquered Mesopotamia. As it was, the
British victory was all but complete. An entire Turkish division
was destroyed. They took 1,600 prisoners and large quantities
of arms and ammunition. But these successes had been dearly
won. Some of the British battalions lost half their men. Ac-
cording to the best authorities the British casualties totaled
4,567, of whom 643 were killed, 3,330 wounded, and 594 men not
accounted for. According to the Turkish accounts of the Battle
of Ctesiphon, which emanated from Constantinople, the British
had 170,000 men in action, and their losses exceeded 5,000. This
estimate of General Townshend's strength was far from th<a
truth. At no time did the British commander's troops number
more than 25,000, and 16,000 men would be a liberal estimate of
his striking force.
A graphic description of what followed the battle is furnished
by a letter home, written by an officer who participated in the
struggle.
"The cold of the night, want of water, the collecting of the
wounded, gave little rest to the men, though many snatched a
few hours' sleep in the trenches among the dead. Dawn of No-
vember 23, 1915, broke with a tearing wind and a dust storm
442 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
which obscured the landscape for some hours, and then the air,
becoming clearer, allowed us to take in the scene of the fight.
Whatever losses we suffered the Turks must have suffered even
more severely. They had fought desperately to the end, knowing
that to attempt to escape over the open ground was to court in-
stant death. The trenches were full of their dead, and here and
there a little pile of men showed where a lucky shell had fallen.
Ctesiphon loomed through the dust before us, still intact for all
the stream of shell which had passed it, for our gunners had been
asked not to hit the ancient monument.
'The early part of the morning was occupied in clearing to the
rear the transport which had come up to the first line during the
night. At about ten o'clock the air cleared and the enemy's
artillery began to boom fitfully. Their guns from across the river
began to throw heavy shells over us, and as the light grew better
it developed into an artillery duel which lasted throughout the
day. General Townshend during the afternoon parked his trans-
port two miles to the rear, and while holding the front line of the
Turkish position swung his right back to cover his park. In the
late afternoon the artillery fire briskened, and long lines of Turk-
ish infantry could be seen in the half light advancing against the
British. The first attack was delivered against our left just after
dark with a heavy burst of fire, and from then until four o'clock
the next morning the Turkish force, strengthened by fresh troops
that had arrived from Bagdad, flung themselves against us and
attempted to break the line. On three separate occasions during
the night were infantry columns thrown right up against the
position at different points, and each effort was heralded by wild
storms of artillery and infantry fire. The line held, and before
dawn had broken the Turks had withdrawn, subsequently to re-
form on their third position on the banks of the Dialah River."
By November 24, 1915, the casualties had been evacuated to
the ships eight miles to the rear. The British force remained on
the position which they had won for another day and then with-
drew toward Kut-el-Amara.
General Townshend's force reached the Eut on or about
December 5, 1915, having fought some rear-guard actions on the
BATTLE OP CTESIPHON 448
way, and lost several hundred men. The news had been skillfully
spread about the country that the Turks had won a great victory
at Ctesiphon, in proof of which it was known that the British
were retreating, and that the Turkish forces were in pursuit.
These facts had the usual effect on the Arabs, who had been
friendly to the British, and who now deserted them to join forces
with the Turks. For the wily nomads are ever ready to go over
to the side which seems to be winning, for then there is promise
of much loot There is no profit in aiding lost causes or the
weaker side.
An officer describing General Townshend's retreat on Kut-eU
Amara through a country swarming with hostile Arabs has this
to say: "It speaks well for the spirit of the troops under his
command that, in the face of overwhelming numbers the retire-
ment was carried out with cheerfulness and steadiness beyond
all praise, and not even the prisoners, of whom 1,600 had been
captured at Ctesiphon, were allowed to fall into the hands of the
enemy. The country around is perfectly flat, covered with short
grass or shrub, though here and there old irrigation channels
make it difficult for carts or motor cars to negotiate. The opera-
tions above the Eut were carried out by land, though ships bore
an important part in bringing up supplies and the thousand and
one things required by an army in the field. An enemy report
was published to the effect that the Turks had captured one of
our armored trains. It will not be giving away a military secret
when I say that no railway of any sort exists south of Bagdad."
How closely General Townshend was pressed by the enemy in
his retreat to Eut-el-Amara is evident from an officer's letter:
"We found the Turks in camps sitting all around us. We had to
fight a rear-guard action all day and marched twenty-seven miles
before we halted. After lying down for two or three hours, we
inarched on fifteen miles more to within four miles of the Eut.
Here we had to stop for a time because the infantry were too
tired to move."
444 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
CHAPTER LIV
STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA — ATTEMPTS
AT RELIEF
KUT-EL-AMARA, where General Townshend and his troops
were so long besieged, stands on the left bank of the Tigris,
almost at the water's level, with sloping sand hills rising to the
north. The desert beyond the river is broken here and there by
deep nullahs which, when they are filled with water after a rain-
fall, are valuable defensive features of the country. Five miles
from the town, and surrounding it on all sides but the waterside,
is a series of field forts of no great value against heavy artillery.
Had the Turks been equipped with large guns such as the
Germans employed in Europe these fortifications would have
been shattered to pieces in a few hours. But the forts proved
useful.
The spaces between them were filled with strong barbed-wire
entanglements and carefully prepared intrenchments. To the
southeast the position was further strengthened by a wide
marshy district that lies just outside the fortified line. General
Townshend was holding a position that was about fifteen miles
in circumference, to adequately protect which it would have been
necessary for him to have twice as many men as were at his dis-
posal. For one of the lessons that has been learned in the Great
War is that 5,000 men, including reserves, are required to the
mile to properly defend a position. General Townshend's occu-
pation of the Kut was therefore precarious, and he could only
hope to hold out until the arrival of reenforcements which had
been held back by the Turks when they were within sight of the
British general's position.
The Turkish success in checking the British advance and in
bottling up General Townshend's troops in Kut-el-Amara had
inspired them with hope and courage and the town was subjected
to almost constant bombardment. Confident of the outcome the
Turks fought with considerable bravery.
STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA 445
It was known to the Turks that reenf orcements had been sent
to the relief of the British commander, and they hoped to capture
the Kut before these arrived. On December 8, 1915, they shelled
the British position all day ; the bombardment was continued on
the 9th and they made some desultory attacks on all sides. From
the British point of view the attitude of the Arabs at this time
was satisfactory. General Townshend received encouraging
news that a relieving force was pushing its way rapidly to
his aid.
On December 10, 1915, the Kut was again heavily bombarded
by the Turks and an attack was developed against the northern
front of the position, which however was not pressed. On the
day following the bombardment was continued. Two attacks
made on the northern front of the British position were repulsed,
the enemy losing many men.
December 11, 1915, the bombardment was renewed. The
Turks reported the capture of Sheik Saad on the line of retreat,
twenty-five miles east of the Kut. They also gave out a state-
ment that the British had lost 700 men in this fight.
Heavy musketry fire marked the Turkish offensive on Decem-
ber 12, 1915. They attacked on the same day a river village on
the right bank of the Tigris, but were repulsed with heavy casu-
alties. It was estimated by the British commander that the
Turks lost at least 1,000 men during this abortive attack.
British losses at the Eut since their return totaled 1,127, in-
cluding 200 deaths, 49 from disease. Reenf orcements were con-
stantly joining the Turkish besieging army, and it was estimated
that in the first weeks of December, 1915, they had been strength-
ened by 20,000 men. Every day the enemy's ring of steel became
stronger, while the British were in such a position that if the Kut
became untenable they could not retreat with any hope of success.
If forced out into the open, there would be nothing left for them
to do but surrender.
A sortie of British and Indian troops was made on December
17, 1915, who surprised the enemy in the advanced trenches,
killed 30, and took 11 prisoners and returned without suffering
any casualties*
446 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On or about this date, on the Sinai Peninsula, a British reo
onnoitering party routed a hostile band of Arabs near Matruh,
losing 15 men killed and 15 wounded, 3 of whom were officers.
The Arabs had 35 killed and 17 taken prisoners.
On December 24, 1915, the Turks having made a breach in the
north bastion of one of the Kut forts succeeded in forcing their
way in, but were repulsed, leaving 200 dead. On Christmas Day
there was fierce fighting again at this point, when the Turks once
more entered through the breach and were driven out with heavy
losses.
The garrison consisting of the Oxford Light Infantry and
the 103d, being reenforced by the Norfolk Regiment and 104th
Pioneers, drove the Turks back over their second line of trenches
and reoccupied the bastion. The total British losses in the fight-
ing on Christmas Day were 71 killed, of whom three were officers,
one missing, and 309 wounded. It was estimated that the en-
emy lost about 700.
The Turks continued to bombard the Kut almost hourly, but
the only serious damage effected by their fire was when on De-
cember 30, 1915, shells burst through the roof of the British
hospital and wounded a few men.
General Aylmer's leading troops under General Younghusband
of the British force sent to relieve the besieged army at the Kut
left Ali Gherbi on January 4, 1916. Following up both banks of
the Tigris, British cavalry came in contact with the enemy on
the following day. These advanced Turkish troops were on the
right bank of the river and few in number, but farther on at
Sheik Saad, the enemy in considerable strength occupied both
sides of the river. On January 6, 1916, the British infantry at-
tacked and then dug itself in in front of the Turkish position on
the right bank. In the morning of the following day by adroit
maneuvering, the British cavalry succeeded in getting around to
the rear of the enemy's trenches on the right bank and destroyed
nearly a whole battalion, taking over 550 prisoners.
Among the number of captives were sixteen officers. Several
mountain guns were also taken. The British casualties were
heavy, especially among the infantry.
STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA 447
The remainder of General Aylmer's force having advanced
from Ali Gherbi, January 6, 1916, fought a simultaneous action
on the left bank of the river while the action on the right bank
just described was in progress.
Early in the afternoon of this day the British forces were sub-
jected to heavy rifle and Maxim fire from the Turkish trenches
1,200 yards away. The hazy, dusty atmosphere made it difficult
to see with any accuracy the enemy's defenses. Their numerous
trenches were most carefully concealed. Toward evening the
Turkish cavalry attempted an enveloping move against the Brit-
ish right, but coming under the fire of the British artillery, that
move failed. Finding the resistance of the Turkish infantry too
strong, the British troops abandoned any further offensive and
intrenched in the positions they had won. Later in the evening
the Turks suddenly evacuated their defenses and retired. A
heavy rainfall hindered the British commander from pursuing,
and a stop was made at Sheik Saad to enable him to get his
wounded away. The Turks finding that General Aylmer did
not pursue, fell back on Es Sinn, from which they had been ousted
by General Townshend in September of the previous year. The
Turkish version of the Battle of Sheik Saad estimated the Brit-
ish losses at 3,000.
On January 12, 1916, the Turks advanced from Es Sinn to the
Wadi, a stream that flows into the Tigris about twenty-four miles
from Kut-el-Amara. Here the British relieving force came in
touch with the enemy on January 13, 1916, and a hotly contested
struggle ensued that lasted all dpy long. The British force con-
sisted of three divisions. One of these, occupying a position on
the south bank of the Tigris, was being opposed by a column
under General Kemball. On the northern bank General Aylmer's
troops engaged two divisions in the neighborhood of the Wadi.
On January 14, 1916, the Turkish army began a general retreat
and General Aylmer moved his headquarters and transport for-
ward to the mouth of the Wadi. On the day following the whole
of the Wadi position was captured by the British relieving force,
and the Turkish rear guard again took up a position at Es Sinn.
It was reported that German officers were with the Turkish force.
CC— War St 4
448 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
Further military operations against the Turks were delayed by
storms of great violence that continued for about ten days. Gen-
eral Ayhner found it impossible to move his troops through the
heavy mire, and not until January 21, 1916, could he advance and
attack the Turks who after their retreat occupied a position near
Felahie, about twenty-three miles from Kut-el-Amara. Here a
brisk engagement was fought in the midst of torrents of rain
that greatly hindered operations. The struggle was indecisive.
Owing to the floods. General Aylmer could not attack on the fol-
lowing day, but took up a position about 1,300 yards from the
enemy's trenches.
Mr. Edmund Candler, the well-known English writer, who was
with the British troops operating on the Tigris, furnishes some
striking details of the engagement. His picturesque description
of what took place at this point in General Aylmer's advance to
relieve the besieged army at the Kut, shows the desperate char-
acter of the Turkish resistance :
'The Turks were holding a strong position between the left
bank of the Tigris and the Suweki Marsh, four miles out of our
camp. It was a bottle-neck position, with a mile and a half of
front : there was no getting around them, and the only way was
to push through.
"We intrenched in front of them. On' January 20, 1916, we
bombarded them with all our guns and again on the morning of
the 21st preparatory to a frontal attack.
"At dawn the rifle fire began, and the tap-tap-tap of the
Maxims, steady and continuous, with vibrations like two men
wrestling in an alternate grip, tightening and relaxing/9 It was
not light enough for the gunners to see the registering marks,
but at a quarter before eight in the morning the bombardment
began. "The thunderous orchestra of the guns shook the earth
and rent the skies. Columns of earth rose over the Turkish
lines, and pillars of smoke, green and white and brown and
yellow, and columns of water, where a stray shell — Turkish no
doubt— plunged into the Tigris.
"The enemy lines must have been poor cover, and I was glad
we had the bulk of the guns on our side. All this shell fire should
STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA 449
have been a covering roof to our advance, but the Turk it ap-
pears was not skulking as he ought.
"The B's came by in support and occupied an empty trench.
They were laughing and joking, but it was a husky kind of fun,
and there was no gladness in it, for everyone knew that we were
in for a bloody day. One of them tripped upon a telegraph wire.
'Not wounded yet!' a pal cried. Just then another stumbled to
an invisible stroke and did not rise. A man ahead was singing
nervously, That's not the girl I saw you with at Brighton/
"I went on to the next trench where a sergeant showed me his
bandolier. A sharp-nosed bullet had gone through three rounds
of ammunition and stuck in the fourth, during the last rush
forward.
"I could conceive of the impulse that carried one over those
last two hundred yards — but as an impulse of a lifetime; to
most of my friends this kind of thing was becoming their daily
bread. The men I was with were mostly a new draft. I could
see they were afraid, but they were brave. Word was passed
along to advance to the next bit of cover.
"The bombardment had ceased. The rifle and Maxim fire
ahead was continuous, like hail on a corrugated roof of iron. The
B's would soon be in it. I listened eagerly for some intermis-
sion, but it did not relax or recede, and I knew that the Turks
must be holding on. The bullets became thicker — an ironic whis-
tle, a sucking noise, a gluck like a snipe leaving mud, the squeal
and rattle of shrapnel.
"I found the brigade headquarters. We had got into the
Turkish trenches, the general told me, but by that time we were
sadly thin, and we had been bombed-out. At noon the rain came
down, putting the crown upon depression. All day and all night
it poured, and one thought of the wounded, shivering in the cold
and mud, waiting for help. At night they were brought in on
slow, jolting transport carts."
The writer met a boy, the only officer of his regiment who had
come out of the trenches alive and unwounded, and who had a
bullet through his pocket and another through his helmet. He
was in a dazed state of wonder at finding himself still alive.
450 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
"It was a miracle that anyone had lived through that fire in
the attack and retreat, but the boy had been in the Turkish
trenches and held them for an hour and a quarter. Oddments of
other regiments had got through, two British and two Indian.
I saw their dead being carried out during the truce of the next
day."
The boy officer's regiment had been the first to penetrate the
enemy's trenches. As he dropped into the trench a comrade next
to him was struck in the back of the head and dropped forward
cm his shoulder. "I saw eight bayonets and rifles all pointing to
me/' said the boy officer describing his experiences. "I saw the
men's faces, and I was desperately scared. I expected to go
down in the next two yards. I felt the lead in my stomach. I
thought I was done for. I don't know why they didn't fire- They
must have been frightened by my sudden appearance. I let off
my revolver at them and it kicked up an awful lot of dust"
The British troops that had charged the Turkish trenches were
not supplied with bombs, but the enemy were well equipped with
them. Consequently the British were gradually driven down
the trench from traverse to traverse, in the direction of the river,
where they encountered another bombing party that was coming
up a trench at right angles. The British were placed in a des-
perate position, being jammed in densely between these attacks,
and literally squeezed over the parapet. In evacuating the
trench they were subjected to a deadly fire in which they lost
more men than in the attack.
The uniform flatness of the terrain in this region and entire
absence of cover for the attacker, whether the movement be
frontal or enveloping, was responsible for the heavy losses the
British incurred in this engagement. Here there were no pro-
tecting villages, hedges, or banks. A swift, headlong rush that
could be measured in seconds was impossible under the circum-
stances. At 2000 yards the British infantry came under rifle
fire, and had no communication trenches to curtail the zone of
fire. An armistice was concluded on January 21, 1916, for a
few hours, to allow for the removal of the wounded and the
burial of the dead. In forty-eight hours the Tigris had risen as
STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA
451
KOWEIT-=XV^
=i&
PERSIANS
THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
452 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
high as seven feet in some places and the country around was
under water, which effectually prevented all movements of troops
by land.
General Townshend meanwhile, besieged at Kut-el-Amara,
continued cheerfully to repel attacks and to await the arrival of
the relieving force. He was well supplied with stores, and there
was no fear of a famine. He described his troops at this time
as being in the best of spirits. Evidently he was not in a posi-
tion to be of any assistance to the relieving force, whose ad-
vance had been delayed by the storms. At the close of January,
1916, he reported that the enemy had evacuated their trenches
on the land side of the Eut defenses, and had retired to a posi-
tion about a mile away from the British intrenchments.
The floods of January, 1916, were a distinct benefit to General
Townshend, for the Turks, intrenched in a loop of the Tigris,
were driven out by the deluge and compelled to seek higher
ground.
In the first days of February, 1916, Sir Percy Lake, who had
succeeded Sir John Nixon to the chief command of the British
forces in Mesopotamia, dispatched General Brooking from Na-
sariyeh with a column up the River Shatt-el-Har, a branch of the
Tigris, to make a reconnaissance. On February 7, 1916, on his
way back, General Brooking was attacked by hostile Arabs near
Butaniyeh. He was also attacked by tribesmen who had been
considered friendly to the British and who issued from villages
ulong the route. There was some sharp fighting in which the
tosses were heavy on both sides. The British had 873 men
killed or wounded, while the Arab dead numbered 636. On the
9th a small punitive expedition was sent against the treacherous
tribesmen, and four Arab villages were destroyed. The incident
offered another striking proof that no dependence could be
placed on the faith of the Arabs.
General Aylmer finding, after his failure at Felahie, that his
force was too weakened physically to attempt to break through
to relieve the beleaguered division at the Eut, decided to intrench
in the position then occupied by his troops and to await the re*
enforcements which were on the way.
STAND AT KUT-EL-AMARA 453
On February 17-19, 1916, hostile aeroplanes dropped bombs
on the Kut, without doing any damage, General Townshend re-
ported. For two and a half months the British army had been
bottled up in this river town, and the Turks had tried every
means to dislodge them.
On February 22, 1916, British columns under General Aylmer
advanced up the river on the right bank to Um-el-Arak, occu-
pying a position which commanded the Turkish camp behind
their trenches at El Henna, a marsh on the left bank. At day-
break the British guns opened a heavy bombardment on the
enemy's camp across the Tigris, which at this point makes a
sharp bend to the north. The Turks were evidently taken by
surprise, for a lively stampede followed.
On March 6, 1916, General Aylmer marched up the Tigris to
the Turkish position at Es Sinn, which is only seven miles from
Kut-el-Amara. This is a Turkish stronghold and was carried by
General Townshend on his way to the Kut. The position had
been greatly strengthened since that time, that General Aylmer
could hardly have hoped to succeed in driving the enemy out.
But the effort had to be made, and resulted in a failure. The
enemy lost heavily according to the British accounts, while their
own casualties were unimportant The Turkish version of the
struggle was as follows :
"On the morning of March 8, 1916, the enemy attacked from
the right bank of the Tigris with his main force. The fighting
lasted until sunset. Assisted by reenforcements hastily brought
to his wing by his river fleet, he succeeded in occupying a por-
tion of our trenches, but the latter were completely recaptured
by a heroic counterattack by our reserves, the enemy being then
driven back to his old positions/'
Owing to the lack of water, General Aylmer was forced to
fall back on the Tigris. On March 10, 1916, information reached
the Tigris corps that the Turks had occupied an advanced posi-
tion on the river. The following day a British column was sent
to turn the enemy out. The British infantry daringly assaulted
the position and bayoneted a considerable number of the Turks,
after which the column withdrew.
PART XI— THE WAR IN THE AIR
CHAPTER LV
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRATEGY AND
TACTICS OP AIR FIGHTING
THE student or observer of the Great European War inevitably
must be impressed with its impersonal character. Every-
where masses and organizations rule supreme, and men and
material are thought of and used as aggregations rather than as
individuals and units for destruction and defense. The indi-
vidual, save as he gives himself up to the great machine, every-
where is inconspicuous, and while no less courage is demanded
than in the days of the short-range weapons and personal com-
bat, yet the heroic note of personal valor and initiative in most
cases is unheard, and the individual is sunk in the mass. One
is almost tempted to believe that chivalry and individual heroism
no longer bulk large in the profession of arms, and that in the
place of the knightly soldier there is the grim engineer at tele-
scope or switchboard, touching a key to produce an explosion
that will melt away yards of trenches and carry to eternity not
tens but hundreds and thousands of his fellows; there are
barriers charged with deadly currents; guns hurling tons of
metal at a foe invisible to the gunners, whose position is
known only by mathematical deductions from observers at a
distance.
All of this and much more the engineer has brought to twen-
tieth-century warfare, and the grim fact remains that trained
masses are used, made and destroyed in vain attempts at an
object often unknown to the individual.
464
STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF AIR FIGHTING 455
Accordingly, when we turn to the work of the aviators we pass
back from the consideration of the mass to the individual. What-
ever may be the airman's convictions as to the ethics of the
Great War, always his duty and his adversary are well defined,
and it is his personal devotion, his skill and daring, his resource-
fulness and intrepidity that are to-day playing no small part on
the battle fronts of Europe. He too is an engineer with scientific
and technical knowledge and training that control the most
delicate of machines ever at the mercy of the elements, and
engineer and scientist have supplied him with instruments and
equipments embodying the results of refined research and in-
vestigation. Withal, he is a soldier, yet not one of a mere mass
aggregation, but an individual on whose faithful and intelligent
performance of his duty mid extreme perils the issue of a great
cause may depend. But not entirely a free-lance, for experience
in aerial warfare has shown that in the air, as on the ground,
harmony of action and plan of operation avail and contribute to
success. Consequently, with the development of military aero-
nautics during the course of the war, the work of the flying
corps, with training and practical experience, gradually became
more systematic and far more efficient.
While many of their achievements were distinctly sensational,
involving extreme personal daring and heroism, yet usually the
general operations were as methodical and prearranged as other
forms of military activity carried on by the different armies on
the ground below. No longer were single aeroplanes used ex-
clusively, but large numbers of machines were brought to bear,
with the pilots drilled not only in the manipulation of their indi-
vidual machines, but to work with others in military formations
and groups, while increased attention was paid to weapons and
the protection of vulnerable parts.
The flying craft cooperated constantly with the intelligence
departments of the various staffs, observing the enemy positions,
the distribution and movement of troops, and photographing the
territory, and their observations were not only useful but essen-
tial to the artillery engaged so extensively in indirect fire. As
their work became more practical and understood, it was the
456 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
more appreciated and its volume increased. Indeed, by the sum-
mer of 1915 the aviation corps of the various belligerent armies
in Europe had settled down to more or less of a routine of obser-
vation, reconnaissance, and patrol, enlivened by bombing expedi-
tions against the enemy and frequent aerial combats. What once
would have been considered feats of usual intrepidity and skill
on the part of the aviators, long since had become commonplace,
and the standard of operation developed to a degree that at the
beginning of the war would have been considered phenomenal.
Reconnaissance was actively in progress on all of the battle
fronts, combats in the air were more frequent, bombing expedi-
tions were conducted across the frontiers, and with a constantly
increasing supply of new and improved machines, and freshly
trained aviators, the work progressed, so that before the end of
1915, on the part of the Allies at least, there was probably ten
times as much flying as at the beginning of the year. Even when
the heavy fogs pervading the battle fields of western Europe in
the early part of 1916 prevented other operations, reconnaissance
was actively carried on, and this, with the routine work of deter-
mining ranges, positions, etc., for the artillery, in active prog-
ress, gave little quiet to the airmen. With the development of
the war there was a constantly increasing demand on the skill of
the aviators.
Many of the places from which it was necessary to begin flights
did not furnish good starting, and often the same condition held
as regards the landing places. Furthermore, flying was attended
with much greater danger, with a corresponding increase in
fatalities, on account of the improvements in the antiaircraft
guns and ranging apparatus and the skill of the gunners.
Withal, all official reports agree in stating that the proportion of
casualties was smaller in the air service than in other branches
of the service. There has been an ever-increasing number of
combats in the air. Often when aeroplanes were observed in
reconnaissance the enemy would make an attack upon them in
force and endeavor to destroy the machines. Indeed, this was a
marked tendency of the war, and the record from the first of
August would show not only an increased number of duels be-
STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF AIR FIGHTING 457
ween individual machines, but of skirmishes between air patrols,
and contests in which a number of machines would attack in
force opposing aeroplanes.
As the war developed there was an increased tendency toward
the tactical maneuvering of a number of aeroplanes, a greater
frequency of bombing raids, and these attempts naturally led to
reprisals as well as to defensive efforts. Often the aeroplanes
designed for dropping bombs were heavy and powerful machines,
not armed primarily for attack, but depending for protection
upon one or more fighting aeroplanes of greater maneuvering
power which accompanied them and carried machine guns and
other weapons. In these bombing raids the tendency was to use
a number of machines. In the raids of October 2, 1915, on the
stations of Vosiers and Challeranges, sixty-five machines were
employed. A few days later a fleet of eighty-four French aero-
planes made a raid on the German lines, starting from an aero-
drome near Nancy. Since then raids by large flocks of aeroplanes
have become common.
One important objective of such attacks was the destruction
of the enemy's communication, and the bombing of railway trains
bringing up supplies or reenforcements, became a most impor-
tant feature. Often this involved considerable daring on the
part of the pilot and his companion, as to insure a successful
dropping of bombs the aeroplanes had to descend to compara-
tively low levels. The British Royal Flying Corps on several
occasions dropped bombs from a height hardly more than 500
feet, and in the operations at the end of September, 1915, within
five days, nearly six tons of explosives were dropped on moving
trains with considerable damage.
The most striking feature, perhaps in the work of the aero-
planes, was the increased height of flight which developing con-
ditions made necessary. At the beginning of the war it was
assumed that overhead reconnaissance could be carried on in
safely at a height of from 4,000 to 6,000 feet above the surface of
the earth. At such altitude it was assumed that the aeroplane
was safe from terrestrial artillery on account of offering so small
a target, as well as on account of its spaed and the difficulty of
458 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
determining its range, but this condition of affairs did not long
remain. Both armies, and particularly the Germans, acquired
experience in the use of their antiaircraft guns, and improved
weapons were placed at their disposal, so that it was not long
before the gunners could cause their shrapnel to burst with
deadly effect some three miles in vertical height above the
ground, and up to 10,000 feet their shooting compelled the ad-
miration of the aviators of the Allies.
Such efficient gunnery practice, of course, contributed to the
loss of life among the aviators and the destruction of machines,
notwithstanding the constantly increased height of flying. In
some cases aeroplanes managed to reach the ground safely with
as many as 300 bullet holes, but in other cases a single bullet
sufficed to kill the aviator or to hit a vital part, and this was a
compelling reason for armoring the aeroplanes and protecting
their engines and controls.
All of this naturally produced a higher standard of skill in the
European armies than was ever before realized, and the training
of new aviators, especially in the light of war experience, was
carried on in large part by convalescent members of the aviation
corps who had seen actual service in the field, so that the quota
of recruits was not only maintained but supplied, trained to a
high degree of efficiency.
The progress of the war marked changes in the tactics of the
aerial services of the various armies. The French and English
believed that in the course of the war the Germans had lost a
number of their most skilled and intrepid aviators, and that the
expert pilots were held in readiness for more serious effort rather
than being sacrificed for any contests of doubtful outcome. The
Germans for a time became more cautious in their fights over
the French lines, and in the summer and autumn of 1915 seldom
crossed. This probably was due in large part to the increased
number of aeroplanes at the disposal of the French and English.
Apparently for a number of weeks there was a decrease in the
reckless flights on the part of the Germans and desire to give
battle, and more attention was paid to developing tactical
efficiency and securing military results. Often their aeroplanes
ZEPPELIN RAIDS 459
operated in connection with the artillery, and in many cases
their object was to draw the Allies' machines within range of the
German antiaircraft artillery, which was efficiently served.
A complete chronicle of the flights and air battles of the period
of the war under review would contain a record where hardly
a day passed without some flight or contest of greater or less
significance. A duel between two hostile airmen might be of less
importance than an exchange of shots between members of
opposing outposts, yet it might involve heroic fighting and a skill-
ful manipulation of aeroplane and machine gun, when one or
both of the contestants might be thrown headlong to the ground.
So for these pages we may select some of the more significant of
the battles in the air with the understanding that many of those
ignored were not without their vital interest.
CHAPTER LVI
ZEPPELIN KAIDS — ATTACKS ON GERMAN ARMS
FACTORIES — GERMAN OVER-SEA RAIDS
THE second year of the war opened with a spirited combat be-
tween the German and French aeroplanes, on August 1, 1915,
when six attacking German machines engaged fifteen French
machines over Chateau Salins. This fight, which at the time was
widely discussed, lasted three-quarters of an hour, and as the
French reenf orcements came the Germans retreated to their own
lines, though it was reported that several of the French machines
were disabled and forced to land. Regarding this contest the
opinion was expressed that the French were inadequately armed
to fight the Germans, and that the latter were not driven back
until armed scouts had joined the French. Furthermore, it was
believed that the German aeroplanes were more heavily armed
than those previously employed, and represented a new and more
powerful type of machine. If the French suffered in this battle
for lack of armament, the lesson was taken to heart, for the f 61-
460 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
lowing week a French squadron of thirty-two units, including
bombing machines convoyed by a flotilla of armed scouts (avion*
de chas8e) made an attack on the station and factories of
Saarbriicken.
There was air war over sea as well as over land. On August 3,
1915, a squadron of Russian seaplanes attacked a German gun-
boat near Windau and forced her to run ashore, while the same
squadron attacked a Zeppelin and two German seaplanes, one of
which was shot down. The Russians the following day attacked
Constantinople and dropped a number of bombs on the harbor
fortifications. That the advantage was not entirely with the
Allies at this time was shown by the report that on August 10,
1915, a Turkish seaplane attacked an ally submarine near
Boulair. The Russian seaplanes were again successful on August
10, 1915, when they participated in the repulse of the Germans
off the Gulf of Riga, where they attempted to land troops. The
Russians had merely small sea craft such as torpedo boats and
submarines in this engagement, but their seaplanes proved very
effective, and the Germans retired with a cruiser and two torpedo
boats damaged.
After the attack by German Zeppelins on the east coast of
England in June, 1915, there was a lull in the activity of the
German airships. Count Zeppelin had stated early in the spring
that in August fifteen airships of a new type capable of carry-
ing at least two tons of explosives would be available, and accord-
ingly, when a squadron of five Zeppelins were sighted off Vlie-
land, near the entrance of the Zuyder Zee, pointed for England,
it was realized that attempted aerial invasion was being resumed
in earnest. These airships bombed war vessels in the Thames,
the London docks, torpedo boats near Harwich, and military
establishments on the Humber, with the result, slight in its mili-
tary importance, of some twenty-eight casualties and a number
of fires due to incendiary bombs. This attack encountered re-
sistance and counterattacks from the British aerial services, not
without effect, but lacking in positive achievement. One Zep-
pelin was damaged by the gunfire of the land defenses, and upon
her return an Ally aeroplane squadron from Dunkirk attacked
ZEPPELIN RAIDS 461
the disabled airship and finally blew her up after she had fallen
into the sea off Ostend.
It was realized, particularly by the British, that the best way
to meet the Zeppelins was by aeroplane attack, yet on the raid
just described, the great airships entirely escaped the Briti^
aviators. This Zeppelin raid was followed by a second on the
night of August 12-13, 1915, which was directed against the
military establishment at Harwich. Six people were killed and
seventeen wounded by the bombs, and the post office was set on
fire by an incendiary bomb. Aside from this, damage was limited
On August 17 and 18, 1915, a squadron of four Zeppelins again
attacked the English east coast, and their bombs killed ten per-
sons and wounded thirty-six. Once again the airships were able
to escape the British air patrols and made their escape appar-
ently without damage, though one, the L-JfO, while flying over
Vlieland, Holland, was fired upon by Dutch troops.
An important effect of the Zeppelin raids was to bring the war
directly to the experience of the British public, and the effect on
recruiting as well as in arousing an increased national spirit for
defense was marked. On the other hand, in Germany the Zep-
pelin raids produced great elation, and the German populace
anticipated that the aerial invasion of Great Britain would con-
tribute materially toward the conclusion of the war.
In the early summer of 1915 there had been rather less activity
on the war front in eastern France and Flanders, especially on
the part of the Germans, and as later developments proved, they
apparently were engaged in experiments with new types of
machines and engines. There was also in this time a manifesta-
tion of increased skill on the part of the German air pilots, so
that when the new machines were brought out they were handled
with skill and ease, especially when climbing to the upper air and
dodging the shells from antiaircraft guns of the Allies.
In the meantime, and especially during August, 1915, the
French began to develop bombing attacks against German arms
and ammunition factories, railway junctions, and other military
establishments, on a scale never before attempted in aerial war-
fare. Toward the middle of the month as many as eighty-four
462 TliE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
French aeroplanes were assembled for a flight over the Germaa
lines, and so carefully were these aviators trained that in less
than four minutes the eighty-four aeroplanes were in the sky,
arranged in perfect tactical formation. On this particular occa-
sion a reconnaissance was made in force, and the various evolu-
tions and the distributions of the machines were carefully tried.
With such practice, on August 25, 1915, a French aerial squadron,
including sixty-two aviators, flew over the heights of Dilligen in
Rhenish Prussia, thirty miles southeast of Treves, and dropped
more than 150 bombs, thirty of which were of large caliber. This
raid, while successful in many respects, was not without damage,
for the French lost four aeroplanes. One fell to earth on fire
near Bolzhen with the pilot and observer killed. A second was
captured by the Germans, together with its occupants, near
Romilly, a third was forced to land near Arracourt, north of
Luneville, and was destroyed by German artillery, and the fourth
landed within range of the German guns near Moevruns, south
of Nomeny, behind the French front. On this very day a second
French squadron bombed the German camps of Pannes and
Baussant, starting fires, and discharged bombs over other Ger-
man stations and bivouacs. In Argonne stations were bom-
barded as well as the aviation park of Vitry-en-Artois. Allied
fleets of French, British, and Belgian aeroplanes, both of the
land and sea services, comprising some sixty machines in all,
bombarded the wood of Houthulst and set a number of fires.
It must not be inferred that at this time there was any lack of
individual effort or achievement. Often bombs were dropped at
important stations on lines of communication, and on August
26, 1915, a poisoned gas plant at Dornach was bombed by a
French aeroplane and ten shells dropped.
On the other side, during the month of August, 1915, and
particularly toward the end, raiding expeditions were organized
by the Germans, and on August 28, 1915, an attack on Paris was
organized, in which six German aeroplanes were to take part
This furnished a striking test of the French aerial defenses, for
none of the German aeroplanes was able to get near Paris, and
in the attempt one was shot to pieces by a French gun plane
11
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i\
1?
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i
s
?
I
ZEPPELIN RAIDS 463
which overtook the German and riddled the machine with bullets,
causing it to fall in flames with the pilot incinerated. The Ger-
man aeroplanes were first discovered by the French scouts aa
they flew over the French battle front at so great a speed and
height that attack from the ground from the parks near the
battle lines was impossible. The alarm was given by telephone,
however, while north of Paris the French patrol flotilla was
found in readiness. The Germans were forced to retreat, and in
addition to the aeroplane shot down, as already mentioned, an-
other was fired upon after it had dropped five bombs on Mont-
morency.
On September 3, 1915, a raid nearly 150 miles from the French
base was made by two French aviators on Donaueschingen
and Marbach in Bavaria. On the same day in retaliation
for the German bombardment at Luneville and Compidgne the
French air service sent out a squadron of nineteen aeroplanes
over the town of Treves, which dropped about 100 shells. The
same squadron, after returning to its base, proceeded in the after-
noon to drop fifty-eight shells on the station at Dommary and on
Baroncour.
During September, 1915, the Germans resumed oversea raids,
and naval airships attacked the city of London, with results con-
sidered generally satisfactory, as German bombs were dropped
on the western part of the city, the factories at Norwich, and the
harbor and iron works near Middlesbrough. In this raid, made
by three Zeppelins on the night of September 8-9, 1915, the
British reported as a result 20 killed, 14 seriously wounded, 74
slightly wounded. The Zeppelins flew over Trafalgar Square,
one of the innermost places of London, and were clearly visible
from the streets. They were attacked by antiaircraft guns, and
by aeroplanes, but the latter were unable to locate the airships,
whose bombs, both incendiary and explosive, fell on buildings
and in the streets. Later in the month of September other
Zeppelin raids occurred over various parts of the eastern coun-
tries of England.
On September 22, 1915, French aviators made a spectacular
raid and shelled the royal palace and station at Stuttgart in the
DD— War St 4
464 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
kingdom of Wiirttemburg. This was partly in retaliation for
the bombarding by the Germans of open towns and civilian
populations, and in the course of the attack about 100 shells were
dropped on the royal palace and the station, killing, according to
German reports, four persons, and wounding a number of sol-
diers and civilians, but without doing important material dam-
age. Antiaircraft opened fire on the French raiders and they
Were forced to retire. In this attack the French machines were
painted with the German distinguishing marks, with the result
that after their attack a German airman arriving at Stuttgart
was fired on by the German troops until he was recognized as
one of their own officers, fortunately landing unhurt near the
town.
During the first three weeks in September, 1915, the Royal
Flying Corps, with the British army in the field, was very active,
and there were forty air duels in eighteen days. During the first
three weeks four monoplanes were known to have been de-
stroyed, and at least seven others sent heavily to earth, and all
survivors were, of course, forced to retire to their own lines.
One notable contest by a British pilot took place one morning
when he beat off the first four German machines that had come
to attack him, one after the other, but by the time of the onslaught
of the fifth, he had exhausted all of his machine-gun and re-
volver ammunition. The British airman proceeded to go through
the motions of aiming and firing his revolver, and the German
pilot not realizing that the weapon was useless, after firing a
number of shots at him, retired, so that the British officer was
able to finish his reconnoitering and return to his own lines.
On September 7, 1915, a furious battle in the plain sight of
thousands of soldiers occurred in midair, and resulted in the
destruction of a German aeroplane, which had been particularly
active in ranging the German guns, and had circled and signaled
above the British positions, apparently with considerable effect.
A British aeroplane straightway went out and attacked the Ger-
man at a height of 9,000 feet above the latter's lines, and the
duel was in clear sight of the armies. Every form of maneuver
known to the expert pilot was indulged in, and in the meantime,
ZEPPELIN RAIDS 465
both foes were shooting at each other as rapidly as possible.
Finally the German aeroplane was seen to fall erratically at an
angle, nose downward, that indicated its probable destruction.
On September 13, 1915, two German aeroplanes were brought
down by the British within their lines, one of which fought a
most thrilling battle before it succumbed. It was a large biplane
of considerable speed, armed with two machine guns, one fore
and one aft. Flying over the British lines, it was sighted by the
English, and a similar type aeroplane attacked. A shot hit the
German machine in the gasoline tank, putting the motor out of
commission, and, notwithstanding their rapid fall, the aviators
maintained their firing until the end. The machine crashed to
the earth, and both pilot and observer were killed, but the aero-
plane itself was not badly damaged. On the same day, Septem-
ber 13, 1915, a German aeroplane visited the coast of Kent and
dropped bombs, which resulted in damage to a house and injured
four persons before it was chased off by two British naval
aeroplanes.
Regarding the British aviation service, Field Marshal Sir John
French, in a dispatch to the secretary of state for war, said with
special reference to the fighting on September 25, 1915, at Artois,
"that the wing of the Royal Flying Corps attached to the Third
Army performed valuable work, and not only in times of actual
battle, but throughout the summer. They continuously cooper-
ated with the artillery, photographing the positions of the enemy,
bombing their communications, and reconnoitering far over
hostile country." In the period under review by the field mar-
shal, he stated that there had been more than 240 combats in the
air, and in nearly every case the British pilots had to seek out the
Germans behind the German lines, where their aeroplanes were
aided by the fire of the movable antiaircraft guns, and that they
were successful in bringing down four German machines behind
the British trenches, and at least twelve in the German lines, as
well as putting out of action many others more or less damaged.
While considerable has been made of the Zeppelins, the French
airships were also active during the war. One of the latter craft
of this type, the Alsace, having a capacity of 23,000 cubic meters
466 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
(30,000 cubic yards) , on the night of September 30 and Octobei
1, 1915, bombarded the junction of Amagne-Lucquy, and the
stations of Attigny and Vouziers on the trunk-line railroad going
through Luxemburg and the Ardennes, which was the main
supply line for the whole German line from Verdun to the neigh-
borhood of Novon, This airship made its journey and returned
safely. However, three days later, in a cruise in the Reathel
district, it was forced to land, and the crew were captured by the
Germans.
On October 3, 1915, a group of French aeroplanes started out
to attack Luxemburg, where the kaiser on his return from Russia
had established his headquarters. The station was bombarded
at the railroad bridge and also military buildings. The "group"
that was used for this work consisted of three flotillas and a
flotilla leader, that is, a total of nineteen aeroplanes.
CHAPTER LVII
ATTACKS ON LONDON — BOMBARDMENT OF
ITALIAN FOBTS — ABBOPLANB AS COM-
MERCE DESTROYER
ON the evening of October 13, 1915, one of the most noted of
the Zeppelin raids over Great Britain occurred, with London
as the objective. The airships flew very high to avoid searchlights
and gunfire, thus interfering with the accuracy of the bomb drop-
ping, and in only one case was damage done to property con-
nected with the conduct of the war. The darkening of the city
and the various protective measures required high flying, so that
the dropping of bombs was more or less at random. The raid
occurred in the early evening, and while hundreds of thousands
of persons heard the bursting bombs and the guns, there was no
panic, and the majority of the citizens took shelter as they had
been warned officially. An investigation of the damage the next
morning showed five distinct areas where bombs containing high
ATTACKS ON LONDON 467
explosives had been dropped, and the principal damage was where
the explosion of the bombs falling into subways containing gas
and water pipes had ignited the former. In one case a number
of bombs were dropped on a suburban area where there were no
aerial defenses or searchlights, but in few cases were houses
actually struck or seriously damaged. Most of the damage was
done to people in the streets, and the effect on buildings, while
serious, possessed no military importance, and fires produced by
incendiary bombs were readily extinguished. The London police
officials repeated the warning to the citizens to remain within
doors during any subsequent air raids and advising them to
keep at hand supplies of water and sand as a safeguard against
incendiary bombs.
In the raid of German Zeppelins over the British Isles on the
night of October 13-14, 1915, and the attack on London, forty-
five were killed and 114 wounded. It was reported during No-
vember that Great Britain proposed to construct fifty dirigibles
within two years to meet the Zeppelin menace, and to construct
each year a sufficient number to secure complete mastery of the
air for England. The attack produced a degree of indignation
and irritation that was more than proportional to the damage
done, and the Government was criticized for the inadequacy of
the protective measures.
After these air raids on Great Britain there was a lull in such
activities, but it was realized by the English that with the open-
ing of spring these attacks probably would be carried on with
greater vigor and determination, as there would be an increased
number both of Zeppelins and SchCitte-Lanz airships. The at-
mospheric conditions pervading the British Isles formed as im-
portant a defense against airship attacks for almost half the
year as actual military measures. Several times fogs and high
winds prevented attempts of this kind, and it was realized by the
German air pilots that unless weather conditions were favorable
flights should not be attempted. Therefore, during the late
autumn and winter of 1915-1916, they concerned themselves with
problems of construction and equipment, and the training of air
pilots rather than actual attempts.
468 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
In the meantime the Germans suffered by the destruction of
several Zeppelins. One was destroyed with its crew by colliding
with a dummy on October 18, 1915, near Maubeuge, and the
Z-28 was lost near Hamburg, and a third, whose number was
unknown, at Bitterfeld, Saxony. On December 5, 1915, the Rus-
sians brought down another Zeppelin near Ealkun on the Libau-
Romin railway, locating it with a powerful searchlight and de-
stroying it by artillery fire. The airship previously had escaped
several attacks after being caught by the searchlights, but when
H appeared for a second time over Ealkun, with its motors silent,
it was hit by gunfire. Another accident at Tondern resulted in
the destruction of the Zeppelin Z-22 during the first week in
December, 1915, this being the same station at which the Z-19
was destroyed in the previous month. The Z-22 had been in
service only a few weeks, and was of the latest type, with invisible
gondolas, platforms at the top of the envelope, and detachable
rafts for use in case of accident while crossing the sea. Its de-
struction was due to the accidental explosion of a bomb while the
airship was leaving the shed, and nearly all the forty members of
the crew were killed or wounded. Still another Zeppelin was re-
ported to have been destroyed by a storm in Belgium about
December 12, 1915.
On November 15, 1915, two Austrian aeroplanes bombarded
Brescia, killing seven persons and wounding ten, all of whom
were civilians, and some of them women. None of the bombs hit
any of the arms factories of the city, which is about fifteen miler
west of the southern part of the Lago di Garda, while Verona,
which was attacked by Austrian aeroplanes on the previous Sun-
day, is about the same distance east The attack on Verona
resulted in the death of thirty persons and injury to about twice
that number, and was made possible in a degree by the fog which
allowed the aircraft to approach close to the city before they
were discovered. They flew as low as 4,500 feet, it is stated, each
dropping five or six bombs. On November 18, 1915, the Aus~
trians' seaplane squadron dropped bombs on the forts at San
Nicote and Alberoni, and also on the arsenal, the aviation station,
gas works, railway station, and several parks at Venice. The
ATTACKS ON LONDON 469
Italians attacked in turn, and there was a heavy fire of anti-
aircraft guns, but the Austrian squadron retired in safety. On
November 19, 1915, Austrian aviators threw fifteen bombs on
Udine, Italy, killing twelve persons and wounding twenty-seven.
The activity of the Italian aero service developed in the course
of the war, and there were many combats between them and
Austrian aviators. On December 30, 1915, it was reported that
during the naval engagement off Durazzo an Austrian seaplane
was shot down by an Italian destroyer, while a fortnight later,
January 12, 1916, when four Austrian aeroplanes were attack-
ing Rimini with bombs with little success, one of them was
brought down by fire from the main artillery and shells from the
warships. On January 13, 1916, Italian aeroplanes dropped bombs
on a barracks in the Breguzzo zone in the valley of the Giudicaria,
with success. On January 15, 1916, an Italian air squadron made
an extensive raid in the region of the East Isonzo and bombarded
the enemy aviation camp at Assevizza, the cantonments at Ciha-
povano and Boruberg, and the railway stations at Longatica,
Pregasina, and Lubiana. This squadron was under continuous
fire by antiaircraft batteries, but returned in safely.
Reports from Montenegro during January, 1916, reported the
activity of Austrian aeroplanes in bombing operations. On
January 7, 1916, an Austrian aeroplane fell near Dulcigno, and
the aviators were taken prisoners.
On November 28, 1915, the French were successful in three
battles in the air and two raids. A French aeroplane in Belgium
pursued a German squadron and brought down one of the Ger-
man machines in the sea off Westende-Bains, between Nieuport
and Ostend. On the same day ten French aeroplanes set fire to
the German hangars in Habsheim in southern Alsace, and also
damaged an aeroplane that was on the ground. Two German
machines that attempted a pursuit of the French were repulsed,
one being damaged by machine gunfire, and the other being
capsized. On the same day, near Nancy, French aeroplanes shot
down a German machine and put another to flight.
The Allies continued vigorously their attacks on various muni-
tion plants and aero stations of the Germans. How much damage
470 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
can be dime by aeroplane attacks was indicated in an item in the
annual financial statement of the Krupps, which was published
during the year 1915 in a German paper. This item reads:
"Claims and damages due to the war, ten million marks ($2,375,-
000)," and deals with the effect of the raid over Essen by the
airmen of the Allies.
The German aerodrome at Gits, containing fourteen machines,
was attacked, and at La Chapelette the ammunition factory with
nineteen machines was also the object of an attempt by the
Allies. Some sixteen British aeroplanes bombarded a stores
depot at Miramont in the Somme district, and the aerodrome at
Hervilly. All of the machines returned safely, and considerable
damage was believed to have been done at the above points.
The aeroplane as a commerce destroyer had a test on October
30, 1915, when three German machines attacked the steamship
Avocet of the Cork Steamship Company. One of these, a large
battle plane, discharged some thirty-six bombs, but none hit.
With the supply of projectiles exhausted, the battle plane, handled
with great skill, opened gunfire on the vessel, while the small
planes crossed and recrossed, dropping their bombs, but without
effect. The aviators and their observers also opened rifle fire on
the steamer, but in the space of thirty-five, minutes they were
unable to do any serious damage, and none of the crew was
injured. It was noted that the failure to fly low so as to get
sufficient accuracy for dropping the bombs was responsible for
the miscarriage of this attack.
The use of seaplanes to attack merchantmen and smaller
warcraft became a feature of the Austrian and German cam-
paign, and in November and December, 1915, several attacks
were reported on steamers of the Allies. Two German aeroplanes
dropped bombs on a British patrol ship off North Hinder Light-
ship in the North Sea on November 6, 1915, and set her on fire.
The French steamer Harmonie was attacked in the Mediter-
ranean by an Austrian aeroplane, but none of the six bombs
which were dropped struck the vessel. Three German seaplanes
attacked a British cargo boat aground off the coast of Belgium,
but before they could succeed in destroying her with bombs, the
ATTACKS ON LONDON 471
attempt was reported by the Allies1 aero scouts, and a squadron
of aeroplanes went to the rescue. The Germans were forced to
retire, while French torpedo boats floated the British freighters.
One of the notable events of the year was the first seaplane
battle between the British and German seaplanes near Dunkirk
on November 28, 1915. The British were successful, as they
were also in an attack on a large German seaplane by one of
their aeroplanes patrolling off the Belgian coast. The German
machine was hit and fell on the sea, bursting into flames and
exploding on striking the water. No trace of pilot, passengers,
or machine could be found. The British aeroplane, under com-
mand of Lieutenant Graham, was also damaged by gunfire and
fell into the sea, but the officers were picked up and safely landed.
The Allies, and particularly the British, employed aeroplanes
chiefly for patrolling their coasts, naval harbors and subsidiary
fleet bases, as well as the principal shipping lanes, in order to
keep them clear of the insidious action of hostile submarines.
Of this silent and steady coast patrol work, which is deprived of
any spectacular side, little has come to light, except where a
reconnaissance also involved an attack upon forces of the
enemy.
It was during such patrol flights, along the Belgian coast, that
two German submarines were put out of action by aviators of
the Allies. The first of these engagements occurred on August
26, 1915, when Squadron Commander A. W. Bigsworth of the
Royal Naval Air Service destroyed a German submarine off
Ostend by dropping several bombs on the but partly submerged
vessel. The second German submarine was destroyed off Middel-
kerke, Belgium, on November 28, 1915, by a British seaplane,
piloted by Flight Sublieutenant Viney, and carrying a French
officer, Lieutenant Count de Sincay, as an observer. German
submarines* having been reported in the vicinity, the aviators
were ordered to patrol the coast with the object of watching for
the enemy. The aviators rose to an altitude of 3,000 meters, and
had been up for half an hour when they sighted, four miles from
the shore, two submarines side by side on the surface. The place
was favorable for attack, the sea being shallow there, and the
472 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
aviators hoped that the enemy boats would be unable to escape
by diving. The seaplane quickly dived to about 200 meters
above the sea and attacked the submarines, one of which suc-
ceeded in escaping, the other boat, however, was hit by two
bombs, which broke open its hull and caused it to sink in a few
minutes.
Owing to the great range of vision afforded by a seaplane,
both horizontally and vertically, owing also to its considerable
speed and ease of maneuvering, marine aeroplanes have proven
formidable foes for submarines, which they can easily overtake
and destroy with bombs. Especially is this true when a sub-
marine is steaming partly submerged, with only its periscope
visible above the sea, for, whereas, the submarine's outline is
easily detected from great heights, the periscope has but a limited
range of vision horizontally, and none vertically.
Another instance of how aeroplanes can be used for attacking
war vessels was furnished by the feat of a British aviator who
attacked a Turkish army transport on August 12, 1915, in the
Marmora Sea and sank the vessel with a heavy projectile, which,
it is claimed, weighed over 200 pounds.
Although not yet sufficiently developed to fulfill the functions
for which they are ultimately intended, i. e., strategical recon-
naissance and offensive action against vessels of war and coast
fortifications — seaplanes have played a very useful role in tac-
tical operations, and particularly in convoying troop ships, as
well as in "spotting" for naval guns. Whenever the compara-
tively limited range of seaplanes precluded their employment for
long-range reconnaissances or bombardment, airships were called
upon to carry out these duties.
In the matter of airships, Germany was markedly favored by
the possession of the Zeppelin type, whose speed and endurance
is still unequaled by the smaller, nonrigid dirigibles which con-
stitute the chief bulk of the British, French, Italian, and Russian
fleets of "lighter-than-air" machines.
Obviously, the employment of airships is fraught with even
more danger, on account of the large hull exposed to enemy fire,
than that of aeroplanes. A great number of Zeppelins have been
AIR FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS— LOSSES 473
destroyed either by antiaircraft guns or by storms, although the
gallant feat of the late Flight Lieutenant Warneford, who blew
up single-handed a Zeppelin near Ghent, has not yet been re-
peated by aviators of the Allies.
An Austrian aviator, however, succeeded on August 5, 1915,
in putting out of action the Italian dirigible Citta-di-Jesi, which
was returning from a bombing raid on Pola. Soaring above the
airship the aviator dropped several bombs on the envelope, which
was damaged, the hydrogen being ignited thereby. The airship
did not explode, but was forced to alight on the sea, her crew
being captured by the Austrians.
CHAPTER LVIII
AIR FIGHTING ON ALL PRO N T 8 — LO S SES
BY December, 1915, and January, 1916, the official reports of
the war in the air contained a continued account of activity.
Almost every day reconnoitering machines were sent out over one
city or another, and attempts were made to interfere with their
work or to bring on battle, and on December 19, 1915, the British
War Office reported forty-four combats in the air, with two
enemy aeroplanes brought to the ground within their own lines,
and two brought down in damaged condition. On this day one of
the British machines was missing.
Again, the report on December 29, 1915, from the British War
Office mentioned an unsuccessful attack by the Germans on one
of the British aerodromes by four machines, only two of which
reached their objective, and no damage was done to them,
although one of the British aeroplanes was shot down. On
December 29, 1915, sixteen British aeroplanes attacked the
Comines station with bombs, and hit the station railway and
sheds in the vicinity. Ten of the British aeroplanes attacked the
aerodromes and did considerable damage, in both cases all ma-
chines returning safely.
474 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
On this day, December 29, 1915, there were twelve encounters
with hostile aeroplanes, and a British aeroplane engaged four
belonging to the Germans, one of which was believed to have
been brought down, while another was damaged, and all four
were driven off. The British aeroplane fell as the result of a
struggle with two machines* On January 5, 1916, a number of
British aeroplanes made a bombing raid against enemy aero-
planes at Douai, while the Germans retaliated by an aeroplane
raid over Boulogne, dropping a few bombs without damage.
The next day the British made another raid with eleven ma-
chines on gun and supply stations at Lesars. On January 10,
1916, enemy aircraft dropped bombs near Starzelle, Hazebrouck
and St. Omer, and one woman and one child were killed.
That the activities of the British were not always crowned
with success is stated in the report for January IS, 1916, where
record is made of the fact that four of the British aeroplanes
sent out on the previous day had not returned. On January 17,
1916, sixteen British aeroplanes attacked the German supply
depot at Lesars, northeast of Albert, and did considerable dam-
age. On this day there were nineteen encounters in the air, and
five of the German machines were driven down, and two British
aeroplanes were lost
, The activity of the French did not diminish as the war pro-
gressed, and the the activity of the bomb-operating squadron
continued. On December 20, 1915, four French aeroplanes de-
signed for bomb-dropping, escorted by seven machines with
rapid-fire guns dropped on the fort and station at Mtilhausen
six shells of 155-millimeter caliber, and twenty shells of ninety-
six caliber. In the terse language of the official report, "they
reached their objective/' The damage must be imagined as it
was not specified.
During December, 1915, and January, 1916, the French avi-
ators were active with the eastern army, although many diffi-
culties were encountered, especially the intense cold in the Balkan
Mountains when reconnoitering around the Bulgarian lines and
elsewhere. French aviators during December, 1915, shelled
Uskub, Istip, Strumitza, and other encampments with great
AIR FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS— LOSSES 475
effect, and they made a remarkable series of photographs and
maps, in addition to reporting to headquarters by wireless. The
aviation corps in this section of Europe furnished daily weather
reports to the headquarters staff regarding the speed of the wind
and the height of the clouds from 1,000 meters altitude, and thi*
work shows the extent of the organization and plan of campaign.
On December 29, 1915, the French aeroplanes bombarded parks
and encampments of the Bulgarians at Petrik, east of Lake
Doiran, and that the activity in this region was not all one-eided
was evident by the fact that on January 27, 1916, hostile aero-
planes bombarded the cantonments of the Allies in the environs
ef Saloniki, doing little damage, but losing one of their aero-
planes, which was brought to earth by gunfire. On January 14,
1916, the Allies were again attacked, and bombs were dropped on
Janes (Tanesh) , northwest of Eukus (EiDdch) , and on DoganizL
In the operations around Constantinople both sides employed
aeroplanes for various purposes. On the GaDipoli front on De-
cember 20, 1915, it was reported that the Allies had a seaplane
shot down and its occupants made prisoners, while on December
28, 1915, an ally aeroplane was shot down at Birheba. On
December 26, 1915, an ally aeroplane was brought to earth near
Birelsabe, and the French pilot, Captain Baron de Ceron, and a
British lieutenant were killed. On December 27, 1915, the Turk-
ish forces sent out a seaplane, which made a reconnoitering flight
over Tenedos, the island of Mavro, and the many positions near
Sedd-ul-Bahr, striking a torpedo boat south of this point with a
bomb. On December 28, 1915, three ally aeroplanes flew over
Ari-Burnu, and one of these was hit by artillery fire and fell into
the sea, while a British seaplane successfully dropped some bombs
on a tent camp. On December 28, 1915, Turkish artillery brought
down a biplane flying over Yent Shehr and Eum Kaleh, and on
the previous day a reconnoitering and bombing expedition was
undertaken by a Turkish seaplane, which dropped bombs on the
harbor tool house at Mudros.
On January 1, 1916, a Turkish seaplane attacked and repulsed
a hostile ally aeroplane while reconnoitering, and on the follow-
ing day a Turkish seaplane dropped bombs on the enemy's camp
476 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
at Sedd-ul-Bahr. Lieutenant Ryck Boddike figured prominently
in a number of successful flights, in one of which he attacked a
French aeroplane on January 6, 1916, killing the aviator and
bringing down the machine on the Anatolian coast, near
Akbanca. Qn the following day he shot down, east of Yalova, a
British Farman aeroplane. On January 7, 1916, also there was
bomb dropping by the Turkish aviators over the enemy's positions
at Sedd-ul-Bahr, and their aviation station on the island of
Imbros. January 10, 1916, Lieutenant Ryck Boddike brought
down his fourth enemy aeroplane, which fell into the open sea,
and two days later he shot down his fifth, a British machine of the
Farman type, killing one of the aviators and wounding the other.
This aeroplane fell in such condition that it could be repaired by
the Turks. On January 14, 1916, a Turkish aeroplane attacked
a monitor which, with other .vessels, opened fire in the direction
of Kilid Bahr. The monitor was forced to withdraw in flames.
Late in the year 1915 the Germans, after a period of inactivity,
made a raid in force on the French fortress at Belf ort At least
three aeroplanes dropped bombs over the city, and were attacked
in turn by the machine and antiaircraft guns of the garrison,
and French aviators proceeded to the attack, beating off the Ger-
mans, who returned again later in the day discharging another
shower of shells over the fortress.
On December 29, 1915, the Germans reported that they had
shot down an English biplane in an aerial flight near Bruges,
and the occupants of the machine were killed. The English ma-
chine had been flying over the district of Lichtervelde, south of
Bruges, and had dropped several bombs, one of which had hit a
munitions depot with disastrous effect. A German aeroplane
intercepted the British machine on its return, and in the course*
of the battle both machines were disabled and crashed to earth.
The same day the Germans reported the loss of two aeroplanes
by the British, one of which was forced to descend at a point to
the north of Lens, and the other, a large battle aeroplane, was shot
down in a fight north of Han, on December 27, 1915, and three
British aeroplanes were destroyed by fire west of Lille. The
Berlin report on December 29, 1915, stated that on the whole
AIR FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS— LOSSES 477
front artillery and aeroplanes were active. The enemy's aircraft
attacked the towns and railroad stations of Wervick and Menin,
Belgium, without, however, doing military damage. A British
aeroplane was shot down in a fight northeast of Cambrai, and on
January 6, 1916, the Allies made an aircraft attack upon Douai,
which failed, and two British aeroplanes were shot down by
German aviators. One of these was brought down by Lieutenant
Boelke, and was the seventh aeroplane that he had disabled
January 10, 1916, a German air squadron attacked the ware-
houses of Fumes. On this same day an interesting air battle
occurred, involving a series of fights, with casualties on both
sides, between the French and German aeroplanes above the line?
of the latter near Dixmude. Three French avions cannon ( Voisin
steel biplanes armed with 37-millimeter quick-firing guns at the
bow) fought with German scouting aeroplanes of the Fokker
type. The attack was brought on by the Fokker assailing a
French machine which was forced to descend, but one of its com-
panions straightway attacked the German and brought him down
by machine gunfire at a distance of twenty-five meters. A third
French machine was also successful in attacking another Fokker,
which fell in the forest of Houthulst, southeast of Dixmude.
On January 11, 1916, a French battle aeroplane was attacked by
German rifle fire and forced to land near Noumen, south of Dix-
mude in Belgium, and the aeroplane and its occupants, unin-
jured, became German prisoners. On this day a British biplane
was shot down in an encounter near Tournai, Belgium. Lieu-
tenant Boelke on January 13, 1916, shot down a British aero-
plane, as did also Lieutenant Immelmann — one northeast of
Tourcoing and the other near Bapaume. Both were decorated
with the Order of Pour-le-M6rite by the emperor. A third British
aeroplane was shot down in an aerial fight near Roubaix, and a
fourth was brought down by German defense guns near Ligne,
northwest of Lille. Of the eight British officers on these four
aeroplanes six were killed and two wounded.
On January 15, 1916, Lieutenant Boelke again shot down an
enemy aeroplane, which fell within the British lines and was set
on fire by German artillery. On January 18, 1916, there were
478 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
aerial battles near Paschendaele and Dadezelle in Flanders, and
three of the four occupants of one machine were killed. A French
aeroplane was shot down by German airmen near Moyenvic, and
the pilot and observer were captured.
In the course of the war the German aeroplane fleet developed
at the close of the year 1915, and at the beginning of 1916, a
renewed activity and initiative of attack. In the period from
December 20, 1915, to January 19, 1916, an analysis of the official
reports indicated that the British airmen had had seventy-five
individual combats with the Germans, in the course of which nine
British and eight German machines were lost. The Germans, on
the other hand, reported in this time that they had destroyed
fourteen British and three French aeroplanes, while the French
claimed the destruction of three German machines, one of which
was shot down in the Balkans; while the Turks, defending the
Dardanelles, claimed to have shot down seven ally aeroplanes.
Italian airmen overcame two Austrian machines, and Austria
and Montenegro each overcame one enemy aeroplane. An
analysis of these figures indicates that for this month the advan-
tage was distinctly with the Germans, as they had destroyed
twenty-five machines as against fourteen aeroplanes brought
down by the enemy.
The statements concerning the losses of airships and aero-
planes published by the various armies and newspapers in most
cases were disputed for their accuracy. The Paris 'Temps" on
February 5, 1916, criticising a German statement, stated as the
correct figures for the aeroplane losses of the various combatants
on the western front between October 1, 1915, and January 31,
1916, the following: 'Thirteen English and seventeen French
aeroplanes lost on the side of thq Allies— eleven German aero-
planes destroyed on the English front and twenty on the French
front. Of the French machines lost, four were overcome in aerial
combats, one destroyed by artillery fire, three were forced to
descend by motor troubles, and eight disappeared on land-scout-
ing missions/'
During the month of February, 1916, patrol service was
actively maintained on both sides of the frontier; a large number
AIR FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS— LOSSES 479
of attempts at bombing were made, and many individual combats
took place, with the losses, so far as the French and Germans
were concerned, about evenly divided, the French reporting the
destruction of nine German aeroplanes, while the Germans
claimed to have destroyed eight French and four British ma-
chines. For this period the official reports of the British claimed
that four German machines were forced to the ground, but it was
not apparent whether they had been actually destroyed or merely
forced to retire. In the French reports, in addition to the nine
German aeroplanes destroyed as noted, it was stated that two
additional were "forced down/'
In January and February, 1916, the German air service again
began its activity against the British Isles, and not only Zep-
pelins but also seaplanes and aeroplanes crossed the Channel and
dropped explosives and incendiary bombs on English towns and
villages, mostly on the east coast. The Germans claimed that in
one instance a Zeppelin had gone as far as Midlands in an at-
tempt at some of the great manufacturing centers of England,
and this seemed to indicate that the campaign would be carried
on with greater relentlessness than ever and more attempt at
material damage. More and more aeroplanes of the German
service were beginning to cooperate with the Zeppelins, and it
was clear that future attacks would be in forces with aeroplanes
to protect the Zeppelins from attack by quick-flying hostile aero-
planes. It was evident from the activity of the Germans that in
all departments of its aerial services increases were being made,
and increased activity was to be manifested. At the same time
the Allies were showing corresponding activity in their attempts
to destroy the air cruisers of the enemy.
The German military Zeppelin L-Z-77 was brought down by a
French incendiary shell from a 75-millimeter antiaircraft gun of
the motor-gun section of R6nigny in the neighborhood of Brabant-
le-roi, on February 21, 1916. This airship was hit by an explosive
shell which ignited the gas bag and caused an explosion of the
bombs, so that it was completely wrecked and fell in flames. The
L-19, belonging to the German navy, previously had been de-
stroyed by a storm in the North Sea on January 31, 1916.
EE— War St 4
PART XII— THE UNITED STATES AND
THE BELLIGERENTS
CHAPTER LIX
SINKING OF THE A R A B I C — A N 0 T H ER CRISIS —
GERMANY'S DEFENSE AND
CONCESSIONS
THE Lusitania issue, after the dispatch to Germany of the
third American note of July 21, 1915, was withdrawn from
the publicity in which the exchange of diplomatic communica-
tions had been made. Note writing having fulfilled its mission
in stating the case, an interlude followed devoted to private con-
versations between the American Ambassador at Berlin and the
German Foreign Office and between the German Ambassador at
Washington and the State Department. Apparently a way out
of the impasse was seen in conferences in the privacy of the
chancelleries rather than by negotiations conducted in the light
of day on the theory that absorbed public observation and criti-
cism of every stage in the exchanges was not helpful to a settle-
ment. But time did not show that this resort to secrecy smoothed
the path of Germany meeting the American demands.
In fact, the ruthless course of the submarine warfare, which
the sinking of the Lusitania only momentarily checked, relegated
that specific issue to the background, or at least made it only
one of a series of indictments by the United States of the entire
submarine policy pursued by the Teutonic Powers.
Thirty days after the American Government had warned Ger-
many that any further contravention of American neutral rights
at sea would be regarded as an act "deliberately unfriendly," the
480
SINKING OF THE ARABIC 481
White Star Atlantic liner, the Arabic, with twenty-nine Ameri-
cans among her company, was sunk without warning off the
south of Ireland by a German submarine. Germany had not re-
sponded to the reiterated demands made in the third American
note on the Lusitania and the question was impetuously asked
in the press : Was the sinking of the Arabic Germany's answer?
This view of Germany's second blow at transatlantic liners, made
at a time when the Lusitania crisis had only seemingly abated
because withdrawn from the public gaze, found its best expres-
sion from a pro-German quarter. The "New Yorker Staats-
Zeitung" deplored the absence of a reply from the German Gov-
ernment to the third Lusitania note as "most unfortunate/'
because the subsequent destruction of the Arabic could therefore
be held to be a "direct challenge," particularly as reports showed
that the liner had been torpedoed without warning and the rescu-
ing of the passengers had been left to "blind chance."
The Arabic was bound from Liverpool to New York, so that
the motive for sinking her could not be that advanced by Ger-
many for destroying the Lusitania — that the vessel was carrying
war munitions to her enemies. The fact that she was headed for
the United States inspired some incensed commentators to make
the direct charge that the German submarine commander de-
liberately aimed at the lives of Americans on board. As else-
where described, the Arabic was sunk on August 19, 1915, with-
out being first warned by the attacking submarine. Abundant
testimony from survivors satisfied the Administration as to this
circumstance, in addition to disproving the belief originating
from German sources that the liner was being convoyed by a
warship, whose presence would deprive her of any right to pro-
tection from attack. The Administration was also assured that
the liner, contrary to Germany's allegation, did not attempt to
ram the submarine or escape from it. Two Americans were
among the passengers lost; but this was not the sole issue.
The days immediately following were charged with dangerous
undercurrents. The President was silent. Had he not said all
there was to be said in the Lusitania notes? But there was no
doubt that the press correctly divined what was passing through
482 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
his mind, and the press said that, short of a satisfactory explana-
tion from Germany, made in a proper spirit, accompanied by a
disavowal of the deed, a break in diplomatic relations was inevi-
table. But the onus was on Germany to speak before the
Administration took action, which could not take the form of an-
other protest. The situation had grown beyond the stage of pro-
tests. They had already been made. If Germany could not show
extenuating circumstances that palliated the sinking of the
Arabic, the President must act on his Lusitania warning, or re-
main silent — must go forward or recede.
This ominous condition of American sentiment was not lost on
Germany. It was true the Berlin press affected an apathetic
tone in referring to the Arabic, saw nothing calling for perturba-
tion, and, in casting doubt on the accounts of the liner's destruc-
tion, hinted that a mine was responsible. But the German Gov-
ernment, wisely informed by Count von Bernstorff on the state
of American feeling, knew better than to belittle the situation.
Pending the receipt of any report from the submarine com-
mander who sank the Arabic, it charged Ambassador von
Bernstorff to ask the American Government to defer judgment
"The German Government," Count von Bernstorff pleaded,
"trusts that the American Government will not take a definite
stand after hearing the reports of only one side, which in the
opinion of the Imperial Government cannot correspond with the
facts, but that a chance be given Germany to be heard equally.
Although the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith
of the witnesses whose statements are reported by the news-
papers in Europe, it should be borne in mind that these state-
ments are naturally made under excitement, which might easily
produce wrong impressions. If Americans should actually have
lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our inten-
tions. The German Government would deeply regret the fact
and beg to tender sincerest sympathies to the American Govern-
ment."
This statement, made five days after the Arabic's destruction,
was viewed as the first ray of hope in the crisis. A disavowal of
unfriendly intent was seen in the regrets expressed for the loss
SINKING OF THE ARABIC 483
of American lives. There was a disposition to credit Germany
with cherishing a desire to avert a rupture with the United
States and to go to considerable lengths in that endeavor. This
impression eased the Washington atmosphere, which had been
weighed by the President's determination not to depart from the
stand he took in the third Lnsitania note, and also by Germany's
apparent indifference to its warning, as shown by her pursuit of
submarine warfare seemingly regardless of consequences.
What the "facts" were in the sinking of the Arabic to which,
according to the German statement, the reports to hand could
not correspond, exercised official Washington. As the German
Government had not so far heard from the submarine comman-
der of its own acknowledgment, it could not itself be aware of
this version of how the Arabic sank. Why Germany was so con-
fident that the reports the Administration accepted were inac-
curate was explained on the surmise that she had revised her
orders to submarine commanders governing the conduct of their
operations. For some time before the sinking of the Arabic the
German submarine commanders had been conforming closely to
the rules of search and seizure demanded by the United States.
The sudden divergence from this procedure in the sinking of the
Arabic, according to the accepted reports, implied that the sub-
marine commander had contravened instructions, or could plead
justification. Germany was indisposed to believe that the sub-
marine commander had disobeyed orders. But if he had done so,
the German Government would give "full satisfaction" to the
United States. This assurance came from the Imperial German
Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the day after Ambassa-
dor von Bernstorff had revealed Germany's conciliatory spirit.
The United States consented to withhold judgment until Ger-
many had presented her side of the case. Meantime Count von
Bernstorff urged upon his Government the imperative necessity
of making more substantial concessions to the United States on
the submarine issue. Another catastrophe such as the sinking of
the Lusitania or Arabic, he warned Berlin, would aggravate the
situation beyond his control. That Germany recognized the
danger was shown by a further declaration from her Imperial
484 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
Chancellor on August 26, 1915, wherein he endeavored to placate
American feeling by declaring that the sinking of the Arabic, if
caused by a German submarine, was not a "deliberately un-
friendly act," but, if the accepted version of the disaster proved
to be true, was "the arbitrary deed of the submarine commander,
not only not sanctioned but decidedly condemned by the German
Government," and that the latter, being "most anxious to main-
tain amicable relations with the United States, would express its
deep regret and make full reparation." This conditional promise
was made in the continued absence of any report from the im-
plicated submarine commander, whose silence became mysteri-
ous. The British added to the perplexity by making the unquali-
fied statement that the submarine which sank the Arabic had
herself been sunk by a British patrol boat.
While the United States waited significantly for Germany to
make the amende honorable, an internal conflict was proceeding
in Berlin over the submarine policy. The Arabic crisis had been
transferred to Germany by the stand the Chancellor, Dr. von
Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow,
made for modifying the ruthless conditions under which the Ger-
man admiralty had pursued the submarine warfare. Grand
Admiral von Tirpitz and the extremists opposed any relaxation
permitting passenger ships to be warned before being torpedoed
or safeguarding the lives of passengers. The chancellor desired
to place Germany on record as an observer of international law,
and the kaiser faced the task of determining which side should
prevail.
Admiral von Tirpitz was generally regarded as the originator
of the policy of sinking merchant shipping without heeding the
recognized laws of visit and search. "What would America say
if Germany declares war on all enemy merchant ships?" he had
asked before Germany initiated the submarine methods which
caused the destruction of the Lusitama and the Arabic and nu-
merous other craft His view of the Lusitama issue, as freely
expressed in an interview, was that the maintenance of friendly
relations with the United States was of far less importance than
the continuance of the submarine blockade of British ports, and
SINKING OP THE ARABIC 485
that the entrance of the United States into the war anions Ger-
many's enemies was preferable to acceding to the American
demands.
Since the Lusitania disaster the imperial chancellor had been
the target of sustained attacks from the Von Tirpitz group, who
charged that he was not radical enough and inclined to abandon
the extreme aims of German policy. The agitation attained such
serious proportions that the National Liberal party issued a
statement denying knowledge of any lack of confidence in the
Government. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's difficult position in
trying to save Germany from international outlawry, however,
was not sensibly weakened. Events temporarily showed that the
kaiser concurred more in his view than that of the hotspurs.
There was a momentary cessation of submarine activity. The
chancellor's policy, the keynote of which was: "Keep at peace
with the United States/9 gained the upper hand, and Admiral
von Tirpitz grudgingly bowed to the chancellor's contentions, on
the condition that his acquiescence must be deemed unofficial;
but he held out against any formal disavowal by Germany of the
sinking of the Arabic. This attitude was comprehensible, for a
disavowal meant a repudiation of his submarine policy. Thus
the surrender of the extremists did not go very far; it merely
helped to relax the friction between the kaiser's councilors.
The outcome of this agreement was a note (September 1,
1915) from Count von Bernstorff to Secretary Lansing announc-
ing that his instructions concerning Germany's answer to the
last American note on the Lusitania contained this passage :
"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning
and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided the
liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."
The German Ambassador added that this policy had been de-
cided on before the Arabic was sunk. Secretary Lansing, com-
menting upon this abatement of Germany's sea war methods,
said : "It appears to be a recognition of the fundamental prin-
ciples for which we have contended." A settlement of ^he Lusi-
tania case, however, was deferred until that of the Arabic had
been satisfactorily disposed of.
486 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
The atmosphere was clearer. But Germany was still silent re-
garding the report of the submarine commander, on whose ver-
sion of the Arabic's destruction hinged the question whether
Germany would disavow his act. The report that the submarine
had been sunk revived in London, but the British admiralty
maintained an impenetrable silence regarding its truth or false-
hood. The circumstantial story was that the submarine later
sighted a cattle boat, and was engaged in shelling it when a Brit
ish patrol boat appeared and, opening fire, sank the submarine
with its crew except two or three survivors. Hence London con*
eluded that in the disappearance of the submarine lay Germany's
reason for her readiness to climb down to the United States on
the Arabic controversy.
On September 7, 1915, nineteen days after the Arabic was
sunk, Germany appeared to disprove this story of furnishing a
report to the American Government giving the submarine com-
mander's account of the sinking. This delay was in contrast to
the promptitude with which the German Government had offi-
cially announced the sinking of the Lusitania. The British openly
charged that Germany could not have heard from the submarine
commander, for the sufficient reason, they iterated, that he was
drowned with his craft, and that the German Government, wait-
ing in vain for him to report, had resorted to "manufacturing"
a report to conform with its preconceived theories of the Ara-
bic's destruction. This, however, remained an unsolved press
controversy in face of the British admiralty's silence. The
American Government gave no indication that it took cognizance
of the charge, or that the British admiralty had privately en<
lightened it as to whether it had any real basis. Hence Ger-
many's report officially stood unquestioned.
The defense of Germany was that before sighting the Arabic
the submarine commander had stopped the British steamer
Dunsley and was about to sink her by gunfire, after the crew
had left the vessel, when the Arabic appeared, headed directly
toward the submarine. Prom the Arabics movements the com-
mander became convinced that the liner intended to attack and
ram his submarine; whereupon, to forestall such an attack, he
SINKING OF THE ARABIC 487
ordered the submarine to dive, and fired a torpedo at the Arabic.
After doing so he had convinced himself that the people on board
were being rescued in fifteen boats.
"According to his instructions," the German report continued,
"the commander was not allowed to attack the Arabic without
warning and without saving the passengers' lives unless the ship
attempted to escape or offered resistance. He was forced, how-
ever, to conclude from the attendant circumstances that the
Arabic planned a violent attack on the submarine.
"The German Government most deeply regrets that lives were
lost through the action of the commander. It particularly ex-
presses this regret to the Government of the United States on
account of the death of American citizens.
"The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge
any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the
commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive in-
tentions of the Arabic.
"If it should prove to be the case that it is impossible for the
German and American Governments to reach a harmonious opin-
ion on this point, the German Government would be prepared to
submit the difference of opinion, as being a question of inter-
national law, to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, pursuant to
Article 38 of The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes.
"In so doing it assumes that, as a matter of course, the arbi-
tral decision shall not be admitted to have the importance of a
general decision on the permissibility or the converse under in-
ternational law of German submarine warfare."
Here Germany affirmed that submarine commanders were for-
bidden to attack liners without warning and safeguarding pas-
sengers9 lives, but that commanders could justifiably disregard
this precaution if they deemed that a vessel's movements, de-
signedly or otherwise, jeopardized the safety of the attacking
submarine. On this reasoning a submarine commander could
excuse a wanton act on the plea of self-defense, which Germany
appeared eager to accept, whether the need of self-defense was
actual or fancied.
488 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
The Washington Government declined to consent to clothing
a submarine commander with the discretionary power of de-
termining whether a vessel should be sunk on sight because of
movements he considered suspicious. The German Government
would absolve him from blame and repudiate any obligation to
grant indemnity, even if the commander was mistaken in at-
tributing aggressive intentions in a vessel's movements. Ger-
many's precept, as laid down by Count von Bernstorff in his note
of September 1, 1915, and Germany's practice, as illustrated by
the foregoing defense for the sinking of the Arabic, were thus
widely divergent
The situation receded to the Lusitania stage. Ambassador von
Bernstorff's assurances as to warning and safety to passengers
were negatived by the new condition that submarine command-
ers could disregard instructions, whether right or wrong, in
doing so. The Administration accepted as convincing the abun-
dant evidence before it that the Arabic made no attempt to ram
the submarine. According to this testimony, no one on board
the Arabic even saw the submarine; only the torpedo was seen
coming from the direction of the sinking Dunsley, behind which,
it was supposed, the submarine had been screened when the
Arabic came in view, whereupon it submerged. Moreover, the
Arabic was struck astern from a direction which showed that the
submarine was at right angles to her. If the Arabic had been
heading toward the submarine with the intention of ramming it,
the torpedo should have struck her at the bow. But the Arabic
testimony was that the submarine was invisible.
Germany's explanation was so unsatisfactory, so discredited
by the overwhelming evidence of the Arabic survivors, as well
as being qualified by an indirect recognition of the possibility
that the submarine commander might have erred, that the ques-
tion of severing diplomatic relations again became imminent. A
resort to arbitration, as proposed by Germany, with the nullify
ing condition that any decision of a Hague tribunal was not to
affect Germany's conduct of submarine warfare, was not deemed
worthy of serious consideration. The question now was
whether, after the pledge given by Count von Bernstorff, the Ger-
SINKING OF THE ARABIC 489
man Government intended to allow submarine commanders a
broad discretion in deciding the circumstances under which pas-
senger chips may be torpedoed. The ambassador was informed
of the Administration's conviction that the torpedoing of the
Arabic could not have been a mistake, justified or unjustified.
Germany's unreadiness to disavow responsibility for the act of
the submarine commander as "arbitrary" and "unsanctioned,"
to quote the German Chancellor, showed that she accepted her
submarine commander's purported report, not the Arabic testi-
mony. In this impasse the Administration was credited with
being almost ready to break off relations with Germany, but de-
ferred doing so until the German Government had studied the
evidence on which the American Government had decided that
the submarine commander was solely to blame.
In the negotiations which followed, the Arabic issue went the
way of the unsettled Lusitania case by its withdrawal from being
threshed out in public. The exchange of notes was abandoned
for pourparlers, which were resorted to as seeming to afford a
more supple means of arriving at a settlement. Germany was
afforded an opportunity of privately establishing her good faith
— which was in serious question — by reconciling her acts on the
seas with her pledge not to attack passenger vessels without
warning. No official disclosure was made to enlighten a forget-
ful public as to the extent to which she had done so in the nego-
tiations which occupied the American and German Governments
throughout September, 1915. But a communication from Count
von Bemstorff to Secretary Lansing, which passed October 2,
1915, was permitted to be revealed acknowledging that the sub-
marine commander was mistaken in believing that the Arabic
intended to ram his vessel, and disavowing the act. The Von
Bernstorff note contained this passage : "The order issued by His
Majesty the Emperor to the commanders of the German sub-
marines, of which I notified you on a similar occasion, has been
so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the
Arabic case is considered out of the question."
The United States had thus brought Germany to an admission
that the sinking of th* liner was unjustified. This important
490 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
point gained, the issue was removed from the acute stage at
which it had dangerously lingered, and only left undetermined
the question of indemnity to be paid by Germany to the Arabic
victims.
It cleared the diplomatic decks sufficiently to enable the de-
ferred negotiations on the Lusitania dispute to be resumed ; but
these had made little headway when both the Lusitania and
Arabic issues were overshadowed by the sinking of the Ancona.
CHAPTER LX
ISSUE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY OVER THE
ANCONA — SURRENDER TO AMERICAN
DEMANDS
THE attention of the United States was abruptly diverted
from Germany to Austria-Hungary. The Ancona, an Italian
liner en route for New York, was steaming westward in the
Mediterranean, between the coasts of Sicily and Tunis, on No-
vember 9, 1915, when a submarine flying the Austro-Hungarian
flag fired a shot at the steamship. As described by the American
protest sent to Austria-Hungary on December 6, 1915, based
upon the testimony of American and other survivors, the Ancona
thereupon "attempted to escape, but being overhauled by the
submarine she stopped ; that after a brief period, and before the
crew and passengers were all able to take to the boats, the sub-
marine fired a number of shells at the vessel and finally tor-
pedoed and sank her while there were yet many persons on
board, and that by gunfire and floundering of the vessel a large
number of persons lost their lives or were seriously injured,
among whom were citizens of the United States."
A heated protest from the Italian Ambassador to the State
Department thus depicted the same scene : "Without any warn-
ing whatever, without even a blank shot, without observing any
of the formalities accompanying the right of search, the sub-
ISSUE WITH AUSTRIA OVER THE ANCONA 491
marine encountered by the Aneona opened fire upon the un-
armed passenger liner, relentlessly shelling not only the wire-
less apparatus, side, and decks of the ship while she was at a
stop, but even the lifeboats in which the terrified passengers
were seeking refuge. Many of the passengers were killed out-
right or wounded. Some who approached the submarine in the
hope of rescue were driven off with jeers. As a result of this
inhumane procedure more than two hundred men, women and
children lost their lives/'
An impenitent explanation came from the Austro-Hungarian
admiralty, who in upholding the submarine commander, saw "no
reason to find fault with his course of action/9 and while recog-
nizing that a commander in the heat of battle could act contrary
to instructions, "nothing of the kind has occurred in this case."
"It appears from his report," said the admiralty defense, "that
nis ship was in danger; indeed, in double danger; first, that an
enemy boat was approaching on a line that threatened to cut off
his retreat, and the enemy ship and the Aneona could have estab-
lished his radius of action and could have set a torpedo boat flotilla
on him; and second, there was danger of the Aneona escap-
ing, which, according to his instructions, was to be prevented
in all circunistances. Hence the conduct of the commander, much
as the loss of innocent lives must be regretted and deplored, can-
not be disapproved. On the contrary, if he had departed with-
out destroying the Aneona, it would have been failure to do his
duty since the Aneona could have notified other ships of his
whereabouts. The loss of American lives is regrettable, as well
as that Americans used a vessel belonging to a nation at war
with Austria-Hungary."
This statement amplified a previous defense by the Austrian
admiralty, in which the latter admitted that the Aneona was
torpedoed after her engines had been stopped and when passen-
gers were still on board. The American protest cited the ad-
miralty's admission as substantially confirming the principal
testimony of the survivors. It, moreover, alluded to the cor-
respondence which had passed between Germany and the United
States on the use and misuse of submarines in attacking vessels
492 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
of commerce, and to Germany's acquiescence in the American
stand thereon. Yet despite the "full knowledge" possessed by
the Austro-Hungarian Government of the views of the United
States, "as expressed in no uncertain terms to the ally of Aus-
tria-Hungary/' the commander of the submarine which attacked
the Ancona, the United States protested, failed to put in a place
of safety the crew and passengers before destroying the vessel.
The United States accused the submarine commander of vio-
lating the principles of international law and humanity, and char-
acterized his conduct as "wanton slaughter of defenseless non-
combatants/' as the vessel was not resisting or attempting to
escape, and no other reason was sufficient to excuse such an
attack, not even the possibility of rescue.
A tone of severity and bluntness, not hitherto used in Ameri-
can communications with the belligerents, marked this note of
protest to Austria-Hungary. Demands were made for a denunci-
ation of the submarine commander's act as "illegal and in-
defensible," for his punishment, and for reparation by the pay-
ment of indemnity for the loss of American lives. The United
States left an avenue open through which Austria-Hungary
could find an acceptable excuse. It preferred to believe that the
submarine commander acted contrary to instructions rather
than accept the alternative assumption that the Austro-Hun-
garian Government "failed to issue instructions to the com-
manders of the submarines in accordance with the laws of
nations and the principles of humanity."
The answer of Austria-Hungary (December 13, 1915) was
deftly befogging by clouding in diplomatic rhodomontade the
familiar issues raised by the United States. Its deliberate eva-
siveness was so direct as to be almost an affront. Stripped of
its confusing terminology, the Austrian note declared that the
United States had not adequately stated its cause of complaint,
and had wrongly assumed that the Austrian Government was
fully acquainted with all communications passed between the
German and American Governments on the submarine issue. This
plea of ignorance was made in face of the precautionary trans-
mission by the State Department to the Austrian embassy of
ISSUE WITH AUSTRIA OVER THE ANUONA 493
copies of all the American notes sent to Germany. The Austrian
note also questioned whether the testimony made by the Aneona
survivors, whom the American protest had not specifically named,
was to be deemed more trustworthy than the report of the sub-
marine commander. As to Austria-Hungary's knowledge of the
American issues with Germany, that Government was not of the
Opinion that "this knowledge could be sufficient for the present
*se, which, according to its own information, is materially dif-
ferent from the case or cause to which the American Govern-
ment apparently is referring." The note thus proceeded :
"Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government must leave it
to the Washington Cabinet to draw up the individual legal
maxims which the commander of the submarine is alleged to
have violated when sinking the Aneona.
"The American Government also thought it advisable to point
out the attitude which the Berlin Cabinet in the before-men-
tioned exchange of correspondence had taken. In the highly
esteemed note the Austro-Hungarian Government finds no sup-
port for this course. If the American Government should have
intended thereby to express an opinion as if a precedent exists
for the present case, the Austro-Hungarian Government, in
order to prevent misunderstandings, must declare that it, of
course, must preserve full liberty to urge its own legal interpre-
tations during the discussion of the Aneona case."
This was a virtual refusal by Austria-Hungary to be bound
by or concerned with the submarine agreement between her ally
and the United States. As viewed through German-American
eyes (the "New Yorker Herold"), the Austrian answer repre-
sented "a very sharp censure of a dilettante diplomacy which de*
sires to negotiate and expects plain replies before the most
essential preliminaries are given. The tenor of the Vienna note
is in substance this: *We are willing to negotiate, but first you
must furnish us with the necessary material — undebatable ma-
terial at that.9 It is quite comprehensible that Washington is
peeved at this censure."
Austria's demand for a "bill of particulars" was aptly ex*
pressed in this hostile view of the American note. The United
494 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
States declined to accede to the request, which was viewed as a
resort to the evasive methods practiced by Germany, but rested
its case on the Austrian admiralty's self -condemning admission
that the Ancona was sunk while people were still on board her.
Nor would the American Government assent to the Austrian
proposal that the two governments "exchange views" as to the
legality of the act as described by the Austrian admiralty. Presi-
dent Wilson and his advisers saw no loophole for argument as
to the justification or otherwise of a submarine sinking an un-
armed merchantman with passengers on board her when the ves-
sel was at a standstill.
Hence the second American note sent on December 19, 1915,
was confined to a simple issue. The Government brushed aside
the questions Austria raised as immaterial to the main fact
based on the incriminating report of her own admiralty. The
Austrian Government was informed that the admission that the
Ancona was torpedoed after her engines had been stopped and
while passengers remained on her was alone sufficient to fix the
blame on the submarine commander. His culpability was estab-
lished.
"The rules of international law," the American note con-
tinued, "and the principles of humanity which were thus will-
fully violated by the commander of the submarine have been so
long and so universally recognized and are so manifest from the
standpoint of right and justice that the Government of the
United States does not feel called upon to debate them and does
not understand that the Imperial and Royal Government ques-
tions or disputes them.
"The Government of the United States therefore finds no other
course open to it but to hold the Imperial and Royal Government
responsible for the act of its naval commander and to renew the
definite but respectful demands made in its communication of
the 6th of December, 1915."
Austria yielded. A lengthy response from Vienna, disclosed
on December 31, 1915, was couched in a spirit which removed all
danger of a cleavage of relations between the two countries on
the Ancona issue. The United States drew from the Dual
a
i!
if
U
a
1
ISSUE WITH AUSTRIA OVER THE ANCONA 495
Monarchy an affirmation that "the sacred commandments of
humanity" must be observed in war, and a concurrence in the
principle that "private ships, in so far as they do not flee or offer
resistance, may not be destroyed without the persons aboard
being brought into safety." Austria-Hungary was thus ranged
in line with Germany in the recognition of, and pledging com-
pliance with, principles for which the United States stood.
The Vienna Government, however, adhered to its own version
of the sinking of the Aneona, and from it sought to show that
the statements made in the first American note were based on
incorrect premises, i. e. :
"Information reaching the United States Government that
solid shot was immediately fired toward the steamer is incorrect ;
it is incorrect that the submarine overhauled the steamer during
the chase; it is incorrect that only a brief period was given for
getting the people into the boats. On the contrary an unusually
long period was granted to the Aneona for getting passengers
in the boats. Finally it is incorrect that a number of shells were
still fired at the steamer after it had stopped.
'The facts of the case demonstrate further that the comman-
der of the submarine granted the steamer a full forty-five min-
utes9 time— that is more than an adequate period to give the per-
sons aboard an opportunity to take to the boats. Then, since the
people were not all saved, he carried out the torpedoing in such
a manner that the ship would remain above water the longest
possible time, doing this with the purpose of making possible the
abandonment of the vessel on boats still in hand.
"Since the ship remained a further forty-five minutes above
water he would have accomplished his purpose if the crew of
the Aneona had not abandoned the passengers in a manner con-
trary to duty.
"With full consideration, however, of this conduct of the com-
mander, aimed at accomplishing the rescue of the crew and pas-
sengers, the Imperial and Royal Marine authorities reached the
conclusion that he had omitted to take adequately into considera-
tion the panic that had broken out among the passengers, which
rendered difficult the taking to the boats, and the spirit of the
FF— War St. 4
496 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
regulation that Imperial and Royal Marine officers shall not fail
in giving help to anybody in need, not even to an enemy.
"Therefore the officer was punished, in accordance with the
existing rules, for exceeding his instructions/'
On the question of reparation by indemnity for the loss of
American lives, Austria-Hungary would not admit liability for
damages resulting from the "undoubtedly justified bombarding
' of the fleeing ship," but was willing to come to an agreement on
the subject.
It will be seen that the note did not denounce the attack on the
Ancona as "illegal and indefensible"; but Austria's acquiescence
in the American demand for the punishment of the submarine
commander was viewed as a virtual admission of the illegality
and indefensibility of the method of attack. Coupled with her
expressed disposition to pay damages and her acceptance of the
humane principle of warning and safety to passengers, Austria
regarded her concessions as closing the Ancona issue, in so far
as it affected the friendly relations between the two Governments.
As the complaint of the American Government had been princi-
pally against the method of attack, and had been met by Austria,
' the crisis passed.
CHAPTER LXI
THE LUSITANIA DE ADL 0 C K — AGREE If E NT
BLOCKED BY ARMED MERCHANTMEN
ISSUE — CRISIS IN CONGRESS
THE Lusitania negotiations were resumed, only to encounter
a deadlock. The issue had been eased in one important par-
ticular— Germany's undertaking, drawn from her in the Arabic
crisis, not to sink unarmed merchant vessels without warning
and regard for the safety of passengers and crews. But there
remained the no less vital questions of indemnity to relatives of
the Americans who lost their lives when the Lusitania sank and
a disavowal by Germany of the submarine commander's act.
THE LUSITANIA DEADLOCK 497
Here was ground well traversed by the State Department in its
communications with Austria over the Ancona; but Germany
was much less pliant. The United States insisted that not only
must full indemnity be paid for the American lives lost, but that
the agreement for such payment must be accompanied by a
declaration of disavowal acknowledging that the submarine com*
mander committed an illegal act in sinking the Lusitania.
The stumblingblock lay in Germany's objection to subscribing
to such a principle as was here implicated — that her war-zone
decree against Great Britain, carried out by submarine attacks
on merchant vessels, was illegal. She held that her submarine
policy was a just reprisal for Great Britain's "starvation" block-
ade of Germany. The United States held that reprisals in thp
form of sinking helpless ships without warning were illegal.
Germany would not admit that her submarine policy as practiced
when the Lusitania went down was illegal. To do so would be an
admission that her entire submarine campaign against Great
Britain violated international law, and that Americans sur-
rendered none of their rights as neutral citizens in traveling
through a war zone on merchant ships of a belligerent power.
But Germany was willing to pay an indemnity for the loss of
American lives, not as an admission of wrongdoing, but as an
act of grace.
Despite this deadlock the private conversations between
Secretary Lansing and Count von Bernstorff continued. Ger-
many submitted proposals in various forms aiming at making
concessions to meet the American demand for disavowal of an
illegal act; but in each case Secretary Lansing discerned an effort
to evade acknowledging wrongdoing.
Matters remained at this stage toward the close of January,
1916, after negotiations extending over several weeks, apparently
fruitless in opening any acceptable channel toward a settlement
That the status of the Lusitania case was unsatisfactory was
vaguely hinted, and the alternative to Germany's meeting the
American demands — a severance of diplomatic relations — which
remained the menace it was from the outset, loomed up again.
A speech by President Wilson before the Railway Business Asso-
498 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
ciation in New York City on January 27, 1915, ostensibly on pre-
paredness for war, was interpreted as having a bearing on the
deadlock in the Lusitania negotiations. At least it was sig-
nificantly coincidental both in time and subject, and did not pass
without comment in Europe, especially this passage:
"I cannot tell you what the international relations of this
country will be to-morrow. I would not dare keep silent and let
the country suppose that to-morrow was certain to be as bright
as to-day. Therq, is something the American people love better
than peace. They love the principles upon which their political
life is founded. They are ready at any time to fight for the vindi-
cation of their character and honor. I would rather surrender
territory than ideals."
Whether this utterance was a warning to Germany or not, the
Lusitania negotiations afterward became more promising.
Throughout them Germany balked at making an outright dis-
avowal ; she indicated a willingness to go part of the way to meet
the United States, but always conditional to an expression being
inserted in her apologia that the attack on the Lusitania was a
justifiable reprisal against Great Britain. A proposal by Ger-
many to submit the question of disavowal to arbitration was re-
jected, for the second time, on the ground that the "vital interests
and national honor9' of the United States were involved and were
therefore not arbitrable. The right of Americans to be on board
the Lusitania, under the protection of international law accorded
to neutrals on the high seas in war time, was too firmly established
to admit of debate. A renewed reminder to Germany that the
private conversations threatened to end in failure, which meant
further consideration of the alternative of a cleavage of relations
between the two countries, brought from Germany a reply on
February 4, 1916, which was described as "one word short" of a
satisfactory surrender. The word needed was a synonym for
"disavowal" which did not convey that Germany had committed
an illegal act. So the proposal again fell short of the demand ; it
did not contain the exact form of disavowal insisted upon by the
United States. But it came nearer to meeting the American de-
mands than any of the varied proposals Germany had previously
THE LUSITANIA DEADLOCK 499
submitted. The dispute turned on terminology that did not
affront Germany's sensibilities. The aim sought was the avoid-
ance of the words "illegal" and "disavowal" or whether to
"assume" liability, which seemed to imply a voluntary act of
grace, or "admit" liability, which implied an acknowledgment of
an illegal act, or "recognize" liability, which was President
Wilson's solution. On February 8, 1916, the outcome of these
efforts in search of the acceptable word or words was a reported
agreement on a memorandum which contained "language suffi-
ciently broad to cover substantially the demands of the United
States."
This bright prospect of a speedy settlement was suddenly
dimmed by a communication received from Germany and Aus-
tria-Hungary two days later notifying that, beginning March 1,
1916, their submarines would sink all armed merchantmen with-
out warning. Germany's revised draft apparently deciding the
Lusitania issue came to hand on February 15, 1916. The follow-
ing day the Administration intimated that the submarine con-
troversy over the Lusitania could not be closed until the United
States had fully considered the possible effect of the new policy
of the Teutonic Powers.
Germany later informed the United States that her assurances
regarding the future conduct of submarine warfare, given in the
Lusitania and Arabic cases, were still binding, but that they
applied only to merchantmen of a peaceful character; that the
new orders issued to the submarine commanders, which directed
them to sink without warning all belligerent merchantmen carry-
ing arms, either for defense or offense, were not in conflict with
these assurances; and that Germany and Austria-Hungary had
entered into an agreement regarding the new submarine orders,
which would go into effect by midnight, February 29, 1916.
Germany charged that Great Britain had instructed all her
merchantmen to arm for offensive purposes against submarine
attacks, and cited instances in which submarines were attacked
by vessels seemingly of a peaceful character. This accusation
was denied by Lord Robert Cecil, Great Britain's Minister for
War Trade, who told the House of Commons :
500 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR
"The British view has always been that defensively armed
merchantmen must not fire on submarines or on any other war-
ships, except in self-defense. The Germans have twisted a pas-
sage in a document taken from a transport which th^y sank into
meaning that merchant vessels have instructions to take the
offensive. This is not so/'
The question of armed merchantmen had been simmering dur-
ing the course of the Lusitania negotiations. It arose over the
unexplained sinking in the Mediterranean of a Peninsular and
Oriental liner, the Persia, on December 29, 1915. The American
Consul to Aden, Robert N. McNeely, was among the passengers
who lost their lives. The Persia carried a 4.7 gun. The Admin-
istration was believed to be exercised — though erroneously — over
the question whether an armed liner was entitled to be regarded
as any other than an auxiliary cruiser, and hence liable to be
sunk without warning. No new issue, however, was raised by
the United States with the Teutonic Powers, because both Ger-
many and Austria-Hungary — Turkey also— categorically denied
that the liner had been sunk by any of their submarines. The
loss of the Persia thus remained a mystery, though there were
not wanting suspicions in the American press that the Teutonic
Powers, in disclaiming that they had any hand in the vessel's
destruction, might have hit upon a new device to evade further
controversies with the United States.
The Persia9 s gun, added to the frequent reports rife of other
merchantmen being similarly armed, injected a new element in
the submarine controversy, which could not be wholly removed
from the pending Lusitania negotiations. Germany had excused
the sinking of vessels without warning on the plea that her sub-
marine commanders, if they appeared on the surface to warn
them to haul to for visit and search, or for those on board to take
to the boats, could never be assured that they would not be fired
upon and sunk. Hence she regarded armed merchantmen as
being more than a match for submarines and not entitled to any
consideration. Had evidence been forthcoming that the Persia
was sunk by a German submarine, the presence of a gun on
board her would, in Germany's view, have justified the vessel's
THE LUSITANIA DEADLOCK 501
destruction without warning, and the uncertain attitude of the
American Government, at this stage, appeared to lean toward the
acceptance of such a defense. It was even hinted that the Ad-
ministration was considering whether the situation did not call
for a proclamation warning all Americans off armed merchant-
men. Sweden had done so in the case of her nationals.
The Administration soon dissipated the impression current that
it contemplated a change of policy in the submarine issue. But,
while the uncertainty lasted, it appeared to have a credible basis
in a proposal Secretary Lansing had made to the Entente Powers,
as a modus vivendi of the submarine controversy, for the dis-
armament of merchant vessels, to assure the safety of their
passengers and crews if attacked. The success of this course de-
pended wholly upon Germany living up to her guarantees. The
proposal was not well received by the Entente Powers, who
doubted the good faith of Germany's pledges, and only saw in the
Tensing suggestion an assurance of safely to her submarines
in their raids on allied shipping.
The American attitude to the new Teutonic policy of sinking all
armed merchantmen on sight remained to be declared. The
Administration had upheld the right of Americans to travel on
the high seas in merchantmen, and saw a surrender of national
principle and an abridgment of personal liberty if the United
States yielded to the terrorism caused by submarine warfare and
warned Americans to stay at home. The United States also rec-
ognized the right of belligerent merchantmen to arm, but for
defensive purposes only. At the beginning of the war it so
notified Germany in a memorandum naming the following Ameri-
can regulations, among others, governing such vessels:
"A merchant vessel of belligerent nationality may carry an
armament and ammunition for the sole purpose of defense with-
out acquiring the character of a ship of war.
"The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a
merchant ship creates a presumption that the armament is for
offensive purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this
presumption by showing that the vessel carries armament solely
for defense."
502 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
The memorandum was sent to Germany as an answer to Ger-
many's protest against the refusal of the United States to intern
as ships of war British liners leaving or entering New York with
guns mounted. Germany dissented from the view that any bellig*
erent merchant ship could carry guns. The United States de-
clined to modify its rulings, but informed Germany that, recog-
nizing the "desirability of avoiding a ground of complaint," it had
disapproved of British vessels using American ports if armed,
and had made such representations to Great Britain that no
armed merchant vessel, since September, 1914, with the excep-
tion of two, had entered an American port
The situation disturbed Congress. A resolution came before
the Senate on February 18, 1916, opposing acquiescence by the
United States in the notifications of the Central Powers of the
right of their submarines to sink armed merchantmen. The
foreign policy of the Administration was bitterly assailed by
Senators Lodge and Sterling, especially for its attitude in rela-
tion to the pending negotiations over the new submarine order.
For the Administration, Senator Stone, chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, said the question of armed merchantmen
was at least debatable. The position at this stage was that the
Administration was taking cognizance of Germany's charge that
British merchantmen were armed for offensive purposes, had
been instructed to attack submarines, and that rewards had been
offered for their success in so doing. Germany offered to furnish
proofs to show that the American rules recognizing merchant-
men armed for defensive purposes as peaceful ships could not
now apply.
There was a division of sentiment in the Senate as to the stand
the United States should take, and a wider one in the House of
Representatives, where a panic-stricken feeling arose that the
country was slowly but surely heading toward war with Ger-
many. A vociferous demand was made by a minority of con-
gressmen for strong action warning Americans off armed mer-
chantmen of belligerents to prevent the United States raising
further critical issues with Germany. The House leaders in-
formed the President that they could not control their following,
THE LUSITANIA DEADLOCK 503
and that on a vote the House would be two to one in favor of
such legislation. They even were tempted to force the passage
of such a resolution on the patriotic ground that in doing so they
would merely be seeking to prevent American citizens from
jeopardizing the peace of the nation. The President suspected
that pro-German propaganda was behind the hysteria in Con-
gress, and objected to any legislative interference in his handling
of the submarine controversy. A resolution was actually pending
in the House forbidding Americans to travel on armed merchant-
men. The President finally stated his position in a forceful letter
to Senator Stone on February 24, 1916, refusing to assent to an?
such abridgment of the rights of American citizens. This letter
followed an emphatic rejection by him of a proposal made by the
Democratic leaders in Congress that that body should relieve him
of all responsibility of forcing an issue with Germany.
"The course which the Central European Powers have an-
nounced their intention of following in the near future with
regard to undersea warfare/9 the President wrote, "seems for
the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent
meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances
v^cently given us by those powers with regard to their treatment
of merchant vessels on the high seas that I must believe that
explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect
upon it . ♦ . But in any event our duty is plain. No nation, no
group of nations, has the right, while war is in progress, to alter
or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in
mitigation of the horrors or sufferings of war, and if the clear
rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged
or denied by any such action, we should, it seems to me, have in
honor no choice as to what our own course should be.
"For my own part I cannot consent to any abridgment of the
rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-
respect of the nation is involved. We covet peace, and shall pre-
serve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people
to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to
vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be
an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of
604 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
the rights of mankind everywhere and of whatever nation or
allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto
proud position as spokesmen even amid the turmoil of war for
the law and the right It would make everything this Govern-
ment has attempted, and everything it has achieved during this
terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile.
"It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allowed
expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevit-
ably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single
abatement of right and many other humiliations would certainly
follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might
crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contend-
ing for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that
have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them
without conceding her own impotency as a nation and making
virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations
of the world."
The leaders in Congress were so impressed by this uncompro-
mising declaration of the President that they set about allaying
the revolt against the Administration's policy, which, it was
feared, was drawing the United States into war. Efforts were
made to smother in committee the resolutions pending in both the
House and Senate forbidding Americans to travel on armed
merchant ships. But the President later saw that much harm
had already been done. An impression became current abroad
that Congress and the President were at cross purposes regarding
the attitude the United States should take toward the new sub-
marine policy of the Teutonic Powers. In the belief that the
country was with him in his stand, the President decided that
such an impression ought not to be permitted to prevail, and that
the question should be determined as to whether Congress upheld
him also. In almost irreconcilable contrast to his previous oppo-
sition to Congress voting on the resolutions forbidding Ameri-
cans to travel on armed merchantmen, the President suddenly
executed an audacious volte face on February 29, 1916, by de-
manding a test vote upon them. The congressional leaders were
confounded by the request, coming as it did after they had done
PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA 505
their utmost to suppress the resolutions in deference to the
President But the latter made his reasons for changing his
attitude cogent enough in a letter he addressed to Representative
Pou of the House Rules Committee.
"The report," he wrote, 'that there are divided counsels in
Congress in regard to the foreign policy of the Government is
being made industrious use of in foreign capitals. I believe tbat
report to be false, but so long as it is anywhere credited it cannot
fail to do the greatest harm and expose the country to the most
aeripus risks.
"I therefore feel justified in asking that your committee will
permit me to urge an early vote upon the resolutions with regard
to travel on armed merchantmen, which have recently been so
much talked about, in order that there may be afforded an oppor-
tunity for full public discussion and action upon them, and that
all doubts and conjectures may be swept away and our foreign
relations once more cleared of damaging misunderstandings."
The House resolution, which was proposed by Representative
McLemore of Texas, was thereupon revived for immediate con-
sideration. The President's demand for a vote upon it came on
the eve of the date set by the Teutonic Powers for inaugurating
their submarine war on armed merchantmen, March 1, 1916*
The ensuing events belong to the next volume of this history.
CHAPTER LXII
DEVELOPMENTS OF PRO-GERMAN PROPA-
GANDA— MUNITIONS CRUSADE DEFENDED
— NEW ASPECTS OF AMERICAN POLICY
PRO-GERMAN propaganda soon developed far beyond its
original aim. Registering protests against the Administra-
tion preserving a neutrality according to its own interpretation
of American laws proved ineffective. Balked in this, the cru-
sade took a form which was plainly an outgrowth of a country-
506 THE STORY OP THE GREAT WAR
wide circulation of literature emanating from German publicity
organizations devoted to presenting the Teutonic cause in the
most favorable light to the American people. Opinions being
free, epistolary zeal of this kind violated no laws, and words
broke no bones. In the fact that the crusade failed perceptibly
to swing national sentiment regarding the European war to a
recognition of the German view of American neutrality obviously
lay a stimulus and incitement for resorting to sterner meas-
ures, since mild measures were vain. Events already narrated
show the extent to which German zealots pursued a defiant
criminal course in making their "protests/' but there was no cer-
tainty—though suspicions and allegations were not wanting —
that their activities had official German inspiration and sanc-
tion. But as the summer of 1915 wore on, the Administration
became satisfied — through an accumulation of evidence— that this
was the case. For reasons of state, in view of the delicate stages
of the Lusitania and Arabic issues with Germany, the Govern-
ment forbore to take cognizance of the undoubted participation
of German diplomats and secret-service agents in plots hatched
and pursued on American soil against the country's neutrality,
and provoking unrest and disorder. The Government's toler-
ance of such a situation did not long endure.
The first revelation that these activities were organized on an
extended scale came through the columns of the New York
"World" in August, 1915. The country was not unprepared for
the disclosure. They had had forerunners in repeated rumors and
accusations that German Embassy officials were involved in the
passport frauds and were using American territory as a base for
an espionage system, whose coils were wound about this country
and Canada, as well as in the charge that German money had
been freely spent in a way inconsistent with international friend-
ship. The newspaper named unreservedly charged that "The
German propaganda in the United States has became a political
conspiracy against the Government and people of the United
States." To substantiate that sweeping indictment the "World"
reproduced the text of a series of letters it had obtained, ad-
dressed to Dr. Heinrich P. Albert, a German Privy Councilor,
PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA 507
who acted as the fiscal agent of the Kaiser's Government in the
United States.
The correspondence, as printed, linked Dr. von Bethmann-
Hollweg, the German Imperial Chancellor, and Count von Bern-
storff, the German Ambassador, with a vast project for spread-
ing German propaganda. The disclosures of the correspondence,
the authenticity of which was not contested, were described as
showing that the German propaganda had for its purpose ''the
involving of the United States in the complications of the Euro-
pean war/9 and that the plans "designed to accomplish this re-
sult were carefully and deliberately projected, efficiently organ-
ized, superbly executed, and adequately financed." These plans
embraced an elaborate scheme to control and influence the press
of the United States to establish newspapers and news services,
finance professional lecturers and moving-picture entertainments
and publish books "for the sole purpose of fomenting internal
discord among the American people to the advantage of the Ger-
man Empire/'
Gift of The People of {.:•, United States
ThrounhtheV:,.-- -Jc^paign
(A.L.\ — ....* ;'
U. S. 0.)
To the Arrr'i f-"-» ^.s r-^ If.; i-?nt
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